

MODERN EUROPE,

FROM THE FALL OF CONSTANTINOPLE TO THE

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE,

A.D. 1453—1871.

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HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE.

CHAPTER XXVII.

IT has been seen in the preceding chapter that the King of Spain was at this period directing his whole attention to the affairs of France; an infatuated policy which, by diverting his money and resources from the Netherlands, fortunately enabled the Seven United Provinces to become an independent Power. The Austrian Archduke Ernest, who had been appointed Governor of the Netherlands after the death of the Duke of Parma,¹ did not take possession of his office till the beginning of 1594; and in the interval the government was conducted by Count Peter Ernest of Mansfeld. Philip, however, allowed the Count but little real power. He sent some Spaniards to watch over him; and appointed a council of war, in which were several of that nation, having for its president Pedro Henriquez, Count of Fuentes, who published some cruel decrees. In 1593 Count Mansfeld sent into France a small army under the command of his son Charles, which helped the Duke of Mayenne to take Noyon and a few other places in Picardy, and then returned into the Netherlands. During this period Prince Maurice succeeded in taking the important town of Gertruidenberg. In the following year (1594) Philip ordered the Archduke Ernest to despatch Mansfeld with a considerable body of troops to assist Mayenne in relieving Laon; the ill success of which attempt has been already related.² Maurice availed himself of Mansfeld's absence to reduce Groningen, a place not only important as a fortress, but also as an indispensable member of the Dutch Republic. Groningen now obtained its place among the Seven United Provinces, of which Maurice was elected Stadholder. Maurice also crippled the power of Spain by supporting the Spanish mutineers in

See vol. ii. p. 452.

² *Ibid.*, p. 483.

Brabant, whose pay was in arrear. The Archduke Ernest, the tameness of whose character made him almost useless in important affairs, having died in February, 1595, at the age of forty-two, Philip appointed in his place Ernest's brother, the Archduke Albert; formerly Viceroy of Portugal, and also substituted him for Ernest as the future husband of the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia. Although Albert had been made Archbishop of Toledo and a Cardinal, he had not taken priest's orders, and a dispensation for his marriage might easily be procured. With Albert returned Philip William, the eldest son of William the Silent, after a captivity of twenty-eight years in Spain. By so long an exile his spirit had been completely broken; by the arts of the Jesuits he had been converted into a bigoted papist; and Philip now thought that he might be made an instrument for the recovery of the Netherlands. Yet Philip William had always cherished a respect for his father's memory, and during his imprisonment he had thrown from the window a Spanish officer who ventured to speak lightly of his father, and killed him on the spot.¹

It was in January of this year, as we have mentioned in the preceding chapter, that Henry IV. declared war against the King of Spain. Besides the expedition of Velasco in the south, Philip II. ordered the Spaniard Fuentes, who, till the arrival of Albert, conducted the government of the Netherlands, to invade the north of France; and Fuentes, having quelled the mutiny of the Spanish troops, and having left Modragon with sufficient forces to keep Prince Maurice in check, set off with 15,000 men, with the design of recovering Cambray. Le Catelet and Dourlens yielded to his arms; Ham was betrayed to him by the treachery of the governor, and in August Fuentes sat down before Cambray. It will be recollected that the Duke of Anjou had made over that place to his mother, Catharine de' Medici, who had appointed Balagny to be governor of it. During the civil wars of France, Balagny had established himself there as a little independent sovereign, and called himself Prince of Cambray; but after the discomfiture of the League he had been compelled to declare himself, and had acknowledged his allegiance to the King of France. His extortion and tyranny having rendered him detested by the inhabitants, they sent a message to Henry IV. requesting him to dismiss Balagny, and receive them under his immediate authority. Unfortunately,

¹ Motley, *United Netherlands*, vol. iii. ch. xxxii.

however, Balagny and his wife had gained over Gabrielle d'Estrées; at her instance Henry declined the request of the citizens, who, to avenge themselves, delivered Cambray to the Spaniards, October 2nd. After the surrender of the citadel, Balagny's wife, a sister of Bussy d'Amboise, starved herself to death for vexation. Fuentes now returned into the Netherlands, where the campaign had not been marked by any memorable event.

The Cardinal Archduke Albert arrived at Brussels in February, 1596, when Fuentes resigned his command, and returned to Spain. Albert also directed his principal attention to the war against France, and sent a peaceful message to Prince Maurice and the United Provinces, which, however, met with no attention. Henry IV. had been engaged since the winter in the siege of La Fère, a little town at the junction of the Serre and Oise. He had received reinforcements from England as well as from Germany and Holland. He had endeavoured to excuse his apostasy to Queen Elizabeth, as an act of political necessity; and although she viewed it with alarm and indignation, her hatred and fear of Spain induced her still to assist the French King, though her succours were no longer bestowed so liberally and so cordially as before. Albert marched to Valenciennes with 20,000 men, with the avowed intention of relieving La Fère; but instead of attempting that enterprise, he despatched De Rosne, a French renegade who had entered the service of Spain, with the greater part of the forces, to surprise Calais; and that important place was taken by assault, April 17th, before Henry could arrive for its defence. La Fère surrendered May 22nd; and Henry then marched with his army towards the coast of Picardy, where he endeavoured, but in vain, to provoke the Spaniards to give him battle. After fortifying Calais and Ardres, Albert withdrew again into the Netherlands.

In the negotiations between Elizabeth and Henry in the preceding year, the English Queen had demanded to be put in possession of Calais or Boulogne, as a security for the charges of the war; a demand which Henry had scornfully rejected. During the investment of Calais by the Spaniards, Elizabeth had renewed her proposal, in case she should be the means of saving it, when Henry again indignantly refused, observing that he would rather receive a box of the ear from the King of Spain than a fillip from her.¹ Nevertheless, Elizabeth, alarmed at the occupation by the Spaniards of a port which afforded such

¹ Du Vair, in *Life of Lord Chancellor Egerton*, p. 407.

facilities for the invasion of England, soon afterwards concluded another offensive and defensive alliance with Henry IV. (May 24th), in which the contracting parties pledged themselves to make no separate peace or truce with Philip II.; and they invited all those States and Princes, who had reason to dread the machinations of that ambitious monarch, to join the alliance.¹ The treaty was acceded to by the Dutch; but the German Protestant Princes, offended by Henry's apostasy, and alarmed by the war then raging between the Austrians and the Turks, refused to enter into it. The treaty, however, had little effect. Elizabeth could not be induced to lend the French King more than 2,000 men, and that on condition of his maintaining them; nor would she allow the armament under Essex, which Henry had in vain solicited for the relief of Calais, to co-operate with him in the Netherlands, but despatched it to the coasts of Spain.

The hostile preparations in the Spanish ports had for some time back excited great alarm in England. Another attempt at invasion was apprehended, and a large armament was fitted out under Lord Howard of Effingham as admiral, and the Earl of Essex as commander of the land forces. The expedition was also accompanied by Sir Walter Raleigh, and other persons of naval and military renown. The fleet, which after the junction of twenty-two Dutch ships, consisted of 150 sail, with about 14,000 men on board,² cast anchor in the Bay of Cadiz, June 20th. On the following day, after an obstinate contest of some hours' duration, two of the four great Spanish galleons were captured, and two burnt. The rest of the Spanish fleet were driven into the harbour, and rather than pay the ransom demanded the Duke of Medina Sidonia caused them to be burnt—a third of the Spanish navy. Essex, then landing with 3,000 soldiers, succeeded in penetrating into the town; and in the market-place he was joined by the admiral and another party, who had entered at a different quarter. The inhabitants now surrendered, purchasing their lives with 120,000 crowns, and abandoning the city with its goods and merchandise to the conquerors. The bold, but perhaps not impracticable, plans of Essex, to penetrate into the heart of Andalusia, or, at all events, to hold possession of the Isle of Cadiz with 3,000 or 4,000 men, having been rejected by a majority of the commanders, the fleet set sail for England; and after making two descents of no great importance on the Spanish

¹The treaty is in Dumont, t. v. pt. i. p. 525.

²6,360 soldiers, about 1,000 gentlemen volunteers, and 6,672 sailors.

coast, arrived at Plymouth after an absence of about ten weeks. The loss suffered by the Spaniards was estimated at 20,000,000 ducats.

• Thus, while Philip II. was affecting the conqueror, a severe blow was struck in his own dominions. The secret of his weakness was revealed; and if the head of the colossus was of gold, its feet were shown to be of clay. The English, on the other hand, acquired, even from the Spaniards themselves, the praise not only of bravery, but also of humanity and moderation, for the manner in which they had used their victory. The coolness of Essex's reception by the Queen and the intrigues which followed are well known to the reader of English history. Infuriated by the insults received at Cadiz, Philip II. prepared at Lisbon a new armada for the invasion of England, or rather Ireland, and was amusing himself with the dream of establishing his daughter, the Infanta, on the English throne, as the lineal descendant of John of Gaunt. Essex, with Lord Thomas Howard and Raleigh, had been intrusted with a counter-expedition against Spain; but the fleets of both nations were defeated by the elements. The Adalantado of Castile, on sailing from Ferrol, was caught in a terrible storm, which dispersed and damaged his fleet. On again collecting his ships, instead of attempting to land in England, he made the best of his way back to the Spanish coast, but lost by another storm sixteen sail in the Bay of Biscay.¹ The enterprise was then abandoned. On the other hand Essex had also been driven back to the port by stress of weather, and his ships were so much damaged that most of the gentlemen volunteers refused again to put to sea. Essex himself, however, with a small squadron, sailed to the Azores, and captured Fayal, Graciosa, and Flores, but missed falling in with the Spanish fleet from the Indies, which was the chief object of the expedition. On their return with a few prizes, the English were enveloped, near the Scilly Isles, in the same storm which dispersed the Spanish fleet, but continued to get safely into their own harbours. But to return to the affairs of the Netherlands.

During Albert's absence in France in 1596 nothing of importance was undertaken by Prince Maurice, who had no great force at his disposal; and the Archduke on his return laid siege to Hulst, which at last surrendered to the Spaniards (August 18th). This disaster, however, was compensated early in 1597

¹ According to Philip himself, 40 ships with 5,000 men. *Letter of Philip to Albert, ap. Motley, United Netherlands, vol. iii. ch. xxii. sub. fm.*

by a splendid victory gained by Prince Maurice at Turnhout, where he defeated and destroyed a large body of Spanish troops. His success on this occasion is ascribed to his having furnished his cavalry with carabines; an invention which afterwards came into general use, and gave rise to that description of troops called "dragoons." Archduke Albert, however, soon afterwards consoled himself for this blow by taking Amiens. Its capture was effected by an ingenious stratagem of the Spanish general Puertocarrero. Setting out from Dourlens with 3,000 men, Puertocarrero halted them before dawn at an hermitage about a quarter of a mile from Amiens. He then sent forward three officers and a dozen of his most resolute soldiers, disguised like peasants in smock-frocks, under which were hidden swords and pistols. Arrived at the gate of the town, one of the pretended peasants let fall, as if by accident, a bag which he carried on his shoulders, filled with nuts and apples. This incident excited the merriment of the guard, who began scrambling for the fruit. While they were thus employed another peasant approached driving a waggon loaded with large beams of timber. As soon as the waggon was directly under the gateway the horses were disengaged; an officer then discharged his pistol, at which concerted signal the men fell upon and killed most of the guard. In vain the sentinel on the top of the gate attempted to lower the portcullis; its descent was arrested by the load of timber, and meanwhile Puertocarrero, rushing forward with his men, entered the town and captured it with but little resistance.

Henry IV., after holding an Assembly of Notables at Rouen, was amusing himself at Paris when he received the news of this terrible blow. For some moments he seemed thunderstruck, but after a little reflection exclaimed, "I have played the King of France long enough: it is now time to be the King of Navarre!" and turning to Gabrielle, who was weeping by his side, added, "A truce to our loves, my mistress; I must mount my horse and go again to the wars." It was indeed time. The loss of Amiens, following so rapidly on that of Dourlens, Cambrai, and Calais, had begun to shake all confidence in Henry's good fortune. A great deal of discontent existed in France, occasioned by the taxes which the King had found it necessary to impose; the Hugonots also were in motion; whilst the Duke of Savoy and the Duke of Mercœur allied themselves with Spain, as we have mentioned in the preceding chapter. In the extremity

of his distress Henry applied to Elizabeth to make a diversion by laying siege to Calais, offering now to pledge that town to her if she took it;¹ but this time it was Elizabeth who refused. Henry, however, met his difficulties with vigour and resolution. He sent Biron with 4,000 or 5,000 men to blockade Amiens, and that body was soon converted into a regular army by recruits from all parts of the kingdom. Henry's success against the Duke of Savoy and in Brittany has been already related. After a siege of several months Amiens submitted (September 19th, 1597). Albert made an ineffectual attempt to relieve it: he was but ill supported by Philip II., who towards the end of 1596 had made another bankruptcy, which had shaken credit and commerce throughout Europe. During the siege Prince Maurice had also gained several advantages in the Netherlands.

The fall of Amiens and the ill success of his attempts upon France turned the thoughts of the Spanish King to peace. Pope Clement VIII. had long been desirous of putting an end to the war between France and Spain, which, besides preventing Philip from succouring Austria against the Turks, promoted the cause of heresy in the Netherlands and elsewhere. In 1596, Cardinal Alexander de' Medici, the Papal Legate in France, made advances to the French King which Henry did not repulse; and Fra Buonaventura Calatagirona, the General of the Franciscans, was despatched to Madrid to try the ground. The negotiations were long protracted; but the reverses just mentioned caused Philip to reflect that he was now old and infirm, and that his son would be incompetent to pursue the vast designs which his ambition had chalked out. Philip made indirect offers of peace to England, and even to the United Provinces, but Henry IV. alone showed any inclination to treat. He sent an envoy extraordinary to London to represent to Elizabeth the necessity of peace for France, and he tried to persuade the Dutch to enter into the negotiations; while on the other hand, Cecil, the English ambassador, and Justin of Nassau and Barneveldt, the Dutch envoys at Paris, did all they could to divert Henry from his design, but without effect. In February, 1598, the French and Spanish plenipotentiaries met at Vervins, and on the 2nd of May a treaty was signed. By the PEACE OF VERVINS the Spaniards restored to France Calais, Ardres, Dourlens, La Capelle, and Le Câtelet in Picardy, and Blavet (Port-Louis) in Brittany, of all their conquests retaining only the citadel of Cambray. The rest of the

¹ Matthieu, ap. Martin, t. x. p. 411.

conditions were referred to the treaty of Câteau-Cambrésis, which Henry had stipulated should form the basis of the negotiations.¹ The Duke of Savoy was included in the peace. Thus Philip at length acknowledged the heretic Sovereign, against whom his arms had been so long employed and such vast resources squandered. By the treaty concluded with England and the Dutch in 1596 Henry had bound himself to make no separate peace without the consent of those Powers; but he seems to have availed himself of a technical flaw in that treaty, purposely contrived by Du Vair, one of the negotiators on the part of France. One of the articles stipulated that the ratifications should be exchanged within six months, and Henry had delayed his signature till December 31st, more than seven months. Such a subterfuge could hardly have been allowed had the contracting parties found it expedient to contest the treaty of Vervins; but Henry succeeded in convincing Elizabeth and the Dutch that the peace was indispensable to him, and the good understanding with those Powers was not interrupted.²

The great political drama of which Philip II. had so long been the protagonist was now drawing to a close. Philip, who felt his end approaching, determined to abdicate, before he died, the sovereignty of the Netherlands in favour of his daughter, thus destroying with his own hands the unity of those provinces for which he had so long been contending. On the 14th of August, 1598, the States-General of the southern or Catholic provinces took the oath of allegiance to the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia, and to her destined husband, the Archduke Albert, who had now resigned the cardinalate. The Infanta was also proclaimed in the County of Burgundy (Franche-Comté). Isabella and her heirs were to recognize the King of Spain as lord paramount; any future Prince of the Netherlands was forbidden to marry without the consent of that monarch; and should he fall from the orthodox faith he was, *ipso facto*, to lose all his rights. The Netherlands were to have the same friends and the same enemies as Spain; to abstain from all commerce with the East and West Indies; and to admit Spanish garrisons into Antwerp, Ghent, and Cambray.³ Albert wrote to the several States of the United Provinces requiring them to acknowledge their lawful Prince, and offering to guarantee them in the maintenance of their religion,

¹ Dumont, t. v. pt. i. p. 561.

² *Life of Egerton*, p. 292; *Camden, Elizabeth*, vol. ii. p. 169.

³ Dumont, t. v. pt. i. p. 573.

and the order of things established among them. But to this communication the States did not even vouchsafe an answer.

Philip did not live to see his daughter's marriage. He expired at his palace of the Escorial, September 13th, 1598, aged seventy-one years, of which he had reigned forty-two. Death was a relief to him. Consumed with ulcers and devoured by vermin, his body had become loathsome to himself and offensive to others; yet he bore his tortures with that sombre resignation which had characterized him through life, and it may be added, with the same gloomy devotion. During his last illness, taking from a coffer a whip stained with blood and shaking it on high, he observed that his own blood and that of his father was upon it, and that he bequeathed it to his children for the same purpose of holy mortification.¹ After his return to Spain in 1559, Philip had chiefly resided at Madrid; making rare excursions to Aranjuez or the wood of Segovia, and visiting more frequently the gloomy pile of the Escorial in a dreary, stony valley, the abode of the monks of St. Jerome. Even here he was mostly shut up in his apartments; and in these dismal solitudes he contracted an air of importurbable tranquillity which froze all who approached him. His character, indeed, is one which makes the blood creep. Even practised diplomatists were disconcerted in his presence. He seemed to enjoy their confusion; would survey them leisurely from head to foot, and then condescendingly bid them to compose themselves. "No one living," says De Cheverny, who knew him in Spain, "ever spoke to him but on his knees, which he excused on the ground of his short stature and the haughtiness of the Spanish nobility." None dared to speak to him before he was ordered. He gave his commands with only half a phrase; it was necessary to guess the rest. He very rarely showed himself to the people, or even to the grandees, except on fêtes and holidays. His smile, however, is said to have been engaging, perhaps from its rarity; yet it was a saying at Court, that there was no great distance between his smile and his dagger. He could long dissemble his resentments till the proper opportunity arrived for gratifying them. Yet with all his gloominess and reserve, Philip was addicted to amorous pleasures, and, besides marrying four wives, often indulged in low and disreputable amours.²

¹ *Mém. de Cheverny*, t. ii. p. 48 (ed. 1664).

² "E molto divoto e si confessa e comunica più volte all' anno, e sta in ora-

zione ogni dì, e vuole esser netto di coscienza. Stimandosi che il suo maggior peccato sia quello della carne." — *Reat. Venez. ap. Mignet, Ant. Periz.* p. 78.

The reign of Philip II. was disastrous to his subjects. The lord of both Indies died a bankrupt; Portugal was ruined under his sway; a great part of the Netherlands was lost, while the provinces retained were almost wholly deprived of their commerce and manufactures; Spain itself was impoverished and enslaved. Such were the results of near half a century of busy and ambitious, but misdirected policy. Philip left three children; namely, by his third wife, Elizabeth of France, two daughters, Isabella Clara Eugenia, now sovereign of Flanders, and Catherine, married to the Duke of Savoy; and by his fourth wife, Anne of Austria, a son, who succeeded him with the title of Philip III. He had also had by Anne two sons and a daughter, who died in infancy.

With these revolutions of Western Europe the affairs of its eastern regions have afforded but few points of contact and connection, nor do these eastern affairs offer in themselves anything of very striking interest or importance. We shall therefore content ourselves with giving only a brief sketch of them down to the end of the sixteenth century.

The death of Maximilian II. in 1576, and the accession of his eldest son Rodolph II. to the Empire, have been already recorded. Born in 1552, Rodolph had been educated by his bigoted mother during the first twelve years of his life in that mechanical devotion which passed for religion among the Roman Catholics of those days. He was then sent to Spain, and under the auspices of his kinsman Philip II. received during the six years that he remained in that country a strictly Spanish education, superintended by the Jesuits. After the death of Don Carlos, Philip had, indeed, for a period designed to make Rodolph his successor on the Spanish thrones, and to give him the hand of his then only daughter in marriage. But these plans came to nothing; Rodolph returned into Germany, and was invested successively, as already recorded, with the Crowns of Hungary and Bohemia, as well as elected King of the Romans. At his father's death, besides the Imperial Crown, he also succeeded to the sole possession of the Austrian lands; for Maximilian established the right of primogeniture in his hereditary dominions. Rodolph, however, intrusted the Austrian administration to his brother, the Archduke Ernest, and took up his own residence for the most part at Prague. His pursuits indisposed him to take any active share in affairs of state. Although of an indolent and phlegmatic temperament, and of a feeble will, which rendered him often the tool of others, Rodolph possessed considerable abilities and acquirements, which,

however, were chiefly applied to the idle studies of alchemy and astrology. The latter, which was dignified with the name of astronomy, incidentally proved of some advantage, by leading him to patronize the eminent astronomers Kepler and Tycho Brahe:

The bigotry of Rodolph II., and still more of his brother Ernest, formed a striking contrast to the tolerant spirit of their father Maximilian, and may be said to have laid the foundation of the war which in the next century desolated Germany during thirty years. The effects of the new reign were soon visible in Austria, then for the most part Lutheran. Rodolph was zealous in performing all the ceremonies of the Romish Church; especially he was a constant attendant in the religious processions, in which he might be seen in the hardest weather bare-headed and with torch in hand. In 1578 he determined to celebrate Corpus Christi Day at Vienna with more than usual solemnity. As the long-drawn procession was passing over the Peasants' Market it was found necessary to remove a few stalls, when a tumult immediately arose, with cries of "To arms! we are betrayed!" At these menacing symptoms, the clergy and choristers abandoned the Host and fled; they were followed by the guards and halberdiers, and Rodolph found himself in the midst of an infuriated mob, from which he was protected only by the princes and nobles, who drew their swords and closed around him. This incident made a deep impression on the Emperor, whose education had imbued him with a Spanish dignity and stateliness. The suppression of Protestantism at Vienna was immediately resolved on. Joshua Opitz, a Lutheran of the Flaccian schism, the most popular preacher in that capital, distinguished by his eloquent, but violent, sermons against the Papists, was ordered, together with his assistants in church and school, to leave Vienna that day, and the Austrian dominions within a fortnight. This measure was followed up by restraints on Protestant worship throughout Austria; and in the following year (1579) it was ordained that none but Roman Catholic teachers and books should be allowed in Austrian schools.

A rapid reaction in favour of the Roman Church also took place in Bavaria after the accession of Duke William II., who succeeded his father Albert III. in 1579. William was a warm supporter of the Jesuits, and erected for them at Munich a college more splendid than his own palace. He employed for the furtherance of the Roman faith all that pomp and that love of art by

which he was characterized; and in order to draw the public mind back to the ancient creed, those religious spectacles and processions were instituted which still subsist in Bavaria. At the dedication of the Jesuits' College a grand dramatic and musical entertainment was exhibited, representing the combat of the Archangel Michael. Nothing could exceed the magnificence of the scenery and costumes; a choir of 900 voices chanted the progress of the action; and the multitude shuddered with affright when they beheld the rebel angels hurled into the deep and undulating abyss of hell.¹ Duke William also instituted the procession which still takes place at Munich on Corpus Christi Day, but with diminished splendour and less characteristic appliances. The original procession consisted of all the saints and heroes of the Old and the New Testament. Adam and Eve led the train, in that state of nakedness, if not innocence, proper to them before the fall; St. Augustine appeared with a large beard; and there were sixteen Marias, of whom the last and most beautiful was borne on a cloud and significantly supported her foot upon moonshine. Amid a strange and miscellaneous crowd of Apostles and Pharisees, shepherds and hangmen, Pharaohs and giants, angels, devils, and heathen gods, the pious profaneness of the Jesuits did not scruple to introduce the Almighty himself and his Son Jesus Christ. To represent God the Father, it was directed that a tall, straight man should be chosen, strong and well-formed, with a long and thick grey beard and a fine red complexion. He was to assume a stately and majestic walk and demeanour and a composed and steady aspect, so as to appear neither sour nor ridiculous.² By such devices were the multitude lured back to a false religion.

On the other hand, an attempt to extend Protestantism in Germany proved a failure; and its origin merited no better fate. Gebhard Truchsess of Waldburg, who at the age of thirty had become Archbishop and Elector of Cologne, while walking in a procession during the congress in that city, beheld at a window the Countess Agnes of Mansfeld, a daughter of that noble house at Eisleben which had befriended Luther. Agnes was of extraordinary beauty, but her family had fallen into poverty; Truchsess, a practised seducer, sought her acquaintance, and prevailed on her to live with him as his mistress. The brothers of Agnes, having learnt their sister's shame, accompanied by some armed

¹ Zschokke, *Baierische Gesch.* B. iii. S. 150 (ed. 1816).

² *Ibid.* S. 159.

followers, surprised the Elector in his palace at Bonn, and compelled him, by threats of death if he refused, to promise that he would marry Agnes. The first thought of Truchsess after this occurrence was to resign his archbishopric; but from this he was diverted by Counts Nuenar and Solms, and others of the nobility, as well as by the exhortations of Agnes. In the autumn of 1582 he openly professed his adherence to the Confession of Augsburg, and in the following February, in spite of an admonition from the Pope, he was married to Agnes by a Protestant minister. Gregory XIII. now fulminated against him a bull of excommunication, depriving him of all his offices and dignities; and the Chapter of Cologne, who had viewed with displeasure the secession of their Archbishop from the orthodox Church, although he had promised not to interfere with the exercise of their religion or to restrict them in the choice of his successor, proceeded to elect in place of Truchsess Prince Ernest of Bavaria, Bishop of Froising, who had formerly competed with him for the see. The troops of Ernest, assisted by some Spaniards lent to him by the Prince of Parma after the conquest of Zutphen, drove Truchsess from Cologne. Of the Protestant Princes of Germany whose help he had sought, John Casimir of the Palatinate alone lent him some feeble aid. The deposed Elector retired into Westphalia and sent his wife to England to implore the interference of Queen Elizabeth. Agnes, however, incurred the jealousy and anger of the Queen by her supposed familiarity with Leicester, and was dismissed from Court. Truchsess then sought the protection of the Prince of Orange, and finally retired to Strasburg, where he lived sixteen years as dean, till his death in 1601, without renouncing his title of Elector.¹ For nearly two centuries after this event, the Chapter of Cologne continued to elect its Archbishops from the Bavarian family.

Germany, almost isolated at this period from the rest of Europe, was the scene of few political events of any importance. The Diets of the Empire were chiefly occupied with matters of internal police. That held at Frankfort in 1577 published some regulations which exhibit in a curious light the manners of the higher classes of the Germans. The oaths and blasphemies of the nobles are denounced; the Electors and Princes of the Empire, ecclesiastical as well as secular, are alone authorized to keep buffoons, and at the same time forbidden to get drunk themselves or to intoxicate others. These regulations are accompanied with

¹ Menzel, B. liii cap. ii.

many more, respecting dress, the table, the rate of interest, monopolies, &c.

The death of Stephen Bathory in December, 1586, having again rendered vacant the throne of Poland, Rodolph's brother, the Archduke Maximilian, proposed himself as a candidate. But the choice of the majority of the Electors fell upon the son of John, King of Sweden, by Catharine, a sister of the last Jagellon; and that young Prince ascended the throne with the title of Sigismund III. Maximilian, however, prepared to contest it with him, and entering Poland with a small body of troops, penetrated to Cracow, at that time the capital, to which he laid siege. But Zamoisky, Grand Chancellor of the Crown, illustrious by his learning and researches, as well as by his military exploits, who had embraced the party of Sigismund, compelled Maximilian to raise the siege; and in the following year (January 24th, 1588) defeated him in a battle near Bitschin in Silesia. Maximilian was soon afterwards captured in that town, and was detained more than a twelvemonth prisoner in a castle near Lublin, till at length the Emperor Rodolph was obliged to obtain his liberation by paying a large ransom, and ceding to the Poles the Hungarian county of Zips, which had been formerly pledged to them by the Emperor Sigismund.

The Hungarians were at this time almost independent, though ostensibly Rodolph II. was represented in that country by his brother the Archduke Ernest. When, in 1592, Ernest was called by Philip II. to the government of the Netherlands, and Rodolph could not prevail upon himself to quit his retirement at Prague, the incompetent Matthias was sent into Hungary; as, of the other two brothers of the Emperor, Maximilian was employed in administering Inner Austria and Tyrol, while Albert was in Spain. The proceedings of the Jesuits and reactionary party, both in Hungary and Transylvania, occasioned the greatest discontent. After the election of Stephen Bathory to the Polish Crown, the government of Transylvania had been conducted by his brother Christopher, who, on Stephen's death was succeeded by his youthful son Sigismund Bathory, a person of weak character, and the mere tool of the Jesuits, by whom he had been educated. Soon afterwards, however, the Protestant party gained the ascendancy, and in 1588 the Jesuits were banished by the States of Transylvania, much against the will of Sigismund. On account of the constant border warfare with the Turks, the Emperor, the Pope, and the King of Spain naturally had much influence with Sigis-

mund, as the only allies to whom he could look for assistance against the Osmanlis, whom he regarded with aversion, though he owed to them his throne. But these circumstances had not much effect on the state of parties in Transylvania till the breaking out of a regular war between the Turks and Hungarians in 1593, to which we must now advert; taking previously a retrospect of Turkish history.

The affairs of Turkey have been brought down in a former chapter to the death of Sultan Solim II. in 1574.¹ The Grand-Yizier, Mahomet Sokollif, concealed the death of the Sultan, as he had previously done that of Solyman II., till Selim's son and successor, Amurath III., arrived at Constantinople from his government of Magnesia, to take possession of the throne (December 22nd, 1574). Amurath's first act was to cause five brothers, all mere children, to be strangled. The Janissaries had then to be conciliated by an augmented donative of fifty ducats a man, and costly gifts were distributed among the great officers of state. Amurath III. was now about twenty-eight years of age. His person was small but agreeable, his features good, his complexion pale and yellow from the baneful effects of opium. In his youth a favourable estimate was taken of his character; for though of a studious and somewhat melancholy disposition, he had not shown himself averse from, or incapable of, military achievements. But from these good qualities he rapidly degenerated after his accession, becoming avaricious, addicted to women, fickle, mistrustful, cowardly; and at length he wholly secluded himself in the seraglio.

The religious troubles in France tended to diminish the influence of that country with the Porte. The help of the Turks against the House of Austria was no longer necessary to France, while the Guises and the League were in close alliance with Philip II. On the other hand the Hugonots had secret dealings with the Porte, and Coligni sent several nobles of his party to Constantinople; ² but it does not appear that these negotiations had any result. It may be remarked, however, that the Protestants were much more acceptable to the Turks than the Papists, as approaching more nearly to their own faith, which rejected with abhorrence any semblance of idolatry; ³ and it was, perhaps,

¹ See vol. ii. p. 315.

² Brantôme, t. ix. p. 218.

³ Thus the cadi of Chios remarked to James Paleologus in 1573: "Nos Lutheranos defendere solemus, quoniam melius

de Deo sentire videntur et nobiscum pagani dissentiant; multum autem dissonant Papiste, qui figuras et imagines faciunt Deo et illas colunt."—Rejanner, *Epist. Turc.* t. iii. lib. xi. p. 143.

partly from this cause that English influence made at this period so surprising an advance at Constantinople.

Towards the end of 1578 William Harebone, or Harburn, an English merchant, presented himself before Sultan Amurath III. with a letter from Queen Elizabeth, in which she besought the friendship of the Porte, and requested permission for her subjects to trade under their own flag; for although the English had opened a commerce in the Levant before the capture of Cyprus by Selim II., they had hitherto been obliged to sail in those waters under French colours. The Sultan did not vouchsafe an answer to this application; but Harburn, nothing daunted, opened private communications with the Grand Vizier, Mahomet Sokolli; and as the merchandize of England, and especially its metals, was much prized in Turkey, Harburn soon made great progress, in spite of the efforts of Germigny, the French ambassador to the Porte, to counteract him. Germigny, indeed, succeeded at first in getting a treaty cancelled which Harburn had effected in 1580, and which allowed the English to trade under their own flag;¹ but in May, 1583, Elizabeth's indefatigable ambassador obtained a rescript from the Sultan, granting English commerce in the Levant the same privileges as the French. A Turkey company had already been incorporated in London by royal charter in 1581. Sir William Monson² assigns the following reasons for England having embarked so late in the Levant trade: the want of ships, the danger from the Moorish pirates on the coast of Barbary, and the monopoly of the trade by the Venetians, whose argosies brought the merchandize of the East to Southampton. The last argosy which visited our shores was unfortunately wrecked near the Wight in 1587, and her valuable cargo lost.

In her negotiations with the Porte Elizabeth used the plea of religion, styling herself in her letter the protectrix of the true faith against idolaters (*veræ fidei contra idololâtras falso Christi nomen profertentes invicta et potentissima propugnatrix*). Indeed the English agents seem to have assumed an attitude of slavish submission towards the Porte which somewhat moved the contempt of the Turks; and the Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha derisively observed to the Emperor's ambassador, "that the English wanted nothing of being true Moslems, except to raise the finger on high and cry *Esched*" (the formulary of faith).³ This was contrary to,

¹ Zinkeisen, B. iii. S. 424.

² *Naval Tracts*, written in 1635. ap. Ann.

³ Hammer, *Osman. Gesch.* B. iv. S. 208.

Macpherson, vol. ii. p. 169.

the practice of the Venetians, who in treating with the Porte had learned from experience that it was necessary to assume an air of dignity. Nevertheless, the advantages of trade, the interests of policy, and above all a common hatred of the Pope and the King of Spain, soon cemented the alliance between England and the Turks; though Harburn in vain tried to persuade them to attack the Spanish coasts at the time of the Armada.

Edward Burton was an able successor of Harburn as English ambassador to the Porte, and till his death, in 1598, very much increased the influence of England in Turkey. He found a powerful friend in Seadeddin, the celebrated Turkish historian, minister, and general, whom during the Hungarian war he accompanied on the expedition against Erlau in 1596. The counsels of England now began to have weight even in the Divan. After the accession of Henry IV. to the throne of France, a rivalry had ensued between him and Elizabeth for the precedence of their flags in the Levant, in which Burton gradually prevailed; and at length the English flag instead of the French became the covering ensign of foreign vessels in that quarter. Henry IV. resumed the traditional policy of France to break the power of Spain with the assistance of the Osmanlis; but he could never obtain from them any effectual help. His abjuration of Protestantism filled the Porte with suspicion; and after the peace of Vervins he no longer wanted its aid. Henry, however, always maintained an honourable and dignified attitude towards the Sultan; he became the special guardian of the rights and liberties of the Christians in the East, as Francis I. had been before him; and he procured the restoration of the privileges of the monks of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem.

Of the Turkish relations at this period, however, the most important were those with Austria and Hungary. The truce concluded between Austria and Selim II. had been frequently renewed; yet the border warfare grew every year more bloody, and the relations with the Porte daily more precarious. In 1592, the Grand-Vizier Sinan Pasha was highly offended by an intercepted letter of Kreckwitz the Imperial ambassador, in which the Vizier was denounced as the cause of the misunderstanding which had so long prevailed. While he was in this temper an event occurred which afforded a pretence to declare open war. Hassan, the Turkish Governor of Bosnia, having, in June, 1593, crossed the Culpa with 30,000 men, was defeated near Sissek with great slaughter and the loss of all his baggage and guns by only 5,000 Germans and Hungarians. Amurath could now no longer resist.

the counsels of his Vizier and the importunities of Hassan, and of two Sultanas who had lost their sons at Sissek, to wipe out this disgrace to his arms. War was declared against the Emperor at Constantinople, and Kreckwitz and his suite were thrown into prison. Sinan Pasha left Constantinople with an army in August, 1593, amid the tricks and howlings of dervishes, carrying with him Kreckwitz in chains, who died upon the march. Crossing the Drave at Essok and passing Stuhlweissenburg, Sinan appeared before Veszprém, which surrendered October 13th. On the other hand, after the Turkish army had retired into winter quarters, the Imperialists gained a signal victory over the Pasha of Buda, November 23rd, which struck the Turks with consternation. During the winter the Archduke Matthias, who commanded the Imperial troops in the northern part of Hungary, received considerable reinforcements, and laid siege in the spring of 1594 to Gran, which, however, he was obliged to abandon. The Archduke Maximilian was not more successful in the south, while Sinan, after taking Tata and Raab, was repulsed at Komorn.

The ensuing campaign seemed to open under better auspices for the Emperor. The Diet, assembled at Ratisbon in 1594, had voted Rodolph large succours of men and money. His hereditary dominions, as well as Bohemia and Hungary, came forward with assistance; from other parts of Europe he received promises which were not fulfilled. But what principally alarmed the Sultan was the revolt from him of the three tributary provinces of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania, the Voyvodes of which, after either slaying or driving out the Turks, entered into an alliance with the Emperor. In Transylvania the young Prince Sigismund himself, influenced by the Jesuits and the Catholic party, was for Austria, while the greater part of the Protestants preferred the Turks for their masters; and, as since the breaking out of open war it became necessary that the province should declare for one side or the other, a *coup d'état* was resolved on. At a Diet held at Klausenburg, in August, 1594, some of the principal leaders of the Protestant party were seized and put to death, and a treaty was entered into with Rodolph, which was ratified at Prague, January 28th, 1595, and confirmed by the Hungarian Diet. The chief conditions were, mutual aid against the Turks, and the reversion of Transylvania to Austria in case Sigismund died without male heirs. The Jesuits now returned into the land, and ruled the weak-minded Sigismund more absolutely than ever. He even thought of entering a convent, and proceeded to Prague to entreat

the Emperor to procure him a cardinal's hat. Rodolph, however, dissuaded him from these projects, and prevailed on him to return into Transylvania. The indifferent success of the campaign of 1594, and above all the revolt of the three provinces, filled Amurath with consternation, and, for the first time, he sent for the holy standard from Damascus, the palladium of the faithful in their contests with the infidels. Death, however, released him from his anxieties. Amurath III. died January 16th, 1595, and was succeeded by his son, Mahomet III. The death of the Sultan was concealed, as usual, till Mahomet could arrive from his government of Magnesia. He was the last heir of the Turkish throne who enjoyed before his accession an independent government; in future all the Sultan's children were educated exclusively in the Scraglio. The funeral of Amurath was immediately followed by the murder of nineteen of his still living sons, and of seven pregnant female slaves. The Janissaries had to be conciliated with a donative of 660,000 ducats, and it was also necessary to pacify a revolt of the discontented sipahis.

In spite of the holy standard, the campaign of 1595 was highly unfavourable to the Turks. Sinan, in attempting to gain possession of Wallachia, was driven back with great slaughter by Prince Michael the Voyvode. The Turkish arms were not more fortunate in Hungary. The Imperialists had now received some of the German contingents, the Pope and other Italian Princes had forwarded contributions in money, and a more able general, Count Mansfeld, who had been despatched from the Netherlands by Philip II., commanded the forces of Rodolph. In September, Mansfeld took the important town of Gran. Shortly after Vissegrad and Waitzen also yielded to the Imperialists, and the Turks lost several places on the Danube. So great was the alarm at Constantinople that prayers were offered up in the mosques for the success of the arms of the faithful, a step never resorted to except in cases of the utmost danger; and the unwarlike Mahomet III. felt himself compelled to revive the spirits of his troops by heading them in person. His departure was delayed by the death of his Grand-Vizier Sinan; but in April, 1596, he commenced with great pomp his expedition against Erlau, accompanied by his newly-appointed Grand-Vizier Ibrahim Pasha, and by Scadeddin, who occupied a conspicuous place in the council of war. The Imperialists did not attempt to arrest his march, which was directed by Belgrade, Peterwardein, and Szegedin on Erlau. A week sufficed for the capture of Erlau, when, in spite of the

capitulation, the garrison of 5,000 men, was cut down by the Janissaries. The Archduke Maximilian, and Sigismund, Prince of Transylvania, now hastened with their forces to recover Erlau, and in October they met the Turks on the plain of Keresztes, where a bloody battle was fought which lasted three days. Victory seemed at first to favour the Christians. Emboldened by their success, they ventured, on the third day (October 26th), to attack the Turkish camp; but they were repulsed with great loss, and, being seized with a panic, took to a disorderly flight, in which 50,000 men are said to have been killed, and 100 guns and the military chest were captured by the Turks. Maximilian, who was one of the first to fly, escaped to Kaschau, and Sigismund with his forces retreated through Tokay into Transylvania. Mahomet then marched back to Constantinople, which he entered in triumph. This signal defeat occasioned the greatest alarm and anxiety at Vienna, and, indeed, throughout Europe.¹

The Sultan, however, did not derive that advantage from his success which might have been expected. In the campaign of 1597 nothing decisive was achieved, while that of 1598 was highly adverse to the Turkish arms: Raab, Tata, Veszprem, Tschambock, besides several fortresses, were taken by the Imperialists, and the operations of the Turkish Scarskier Saturdayschi were so unfortunate as to cost him his dismissal and his life. Both sides were now exhausted, and eager to conclude a peace if satisfactory terms could be obtained. In 1599 the Grand-Vizier, Ibrahim Pasha, who commanded the Turkish forces in Hungary, made proposals to the Imperial general, Nicholas Palfy; but nothing was effected: the demands on both sides were too high, and the war was continued six years longer. We shall not, however, enter into the details of a struggle which was feebly carried on with varying success, and which gave birth to no events of decisive importance. Even the death of Mahomet III., December 22nd, 1603, had little effect on the war, except that it served still further to exhaust the resources of the Porte by the payment of the accustomed donative to the Janissaries. Mahomet was quietly succeeded by his son Achmet I., then hardly fourteen years of age. The renewal of the war between the Sultan and the Shah of Persia in 1603 tended still further to dispose the Porte to close the struggle in Hungary; and the negotiations were facilitated by a revolution in Transylvania.

The weak and simple-minded Sigismund Bathory was per-

¹ Katona, t. xxvii. p. 324 sqq.

suaded in 1597 by the Jesuits, as well as by his wife—Maria Christina, daughter of Charles, Duke of Styria—who wanted to get rid of him, to cede Transylvania to Rodolph II., in exchange for the Silesian principalities of Oppeln and Ratibor, and a large pension. In the spring of 1598 Sigismund proceeded into Silosia, where he soon found that he had been deceived in the bargain which he had made; and before the end of August he returned to Klausenburg at the invitation of Stephen Bocskai, a Hungarian noble, and one of the leaders of the liberal and Protestant party in that country. A counter-revolution now took place. The Austrian commissaries who had been sent to take possession of Transylvania were seized and imprisoned; Sigismund took a new oath to the States that he would make no innovations in religion, and the Jesuits were again sent into banishment. But they soon recovered their influence. Sigismund was induced to relinquish his authority to his fanatical kinsman, Cardinal Andrew Bathory, and retired into Poland to live in a private station. At the same time his wife entered a convent at Hall in Tyrol, where she passed twenty-two years, the remainder of her existence. Cardinal Andrew Bathory having been recognized by the States as Prince of Transylvania, in 1599, the Emperor Rodolph commissioned his general, Basta, as well as Michael, Voyvode of Wallachia, to overthrow him, and the Cardinal was soon after killed by Michael's troops. Sigismund now regained for a short time possession of Transylvania, but in 1602 was once more compelled to abdicate, and never again appeared on the political scene. About eight years afterwards, having incurred the suspicion of the Emperor, he was summoned to Prague, where he soon after died in his forty-first year.

Stephen Bocskai now set up pretensions of his own, not only to the Principality of Transylvania, but even to the Crown of Hungary. In June, 1605, he entered into an alliance with the Grand-Vizier Lala Mohammed, commander of the Turkish army in Hungary, and assisted him in the campaign of that year, in which Gran, Vissegrad, Veszprem, and other places were taken by their united forces. Bocskai had already been invested with Transylvania, and on November 11th, Lala Mohammed solemnly crowned him King of Hungary on the field of Rakosch, presenting him at the same time with a Turkish sword and colours, in token that he was the Sultan's vassal. It would seem, however, that Bocskai had only been set up as a man of straw by the Turks, in order to obtain better conditions in the treaty of peace which

was still negotiating between them and Rodolph II. The Archduke Matthias was first of all commissioned to treat with Bocskai, who was easily persuaded to renounce the Crown of Hungary; and by a treaty signed at Vienna (July 23rd, 1606), he was allowed to retain Transylvania, besides several places in Hungary. This was the prelude to another treaty with the Turks, concluded at Sitvatorok November 11th.

The PEACE OF SITVATOROK, which was to last twenty years from January 1st, 1607, made but slight alterations in the territorial possessions of the contracting parties; but it is remarkable for what may be called the moral and diplomatic concessions on the part of the Porte. It was arranged in the preliminaries that the Emperor should no longer be insulted with the title of "King of Vienna," but that both he and the Sultan should be treated with the Imperial title; and the diplomatic intercourse between the two nations was henceforth to be conducted on an equal footing. But a still more important concession was the abandonment by the Porte of the tribute hitherto paid by Austria; in consideration of which, however, the Emperor was to pay down, once for all (*semel pro semper*), a sum of 200,000 florins, besides making valuable presents.¹ Such an abatement of the haughty tone in which the Turkish Sultans had hitherto spoken betrays a consciousness of inward weakness. The Osmanlis had, indeed, now passed the zenith of their power, and had arrived at the limits of their conquests; yet their Empire still embraced an extent unparalleled since that of ancient Rome. In Asia, the Tigris and Mount Ararat separated the dominions of the Ottoman Sultan and the Shah of Persia; Bagdad, Van, and Erzeroum were Turkish governments; between the Black Sea and the Caspian, the Georgians, Mingrelians, and Circassians, though free, were tributary; the south and west coasts of the Black Sea, from the Caucasus to the Dnieper, Anatolia, Caramania, Armenia, Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and Arabia obeyed the Sultan. In Africa he possessed Egypt, and was lord of the whole coast from the delta of the Nile to the Straits of Gibraltar, with exception of a few places held by the Spaniards. In Europe, as the reader will have already learnt, he ruled, besides Greece and its archipelago and the islands of Cyprus, Rhodes, and Chios, Thrace, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Wallachia, Moldavia, Transylvania, the greater part of Hungary, Bosnia, Servia, and Albania.

¹ The articles are in Katona, t. xxviii. p. 612 sq.; Cf. Zinkeisen, B. iii. S. 618.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

AT the peace of Vervins a century had elapsed since the French, by their incursions into Italy, had inaugurated the modern European system, and the result up to this time had been entirely in favour of their Spanish rivals. Spain had succeeded in seizing and retaining the two Sicilies and the Duchy of Milan, and, in spite of a wretched system of administration and the revolt of her provinces in the Netherlands, was still incontestably the leading Power of Europe. The Spanish infantry continued to retain their prestige; the conquest of Portugal helped to support the declining power and reputation of Spain; and we have beheld Philip II., towards the close of his long reign, aspiring, with perhaps even a better chance of success than his father, Charles V., to universal monarchy, by the conquest of England, and the reduction of France under his dominion by placing his daughter on the throne. These successes, however, were due, not to the strength of Spain, but to the weakness of her adversary. Torn by her religious wars and the anarchy of the League, France was unable to compete with a rival in which those disturbing causes were absent; and as soon as they ceased to operate she rapidly rose to her true position. The question of religion was also the mainspring of action in England and the Netherlands. Thus the Reformation forms the key to the political state of Europe at this period, and as its effects were to continue another half century, namely, down to the peace of Westphalia, it will be proper here to take a view of its progress, and the changes which it had effected; after which we shall briefly consider the internal condition of the chief European nations.

About the middle of the 16th century Protestantism had established itself in the greater part of Europe. The doctrines of Luther had become the national religion of the Scandinavian kingdoms of East Prussia, Livonia, and the northern parts of Germany. In Bavaria a large majority of the nobles had embraced them, and the same creed had made still greater pro-

gress in Austria, where it was computed that only one-thirtieth part of the population remained faithful to the Roman Church. In 1558 a Venetian ambassador reckoned that only one-tenth part of the whole German people were Roman Catholics.¹ In Poland, although the King himself was a Roman Catholic, many of his subjects had adopted the reformed doctrines. These also prevailed very extensively in Hungary, where, in 1554, a Lutheran had been elected Palatine. In Bohemia the large Hussite party already established could not but derive additional strength from the religious movement in Germany. Calvinism, still more inimical to Rome than were the doctrines of Luther, had from Geneva, its centre and stronghold, spread itself in all directions in Western Europe. In the neighbouring parts of Germany it had in a great degree supplanted Lutheranism, and had even penetrated into Hungary and Poland; it was predominant in Scotland, and had leavened the doctrines of the English Church. In France it had divided the population into two hostile camps. The Venetian ambassador Micheli relates that, immediately after the death of Francis II. in 1560, fifty preachers had issued from Geneva and settled themselves in various French towns. When Micheli paid a visit to that metropolis of Calvinism he was struck with astonishment at the veneration in which the great French reformer was held, and at the vast sums of money which he received in aid of the thousands who had taken refuge at Geneva.² In the Netherlands the doctrines of Calvin supplanted those of Luther. Tiepolo, another Venetian ambassador, says that all the Pope could reckon upon as sound and secure was Spain and Italy, with a few islands and the Venetian possessions in Dalmatia and Grecca.³

The proceedings of the Council of Trent drew an insuperable line of demarcation between Catholics and Protestants; all idea of conciliation was abandoned, and the hostility of the two parties stood out in bolder relief. The violent and impolitic conduct of Pope Paul IV. also tended to widen the breach. From his antipathy to the House of Austria, Paul broke with the Imperial party and drove the Emperor Ferdinand to cultivate the friendship of the Protestants. He acted in the same inconsiderate manner towards England. Instead of endeavouring to conciliate Queen Elizabeth and the English nation, Paul repulsed her

¹ Ranke, *Popes*, vol. ii. p. 12.

² *Relat. delle cose di Francia*, 1561; *ibid.* p. 17. During the reign of Henry II., 1,400 French families had established

themselves at Geneva. Gaberel, *Hist. de l'Eglise de Genève*, t. i. p. 346.

³ *Relat. di Pio IV. e V.*, ap. Ranke, *ibid.* p. 19.

ambassadors by his haughty demands, deprived Cardinal Pole of his legateship, endeavoured to re-establish Peter's pence, and annulled every alienation that had been made of Church property; nay, so blind was he to his own interests that he was even hostile to Philip II., the great prop of the Roman Catholic cause. But soon after his pontificate a reaction began in favour of the Roman Church. Shaken to her very centre by the Reformation, Rome found means to reclaim vast numbers of apostates, and to recover a large share of her former influence and power. As this anti-Reformation is the most striking feature in the history of the latter half of the sixteenth century, and lay at the root of the Thirty Years' War, it may be worth while to inquire into the causes of so remarkable a reaction.

Among these causes we may note the reform effected in the Roman Curia itself. The first part of the sixteenth century had been characterized by a general relaxation of the discipline and authority of the Church; profane studies, literature and art, had usurped the place of religion; and Rome herself seemed to have forgotten her hierarchical character. But the conduct of Pius V., and of several exemplary Pontiffs who succeeded him, had a great influence in amending the lives of the Roman prelates. At the beginning of the century the Cardinals levied war on the Pope, or hatched conspiracies against him; while the Pope himself did not scruple to gird on the sword and to lead his armies to battle like any temporal Prince. But towards the close of the same era everything was done in the name of religion; a ceremonious behaviour began to prevail in the Roman Court, and the outward forms at least of piety and virtue were strictly observed. A similar reformation took place in other Roman Catholic countries. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the ancient monastic orders, the Benedictines, Dominicans, and Franciscans were vigorously reformed in France; and to such a degree were austerities carried among some of the religious communities of women, that fourteen Feuillantines are said to have died in one week. The celebrated Cistercian nunnery of Port-Royal was distinguished by its nocturnal vigils, its unbroken silence, and perpetual adoration of the Eucharist.¹ This was also the period of the reforms and labours of St. François de Sales in Savoy and of St. Theresa in Spain. At the same time were revived certain practices which answered their purpose among the vulgar. Miracles, which had long ceased, began again to be worked. At San

¹ Félibien, *Hist. de Paris*, t. ii. p. 1339.

Silvestro an image of the Virgin spoke, and the desolate region which surrounded her shrine, such was the attraction of the miracle, was soon occupied with houses. Similar portents became frequent, and spread from Italy into other countries. By these and the like acts did the clergy recover their reputation, and with it a large share of their former power.

But the chief instrument of Catholic reaction was the Society of Jesuits, to whose foundation we have already adverted.¹ The use that might be made of that body in retrieving the fortunes of the Church was quickly perceived; and Pope Julius III., soon after his accession, in 1550, conferred upon them vast privileges which roused the jealousy of the regular orders. They were empowered to grant degrees to competent persons whose poverty debarred them from studying at a University: a privilege which, by drawing to them the youths of talent among the lower classes, gave them the command of education, and enabled them to mould at an early age the pliant consciences of their pupils. Their method of instruction was most artful. They reduced study to a sort of mechanical process, whose results were quick but superficial; and even Protestant parents, dazzled by their success as teachers, confided to them their children.² As they thus formed the principles of the younger portion of the community by means of education, so likewise the unreserved power conferred on them of granting absolution, enabled them to obtain the direction of the consciences of older persons, by assuming the functions of confessors. The absurd quarrels of the Protestants among themselves, and particularly that concerning original sin, did not a little contribute to the success of the Jesuits.³

It was about the middle of the sixteenth century that the Society of Jesus began to spread themselves throughout Europe. In 1548 the Duke of Bavaria, William I., appointed to the chairs of theology, at Ingolstadt, the Jesuits Le Jay, a Savoyard, Salmeron, a Spaniard, and the celebrated Peter Canisius, of Nymegen. Hence Ingolstadt soon became of a like importance as a Catholic seminary, as Wittenberg for Lutheranism, or Geneva for Calvinism. Favoured by William I. and his son and successor Duke Albert III., the Jesuits gradually acquired the direction of all the Bavarian schools. They were likewise encouraged by the Emperor Ferdinand in Bohemia and Austria; and it was at the

¹ See vol. ii. chap. xvii. The principal histories of the Jesuits are those of Orlandini, Maffei, and Ribadaneira. There is a good sketch in Schröckh, *Christliche*

Kirchengeschichte seit der Reformation, B. iii.

² See Michélet, *Ligue*, p. 116.

³ Menzel, B. iii, S. 43.

request of that Sovereign that Canisius, who did more than any man for his Society in Germany, drew up his *Summa Doctrinæ Christianæ*, from which he afterwards extracted his celebrated catechism. In 1551 Ferdinand established a Jesuit's college at Vienna, which he soon after incorporated with the University; in 1556 he removed some of them to Prague: and by that year their influence may be said to have extended over Bavaria, Tyrol, Franconia, Suabia, Austria, and the Rhenish lands, and also to have been felt in Hungary, Poland, Bohemia, and Moravia. In 1578, as related in the preceding chapter, Protestantism was utterly proscribed in the Austrian dominions. In Poland, Cardinal Hosias, Bishop of Ermeland, founded a college for the Jesuits at Braunsberg, in 1569. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Polish Jesuits nearly succeeded in effecting a revolution in Russia, and bringing that country within the pale of the Roman Church. After the murder of the legitimate heir, Demetrius Ivanowitch, and the usurpation of the throne by Boris Godenuff, a Muscovite Boyard, a false Demetrius appeared in Poland, the Jesuits took up his cause, procured his recognition in Poland and the help of an army, with which they entered Moscow after the death of Boris, who had died during the struggle. But the Muscovite nation soon recovered from its surprise; Demetrius was massacred, the Poles were expelled from Moscow, and the hopes of the Church of Rome entirely frustrated.

It was not till a rather later period that the Jesuits obtained a footing in France, and at first in places remote from the capital. At Paris, as we have already related,¹ they met with great opposition; the University, the Sorbonne, and the Parliament, who thought their privileges invaded, united in bitterly opposing them. By perseverance, however, they gradually succeeded in establishing themselves: and, in 1564, were allowed to become teachers. Three years later a magnificent college was erected for them at Lyon, in 1574 the Cardinal of Guise founded a Jesuit College at Pont-à-Mousson; and they also established themselves in other important towns. Their ranks at this time included many men of distinguished talent, and wherever they appeared the numbers of the Roman Catholics were observed to increase. In 1574 a Jesuit college was founded at Lucerne, in Switzerland, to which the Pope, the Catholic King, and the Guises are said to have contributed.

But although the religious struggle in France ended, as we

¹ See vol. ii. p. 299.

have seen, in favour of the Roman Catholic Church, the authority of the Pope and of the Jesuits never attained to any extraordinary height in that country. The Jesuits succeeded, indeed, in procuring the revocation of the banishment inflicted on them after Châtel's attempt on the life of Henry IV. ; that King even gave them the site for their College at La Flèche, whither his heart was carried after his murder ; yet in general they continued to be unpopular among the French. In 1611 the inhabitants of Troyes opposed their establishment in that city, on the ground that they were fomenters of discord and division ; in the same year, the University of Paris frustrated their attempt to teach publicly in their renewed college, and compelled them to content themselves with privately instructing, by means of salaried masters, the boarders whom they were permitted to keep in their house. In 1614 the Parliament of Paris ordered to be burnt a book of the Jesuit Suarez, entitled *Défense de la Foi Catholique Apostolique contre les erreurs de la secte d'Angleterre*, on the ground of its advocating the assassination of Sovereigns.¹ It was remarked that, though other religious societies had produced assassins, the Jesuits were the only one which supported assassination systematically and on principle. The deed had a law of its own. It was not to be perpetrated at the arbitrament of a private individual, but it might be lawfully carried out by the decree of an ecclesiastical tribunal ; and this view the Jesuits founded on the 15th decree of the Council of Constance, which anathematized those only who attempted such an act without having first procured a mandate for it.²

Altogether, therefore, the movement against the Reformation was not so successful in France as in Austria and Bavaria. The Edict of Nantes was, in fact, a compromise which still left the Hugonots a powerful party—a sort of *imperium in imperio*. They had their cautionary towns, an organized army, their representative charter, their assemblies ; they had even their great seal, of which the device was Religion leaning on the cross, holding the sacred volume in her hand, and treading under foot an aged skeleton intended to represent the Romish Church. Thus they possessed an organization which enabled them, in times of disturbance, to break through all the checks and restraints which it had been endeavoured to place upon them. But the zeal and energy of their leaders had died out. Sully, Morpay, Lesdi-

¹ See Richelieu, *Mémoires*, t. i. p. 113 sqq. p. 149 and note, and p. 202.

dato judicis cujuscunque."—Ap. Siamondi, *Hist. des Français*, t. xv. p. 333.

² "Non expectata sententia vel man

guières, were either lukewarm or self-interested; nor did Protestantism find in France that pabulum in the popular temperament which had nourished it in Germany and England. Rohan, indeed, was animated with enthusiasm; but alone he could do nothing.

The Gallican Church, however, without regard to Rome and in spite of the great Hugonot party, made France groan, like other Roman Catholic countries, under the burden of an enormous ecclesiastical establishment. Early in the seventeenth century the whole number of secular and regular ecclesiastics considerably exceeded a quarter of a million,¹ of which more than three-fifths were monks or nuns: viz. 35,600 *religieux rentés*, or monks belonging to foundations; 80,000 nuns of various orders; 46,500 mendicant friars, ancient and reformed; and 500 hermits. But while the *curés* or parochial clergy, had scarcely sufficient for the necessaries of life, dwelt in houses which did not defend them from the weather, and sometimes subsisted on bread which they squeezed with difficulty from their parishioners, the mendicant orders, by virtue of their vow of poverty, dwelt in magnificent buildings, and consumed each a pound of meat and three pints of wine a day. Their *repas maigres*, or fast-day meals, were still more expensive; and it was reckoned that the subsistence of each monk cost daily twenty sous.

It was not till 1580 that the Jesuits appeared in England. Dr. William Allen, as we have said (vol. ii. p. 410), had founded an English Catholic seminary at Douai, and others were subsequently established at St. Omer, Rheims, and Rome. The pupils of these colleges were animated with the same savage spirit of murder. Against Queen Elizabeth their rage was inexhaustible, since, under her auspices, Protestantism had not only been firmly established in England, but also found her its chief protectress in other countries. The work of Saunders, *Demonarchia visibili Ecclesie*, published at Lovvain in 1571, was the bible of these ferocious fanatics. Saunders had been secretary to bloody Mary, and his book was written under the patronage of the Duke of Alva. It was in the year mentioned that the Jesuits Parsons and Campion returned to England, after which a great many penal laws were promulgated against that Society. Queen Elizabeth, in self-defence, was compelled to take a leaf out of her enemies' book, and England witnessed to some extent a persecution of the Catholics, of whom about two hundred were executed during her reign. It

¹ 266,936: an enormous proportion, considering the population at that time.

See *Le nombre des Ecclésiastiques de France* in the *Archives Curieuses*, &c. l. x. xiv.

should, however, be recollected that they were Elizabeth's political enemies, that they were constantly endeavouring to deprive her of her kingdom, and even of her life, and that most of those who suffered in England were convicted of conspiracy.¹

It may appear surprising that in a bigoted country like Spain the Jesuits should have obtained little or no influence; but, in fact, that very bigotry afforded small scope for their activity in that country; and we have before had occasion to remark that Spain, with all her superstitious devotion, was inimical to the encroachments of Rome. Yet Spain had given birth to the founder of the Society, and produced an eminent patron of it in Francis Borgia, Duke of Gandia, great-grandson of the infamous Pope Alexander VI., who displayed as much bigotry and superstition as his great-grandsire did vice and atheism, at last turned Jesuit himself, and eventually became third general of the Society. As a rule, however, the Jesuits in Spain were not native Spaniards, but converted Jews, and even became objects of suspicion to the government. St. Francis Borgia himself was prosecuted by the Inquisition as one of the mystics or *illuminati*, a sect which seems to have borne some resemblance to the English Quakers.² In Portugal, on the other hand, during the minority of Sebastian and the tutorship of his ecclesiastical guardians, the Jesuits, as we have already said, obtained a complete control. John III. had founded for them a college at the University of Coimbra, whence issued the greater part of those missionaries who spread themselves over Asia and Africa.

Neither Spain nor Italy,³ however, was altogether exempt from the invasion of heretical doctrines. As early as 1519, Froben, the celebrated printer of Basle, forwarded some of Luther's tracts into Spain; and in 1527 several works of Erasmus were condemned, and prosecutions instituted against some of the most learned men in the country. By 1530 the doctrines of Luther had made such progress that the Council of the Supreme instructed the inquisitors throughout Spain to exercise the greatest vigilance: an injunction which led to domiciliary visits by the familiars of the Inquisition. The Spaniards themselves attributed the propagation of Lutheran opinions in Spain to their

¹ On this subject see Hallam's *Constitutional Hist.* ch. xi. and iv.

² Llorente, t. vi. p. 29.

³ The Reformation found for a time a footing in Italy, and especially at Ferrara, under the auspices of René of France, who had married the Duke; but its pro-

gress in that country is not important enough to be detailed.

⁴ The chief tribunal of the Spanish Inquisition, consisting of the Inquisitor-General as president, and three counsellors, two of whom were Doctors of Laws.

own learned men who had been sent abroad to confute them; an admission than which any more complimentary to Luther can scarcely be imagined, although, according to the testimony of Valdes, that reformer was regarded in Spain as a reprobate atheist, and it was deemed as meritorious to strangle a Lutheran as to shoot a Turk.¹ The Spanish converts, like Valdes himself, were mostly persons of rank and education; for in Spain the reformed doctrines were chiefly imbibed from books, procured and read with danger. The Protestants of Béarn, indeed, who crossed the Pyrenees, spread their faith in Aragon, where it made most progress, though it also penetrated into the neighbouring kingdoms. It was reserved for Philip II. to crush the nascent heresy, almost the only instance in which his policy can boast of entire success. This triumph of bigotry shows that the power of opinion is not always a match for despotism and physical force, when wielded with adequate means and a relentless will. Philip, who was supported by that savage Pope, Paul IV., published in 1558 a bloody law by which death and confiscation of property were inflicted on anybody who sold, bought, read, or possessed a book prohibited by the Holy Office. In January, 1559, Paul authorized the Spanish Inquisition to hold inquests on archbishops, bishops, and other prelates suspected of heresy, and to send them to Rome; and in the following February, at the request of Philip, he published a brief authorizing the Council of the Supreme to deliver over to the secular arm—that is, to put to death—persons convicted of Lutheran opinions, even though they were not relapsed and were willing to recant, a proceeding contrary to all former practice, and against the standing laws of the Inquisition itself.² It was in the same year that the first *auto-de-fé* of Protestants was celebrated at Valladolid, which was soon followed by another in the same city, and two more at Seville. In these human sacrifices two hundred and eight victims appeared, of whom sixty-two were burnt and the rest condemned to minor punishments. About the same time Carranza, the Primate of Spain, was pursued by the Inquisition, a prosecution followed by that of eight bishops and twenty-five doctors of theology, most of whom were men of distinguished learning, and had assisted at the Council of Trent. The four *autos-de-fé* just mentioned were followed by others down to the year 1570, when the Reformation in Spain was pretty well suppressed; for though a few

¹ Ap. McCrie, *Reform. in Spain*, p. 132.

² *Ibid.* p. 256.

Protestants were subsequently burnt, the gleanings were scanty.¹ In the hands of the Spanish Government, the Inquisition, as we have said, became an instrument of State policy, and even of fiscal law; and thus, in 1569, the exportation of horses to France was brought under cognizance of the Council of the Supreme.²

A statistical account³ of the year 1616 shows the wonderful progress of the Jesuits in about three-quarters of a century since their foundation. At that time they had thirty-two provinces—viz., Rome, Sicily, Naples, Milan, Venice, Portugal, Goa, Malabar, Japan, Brazil, Toledo, Castile, Aragon, Bætica (South Spain), Sardinia, Peru, Paraguay, New Granada, Mexico, Philippine Isles, France, Aquitania, Lyon, Toulouse, Champagne, Upper Germany, the Rhonish province, Austria, Flanders, Walloon Netherlands, Poland, and Lithuania. The order numbered 13,112 members, and possessed 23 professed houses, 372 colleges, 41 novitiates, and 123 residences. At this period the Jesuits could boast of many distinguished writers, amongst whom it may suffice to mention Petau, Sirmont, Schott, Tursellinus, Bellarmine, Suarez, Sanchez, and Mariana. The Jesuits had even penetrated to Constantinople early in the seventeenth century, whither they had gone with the design of overthrowing the Greek Patriarch, and bringing his flock under the dominion of Rome. A struggle ensued which lasted many years, and in which the ambassadors of the different Christian Powers to the Porte took part, the Jesuits being supported by the French and Austrian envoys, while those of England and Holland came to the aid of the Patriarch. In 1662, by a skilful application of 40,000 dollars, the Jesuits effected the deposition and banishment by the Porte of the Patriarch Cyrill, who was supposed to be a Calvinist; but on a change in the Ministry his restoration was soon after effected, principally through the intervention of the English envoy, Sir Thomas Roe. In 1628 the same minister, supported by the Mufti and the Ulemas, gained a complete triumph over the Jesuits, and effected their banishment from Constantinople; but Roe went back to England in that year, and the Jesuits soon after managed to return.⁴ It is not encouraging to the friend of

¹ The fires of the Inquisition were not, however, completely extinguished till 1581, when a *beata*, or nun, accused of heresy, was burnt at Seville, Nov. 7th. Llorente, c. ix. p. 231.

² McCrie, p. 333.

³ In Jouveney, *Hist. Soc. J.es.*, ap. Schröckh, B. iii. S. 362. About 1623

started up an order of *Jesuitisse*, or female Jesuits, who imitated as nearly as possible the constitutions of their brethren, by whom, however, they were never recognized. They were abolished by Pope Urban VIII. in 1631. *Ibid.* p. 536.

⁴ On this subject, see Sir Thomas Roe's *Negotiations*, p. 758 sq. and 779.

human progress to reflect that the men who succeeded in subjugating the understandings of so many millions were the disciples of one whose wild hallucinations might have qualified him for an inmate of a lunatic asylum. The principles of Loyola, however, were reduced to a practical and methodical system by cooler and more designing heads than his own, and the designs of the Jesuits were at once concealed and aided by the assumption of manners which in appearance rendered them more secular and less fanatical than any other religious order.

The world-wide influence of the Jesuits appears from the preceding list of their provinces. It is their missionary labours beyond the bounds of Europe which show the brightest side of their character; for though some may question the practical utility or permanent success of their efforts, nobody can deny them the praise of courage and self-devotion. To detail their missions lies not within our plan, and it may suffice to indicate generally some of the leading events. • Xavier, the companion of Loyola, was the first and greatest Jesuit missionary. He proceeded to the East Indies, and founded in 1542 a college at Goa, which before the close of the century numbered 120 members. The natives educated at this institution served as interpreters to the Jesuits in the East Indies and in Japan, where, in spite of the ingenious objections of the Bonzes, they succeeded in making many converts. No permanent good was, however, effected; for in less than a century after, the Dutch, in the interests of their commerce, helped in driving all the Christians from Japan. Xavier died on his voyage to China in 1552. Towards the end of the century, the Jesuit Ricci established a mission in that country which met with some partial success. • King John III. of Portugal despatched Jesuit missionaries into Brazil in 1549, some of whom found their way into Paraguay. The conquest of this country by the Spanish Jesuits at the beginning of the seventeenth century is a singular event in the history of mankind. Aided by the children of some of the natives, whom they had taught Spanish, they penetrated by degrees into that savage country; introducing flocks and herds, teaching the Indians to sow and reap, to make bricks, to build houses, in short, all the essential arts of civilized life. The people of Paraguay became the devoted servants, nay, almost the slaves of the Jesuits; who, although they acknowledged the authority of the King of Spain, and paid as a sort of tribute a piastre a head for their subjects, ruled quite independently of the Spanish government. As the masters as well as the rulers of the

Paraguayans, the Jesuits distributed to them the hemp, the cotton, the wool and other raw materials which they were to manufacture; they were allowed to possess neither money nor arms, although the priests exercised them in the use of the latter, and converted them into excellent soldiers. Thus the Jesuits were at once the founders, lawgivers, pontiffs, and sovereigns of this singular state. As the Roman Catholic religion thus began to spread abroad into distant countries, Pope Gregory XV. established in 1622, to superintend its diffusion, the *Congregatio de propaganda Fide*; and a few years afterwards Urban VIII. bestowed on it the building, or college, of the Propaganda (1627).

The bigotry and intolerance of Charles V. and Philip II. and of friars like Ximenes and Torquemada, were one cause of the subsequent decline of Spain; in the general policy and especially the wretched commercial system of those Sovereigns we must look for others. Towards the end of Charles V.'s reign, Spain seemed to have reached the zenith of her prosperity, and in the year 1543 we find that Emperor congratulating himself on the flourishing state of the Indian trade whose operations were conducted at Seville. "Thanks be to God," he exclaimed, "it has ever increased and still increases daily." But the possession of the New World was regarded as supplying the means for subjugating the Old; and the command of an apparently inexhaustible source of wealth only prompted Charles and his son to gratify their ambition or their bigotry by plunging into those expensive and ruinous wars which at length exhausted even the Spanish treasures: a result which a wretched fiscal policy contributed to hasten.

It was an evil hour when governments bethought themselves of increasing the wealth and prosperity of their subjects by fiscal regulations; yet the idea seems to have been coeval with the extension of commerce, and the Venetians, the first nation of modern Europe which enjoyed any considerable trade, were also among the first to invent restrictions, prohibitions, and monopolies. Nothing could be narrower and more selfish than the spirit of their commercial laws. Foreigners were subjected to double customs' duties; they could neither build nor purchase ships in Venetian ports; they were forbidden to be received on board a vessel of the State, or to contract a partnership with any subject of the Republic. Ingenious foreign artisans were encouraged to settle in the Venetian dominions, while native artisans and mechanics

were forbidden under the severest penalties to emigrate. The nearest kinsfolk of such as attempted to do so and did not return when ordered, were thrown into prison; if the emigrant persisted in his disobedience, emissaries were employed to kill him!¹ It is impossible to carry further the selfish and cruel jealousy of trade. This system of prohibition and exclusion was initiated by other countries. Among these, Spain was remarkable. We have briefly referred in a former chapter to the ignorance of the Spaniards of the first rudiments of political economy; and we will here add a few particulars. The ruin of Spanish trade and commerce was initiated under Charles V. In 1552 the export of cloth as well as of spun and combed wool was forbidden. In the same year the Cortes proposed that the importation of foreign silk should be allowed, and the exportation of home manufactured prohibited. It was also forbidden to export corn, cattle, and leather. Reversing the very rudiments of economical policy, exorbitant duties were laid on the exportation of manufactured articles, and upon the importation of raw materials. We see in these regulations the germs of inevitable ruin, and one of the causes which drained the country of the specie acquired by so much cruelty and bloodshed. At the end of the sixteenth century Spanish pistoles were much more common in France than in Spain, because the French exported freely their corn and wine, while the Spaniards would suffer nothing to quit the country.² The consequences soon became apparent in the shutting up of the manufactories, so that in 1558 it was found necessary to relax the prohibition, at least on the Portuguese frontier.³ But the blow was irremediable, and fashion soon put the seal to a ruinous system that had been initiated by ignorance. In 1560 we find complaints that silk and woollen stuffs, brocades, tapestry, arms, all came from abroad, although the materials for their manufacture were abundant in Spain; nay, that the foreigner actually made them of Spanish products and then set his own price on them. The use of foreign articles begat a liking for them, which became a fashion. No better silk could be produced than in Granada and Murcia, yet that of Italy and China was preferred. English jackets, Lombard caps, German shoes, Dutch linen, Antwerp tablecloths, Brussels tapestry, Flemish cabinet ware, became all the

¹ Statutes of the State Inquisition, Art. 26, ap. Blanqui, *Hist. de l'Economie Polit.* t. i. p. 268.

² Forbonnais, *Recherches sur les Fi-*

nances de France, ap. Twiss, *Progress of Political Economy in Europe*, p. 41.

³ See Ranke, *Fürsten und Völker*, B. i. 401 ff.; Twiss, *ibid.* p. 6.

vogue. People appeared by day in Florentine brocade, and slept at night under outlandish bed-hangings. France supplied the children of Spain with their toys, her monks and nuns with their rosaries. She was dependent on foreigners even for the materials of war: it was necessary to fetch wood and gunpowder from Flanders, metal and men to cast it from Italy; for Spain had no cannon foundries of her own.

Other circumstances which militated against commerce in Spain were the idleness, pride, and bigotry of the Spaniards. The nation was divided into two classes, between which there was a continual jealousy: the *Hidalgos*, or nobles, and the *Pecheros*, or persons employed in trade and agriculture. The *Hidalgos* enjoyed peculiar privileges, and are expressly named as entitled to favour by Ferdinand and Isabella, "because through them we achieved our conquests."¹ This class would have deemed itself disgraced by any other profession than that of arms. They were regarded as the pith and marrow of the nation; they filled all the offices of state; a municipal town would have been affronted by the appointment of a trader to be its *corregidor*; the Cortes of Aragon would admit no member who had been engaged in commerce. As neither the house, the horse, the mule, nor the arms of a *Hidalgo* could be seized for debt, nor his personal liberty be infringed, nor taxes be imposed upon him, everybody naturally wished to belong to an order which enjoyed so large a share of favour; and so many claims were consequently made to the privileges of the *Hidalguia*, that, although the tribunals set apart every Saturday for the examination of them, it was often found insufficient. The interest of money being high in Spain, if a *roturier* could scrape together some 7,000 ducats, which would yield an income of about 500, he settled it on his eldest son as a *majorat*, or patrimony. The son of a *si-devant* farmer or shopkeeper now considered himself a noble, and dubbed himself *Don*; while his younger brothers began to be ashamed of their callings, and wanted the same title. Those who had no chance of attaining to such a rank, often turned their views towards a convent; where, if they could not gratify their pride, they might at least indulge their idleness. Hence the number of convents increased enormously in Spain. As the tradesman aped the noble, so the noble aped the King; and because Philip II. had founded the Escorial, so the grandees thought it a fine thing to

¹ *Nueva Recopilacion*, ap. Ranke, *Fürsten und Völker* S. 399.

have a monastery on their estates; convents rose on every side and candidates to fill them were always forthcoming. These institutions not only offered an easy, idle life, but also secured a certain degree of respect and importance. Philip III. and his consort founded even more convents than Philip II.; and in the reign of the former it was computed that Spain contained 988 nunneries, all numerously filled; that there were 32,000 friars of the Dominican and Franciscan orders alone; and that the clergy in the two dioceses of Pamplona and Calahorra amounted to 20,000.¹ A consequence of this state of society was that even the little commerce that remained in Spain fell mostly into the hands of foreigners. The financial embarrassments of Charles V. led him not only to give to Germans and Italians a monopoly of the Indian trade as security for their advances, but even to allow them to encroach upon the birthright of his Spanish subjects by engrossing the trade and commerce of the interior. The Fuggers and other great foreign houses to whom Charles was under obligation, obtained commercial privileges that were denied to born Spaniards, such as that of exporting prohibited articles, and others of a similar kind. By degrees, these intruders, favoured by such a state of manners as we have described, monopolized not only the higher branches of commerce, but even the smaller handicraft trades; and in 1610 it was computed that there were 160,000 foreigners settled in Castile alone, of whom 10,000 were Genoese.²

In the absence of an adequate revenue from trade, the Spanish government was compelled to lay on very burdensome taxes. In 1594 the Cortes complain that a capital of 1,000 ducats paid annually 300 to the King, so that in the course of three or four years the whole of it would be swallowed up. Yet people, they said, instead of engaging in commercial enterprises, lived off their capital as long as it would last. Rents were low, yet no farmers could be had; they were either emigrating or else shut up in prison. Scarcely a fifth part of the wool formerly used was now manufactured; whence, as well as through the heavy tax on that commodity, the flocks also began to be greatly diminished. Agriculture and pasturage, manufactures and commerce, drooped together; every town in the land was beginning to be depopulated; the country was going to ruin! Such is a picture of Spain at the close of the sixteenth century, after a hundred years'

¹ Davila, *Felipe III. ap. Ranke, ibid.* p. 415.

² Ranke and Twiss, *ubi supra.*

possession of the treasures of the New World, not drawn from the deductions or descriptions of historical writers, but taken from an official document of the Cortes.¹

But although the taxes were enormous they brought comparatively little into the royal treasury, the greater part of the produce being swallowed up by the expenses of collection. This abuse was one of the consequences of the sale of offices. As every place was venal, it followed that Philip II. was most unfaithfully served; and his officers indemnified themselves for their outlay by impounding what passed through their hands. Another evil was, that while the taxes were so high and so badly collected, they were spent out of the country. The government had to procure its necessaries abroad; its principal creditors were foreigners; the money once withdrawn from Spain never returned, owing to its absurd fiscal system, and thus the country became every year more and more exhausted. Already in 1540, Charles V., the master of the treasures of the New World, had coined a large quantity of base gold crowns to supply his necessities. So great continued to be the drain of specie in order to purchase foreign manufactures that, in 1603, Philip III. was advised by Lerma to issue a royal edict raising the nominal value of copper money almost to an equality with that of silver.² All these evils were aggravated by the impolitic nature of the wars entered into by Philip II. By his quarrel with the Netherlands, besides the expense it entailed, he had deprived himself of one of his most productive sources of revenue;³ yet he did not even pursue that war in a manner which might have insured its success, but frittered away his means in chimerical projects in France.

Spain, however, may perhaps be said not so much to have declined as to have returned to the normal condition from which it had been forced by a series of extraordinary events; the union of the Crowns of Castile and Aragon; the reduction of the Moors; the wonderful discoveries in America; and the enormous accumulation of power in the hands of the House of Austria. All these advantages, which by able rulers might have been developed into a permanent system of power, were thrown away by the

¹ *Memorial de las Cortes de 1594*, ap. Ranke, *ibid.* S. 412.

² Blanqui, t. i. p. 282; Gonzalez Davila, ap. Watson, *Philip III.* vol. i. p. 191.

³ The average produce of the American mines during the reign of Philip II. was

11,000,000 ducats (Humboldt, *Essai sur la N. Espagne*, t. iii. p. 428), and the war in the Netherlands cost him 7,000,000 ducats annually (Motley, *Rise of the Dutch Rep.* ii. 518).

absurd and reckless mode, of government which we have just described, and Spain returned to the condition depicted by the Venetian Navagero in his *Viaggio* in 1526.¹ Even Catalonia is described by that writer as then ill-peopled and little cultivated; Aragon was for the most part desolate; in Castile the traveller found extensive tracts of desert, with now and then a *Venta*, commonly uninhabited, and resembling rather a caravansary than an hotel.

Towards the end of the sixteenth century, a little band of original thinkers arose in Calabria, who were the first to promulgate any just notions on the subject of political economy. The chief among these were Thomas Campanella and Antonio Serra, who had both been engaged in an attempt to rescue Calabria from the Spanish yoke in 1598. From the depths of a Neapolitan dungeon the friar Campanella addressed to Philip III. of Spain a remarkable prediction of that country's decline, founded on the actual appearances which it presented. The Spaniards, he observed, who so haughtily keep aloof from other people, who neglect agriculture and commerce, and esteem only the profession of arms, will soon exhaust themselves; they will never be able to recover their losses, and their wealth will pass away into the hands of the foreigner. Already the most useful arts of life languish in neglect; and, without manufactures, agriculture, or trade, how can any people hope to prosper? So indolent are the Spaniards that they do not even deign to record the great actions which they achieve. Campanella reviews and condemns the system of taxation; advises the encouragement of navigation; because the key of the ocean is the key of the world; recommends the equality of civil laws; the accession of all classes to power; the encouragement of art and manufacture, as things of more real value than mines of gold and silver. And while he thus proclaims the approaching ruin of Spain, the prophetic monk announces in glowing terms the renovation of the world through the wonderful discoveries of science, and the irresistible progress of human liberty and knowledge.² In 1613, Antonio Serra, then also in a Neapolitan dungeon, addressed to the Spanish Viceroy Lemes a work on the methods of procuring the precious

¹ Apud Ranke, *Fürsten und Völker*, B. i. S. 397 f.

² The treatise of Campanella, *De Monarchia Hispanica*, has gone through many editions, and was translated into English by Chilmead, with a preface by the celebrated William Prynne, 1639. Serra's

tract is entitled *Breve trattato delle cause che possono far abbondare li regni d'oro e d'argento, dove non sono miniere*. The writers of this school are described by Botta, *Storia d'Italia*, lib. xv. Cf. Twiss, *Progress of Political Economy*, lect. 1.

metals in countries which do not possess mines, in which true principles of trade are first laid down. Ruin stole on Spain with a more rapid stride than even Campanella might have anticipated. Between the years 1600 and 1619 the peasantry in the diocese of Salamanca had decreased from 8,384 to 4,135, or more than one-half, and depopulation was going on at the same rate in other parts of Spain.¹ The most fertile fields were left unploughed, the houses were everywhere dilapidated and decayed. The first Cortes of Philip IV., who ascended the throne in 1621, complain that if things went on in their present course there would soon be no labourers for the field, no pilots for the sea; people would no longer marry, the nation would become extinct, the clergy alone surviving without a flock! The chief cities, they remark, are filled with beggars; whole families abandon house and home and adopt mendicancy as affording the only chance of support. Yet, though they saw and felt these evils, so blinded were the Spaniards with bigotry, so utterly unconscious that it was one of the chief sources of their misery, that these very Cortes could suggest no better remedy than to change the patron saint! Their proposition to hand over Spain to the protection of St. Teresa de Jesus was, however, opposed on the ground that their former patron St. Iago might take offence, "under whose protection they had seen the whole world at their feet, and the nation enlightened by science and virtue!"²

The ancient maritime commerce which the Catalans had shared with Genoa and Venice partook in the general decay. At the beginning of the sixteenth century the trade of Barcelona was still flourishing, and does not then appear to have been much injured by the Portuguese discoveries. That city prided itself on a saying of Charles V., that he deemed it more honourable and important to be Count of Barcelona than to have received the Roman Crown. In 1529, however, Charles fitted out his last fleet from the remnant of the Catalan marine. Ten years more and Barcelona had a consul neither at Tunis nor Alexandria; commerce with Constantinople and the Levant was a thing to be no longer contemplated. The new route of ocean commerce was one of the causes of this decline; a still more direct one was the predominance of the Turkish navy in the Mediterranean after the victories of Hayraddin Barbarossa over the Spanish and Venetian fleets in the Ionian Sea in 1538, the alliance between Sultan

¹ Davila, *Felipe III.* an. 1619., ap. Ranke, *ibid.* S. 417.

² *Cortés primeras de Felipe IV.*, ap. Ranke, *ibid.* S. 417 f.

Solyman and Francis I., and the settlements of the Mahometans on the coast of Africa.

France, like Spain, was also suffering from an erroneous system of political economy introduced by Birago, the *Garde des Sceaux* and Chancellor of Catharine de' Medici, before whose time the trade of France seems to have been unfettered. By birth a Milanese, Birago had adopted the prohibitive and protective theories of Venice and other Italian cities, though his regulations were somewhat better than those observed in Spain, and were intended to promote the manufactures of France. He discountenanced only the exportation of raw materials (*matières premières*) and the importation of manufactured articles; a system which from this time forward plays a great part in the laws and policy of France.¹ Thus the export of wool, flax, hemp, &c. was forbidden, and on the other hand the importation of woollen and linen cloths, gold and silver lace, velvet, satin, arms, tapestry, &c. Drugs and spices could enter only at certain ports, as Marseilles, Rouen, Bordeaux, and La Rochelle. These laws were accompanied with others regulating the prices of articles. Special commissions of notables were appointed in every town to assess the price of victuals, cloths, and other goods, as well as to settle the rate of labourers' wages. This injudicious meddling had the same operation as in Spain, though not to the same extent, of depressing the trade and industry of the nation. At the beginning of the seventeenth century French manufactures had much deteriorated. France had at one time the reputation of making the best cloth in the world, both for dye and texture, but it had now entirely lost its character. The trade in scarlet cloth exported to Turkey, which in the time of Francis I. had been very large, had been entirely lost. The Turkey trade was now carried on by the French with ready money only. The Author of the *Advis au Roi*,² published in 1614, complains that Marseilles alone sent annually to Turkey seven million crowns of silver, and attributes to this cause the scarcity of that metal in France; what little there was being mostly foreign coin, and of baser alloy than the French. The chief cause of the great drain of money in that direction was that France still imported her spices, drugs, and cottons from Turkey instead of procuring them from the East Indies, either through the Amsterdam Company, or by establishing a company

¹ See Isambert, *Recueil d'anciennes Lois Françaises*, t. xiv. p. 241.

² In the *Archives Curieuses*, 2^{de} sér.

t. i. On the trade of France at this period, see also Laffemas, *Hist. du Commerce de France*, *ibid.* 1^{re} sér. t. xiv.

of her own. Other manufactures, as that of leather, had also deteriorated; and although glass had long been used in France, it was only recently that it had begun to be made there. As in Spain, the caprice of fashion had also proved injurious to trade. The French gentry disdained to wear articles of home manufacture, and procured instead, at an extravagant price, the rich cloths and silks of Venice and Genoa; while the inhabitants of those towns themselves went very simply clad. The Parisians, however, were already distinguished for their taste in manufacturing articles of domestic luxury, and the silver plate made in that capital was in great demand throughout the world. But, on the whole, commerce drooped, and what little existed was mostly in the hands of aliens. Commercial pursuits were not regarded with favour by the higher classes, and the French gentleman, like the Spanish hidalgo, considered arms to be the only honourable profession. The decay of trade was aggravated by the want of good internal communications. In consequence of the badness of the roads, merchants were in many places compelled to send their goods thirty or forty leagues round, a circumstance which had caused the ruin of many towns. The rates levied for the maintenance of such roads as existed were often diverted to other purposes; and fraudulent bankrupts and other dishonest persons sometimes took advantage of the neglected and unguarded state of the highways to pretend a robbery or an accident, and thus to defraud their creditors. When Henry IV. was firmly established on the throne, Sully turned his attention to the state of the roads, made them more direct, and planted their sides with elms; which, however, were uprooted by the ignorant populace. The scheme of joining the Mediterranean and the ocean by means of a canal was also agitated in Henry's reign, and appears to have been suggested in a letter of Cardinal Joyeuse to the King.¹ The plan was subsequently discussed in the council of Mary de' Medici, "but," says Richelieu, "the enterprise was too great for the times, nor was there anybody who cared enough for the commerce and riches of France to support it."² The execution of that useful and magnificent work was reserved for the reign of Louis XVI. Sully, however, commenced the canal of Briare to join the Seine and Loire, a work not completed till the reign of Louis XIII.

• France was saved by its agricultural wealth and by the cares of

¹ *Archives Curieuses*, 2nd édit. t. i. p. 12, ed. note. On the state of trade, finance, &c. under Henry IV., the work of M. Poisson is of great authority.

² *Mémoires*, t. i. p. 179.

Sully, who, though he paid little attention to commerce, and indeed strangely regarded foreign trade and home manufactures as sources of impoverishment,¹ was careful to develop the natural resources of France, and to restore its financial system to a sound and vigorous condition. Giovanni Botero, a Piedmontese, who wrote towards the end of the sixteenth century, remarks that France possessed four magnets which served to attract the wealth of other countries: its corn, which helped to supply Spain and Portugal; its wine exported to England, Flanders, and the Baltic; its salt, manufactured on the shores of the Mediterranean and the ocean; and its hemp and cloth, in demand at Lisbon and Seville, for the sails and cordage of the Portuguese and Spanish shipping.² The breeding of cattle, however, does not seem to have kept pace with the progress of agriculture; horses, in particular, it was found necessary to import from Turkey, Italy, Spain, England, Germany, and other places. Hence, although France had gone through nearly half a century of civil wars, carried on in the name of religion, which to a great extent brought back the middle ages, she was nevertheless, from her natural resources, in a much more flourishing condition; and enjoyed better future prospects at the beginning of the seventeenth century than Spain, in spite of the vast colonial possessions of the latter country, the internal peace which had reigned in it, and the absolute authority acquired by its Sovereigns. This last advantage, so far as foreign affairs are concerned, was the only thing yet wanting to render France more than a match for Spain in that rivalry between the two nations which will hereafter occupy so much of our attention. After the peace of Vervins and the Edict of Nantes, the old struggle between the French Crown and the French nobles still remained to be renewed. It was necessary that France should become a powerful monarchy before it could be a great nation, and from this period it was the constant aim of the government to centralize the power of the King; an object not thoroughly attained till the reign of Louis XIV. •

The very conditions on which Henry IV. had made his peace with the heads of the League presented an obstacle to this centralization. He had been forced to purchase their submission with governments, fortresses, and money, thus creating a new class of powerful vassals, almost as formidable as those feudal ones which it had been the constant aim of Louis XI. to control and humiliate. Although the twelve great governments were of

¹ Bianqui, *Econ. Polit.* t. i. p. 357. •

² Botero, ap. Macpher-son, vol. vi, p. 197.

royal delegation, yet the holders of them were often obeyed by the inhabitants of these provinces in preference to the King. In 1599, when Henry IV. was troubled by the machinations of the Spanish Court, the Duke of Montpensier insulted him with the proposition that Governors should be allowed to hold their provinces as proprietors, doing only liege homage to the Crown; and he assured the King that he would thus always be provided with the means of raising an army.¹ To check the power of the Governors, Henry sometimes appointed lieutenant-generals in the provinces; but these officers became sometimes as formidable as the Governors themselves. The Court had also begun to oppose the old hereditary aristocracy by another kind of nobles more dependent on the Crown, that of the "Dukes and Peers" (*la duché-pairie*) created by letters-patent: an order which pretended to the first rank of nobility. At the accession of Henry III. there had been only eight such *duchés-pairies*; when Henry IV. ascended the throne, there were eighteen, and the Bourbons in every reign created new ones.²

But there was also a class of lower nobles, having the command of a fortress or two, who could set the royal authority at defiance. As the theory and practice of engineering and fortification were then in their infancy, the King might be bearded by the commandant of a single fortress, provided he had a devoted garrison; while a confederation of three or four such commanders might make the Sovereign tremble on his throne. France was covered with such places. The fortress called *Le Castellet*, which commanded the tower of Château-Renard, affords a specimen of one. The walls were four and a half *toises* thick, with many casemated chambers, and a subterranean passage running through the whole building. It contained dungeons, magazines, a well, windmills for grinding corn, and an oven to convert it into bread; while for its defence it was stored with battering cannon and falconets, gunpowder and ammunition of all descriptions.³ Richelieu caused most of this kind of castles to be dismantled after the taking of La Rochelle. The holders of such places, and indeed the nobility of France in general, were for the most part grossly illiterate, priding themselves only on their prowess and feats of arms, which were frequently exhibited in sanguinary duels. The Constable, Henry de Montmorenci, who died in 1614, and was reputed one of the most perfect cavaliers of his time, was so illite-

¹ Anquetil, *Intrigue du Cabinet*, t. i. p. 18 s. 1.

² Sismondi, *Hist. des Franç.* t. xv. p. 142.

³ Anquetil, *ibid.* t. ii. p. 174 note.

rate that he could scarcely write his name. There were of course occasional exceptions; as, for instance, Marshal Biron. One day Biron showed himself better informed respecting some of the antiquities preserved at Fontainebleau than a professed scholar who was present; but he was half ashamed of his knowledge, and only communicated it over his shoulder as he was going away.¹ The ferocity of the nobles and the fashion of duelling had been nourished by the frivolous, and at the same time sanguinary, reign of Henry III., who, with an effeminate love of febrile emotions, accorded his favour to none but duellists. The more manly heart of Henry IV. was bent on repressing the practice, and in 1602 he published an edict declaring guilty of high treason, and consequently amenable to capital punishment, whosoever should be engaged in a duel either as principal or second. But this law proved too severe to be executed; and between 1601 and 1609 no fewer than 2,000 gentlemen were killed in duels!² In the latter year Henry published a milder edict, referring all persons who had been affronted to himself to decide whether a duel could be permitted. Whoever sent or accepted a challenge without such authority was to lose his right of reparation, and to be deprived of all his offices and employments; and he who killed his adversary in such an unlicensed duel was to be punished with death without sepulture, and his children were to be disgraced for a term of ten years.³

In the state of disorganization in which France was left by the civil wars, and in the midst of that rude and insolent nobility, she was fortunate in possessing such a King as Henry IV. and such an administrator as Sully. With all his faults, Henry did not suffer even the greatest of them, his unconquerable addiction to women, to make him forget his kingly office, and even the spell of the charming Gabrielle was powerless to resist the calls of duty and the stern admonitions of Sully. Nothing could present a greater contrast than did his Court with that of his voluptuous, effeminate, and extravagant predecessor. To repress the disorders of the nobility, which had been encouraged by Henry III., he told his nobles that they must accustom themselves to live off their

¹ Ranke, *Französ. Gesch.* B. ii. S. 84. Péréfixe in his *Hist. du Roy Henri le Grand*, represents Biron as very ignorant, like his brother nobles (p. 393, Elzevir ed. 1661).

Fontenai-Mareuil, ap. Martin, t. x. p. 469. The Memoirs of the period and the works of Brantôme abound with

accounts of duels. The celebrated one between Jarnac and La Châtaigneraye in 1547, terminated by the *coup de Jarnac*, has become classical in French history. M. Michelet has devoted two chapters to a most graphic description of it. *Guerres de Religion*, chr. i. and ii.

² Isambert, t. xv. p. 351.

own property, without recourse to the royal coffers, or oppressing their own vassals with a thousand robberies and extortions; and he advised them, as peace was now restored, to return to their homes and look after the cultivation of their lands. Knowing, moreover, how apt the French nobility was to follow the example of their King, he taught them by his own mode of dress to retrench their superfluous finery. He commonly wore a grey cloth and a doublet of satin or taffety, without pinking, lace, or embroidery, and he ridiculed those who went too finely clad, and carried, as he said, their windmills and their forests on their backs.¹

Henry's counsellor Maximilian de Béthune, Baron Rosni and afterwards Duke of Sully, on whom he had early cast his eye, was precisely the man capable of helping him in the reorganization of France. The stoical, nay somewhat cynical, manners of Sully were little calculated to gain friends. He was rude, obstinate, proud, self-interested, but he had displayed great financial ability, and Henry saw that even his repulsive qualities, his avarice included, rendered him the very man for the conjuncture. All the King required of him was that he would bestow as much care on the royal revenue as he had done on his own; nor cared to inquire whether his minister made his own fortune at the same time with that of the State. Rosni did not indeed belong to that order of statesmen who forget themselves. His income was 200,000 livres, and he possessed a couple of million in trinkets.² His rough and somewhat brutal manners served to stem the opposition he encountered. At the command of the King he had undertaken in the summer of 1596 a sort of financial voyage of discovery throughout France; when, armed with unlimited powers, he suspended the greater part of the officers of finance, examined their accounts for the last four years, and brought to the King seventy cart-loads of silver, amounting to half a million crowns, the fruits of his researches. Such was the rapacity of the *traitants*, or farmers of the revenue, that of 150 millions levied in taxes, scarce thirty found their way into the royal treasury.³ Besides putting an end to the thefts of the financiers, Sully also repressed the extortions of the Governors of provinces. He had found the State charged with a debt of nearly 300 million francs, and having a disposable revenue of only from seven to nine millions; in 1610,

¹ Péréfixe, *Hist. de Henri le Grand*, p. 260.

² Ranke, *Franz. Gesch.* B. ii. S. 80.

³ Blanqui, *Hist. de l'Econ. Polit.* t. i. p. 352.

after a lapse of twelve years, one-third of this debt had been paid off, the net revenue had been doubled, and now yielded sixteen millions, exclusive of four millions arising from a better management of the royal domains, and other sources; and the King had, at his disposal a reserve of more than twenty millions, three-fourths of which were deposited in specie at the Bastille.¹

By the wise and energetic measures of Sully, France was saved from that ruin which menaced Spain, and began rapidly to improve. Giovanni Botero, the Piedmontese writer before referred to, says that France was in his time the greatest, richest, and most populous of all European Kingdoms, and contained fifteen million inhabitants. Paris, with a population of 450,000 souls, was, with the exception, perhaps, of Moscow, the largest capital in Europe. The weak and profligate Henry III., by making that city his constant residence, had contributed much to enlarge and improve it. The earlier Kings had preferred their castles on the Loire; Francis I. had commonly resided in the neighbourhood of Paris; Henry II. had held his Court somewhat more frequently in the capital; but Charles IX. had been mostly banished from it by the religious wars.² According to the Italian writer whom we have just cited, the three European cities of the first rank and magnitude were, at that time, Moscow, Constantinople, and Paris. London could only claim a second rank, with Naples, Lisbon, Prague, Milan, and Ghent; each containing some 160,000 inhabitants; whence Botero too hastily infers that England, Naples, Portugal, Bohemia, Milan, and Flanders were States of equal magnitude and power. The size of the capital is not always a criterion of the strength of a Kingdom; but Botero's inference will show the estimation in which England was then held by foreigners. Spain certainly was, or had been, the leading nation of Europe; yet that country did not contain any city even of such magnitude as these last; a circumstance owing partly to its being made up of several small realms. The chief cities were those in which ancient Kings and Princes had held their seats; as Barcelona, Saragossa, Valencia, Cordova, Toledo, Burgos, Leon. Madrid was increasing through the residence of Philip II.; but the cities to which a Spaniard could point with most pride were Granada, the ancient capital of Moorish Kings; Seville, enriched by being the seat of the American trade; and Valladolid, which had long been the residence of the Castilian Kings. In Italy, Rome owed its splendour to the residence of the Pope;

¹ Martin, t. x. p. 446 sq.

² Ranke, *Franz. Gesch.* B. i. S. 376.

Milan and Venice were stationary, if not declining, and were no larger than they had been; Cracow and Wilna were the two chief cities of Poland; in Russia, besides Moscow, Vladimir and Great Novgorod.¹

England, under the rule of Elizabeth and her able ministers, was, at the period we are surveying, fast rising in the scale of nations, though the population was then perhaps hardly more numerous than that now contained in the capital. Meteren, the Flemish historian,² who long resided in London, describes the English as being indolent, like the Spaniards, instead of laborious like the French and Hollanders, fond of dress, field sports, and good living. The more ingenious handicrafts were exercised by foreigners, nor did the natives even cultivate the soil to the extent which they might; though England at that time exported, instead of importing grain. The true principles of commerce were at first ill-understood in England as in other countries, though perhaps not to so great an extent; and she was the first to improve upon them in practice. While statesmen, like Sully, harboured the popular prejudice against the exportation of gold and silver, the English East India Company, at its first establishment in 1600, had obtained permission to export annually 30,000*l*. It was still held, indeed, that the precious metals were the sole true elements of wealth, and that the employment of them abroad was wholesome and legitimate only when the commodities procured with them should realize in foreign markets a still larger amount, and thus raise a balance to be paid in specie. By degrees, however, juster notions began to prevail; it was at length discovered that gold and silver are nothing but commodities, and that the circulation of them, like that of any other article, should be unrestricted. These ideas at length made their way into the House of Commons, and in 1663 the statutes prohibiting the exportation of coin and bullion were repealed.³ The publications of Mr. Thomas Munn were very useful in establishing better notions of commerce; but that author was also the first who rendered popular the celebrated theory of the balance of trade; a system whose errors were pernicious, not only by inducing governments to tamper with trade instead of leaving it free to find its own channels, but also, what was still worse, by leading nations to regard the prosperity of their neighbours as incompatible with their own. Hence arose among them a desire to hurt and impoverish

¹ Botero, ap. Macpherson, ii. p. 194 sq.

² Ap. Motley, *United Netherlands*, vol. i. p. 307.

³ Twiss, p. 49.

one another : commerce; that should naturally be a bond of union, became an occasion of discord, and the jealousy of trade not only impelled them to contend with hostile tariffs, but even gave rise to frequent and bloody wars.

Some years before the close of Elizabeth's reign, Raleigh had made two unsuccessful attempts to found an English colony in Virginia; and it was reserved for her successor, James I., to initiate that colonial system by which England has been distinguished among modern nations. We pass over this subject, as well as the first attempts of the English to trade with India and America, as foreign to our purpose, except in so far as they were occasions of quarrel with the Spanish Government. The voyages of Drake, Cavendish, and others, to the New World, were really no better than piratical, though in some measure excused by the absurd and exclusive pretensions of Spain, as well as by that underhand system of hostility and annoyance, without an open breach, which had during many years prevailed between the two countries. If Drake plundered Spanish settlements on the American coast, and returned with untold treasure, Philip was aiding and abetting a rebellion in Ireland, or scheming the assassination of the heretic English Queen. It must, however, be acknowledged that the piracies of the English had often no such excuse, being in many cases exercised on friendly nations, as the French, Dutch, and Danes. After the peace of Vervins, the French maritime commerce with Spain and the Netherlands was terribly annoyed by English privateers: we find the Danes also complaining, and, in 1599, Elizabeth issued a proclamation enjoining all masters of vessels having letters of marque to give security before they sailed, that they would commit no injury on the subjects of friendly Powers.¹ Thus the hardy mariners of England, like those of ancient Greece, were nursed in piracy, and seem, like them, to have felt glory rather than shame in the exercise of a profession to which the boundless sea opens so many temptations and facilities.² The disputes which hence arose nearly produced a war between England and France, till, in 1606, they were put an end to by a treaty of commerce; by which all letters of reprisal were annulled on both sides, and many salutary regulations adopted respecting trade.³

The opening of a more extensive commerce with Russia, which

¹ Rymer, vol. xvi. p. 384.

² Οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληες τὸ πάλαι ἐτρέποντο πρὸς ληστείαν—οὐκ ἔχοντός πω αἰσῦνην τούτου τοῦ ἔργου, φέροντος ᾗ τι καὶ δόξης

μᾶλλον.—Thucyd. i. 5.

³ Rymer, vol. xvi. p. 645. Cf. Poirson, *Hist. du Règne de Henri IV.* t. ii. p. 115 sqq.

had hitherto been confined to Narva, was of a more legitimate nature. In the year 1553, a Joint-Stock Company was established in London, under the direction of the celebrated Sebastian Cabot, for the prosecution of maritime discovery, and a squadron of three ships, under the command of Sir Hugh Willoughby, doubled the North Cape in search of a north-eastern passage. Sir Hugh, with two of his ships, was compelled by the approach of winter to seek shelter in a harbour of Russian Lapland, where he and his crews were all frozen to death. In the following summer they were discovered by some Russian fishermen in the same attitudes in which death had surprised them; the commander still sitting at his cabin table with his diary and other papers open before him. The third vessel, under Richard Chancellor, was fortunate enough to run into the White Sea, or Bay of St. Nicholas; and the crews landing at the Abbey of St. Nicholas near Archangel, were enabled to weather the rigour of the season.¹ Chancellor employed the opportunity to seek an interview with the Czar, Ivan Basilovitch, at Moscow, and to obtain for English commerce important privileges at Archangel, and other ports in those seas, which had been hitherto unvisited by any ships of burden. The Russians were the more inclined to enter into this connection, as Livonia, whence their products were shipped to the rest of Europe, was at this time in the hands of the Teutonic Order. Another fruit of this voyage was the discovery of the whale fishery at Spitzbergen. In the following year (1554) a charter of incorporation was granted by Queen Mary to the merchant adventurers engaged in this trade, who were subsequently called the Russia Company. In 1555, Chancellor and his companions again visited Moscow, and were hospitably entertained by the Czar, who granted them further important privileges. In the same year a Muscovite ambassador visited the Court of London. A few years after, Anthony Jenkinson, the energetic agent of the Russia Company, sailed down the Wolga to Astrakan, crossed the Caspian Sea into Persia, and established at Bokhara a trade with the merchants of India, Persia, Russia, and Cathay, or China; and the silks and other products of the East were conveyed by the route thus opened to Kholmogory, on the Lower Dwina, and shipped thence to England.² In 1566, the Russia Company was sanctioned and confirmed by an express statute, the first of the kind passed by the

¹ See Clement Adam, *Anglorum Navigatio ad Moscovitas*.

² See Hakluyt's *Voyages*, vol. iv. p. 632

(ed. 1747). Cf. Macpherson, *Annals of Commerce*, vol. ii. p. 114 sqq.

English Parliament. In the year 1581 was incorporated a trading company of the same kind, the English Turkey, or Levant Company. But the most important of all the commercial associations formed during the reign of Elizabeth was the East India Company, established by charter, 31st December, 1600, for the purpose of carrying on a direct trade with the East Indies. In this enterprise, however, we had been anticipated by the Dutch.

The history of Holland at this period affords a striking example how the spirit of liberty not only serves to secure the domestic happiness of a people, but also to promote their wealth and power. The war of independence became a source of prosperity to the new Republic. Although engaged in a long life-and-death struggle with the Spaniards, the commerce of the Dutch had gone on increasing every year, and their navy had attained to such a force as made them without a rival on the seas.¹ So Athens reached her highest pitch of power and glory during her struggle with Persia; and though the Dutch will not afford many points of comparison with the Athenians, except their naval strength, yet the insolence, vain glory, and radical weakness of the Spaniards may find no unapt counterparts in the Persians. From the middle of the sixteenth century the maritime commerce of the Dutch had been gradually superseding that of the Hanse Towns; against which trading confederacy a terrible blow had also been struck by Queen Elizabeth, who, after many disputes and some deeds of violence, caused the Steelyard, or house of the Hanse merchants in London, to be shut up in 1597.² Before the close of the century the Dutch had become the chief carriers between the southern and northern parts of Europe. During the years 1586 and 1587, the most miserable years of their struggle, more than 800 ships entered the Dutch ports. The merchants and manufacturers of Brabant and Flanders flocked into Holland and Zealand, and contributed so much to the wealth and population of those provinces that it became necessary to build new towns, and enlarge the old ones. This prosperity was accompanied with a corresponding decline in the southern, or obedient, provinces of the Netherlands. In these, large districts once fertile were become waste; innumerable villages, and even some small towns, were wholly depopulated; the fox, the wolf, and the wild boar prowled around even the larger cities, and in the winter of 1586-7, two hundred persons

¹ It was far superior to that of England towards the close of the sixteenth century. *Report of the magistrates of Amsterdam, Hague Archives*, ap. Motley, *United Netherlands*, vol. ii. p. 133.

² Macpherson, *Annals of Commerce*, vol. ii. p. 212.

were killed by dogs and wolves in the neighbourhood of Ghent. Nobles and wealthy citizens had been reduced to beggary, and peasants and artizans were forced to turn soldiers or brigands.¹ Antwerp had been completely ruined by the closing of the Scheld. Meanwhile the Dutch, being no longer able, on account of the Spanish conquest of Portugal in 1580, to convey the commodities of the East from the Portuguese ports to those of northern Europe, resolved to trade on their own account with the East Indies, and with this view secured the services of one Cornelis Houtman, a Fleming, who, having made several voyages to India with the Portuguese, was well acquainted not only with the navigation, but also with the ports best adapted for trade. The merchants of Amsterdam now entered into an association called the Company of Distant Countries, and despatched, under Houtman's command, four ships of small burden, carrying 250 men, with 100 guns, and laden with commodities suitable for the Indian market. After an absence of about two and a half years, Houtman, with three of his ships, returned to the Texel in August, 1597, having penetrated as far as Bantam, in Java; but the Portuguese merchants settled there set the natives against the Dutch, and the profits of the voyage scarcely repaid the expenses of the outfit. It was found, however, that the influence of the Portuguese in the Indies had very much declined since the conquest of Portugal by Philip II.; the rapacity, tyranny, and bad faith of their governors and merchants had disgusted the natives—circumstances which encouraged the Dutch to persevere, especially as they had acquired a good knowledge of those seas, and had brought home with them some native Indians who might be useful in another expedition. Various trading companies were formed, and, in 1598, eighty vessels were despatched to the East and West Indies, to the coast of Africa, and even to the Pacific Ocean, in squadrons of from four to eight vessels, completely armed, and some provided with troops; so that they were alike ready to fight or trade. But as these divided associations were not found to yield much profit, they were, in the year 1602, amalgamated into one, under the name of the East India Company, with a joint-stock capital of between six and seven million guilders, or about six hundred thousand pounds sterling; and power was conferred upon this society to trade beyond the Cape of Good Hope and Straits of Magellan, to appoint governors, administer

¹ See the authorities collected by Mr. Motley, *Un. Netherl.* vol. ii. p. 129.

justice, build forts, raise troops, &c. Their trade was secure from molestation through the maritime superiority which the Dutch navy had begun to assert.¹ We shall not pursue in detail the history of their settlements in the East, contenting ourselves with remarking that in time they planted factories and settlements along the coasts of Asia and Bussorah on the Persian Gulf as far as Japan, and in particular they established themselves in the island of Java, where they made Batavia the central emporium of all their eastern trade. They also appropriated the Molucca and other spice islands, and became at length so powerful in the East as to send out fleets of forty or fifty large ships, and an army of thirty thousand men. In short, the foreign commerce of Holland grew so large as quite to overshadow that of England, and to excite the jealousy of our merchants and adventurers, as may be seen in the *Observations*² addressed to James I. by Sir Walter Raleigh shortly before his execution.

France also appeared as a competitor in the race of colonization; but that nation does not seem to be well fitted for such enterprises, which, instead of giving birth at once to brilliant and striking results, must be fostered and brought to maturity by long years of patient care and industry. It is, at all events, certain, that the attempts of the French in this way were not crowned with any remarkable success. Sully, observing this characteristic in the national genius, dissuaded Henry from renewing the attempts to form plantations in New France.³ But Henry was not to be discouraged. He resolved to compete with Spain and England in the foundation of trans-atlantic colonies; but in order to avoid disputes with those Powers, he confined the researches of his navigators to the regions beyond the fortieth degree N. latitude. These efforts resulted in the foundation by Champlain of the colonies of Port-Royal in Acadia (1607) and Quebec in Canada (1608). The Gallic race obtained a permanent footing in the New World, though destined at length to fall under the dominion of their English rivals in that Hemisphere. Henry also attempted in 1604 to establish a French East India Company; but there was not commercial enterprise enough in the country to carry out his views. The company remained in abeyance till 1615, when Louis XIII. gave them a new charter,

¹ See Watson's *Philip III.* bk. iv.; Macpherson, vol. i. p. 226.

² See abstract in Macpherson. *ibid.* p. 233.

³ *Letter of Sully to the President Jeannin* (1608), ap. Martiņ, t. x. p. 464.

and they took possession of the vast island of Madagascar. But it was soon found not to answer their expectations, and the company sank into oblivion.¹

The Ottoman Empire, as already hinted, was beginning, towards the close of the sixteenth century, to feel the approaches of decay. The wars of Selim II. had so exhausted the treasure which had previously been kept in the ancient Byzantine castle, called the "Seven Towers," that he caused it to be removed to his private treasury. In the palmy days of the Empire, each of these seven towers had its appropriate use: one contained the gold, another the silver money; a third the gold and silver plate and jewels; valuable remains of antiquity were deposited in the fourth; in the fifth were preserved ancient coins and other objects, chiefly collected by Selim I. during his expeditions into Persia and Egypt; the sixth was a sort of arsenal, and the seventh was appropriated to the archives. After the time of Selim II. the Seven Towers were used as a prison for distinguished persons and as an arsenal. Amurath III., whose avarice was prodigious, retained and improved upon the custom of his predecessor. He caused, it is said, a vault to be built, with treble locks, in which his treasure was deposited, and over which he slept every night; it was opened only four times a year to receive fresh heaps of wealth, which have been estimated at twelve million ducats annually; but two millions are perhaps nearer the truth.²

More than a century of Turkish despotism had at length done its work. Ragazzoni describes³ the Christians in the Ottoman Empire in 1571 as so depressed and degraded that they dared hardly look a Turk in the face; the only care of their listless existence was to raise enough for their maintenance, and to pay their *karatsh*, or poll-tax—all beyond would be seized by the Turks. Constantinople, however, still afforded a secure place of residence, whither the Greeks flocked in great numbers; so that towards the end of the sixteenth century it was reckoned that there were 100,000 of them in that capital. Many of these acquired great wealth, either by trade or by farming certain branches of the Grand-Signor's revenue. Among them one Michael Kantakuzenus was conspicuous both for his enormous wealth and his intrigues, which procured him the name of the "Devil's Son" (*Seitan Oglie*), although it was thought that he

¹ Letter of Sully to the President Jeannin (1608), ap. Martin, t. x. p. 465; Macpherson, *ibid.* p. 282.

² *Inform. Pol.* ap. Zinkeisen, B. iii. S. 353.

³ *Relatione*, in Alberi, ii. p. 100 (ser. iii.).

was no true Greek, but an Englishman by birth, and belonging to the family of an English ambassador. The fate of whole provinces lay in his hands; he could fit out twenty or thirty galleys at his own expense, and the splendour of his palace at Anchioli rivalled the seraglio of the Grand-Signor. Kantakuzenus had gained his influence through the favour and friendship of Mohammed Sokolli; but even that powerful Vizier could not at last save him from the wrath of Amurath III.; and he was hanged before the gate of his own palace (March, 1578). The Jews also occupied an important position in the Ottoman Empire. From the earliest period the physicians of the Sultan were of the Hebrew race; they monopolized most branches of commerce, they were the chief musical performers, and acted obscene comedies for the entertainment of the Grand Signor.¹

¹ Gerlach's *Tagebuch* contains much information on the state of Constantinople.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE peace of Vervins, recorded in Chapter XXVII., was not very well observed on the part of France. The ruling idea which guided the foreign policy of Henry IV. was, to curb the power of the House of Austria: a plan incompatible with the letter of the treaty. In pursuance of this policy Henry became the supporter of Protestantism; not, perhaps, from any lingering affection for his ancient faith—his indifference in such matters has been already seen—but because the Protestants were the natural enemies of the Austrian House. Hence he was determined to support the independence of Holland. He annually paid the Dutch large sums of money; he connived at the recruiting for them in France; and in spite of a royal prohibition, granted at the instance of the Spanish ambassador in 1599, whole regiments passed into the service of the United Provinces. In aid of these plans Henry fortified himself with alliances. He courted the Protestant Princes of Germany, and incited them to make a diversion in favour of the Dutch; he cultivated the friendship of Venice, reconciled himself with the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and attached the House of Lorraine to his interests by giving his sister, Catharine, in marriage to the Duke of Bar (January 31st, 1599); who, formerly, when Marquis of Pont-à-Mousson, had been his rival for the French Crown, and who in 1608 succeeded his father as Duke of Lorraine. The Porte was propitiated by Savary de Brèves, an able diplomatist; and the vanity of France was gratified by obtaining the protectoratè of the Christians in the East. The Pope was gained through his temporal interests as an Italian Prince. Henry had promised, on his absolution, to publish in France the decrees of Trent; and, as he had refrained from doing so out of consideration for the Hugonots, he had, by way of compensation, offered to support Clement VIII. in his design of uniting Ferrara to the immediate dominions of the Church; although the House of Este had often been the faithful ally of France. The direct line of the reigning

branch of that family becoming extinct on the death of Duke Alfonso II., Clement VIII. seized the duchy; and Cæsar d'Este, first cousin and heir of Alfonso, obtained only the Imperial fiefs of Modena and Reggio (1597). The connivance of Henry gratified the Pope and caused him to overlook the Edict of Nantes.

The friendship of the Pope was also necessary to Henry for his private affairs, as he was meditating a divorce from his consort, Margaret of Valois, from whom he had long been estranged. She had borne him no children, and she was now hiding her debaucheries in an old château in Auvergne; but neither sterility nor adultery was, with the Court of Rome, a sufficient plea for a divorce *a vinculo*, and it was therefore necessary to find some cause of nullity in the marriage itself; a task in general rendered easy by the numerous formalities of the canon law. Besides the extraordinary circumstances of the marriage before related, flaws were discovered in Gregory XIII.'s dispensation for kinship; and as Margaret herself, in consideration of a large pension from the King, and with the prospect of more unbounded licence to gratify her inclinations, agreed to the suit (July, 1599), a divorce was easily obtained. The choice of her successor was more difficult. Love pointed one way, policy another. The charming Gabrielle still possessed Henry's heart; the rival proposed was Mary de' Medici, the offspring of Francis, Grand-Duke of Tuscany, by a daughter of the Emperor, Ferdinand I. A marriage with Gabrielle, now Duchess of Beaufort, would have caused bitter discontent and opposition, as, by legitimating her children they might thus have claimed the Crown to the detriment of the Princes of the blood. Gabrielle was opposed by Sully, though he owed his elevation to the fair favourite, and some violent scenes ensued between them, in which Henry supported the minister against the mistress;¹ for with all his love and admiration of women, he never suffered himself to be governed by them. The difficulty was solved by the sudden death of Gabrielle, April 10th, 1599. She was seized with an apoplexy, and, being then pregnant, brought forth a dead child; expiring herself thirty-six hours after, in such dreadful convulsions, that her lovely face could be no longer recognized. Sinister suspicions arose. The Tuscan Grand-Duke was not unfamiliar with the arts of poison, and on the day before her accouchement, Gabrielle had dined with Zamët, a celebrated Lucchese financier.² Henry,

¹ Henry told her bluntly: "Pardieu, madame, je me passerois mieux de dix maîtresses comme vous, que d'un serviteur comme lui."—*Économ. Royales*, t. iii. p. 241 (Petitot).

² Sismondi, *Hist. des Français*, t. xxii. p. 62.

who was absent from Paris, though he felt and displayed an unfeigned sorrow for the death of his mistress, harboured no suspicions, and the negotiations for the Florentine marriage went on. Mary de' Medici, however, was nearly supplanted by another rival. Before the end of the summer, Henry had been captivated by a new mistress, Mademoiselle d'Entragues, whom he created Marquise de Verneuil. The new favourite and her father had extorted from Henry a written promise of marriage in case she should bear a child; and though the document was torn by Sully, it was renewed by the love-sick King. Luckily, perhaps, for Henry, the fright occasioned by a thunderstorm brought Henriette d'Entragues to bed of a still-born child, and released him from his engagement, though his new passion still continued. The Papal commissaries had, in December, 1599, pronounced his marriage with Margaret null; and on the 25th of April following the King signed his marriage contract with the Tuscan Princess; the second descendant of the Florentine bankers, who was destined to give heirs to the Crown of France.

A domestic rebellion, fomented by Spain and Savoy, diverted awhile the attention of Henry from his plans of foreign policy. Sully's economy and love of order had excited much discontent among the powerful nobles of France; the materials of sedition were accumulated and ready to burst into a flame; and a point that had been left undecided in the treaty of Vervins afforded the means of applying the torch. By that treaty the question between France and Savoy respecting the Marquisate of Saluzzo had been referred to the decision of the Pope; but Clement VIII., unwilling to offend either party, had declined to interfere. In order, if possible, to settle this question, and also to engage Henry to support his pretensions to Geneva, Charles Emmanuel, who then reigned in Savoy, paid a visit to the French King at Fontainbleau; where, alarmed apparently at the idea of being seized and detained, he agreed to decide whether he would give up Bresse in exchange for Henry's claims on Saluzzo. He had, however, no intention of surrendering either the one or the other; and he employed his visit to France in ingratiating himself with the French nobles, many of whom he gained by large gifts and still larger promises. It had been predicted by an astrologer that in the year 1600 there should be no King in France; and Charles Emmanuel made use of a prediction which, in that age, carried no slight weight, not only to rouse the ambition of the French nobility, but also, it is said, to stimulate a renewal of

the odious enterprises against Henry's life. A plan was formed to convert France into an elective monarchy, like the Empire, and to establish each great lord as an hereditary Prince in his government.¹ It was thought that many towns as well as nobles might be drawn into the plot, nay, even that some princes of the blood might be induced to engage in it. Among the leading conspirators were the Dukes of Epernon and Bouillon (Turenne), and the Count of Auvergne, a natural son of Charles IX. and uterine brother of the King's mistress, Henriette d'Entragues. But Marshal Biron was the soul of the plot: whose chief motive was wounded pride, the source of so many rash actions in men of his egregious vanity. Biron pretended that the King owed to him the Crown, and complained of his ingratitude, although Henry had made him a Duke and Peer, as well as a Marshal of France and Governor of Burgundy. Henry had mortified him by remarking that the Biron's had served him well, but that he had had a great deal of trouble with the drunkenness of the father and the freaks and pranks of the son. Biron's complaints were so loud that the Court of Spain made him secret advances; while an intriguer named La Fin proposed to him, on the part of the Duke of Savoy, one of the Duke's daughters in marriage, and held out the hope that Spain would guarantee to him the sovereignty of both Burgundies. After many pretexts and delays, Charles Emmanuel having refused to give up Bresse for Saluzzo, or Saluzzo for Bresse, Henry IV. declared war against him in August, 1600, and promptly followed up the declaration by invading Savoy. Biron carefully concealed his designs, nor does the King appear to have been aware of them; for he gave the Marshal a command, who conquered for him the little county of Bresse,² though still secretly corresponding with the Duke of Savoy. Henry's refusal to give Biron the command of Bourg, the capital of Bresse, still further exasperated him.

One of the most interesting incidents of this little war is the care displayed by Henry for the safety of Geneva. The Duke of Savoy had long hankered after the possession of that city, and had erected, at the distance of two leagues from it, the fort of St. Catherine, which proved a great annoyance to the Genevese. The fort was captured by the royal forces; and the now aged Beza, at the head of a deputation of the citizens, went out to meet the King, who, in spite of the displeasure of the Papal Legate,

¹ Evidence of La Fin in the process against Biron, ap. Ranke, *Französische Gesch.* B. ii. S. 150.

² Now in the Department of the Ain.

gave him a friendly reception, presented him with a sum of money, and granted his request for the demolition of the fortress.¹ This war presents little else of interest except its results, embodied in the treaty of peace signed January 17th, 1601. The rapidity of Henry's conquests had quite dispirited Charles Emmanuel; and although Fuentes, the Spanish Governor of the Milanese, ardently desired the prolongation of the war, the Duke of Lerma, the all-powerful minister of Philip III., was against it; for the anxiety of the Spanish cabinet had been excited by the appearance of a Turkish fleet in the western waters of the Mediterranean, effected through the influence of the French ambassador at Constantinople. Under these circumstances negotiations were begun. In order to retain the Marquisate of Saluzzo, which would have given the French too firm a footing in Piedmont, the Duke was compelled to make large territorial concessions on the other side of the Alps. Bresse, Bugei, Valromei, the Pays de Gex, in short, all the country between the Saone, the Rhone, and the southern extremity of the Jura mountains, except the little principality of Dombes and its capital Trévoux, belonging to the Duke of Montpensier, were now ceded to the French in exchange for their claims of the territories of Saluzzo, Perosa, Pinerolo, and the Val di Stura. The Duke also ceded Châteaux-Dauphin, reserving a right of passage into Franche-Comté, for which he had to pay 100,000 crowns. This hasty peace ruined all Biron's hopes, and struck him with such alarm, that he came to Henry and confessed his treasonable plans. Henry not only pardoned him, but even employed him in embassies to England and Switzerland; but Biron was incorrigible. He soon afterwards renewed his intrigues with the French malcontent nobles, and being apprehended and condemned for high treason by the Parliament of Paris, was beheaded in the Court of the Bastille, July 29th, 1602. The execution of so powerful a nobleman created both at home and abroad a strong impression of the power of the French King.

While the war with Savoy was going on, Mary de' Medici arrived in France, and Henry solemnized his marriage with her at Lyon, December 9th, 1600. The union was not destined to be a happy one. Mary, though not destitute of a certain vulgar beauty, was neither amiable nor attractive; she possessed but little of the grace or intellect of her family; and was withal ill-tempered, bigoted, obstinate, and jealous. For this last quality,

¹ Thuanus, lib. cxxv. t. vi. p. 42 sqq.

indeed, she had sufficient excuse. The Marquise de Verneuil was installed in an apartment of the Louvre, and the jealousies of the wife and the mistress converted that palace into a little Pandemonium. Both ladies promised to give birth to what each contended would be the rightful heir to the French throne; and Mademoiselle de Verneuil was constantly asserting her right to be Queen instead of the "great banker." Henry was not content even with these two ladies; he had other mistresses, and the Queen repaid his infidelities in kind. It was whispered that she had intrigues with Virginio Orsini, her cousin, with the Duke of Bellegarde, Henry's ambassador at Florence; above all, with Concini, a young and brilliant Florentine gentleman, whom she had brought to France in her suite, and whom she afterwards married to her foster-sister, Leonora Dori, better known by the name of La Galigai. The quarrels between the King and his consort sometimes ended in personal violence; and Henry would probably have sent Mary back to Italy had she not presented him with a Dauphin (September 27th, 1601), who afterwards became Louis XIII.¹

Although the aims of Henry IV. were always noble and worthy of his character, the means which he employed to attain them will not always admit of the same praise. His excuse must be sought in the necessities and difficulties of his political situation. At home, where he was suspected both by Catholics and Hugonots, he was frequently obliged to resort to finesse, nor did he hesitate himself to acknowledge that his word was not always to be depended on.² Abroad, where his policy led him to contend with both branches of the House of Austria, he was compelled, in that unequal struggle, to supply with artifice the deficiencies of force; and he did not scruple to assist underhand the malcontent vassals and subjects of the Emperor and the King of Spain. France is the land of political "ideas," and Henry, or rather his Minister, Sully, had formed a magnificent scheme for the reconstruction of Europe, which for the liberality, as well as for the boldness and originality of its principles, may bear away the palm from the visionary projects often agitated in our own days. Against the plan of Charles V. and Philip II., of a universal THEOCRATIC MONARCHY, Sully formed the antagonistic one of a CHRISTIAN REPUBLIC, in which, for the bigotry and intolerance, supported by

¹ Richelieu's *Mémoires*, *L'Histoire de la Mère et du Fils*.

² "La nécessité, qui est la loi du temps,

me fait ores dire une chose, ores l'autre."

—Ranke, *Gesch.*, *Frankr.* B. ii. S. 102.

physical force, that formed the foundation of the Spanish scheme, were to be substituted a mutual toleration between Papists and Protestants and the suppression of all persecution. Foreign wars and domestic revolutions, as well as all religious disputes, were to be settled by European congresses, and a system of free trade was to prevail throughout Europe. This confederated Christian State was to consist of fifteen powers, or dominations, divided according to their constitutions into three different groups. The first group was to consist of States having an elective Sovereign, which would include the Papacy, the Empire, Venice, and the three elective Kingdoms of Hungary, Poland, and Bohemia. The second group would comprehend the hereditary Kingdoms of France, Spain, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and the new Kingdom of Lombardy which was to be founded; while the Republics or federate States, as the Swiss League, the contemplated Belgian commonwealth, and the confederacy of the Italian States would form the third.¹ The Czar of Muscovy, or as Henry used to call him, the "Scythian Knè," was at present to be excluded from the Christian Republic, as being an Asiatic rather than a European potentate, as well as on account of the savage and half barbarous nature of his subjects, and the doubtful character of their religious faith; though he might one day be admitted into this community of nations, when he should think proper himself to make the application. But as a principal aim, and, indeed, essential condition, of the scheme, was the abasement of the House of Austria, many political changes were to be effected with a view to attain this end. Naples was to be withdrawn from Spain and annexed to the Papal dominions, while the Duchy of Milan, united with that of Savoy; was to form a Kingdom of Lombardy; Spain was to be still further crippled by the loss of her Belgian provinces; the Empire, now become almost hereditary, was to be rendered truly elective; the remains of the Hungarian Kingdom were to be strengthened, at the expense of Austria, by the addition to it of that Archduchy, as well as of the Duchies of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, besides such districts as could be recovered from the Turks, though the Austrian House was to receive a sort of nominal compensation by the suzerainty of the Helvetian and Belgian Republics. We forbear to go further into the details of a scheme which it was never attempted to put in execution. That Henry IV. himself entertained any serious idea of its feasibility may well be doubted, though a plan so well

¹ See Sully, *Œconomies Royales*, t. viii. p. 253 sqq. (Petitot.)

calculated by its grandeur to dazzle the French nation has been regarded by some of the historians of France as the main-spring of all his policy. But it sometimes served Henry as a basis for negotiations, and the mere conception of it is worthy of note, as showing a wonderful advance in political and social views.

The Spanish branch of the Austrian House was naturally a more immediate object of Henry's solicitude than the Austrian. Philip III. had succeeded, in his twenty-first year, to the Spanish throne on the death of his father, Philip II., to whom, in character, he offered a striking contrast. Soft, gentle, indolent, the conduct of Philip III., as a son, had been marked by extreme obsequiousness; of which a singular anecdote is related. His father had resolved that he should marry one of the daughters of the Austrian Archduke Charles;¹ and sending for the portraits of those Princesses, bade his son select his bride. But such was the awe with which the dread impersonation of paternal and kingly authority had inspired the heir of Spain, that with an apathy which seems to have excited something like contempt and indignation even in the cold-blooded Philip II., his dutiful son persisted in submitting to him the decision of the very limited choice with which he was indulged!² Such a Prince was naturally fanned not to rule but to be governed. Immediately after his accession Philip III. committed the entire direction of affairs to his favourite the Marquis of Denia, whom, to the great indignation of the Spanish grandees, he created Duke of Lerma. That powerful minister possessed but limited abilities, and was utterly unversed in the art of government; but his manners were courteous and affable, and he had gained the favour of the ecclesiastics by his devotion to the Church.

One of the first acts of Philip III. was to solemnize at Valencia his marriage with Margaret of Austria. About the same time (April, 1599) was celebrated the previously arranged marriage of the Archduke Albert and Philip II.'s daughter, the infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia; and in September they returned to the Netherlands, where they assumed the title of the "Archdukes." Albert now adopted all the formalities of the Court of the Escorial; assumed the Spanish dress and manners, and required to be served on the knee; a proceeding which gave great offence to the plain and unceremonious Netherlanders. As Philip II. had reserved the liberty of garrisoning Antwerp, Ghent and Cambay with Spanish soldiers, the money and troops of Spain, notwithstanding

¹ A son of Ferdinand J.

² Watson, *Philip III.* vol. i. p. 3, note.

the nominally independent sovereignty of the Archdukes, continued to be employed in Belgium as in the preceding reign. Albert, during his absence in Spain, had left Mendoza, Marquis of Guadalete, commander in the Netherlands, who undertook some plundering operations on the Rhine; but the campaign of 1599 presents little of importance. Prince Maurice of Nassau, Stadholder of Holland, the leader of the Dutch, was reckoned the ablest captain of the day; but he was suspected by the leaders of the republican party in Holland of a design to seize the sovereignty, and, with a view to that object, of endeavouring to prolong the war; and they therefore appointed commissioners to watch his movements; among whom Olden Barneveldt, Advocate of Holland, was the foremost. The Seven United Provinces had now reached a great height of prosperity. Their navy was the best in Europe; they were aided by Scotch and English troops; and though the peace of Vervins had deprived them of the open support of France, yet Henry IV. continued secretly to assist them.

A mutiny in 1600 among the Spanish and Italian troops of the Archdukes, occasioned by their pay being in arrear, seemed to Olden Barneveldt and the States to present a favourable opportunity for striking a blow in Flanders. Maurice, against his better judgment, was reluctantly persuaded to undertake the expedition, and after capturing some towns and fortresses, he laid siege to Nieuport. The Archduke Albert, accompanied by his consort, hastened to the relief of that important place, when Clara Eugenia appeared on horseback before the Spanish troops near Ghent, soothed them by her condescension, and animated them by her courage; and pointing to her costly earrings, she declared that she would part with them sooner than the men should lose their pay. Maurice had scarcely arrived before Nieuport when he was surprised by the intelligence of the approach of the Archdukes. Against the earnest advice of Sir Francis Vere, who commanded the English contingent sent to the aid of the States, he despatched to certain destruction nearly a third of his army which had not yet crossed to the western side of the creek forming the harbour of Nieuport, in the vain hope that they might arrest for some time the advance of the Spaniards; but they were dispersed and almost entirely destroyed in an hour.¹ A battle was

¹ This division, under Count Ernest of Nassau, had encountered the enemy at Lef-fington at eight o'clock in the morning, and they were destroyed before nine. Motley,

Un. Netherlands, vol. iv. ch. xxxviii. note 36, end. This author, in his account of the battle, has maligned Vere in a manner betraying national antipathy rather than

now inevitable, and all the arrangements for it were intrusted to Vere. Maurice seems to have lost all confidence in himself and his troops, and in the hope of gaining some courage from despair sent away his numerous fleet, the only hope, in case of reverse, of salvation for his army: a resolution which by some authors has been styled heroical, but which rather shows that he had lost his head. The army of the States was saved chiefly through the bravery of Vere and his Englishmen; Sir Francis, ever in the thickest of the fight, was severely wounded. The Spaniards were defeated with great loss. Maurice, however, apparently for no adequate reasons, did not pursue the siege of Nieupoort; he soon afterwards returned into Holland, and no other memorable action took place during this campaign.

The Northern Netherlanders still occupied Ostend, and as their sallies from that place occasioned much annoyance to the Flemings, they requested the Archduke Albert to attempt the reduction of it; a task which had baffled the skill of the Duke of Parma. Nevertheless, Albert, early in 1601, consented to begin a siege which is among the longest and most memorable in the annals of warfare. Ostend was defended by Sir Francis Vere,¹ who, having lost the greater part of his garrison, amused the enemy with a pretended capitulation till he had received reinforcements; and he frustrated a rash and desperate assault of the Spaniards, by causing the sluices to be opened, and drowning large numbers of the assailants. In 1601 Henry IV., who, in consequence of an affront offered to the French ambassador at Madrid, was at this time meditating open war against Spain, repaired to Calais, in order to encourage the Dutch by his neighbourhood; and at the same time Queen Elizabeth went to Dover, in the hope that the French King might be induced to pay her a visit at that place. Fear of giving umbrage to the Catholics deterred Henry from crossing the Channel, but he sent his minister Sully,² who was surprised to find that the English Queen had anticipated in many points his plans for the abasement of the House of Austria. The interview, however, had no practical result; the Pope hastened to make up the quarrel between France and Spain; but Henry gave Elizabeth to understand that if they did not unite their arms they might at least join their diplomacy; and he continued to send

the calm and impartial judgment of an historian. Luckily, however, the glaring contradictions and unfair conclusions of his own narrative suffice to refute it, without seeking further proof.

¹ The States relieved Vere at the end of five months by another governor.

² We use this name, as best known, but Rosni was not created Duke of Sully till 1606.

money secretly to the Dutch, and to wink at the succours forwarded by the Hugonot party to Ostend. Albert did not make much progress in the siege of that place; he was hindered sometimes by the operations of Maurice, sometimes by the mutinies of his own troops, as well as the difficulties naturally belonging to the undertaking. In 1602 the Spaniards were reinforced by the arrival from Italy of 8,000 men under Ambrose Spinola, a Genoese nobleman of large fortune and sort of amateur soldier, who was devoted to the Spanish cause. Spinola mortgaged his large possessions in Italy in order to raise the succours just mentioned; while his brother Frederick appeared on the Flemish coast with a fleet fitted out at his own expense, and inflicted much loss on the Dutch commerce; in which enterprises he met a speedy death.

Queen Elizabeth, who had succoured the Dutch with 6,000 men, died before the siege of Ostend was brought to a conclusion. The Spaniards had retaliated by aiding O'Neill's rebellion in Ireland; but she lived just long enough to see its extinction. Her death (March 24th, 1603) was a great loss, not only for the Dutch and the Protestant cause, but also for Henry IV., who, besides counting on her help in his struggle with the House of Austria, was loath to see the Crowns of England and Scotland united on the same head. Henry, however, despatched Sully into England to endeavour, if possible, to persuade Elizabeth's successor, James I., to act in concert with France with regard to the affairs of the Netherlands. It was a difficult task. Prejudiced by his maxims respecting the divine right of Kings, James looked upon the Dutch as rebels and traitors, and seemed inclined to listen to the advances of the Spanish Court, though he rejected those of the Pope with signs of the most bitter aversion. The Dutch had also sent Barneveldt, together with the young Prince Frederick Henry of Nassau, to congratulate James on his accession, and to solicit a renewal of the English alliance. James at length agreed to despatch some troops into the Low Countries, whose pay was to be furnished by France, though a third of it was to go in reduction of the debt due from Henry IV. to England (June 25th, 1603). Sully also sounded the English King on his grand scheme for the reorganization of Europe, and James, who was fond of speculation, seemed to enter wonderfully into the spirit of it; yet in the very next year he concluded a formal peace with Spain (August 18th, 1604). James, however, refused to deliver up to the Netherland Archdukes Flushing, Brielle, and Rammekens,

• ¹ Rymer, t. xvi. p. 585 sq.; Dumont, t. v. pt. ii. p. 32 sq.

places which the United Provinces had assigned to Elizabeth as security for their debt; and though he offered his mediation to make the States accept a fair and reasonable peace, yet he appears to have reserved to himself, by a secret agreement, the right of assisting them.¹ The treaty was limited to Europe, and James could not prevail upon the Spanish Court to open the Indies to British commerce. The discovery of the Gunpowder Plot in the following year inclined James more towards the French alliance, and in February, 1606, a treaty of commerce was concluded with France.

Meanwhile the siege of Ostend still continued. Albert, weary of the enterprise, had devolved the conduct of it on Spinola, who at length succeeded in lodging his troops in the outworks; and the Dutch, despairing of the defence of the town, resolved to compensate themselves for its loss by the capture of Sluys, which surrendered on capitulation to Prince Maurice. Soon afterwards, as Ostend seemed no longer tenable, they instructed the commandant to capitulate (September 20th, 1604). The contending parties are said to have lost 100,000 men during this siege, which was now in its fourth year. Spinola, on entering the town, gave the commandant and his officers a magnificent entertainment, by way of marking his estimation of their conduct.² The fall of Ostend had but little influence on the general progress of the war, which we shall here pursue to its conclusion. The brunt of the struggle was next year transferred to the borders of Overijssel and Gelderland; but the campaign of 1605 offers little of importance. At the close of it, Spinola, ill supported by the Spanish Court, found it necessary to proceed to Madrid to hasten the supplies of troops and money which Philip III. and Lerma were very slow in furnishing. On his way back he was seized with a fever, which prevented him from reaching the Netherlands till July, 1606, and the only event of much importance that year was the capture by him of Rheinberg. At the conclusion of this campaign negotiations were opened for a peace, of which Spain, and even Spinola himself, was now very desirous. The same result was ardently wished for by a large party in the United Provinces, at the head of which was John of Olden Barneveldt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, the first statesman and patriot of his age; and he at length prevailed upon Prince Maurice, who wished to

¹ Winwood's *Memorials*, vol. ii. pp. 330, &c.

ters to the siege of Ostend. *Un. Netherlands*, vol. iv.

² Motley has given two or three chap-

continue the war, to enter into his views. The States, however, resolved not to treat unless their independence was acknowledged, a condition very unpalatable to the pride of Spain and the Archdukes. A subterfuge was at last hit upon. John Neyen, an Antwerp Franciscan, who had studied in Spain, and was now Commissary-General of his order in the Netherlands, was sent to Ryswyck (February, 1607), whence he was several times introduced secretly of an evening to Prince Maurice and Barneveldt at the Hague. The friar silyly evaded a direct recognition of Dutch independence, by declaring that he was empowered to treat with the States "as if they were free." A truce of eight months, to begin on the 4th of May, was agreed upon, in order to conduct the negotiations; though not for a permanent peace, which would have been insufferable to Spanish pride, but only for a prolonged truce. The Hollanders, however, refused to suspend hostilities by sea, and while the negotiations were pending, Admiral Heemskerck was despatched from the Texel to the coasts of Spain and Portugal with a formidable fleet, and instructed not only to watch over the Dutch ships returning from the Indies, but also to inflict on the Spaniards all the damage he could. Heemskerck sailed to Gibraltar Bay, where the Spanish fleet, consisting of twenty-one large ships under the command of Admiral Davila, was drawn up in order of battle under the guns of the fortress. Upon this formidable array the Dutch commander bore down in full sail; the Spanish admiral at his approach retired behind his other galleons, pursued by Heemskerck, who, as he neared the Spaniards, was killed by a cannon ball; but Davila also soon shared the same fate. The officer who succeeded him in command, seeing that the fleet had sustained considerable loss, hoisted a white flag; but the Dutch, animated with an uncontrollable fury against the Spaniards, would not recognize it, and continued the fight till they had half destroyed the Spanish fleet, and 2,000 or 3,000 of the crews. Then, after repairing at Tetuan the damage they had sustained, which was comparatively trifling, they again put to sea in small squadrons in order to intercept and capture the Spanish merchantmen (April, 1607). This bloody and decisive victory had a great effect in lowering the pride of the Spaniards, and rendering them more practicable; they found their commerce ruined, and were fain to ask quarter of the "Beggars of the Sea." Yet when the ratification of the truce arrived from Spain it was not satisfactory. The independence of the United Provinces was not recognized; the instrument was signed *Yo el Rey* (I, the

King), a form used only towards subjects, and it was not sealed with the Great Seal. At the entreaty of the Archdukes, however, the Dutch consented to recall their fleet till a satisfactory ratification should be obtained within a given period.

King James felt at first some alarm at the negotiations between the Archdukes and the States; but he was at length satisfied with the explanations of Caron, the Dutch ambassador, and he sent Sir Ralph Winwood and Sir Richard Spencer to assist at the deliberations. It was now necessary for France to take a decided part. Henry deemed it prudent to join England in mediating a peace between Spain and her revolted subjects, and in August, 1607, the President, Jeannin, was sent into Holland with instructions for that purpose.¹ The discussions, chiefly conducted by Jeannin and Barneveldt, were long and stormy, and the provisional truce had often to be prolonged. Neyen endeavoured to corrupt Aersens, the Dutch secretary, by offering him a splendid diamond for his wife, and for himself a bond of Spinola's for 50,000 crowns. Aersens communicated the offer to Prince Maurice, who advised him to accept it, and then to give up the bribes to the Council of State, and at a later stage of the proceedings Olden Barneveldt produced these bribes to Verreiken, the minister of the Archdukes, and covered him with confusion. The leaders of the Republican, or anti-Orange party, among whom we may distinguish, besides Barneveldt, Ladenburg, Hogerbeets, and Hugo Grotius, Pensionary of Rotterdam, were willing not to haggle too closely about the terms; but the war party, which adhered to Maurice of Nassau, and which included the army and navy, the East India Company, the populace of the larger towns, and a considerable proportion of the clergy, appeared to recover its influence, and towards the end of 1608 the negotiations were on the point of being broken off. Holland especially, where Maurice was all-powerful, and Zealand, where his estates lay, and where he almost ruled as a Prince, were loud against a peace; and Zealand even threatened to give herself to England, unless the French would declare against Spain. Philip III., through his ambassador, Don Pedro de Toledo, had endeavoured to detach Henry IV. from the Dutch cause by renewing his proposals for a matrimonial treaty between the families. Soon after the conclusion of the peace between Spain and England, Philip had tried to impress upon Henry that France and Spain, instead of opposing each other, should combine to dictate the law to Europe, and had

¹ See on this subject the *Négoc. du Président Jeannin* (Petitot, t. xij.).

suggested that they should cement their alliance by a double union between their children; for Henry had now a son and daughter. There was a large party in France in favour of this alliance, and Henry himself appeared to listen to the proposal, but he was dissuaded from it by Sully, the constant opponent of the House of Austria. The project when now renewed met with no better success. Early in 1609 Jeannin, seconded by the English ambassadors, succeeded in extorting some important concessions from the Spaniards, and he prevailed on the Dutch States to appoint a large deputation to accept the proffered terms. Accordingly a body of 800 deputies assembled at Bergen-op-Zoom to treat with the Spanish plenipotentiaries; and at last, on the 9th of April, 1609, a truce was signed for a term of twelve years. In the preamble to the treaty, the Archdukes acknowledged that, both in their own name and in that of the Catholic King, they treated with the Dutch States as with free and independent peoples. The treaty was founded on the basis of *uti possidetis*. Spain now yielded on the question of the Indian trade, which had been one of the chief subjects of dispute, as well as respecting the navigation of the Scheld, and the ruin of Antwerp was consummated for the benefit of the ports of Holland and Zealand. The Spanish envoys, though they struggled hard, could obtain no toleration of Catholic worship in the United Provinces. Great regard was shown in this treaty for the interests of the family of Nassau. It was provided that none of the descendants of William, Prince of Orange, should be liable for any debts he had contracted between the year 1567 and his death, and that such of his estates within the territories of the Archdukes as had been confiscated should be restored. The States took care that Maurice should suffer no diminution of income by the conclusion of the war, and they also augmented the appointments of Prince Frederick Henry and of Count William Louis of Nassau.¹ These sums had been voted chiefly through the influence of Barneveldt; but they did not appease Maurice's jealousy and resentment against him, though for some few years longer an apparent friendship subsisted between them.² By this treaty was terminated, after a war of forty years, the struggle of the Dutch for independence, though a like period was still to elapse before it was formally recognized by Spain. Up to this time the Dutch

¹ Dumont, t. v. pt. ii. p. 99 sqq. The treaty in Watson's *Philip III.* vol. i. is a summary of the chief articles of the p. 384 sqq.

² Motley, *Life of Barneveldt*, ch. vii.

had enlarged their Union by the addition of the two important provinces of Overysse and Groningen; they had extended their boundary on the Flemish side by the conquest of Sluys, Hulst, and several other places, constituting what was afterwards called Dutch Flanders; in Northern Brabant they had conquered several strong towns, including Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, and Hertogenbosch; by means of Lillo and other forts they had obtained the command of the Scheld; they had attacked, and vanquished in their own harbours, the powerful navies of Spain, and had interrupted and shared her commerce at the furthest extremities of the globe.

Meanwhile Henry IV.'s policy of weakening and annoying the House of Austria seemed to involve him in the grossest contradictions; for, while he courted the German Protestants, he endeavoured at the same time to stand well with the Pope, and at home he showed more favour to the Roman Catholics than to the Hugonots, as being both more able and more willing to extend and confirm the royal authority. Hence in 1603 he had recalled the Jesuits to Paris, had endowed several Jesuit colleges, and had intrusted to a celebrated member of the Society, the Père Cotton, the difficult and delicate task of directing his conscience. Henry's former friends, the Hugonots, had indeed become his chief domestic enemies. The Duke of Bouillon, their principal leader, had long been intriguing with the malcontent French nobles, and with Spain; and in 1606 Henry had appeared before Sedan with an army, and compelled the Duke to surrender that place for a term of four years. But Henry's policy compelled him to inconsistencies even in the treatment of his rebellious vassals; and, for fear of offending the Protestant Princes of Germany, he granted Bouillon a complete pardon, allowed him to retain his offices and honours, and suffered him to instal himself at Court.

At the same time Henry endeavoured to ingratiate himself with the Pope. On the death of Clement VIII., March 5th, 1605, the influence of France had been exerted in the Conclave to procure the election of Cardinal Alexander de' Medici, a kinsman of the French Queen; 300,000 crowns were expended in the purchase of votes, and Alexander assumed, with the tiara, the title of Leo XI. But in less than a month the death of Leo occasioned another vacancy. It was supplied by the election of Cardinal Camillo Borghese, who took the name of Paul V. (May 16th, 1605). Cardinal Bellarmine, the great Jesuit theologian, had nearly obtained the tiara; but his profession was

against him; the Sacred College feared that, if the Society of Jesus once succeeded in seizing the throne of St. Peter, they would never relinquish it.¹ Originally a Consistorial advocate, Borghese had risen through every grade of the clerical profession; but he had lived in seclusion, buried in his studies, and his character was but little known. After his accession a great change was observed in him. He had conceived the most extravagant ideas of the greatness of his office, and began his administration with acts of extreme rigour. He endeavoured to break down all the restraints which the Italian governments had placed on the Pontifical authority in the relations of Church and State, and in most instances he succeeded in extorting concessions; but Venice opposed a formidable resistance.

In that Republic a little knot of liberal thinkers had been formed, at the head of whom was Fra Paolo Sarpi, the celebrated historian of the Council of Trent. Endowed with great originality of mind, Sarpi appears to have anticipated some of the doctrines of Locke; but it is difficult to describe the exact nature of his religious tenets; they seem to have approximated to those of the Reformation, and by some he was considered a Protestant in disguise. It is at all events certain, that he was a most determined enemy of the secular influence of the Pope; and Cardinal Borghese a nephew of Paul V. is said to have hired some assassins who attempted to poignard him. The contumacy of Venice soon occasioned open strife. The government having instituted before a secular tribunal a prosecution against two ecclesiastics, the Pope launched against the Republic an interdict in all its ancient forms (April 17th, 1606). The Signory replied by a proclamation, in which they expressed their resolution to uphold their sovereign authority, and ordered the clergy to continue divine service, without regard to the Papal interdict; a command which was universally obeyed, except by the three orders of the Jesuits, Capuchins, and Theatines, who, persisting in their fidelity to the Pope, were banished from the Venetian territories. Paul V. now meditated open force against the refractory Republic, when Henry IV., to whose designs the friendship both of Venice and the Pope was needful, interposed his mediation. At his instance the Venetians made several concessions; but, supported by Spain, they resolutely refused to receive back the Jesuits, and Paul was compelled to concede the point; a mortifying lesson for that haughty and violent Pontiff.

¹ See Bayle, art. *Bellarmin.*

Shortly after this affair, Henry, in pursuance of his plans against the House of Austria, began to sound the Pope concerning the liberation of Italy from Spanish domination, and the wresting of the Imperial Crown from the Habsburgs. Agreeably to his grand European scheme he held out to Paul the bait of Naples; and though the Pontiff did not venture to give his direct consent, Henry trusted that the first victory would secure it. With the same views he also made advances to Venice and the Duke of Savoy. Venice promised her aid in consideration of receiving a portion of the Milanese; and she was also to have Sicily, if the Allies succeeded in wresting that island from the Spaniards. The Duke of Savoy was attracted with the prospect of Milan and the Crown of Lombardy. Charles Emmanuel's eldest son was to marry Elizabeth of France, Henry's eldest daughter; and the Duke was to claim Milan in right of his wife, a daughter of Philip II. of Spain, and by way of compensation for Belgium and Franche-Comté, bestowed upon his sister-in-law, Clara Eugenia. France, or at all events Sully, affected to renounce all her pretensions in Italy, and to seek nothing but the honour and glory of rescuing that peninsula from foreign domination; only Gaston, Duke of Anjou, Henry's third son, an infant two years old, was to be affianced to the heiress of Mantua and Montferrat. Henry, however, had not quite the disinterested views of his minister. His policy may be said to have survived by tradition to the present day, for it embraced a plan which in 1860 we saw realized by one of the supplanters of his dynasty: namely, to round off the French territory by the cession of Savoy, and perhaps also of Nice, by the Duke of Savoy, in return for the help of France in conquering Milan. In fact, Henry's scheme anticipated that union of *nationalities*—to adopt the term in vogue—by which ambition now covers her views of aggrandizement under the cloak of natural equity. Henry aimed to unite under the sceptre of France all who spoke a Romance tongue on this side the Alps and Pyrenees, a design which would ultimately include Lorraine, Walloon Belgium, and Franche-Comté: and he had already begun to stir in this matter with regard to Lorraine, by demanding for the Dauphin the hand of the Duke of Bar's only daughter by his deceased wife, Henry's sister; a demand which the Duke had not ventured to refuse.¹

These plans were connected with another for striking a blow

¹ For these negotiations see Sully, *Economies Royales*, and the *Mémoires* of Bassompierre and Fontenai-Mareuil.

in the heart of Spain itself, which, however, was defeated by an unforeseen and surprising occurrence. Spain still contained many thousand families of Moriscoes, not only in Granada, but also in Valencia and Aragon, and even in Castile and Catalonia. Henry IV. had early in his reign opened secret communications with these discontented subjects of the Spanish Crown; and in a memorial addressed to the French King, the Moriscoes affirmed that they could raise an army of 80,000 men.¹ In 1605 a French agent employed in these intrigues had been detected and hanged in Valencia; a circumstance which served still further to inflame the bigoted hatred with which the unfortunate Moriscoes were regarded by the Spanish Court. The distorted Christianity which it had been attempted to inculcate upon that people during the last century had made no real progress, though forced conversions were accomplished; for the monks despatched to preach the Gospel to them, by way of supporting their arguments, were accompanied by the hangman. The Archbishop of Valencia had long endeavoured to persuade Philip III. to expel all the Moriscoes from Spain, or send them to the galleys, and educate their children in the Christian faith; the Archbishop of Toledo, who was brother to the Duke of Lerma, and Grand-Inquisitor, went still further, and demanded the death of all the infidel race, without distinction of age or sex. The humanity, or the self-interest of the lay nobility, the estates of many of whom would be ruined by the massacre or banishment of the Moors, opposed for a while the execution of these barbarous measures, nor did the Court of Spain deem it prudent to resort to them, while engaged in war with the revolted Netherlands; but scarcely had a long truce been concluded with the United Provinces, when an edict was published for the expulsion of the Moors from Valencia. An insurrection which the Moriscoes had attempted in the mountains was suppressed, and more than 130,000 of them were compelled to embark, and thrown upon the coast of Africa, where three-fourths of them perished of hunger and fatigue. The remainder succeeded in reaching Oran and Algiers.

On the 9th of December appeared another edict directing the embarkation of the Moors of Granada, Murcia, and Andalusia; and on the 10th of January, 1610, a third for the expulsion of those of Aragon, Catalonia, and Castile. These last were driven towards the Pyrenees, and were forbidden to carry with them

¹ See *Mémoires of La Force*, t. i. p. 219 sqq. (ed. La Grange, 1843).

either money or bills. Some 100,000 of them¹ passed into France, either by crossing the mountains, or taking their passage to Marseille; but, in spite of the former tamperings of the French government with them, they did not fare much better than those expelled direct from the Spanish ports. Henry IV. published, indeed, an ordinance (February 22nd, 1610) which, however, was soon recalled, directing that they should be received and suffered to remain, but, after making professions of Catholicism, an alternative which they had already rejected in their native homes; and that vessels should be provided for such of them as wished to depart. It was thought that large numbers of them would have been willing to embrace Protestantism, which did not so much shock their horror of idolatry; but Henry was afraid to take a step which would have excited the religious prejudices of the mass of the nation. Many of the Moriscoes became the victims of the fanatics through whose districts they passed; the greater part of them were detained for months on the Provençal coast for want of transport, and were reduced to a state of indescribable distress by the inhumanity and extortions of the officers appointed to superintend their embarkation; and when at last they contrived to get on board their vessels, numbers of them were robbed and even thrown into the sea by the sailors, while many more died of misery and privation. So numerous, it is said, were the corpses cast into the sea, that the inhabitants of Marseille abstained from eating fish, and gave the name of *grenadines* to the sardines, as having banqueted on the flesh of the unhappy Moors.² Thus was consummated at vast expense,³ and at the price of inflicting an incurable wound on the future prosperity of Spain, that inhuman system of persecution which had been carried on since the administration of Ximenes. At the time of the expulsion of the Moors Henry IV. was meditating open war against the House of Austria, both in Germany and Spain; and he was in hopes that he should be able to attack Philip III. soon enough to obtain the services of some of the Moriscoes. He was organizing two large armies destined to enter Spain at the opposite sides of San Sebastian and Perpignan; 14,000 men under Lesdiguières were ordered to join the Duke of Savoy in the operations contemplated in Italy;

¹ It must be observed that the accounts of the number of Moriscoes expelled from Spain are very discrepant, and range from 160,000 to a million.

² Bouche, *Hist. de Provençer*, t. ii. liv. x. p. 850; Viardot, *Hist. des Arabes et des*

Mores d'Espagne, t. i. ch. vii.

³ Sir F. Cottington's letters to Trumbull (in Winwood's *Memorials*, vol. iii.) contain many details respecting this persecution.

while Henry himself was preparing to lead another army to the assistance of the German Princes in the affair of the Duchy of Jülich. But in order to explain this last transaction it will be necessary to resume from an earlier period the history of Germany.

Brought up in Spain, gloomy, fanatical, given to abstruse studies, fonder of observing the stars¹ in his retirement at Prague than of attending to the affairs of his dominions, the Emperor Rodolph II., though himself unfit to govern, was yet loath to resign any share of his power to his eldest surviving brother, Matthias, the heir presumptive of his hereditary lands; who, though himself not the model of a ruler, was better fitted than Rodolph by his manners and his German education to conduct the affairs of the Austrian dominions. It was with reluctance that Rodolph was at length compelled to intrust the administration of Hungary and Austria to Matthias, who, in the discharge of these functions, and without the approbation of the Emperor, made concessions to the Hungarian Protestants, and concluded with the Turks the peace of Sitvatorok already mentioned. In order to carry out these measures, Matthias had, indeed, by a family compact, virtually deprived Rodolph of his power. In April, 1606, he summoned to Vienna his younger brother, Maximilian, who had some years governed Tyrol, and his two cousins, the Archdukes Ferdinand and Leopold of Styria;² who, by a formal act declared Matthias head of the House of Habsburg, on account of the mental unsoundness betrayed from time to time by Rodolph.³ To this act, which was kept secret, the Archduke Albert, Sovereign of the Netherlands, the only other surviving brother of the Emperor, also acceded. Matthias was already contemplating the deposition of Rodolph, and a year or two afterwards he openly manifested his hostility by convening at Presburg the Austrian, as well as the Hungarian, States (February 1st, 1608), which by an Act of Confederation agreed to support Matthias. This was, unquestionably, a revolutionary movement, and Rodolph ordered the Austrian and Hungarian States, thus unconstitutionally united, to separate; but he was not obeyed.

¹ Rodolph's observatory at Prague was successively superintended by two famous astronomers, Tycho Brahe and Kepler. The latter passed a year as Tycho Brahe's assistant; but the two philosophers did not live on the best terms, as Kepler's observations were often at variance with the theories of his principal. On Tycho's

death, in October, 1601, Kepler was appointed his successor.

² Sons of the Archduke Charles, a younger brother of the Emperor Maximilian II., and founder of the Styrian branch of the Austrian family.

³ Menzel, *Neuere Gesch. der Deutschen*, B. iii. S. 169.

Long negotiations ensued between the Emperor and Matthias, which, however, led to no result. It was evident that the differences between the brothers must be decided by arms. The bigoted government of Rodolph had caused the greatest discontent in Bohemia and Moravia; the latter province was in a state of open revolt. Matthias, by the advice of his minister, Cardinal Klesel, entered it with an army, and advanced to Czaslau in Bohemia, where, after convoking the combined States of Austria and Moravia, he invited those of Bohemia also to a general assembly on the 4th of May. Rodolph parried this blow by summoning the Bohemian States to Prague, though, as the majority of them were Protestants, he could expect no favourable result; and meanwhile Matthias advanced with his army to the neighbourhood of that capital. Here he permitted the States to conduct the negotiations with the Emperor, or rather to name their terms; and on the 29th of June, 1608, a treaty¹ was concluded, by which Rodolph ceded Hungary to Matthias, with the title of King, as well as the Archduchy of Austria above and below the Enns. Matthias also received the title of King-Elect of Bohemia, with the consent of the Bohemian States; who expressed their wish that he should immediately undertake the government of Moravia. On the other hand, Matthias took upon himself Rodolph's debts in Hungary and Austria, and abandoned to him his own share of Upper Austria.²

Neither the Bohemians, however, nor the States of Hungary and Austria were content with these capitulations. The latter insisted upon the confirmation, nay, even the extension of the religious liberties granted to them by the Emperor Maximilian II., for would they do homage to Matthias as their new lord till he had complied with their demands. After long negotiations Matthias found himself compelled to yield, and on the 19th of March, 1609, he signed a capitulation conceding complete religious toleration. The Bohemian Diet, which had been assembled to declare Matthias successor to the Crown of Bohemia, had also demanded the re-establishment of all their ancient privileges in matters of religion, which, through the influence of Spain and the Jesuits, had been much curtailed during Rodolph's reign, and Rodolph had referred the settlement of the question

¹ In Glafey, *Pragmatische Gesch. Böhmens*, S. 565 ff.

² Tyrol was called *Upper Austria*. *Lower Austria* comprehended the district above and below the Enns. *Inner Austria* com-

prised Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Austrian Istria, Austrian Friuli; and the Litoral. *Further Austria* was the Vorarlberg, the Breisgau, and the various pieces of Austrian territory in Swabia.

to a future assembly. When this met, Rodolph's counsellors refused to recognize any other Protestant sect than that of the Utraquists, although many of the leading men in Bohemia, as Count Schlick, Count Thurn, and the eloquent Wenzel von Budowa, were either Lutherans or belonged to the freethinking fanatics called *Picards*. The Diet, finding that they could obtain no concessions, appointed a provisional government of thirty directors to sit at Prague; they raised an army, and named Count Thurn, Leonard von Fels, and John von Bubna to the command of it; and they published the articles for the maintenance of which they had resorted to these violent and extraordinary measures. Rodolph, who had neither troops nor money, by the advice of the Spanish and Saxon ambassadors, agreed to a capitulation, with the secret determination of evading it; and on the 12th of July, 1609, he signed the celebrated Royal Charter (*Majestats-Brief*) which was the immediate occasion of the Thirty Years' War. By this instrument liberty of conscience was allowed to all Bohemians who belonged to certain recognized religions; they were admitted to the University of Prague; they received permission to build churches on all Crown lands, to appoint consistories, and even to choose protectors, a thing at variance with all good government; and all ordinances which the Emperor or his successors might hereafter issue in contravention of the charter were declared beforehand null and void.¹

There was a Prince, afterwards destined to obtain the Imperial sceptre, who regarded all these concessions to the Protestants with the most lively abhorrence. The Archduke Ferdinand of Styria possessed energy and talents, and an autocratic, if not exactly a noble, disposition; he had been bred up in the principles of Spain and the Jesuits, and looked upon the uprooting of Protestantism as the special and solemn vocation of his life. In this respect he trod in the footsteps of his father Charles, who, at the beginning of the Catholic reaction, had committed to the flames 12,000 Lutheran Bibles and other books. In like manner Ferdinand, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, had effected holocausts of heretic works, at Gratz and Laibach, and in the former place founded a convent of Capuchins on the spot where they had been consumed. He resorted to *dragonnades* against his refractory Protestant subjects; and even in some towns erected, *in terrorem*, gibbets in the markets-places,

¹Dumont, t. v. pt. ii. 115. An abstract in Menzel, *Neuere Gesch. der Deutschen*, B. iii. S. 201 ff.

though he seems not actually to have used them. In his cousin and schoolfellow, Duke Maximilian of Bavaria, afterwards the first Bavarian Elector, Ferdinand found a strenuous coadjutor of kindred principles, and both were destined to become leading figures in that great war of bigotry and intolerance which disfigured the first half of the seventeenth century. In other respects Maximilian possessed good talents, and was one of the best rulers Bavaria ever had. An act of aggression, which at once gratified Maximilian's religious prejudices and augmented his dominions, had no little influence in producing that state of things in Germany which rendered possible the Thirty Years' War.

Donauwörth, a free Imperial city in the Circle of Suabia, but to which the Dukes of Bavaria asserted some ancient pretensions, had adopted the Protestant confession; but it held within its walls a small minority of Catholics, through whom the Jesuits were endeavouring to foment a reaction. In 1606 the abbot of the Benedictine abbey of Holy Cross thought fit to marshal in the streets a procession conducted with all that gorgeous pageantry in which the Romish Church delights, though such things had before been tolerated only in a quiet way. Disturbances followed; the procession was hooted and assaulted by the mob; and Maximilian, by perseverance, at length procured from the Aulic Council a decree by which Donauwörth was placed under the ban of the Empire, and the execution of the sentence intrusted to himself (August, 1607). As the inhabitants showed no signs of submission, Maximilian, in November, after publishing the ban with the customary solemnity, despatched some troops to take possession of the town; together with four Jesuits and two barefooted friars to bring the inhabitants to a proper sense of religion. A demand was then made for the expenses of executing the ban, which were estimated so high as to render payment impossible; and thus Donauwörth, from a free Imperial Protestant city, was converted into a Catholic provincial town of Bavaria.

The "Troubles of Donauwörth" are important in general history only by their consequences. The German Protestant Princes had, in 1603, entered into an alliance at Heidelberg to protect themselves from the innovations daily made by Austria and Bavaria, and being alarmed by the proceedings at Donauwörth, convened an assembly at Ahausen, an ancient convent in the territory of Anspach. Here the Elector Palatine, Frederick IV.,

¹ Maximilian was the son of Duke William II. of Bavaria, brother of Ferdinand's mother, Mary.

and Prince Christian of Anhalt, who had summoned the meeting, were met by Joachim Ernest and Christian, the two Margraves of Brandenburg-Anspach and Brandenburg-Culmbach, together with the Count Palatine, Philip Louis of Neuburg, and the Duke John Frederick of Würtemberg; and they formed, for a period of ten years, a defensive alliance, called THE PROTESTANT UNION (May 14th, 1608).¹ The objections which they took against the proceedings at Donauwörth were, that it was not competent to the Aulic Council² to pronounce sentence against a free Imperial city, such power residing only in the Diets and the Imperial Chamber; and further, that the execution of the ban had been intrusted to a Prince of the Circle of Bavaria, whilst the decree was against a State of the Circle of Suabia. By the Act of Union, the allies agreed to provide an army and a common chest, and they named the Elector Palatine to be their director in time of peace; but in case of war, any Prince whose territory should be attacked, when the general affairs of the Union were to be directed by a council of war. At subsequent meetings held at Rothenburg on the Tauber and Hall in Suabia, the Margrave Joachim Ernest was appointed general of the Union out of the territories of the allied Princes, with Christian of Anhalt for his lieutenant. The Union was eventually joined by fifteen Imperial cities, including Strasburg, Ulm, and Nuremberg, by the Landgrave Maurice of Hesse, and by John Sigismund, the new Elector of Brandenburg.

This alliance on the part of the Protestants provoked a counter one of the Catholics, organized by Maximilian of Bavaria. At his invitation the plenipotentiaries of the Bishops of Würzburg, Constance, Augsburg, Passau, Ratisbon, and other prelates assembled at Munich in July, 1609; and the Catholic States of the Circles of Suabia and Bavaria, agreed to enter into an alliance which afterwards obtained the name of the HOLY LEAGUE. The alliance purported to be only a defensive one; but in case of need great powers were entrusted to Maximilian as its director, who had raised a little standing army under the command of Count Tilly, already notorious by the cruelties which, in the service of the

¹ The Act is in Sattler's *Gesch. Würtembergs*. B. vi. Beif. 4. There is an abstract of it in Menzel, B. iii. S. 173.

² The Aulic Council (*Reichshofrath*) was established in its newer form by Ferdinand I. in 1559. As the members of it were all named by the Emperor, it was of course subservient to his will; and he

endeavoured to draw under its jurisdiction cases which should have been decided by the Imperial Chamber. But its authority was constantly disputed by the German States, and did not obtain entire recognition till the peace of Westphalia. See Pfäffel, sub anno 1512 (t. ii. p. 98 sq.).

Emperor, he had committed^d against the Protestants. In August the League was joined by the three spiritual Electors; and subsequently an alliance was made with the Pope, and subsidies demanded from Spain. Thus the great religious parties of Germany were formally arrayed against each other: for open violence nothing was wanting but the occasion, and this was afforded by a dispute which arose respecting succession to the Duchy of Jülich.

On the 25th of March, 1609, had died, without issue, John William, Duke of Cleves, Jülich and Berg, Count of the Mark and Ravensberg, and Lord of Ravenstein. Numerous claimants to the Cleves succession arose, of whom the most important were the following four: 1. The Albertine, or then Electoral, House of Saxony, which founded its pretensions on a promise of the reversion of the Duchies of Jülich and Berg given by the Emperor Frederick III. in 1483. 2. The Ernestine, or Ducal, House of Saxony alleged, besides this promise common to both branches of the family, the marriage contract between the Elector John Frederick and Sybille of Cleves, Jülich and Berg (1526); which had been confirmed by the Emperor Charles V., the Diet of the Empire, and the States of the three Duchies. 3. John Sigismund, Elector of Brandenburg, claimed by right of his wife, Anne of Prussia, daughter of Mary Eleanor of Cleves-Jülich-Berg, eldest sister of the last Duke, as well as by the letters patent of Charles V., 1546, confirmed by his successor in 1566 and 1580, which appointed the Duke's sisters to the succession. 4. Philip Louis, Palgrave of Neuburg, who also pleaded the claim of his wife, Anne of Cleves-Jülich-Berg, younger sister of the deceased Duke, by whom he had a son, Wolfgang William. The whole question, therefore, turned on the following points: Whether the contested duchies were solely male fiefs, or female as well? Whether the reversion of the House of Saxony, founded on the assumption of their being male fiefs, was to be preferred to a subsequent privilege in favour of the sisters of the last Duke? Whether such a privilege, first granted in 1526, could be opposed to the marriage contract of 1546? and lastly, Whether the daughter of the eldest sister could contest the claim of the son of the youngest sister?¹

In the present posture of affairs the question of this succession derived its chief importance from the circumstance that, though Protestantism had spread around them, the Dukes of Cleves-Jülich-Berg had remained firmly attached to the orthodox

¹ Pfeffel, *Hist. d'Allemagne*, t. ii. p. 238 sq.

Church, thus constituting one of the few large Catholic lay Powers among the temporal Princes of Germany. As the various claims had arisen from the awards of his predecessors, the Emperor Rodolph II. evoked the cause before the Aulic Council, as the proper tribunal in all feudal disputes; and to this course the Elector of Saxony, always the subservient friend of the House of Austria, readily consented. But as the policy of Saxony was of great moment in the wars and quarrels that were about to desolate Germany, it will here be proper to give a brief account of that Electorate, and of the religious and political views by which it was governed.

That unfortunate strife between the Lutheran and Calvinist divines, which divided the German Protestants into two hostile camps, had nowhere been attended with more disastrous effects than in Saxony. During the latter portion of the sixteenth century the Elector Augustus, brother and successor of Maurice, had introduced a sort of Inquisition into his dominions; and by the Confession of Faith styled the *Concordien-Formel*, or Formula of Concord, published in 1580, had, as it were, erected Lutheranism into a Protestant Papacy. The confession was forced upon clergymen and schoolmasters; those who refused it were turned out by hundreds from office and bread; Melancthon himself was abused in his grave, and the adherents of his principles were designated by the names of *Philipists* or *Crypto-Calvinists*. So absurdly intolerant was Augustus that he actually caused a medal to be struck in commemoration of his victory over four theologians, whom he had reduced to silence by persecution! Calvinists were regarded as children of perdition, to be exterminated from the earth; and from this period Saxony approximated much more nearly to the doctrines of Rome than to those of the Reformed Church. Christian I., the son and successor of Augustus, was rather more moderate. He died in 1591, leaving a minor son, Christian II.; but before he was buried the Saxon nobles rose against his Chancellor Krell and his party, who from their moderation were suspected of Calvinism. Many of them were persecuted and banished; Krell himself was thrown into prison, where he was kept ten years; and after repeated tortures, was at length beheaded. Christian II. was distinguished only by his sottishness; he is said to have drunk two large pitchers of wine daily,¹ till he was suddenly carried off in July, 1611. He was succeeded by his brother, John George, whose conduct, as

* ¹ Joh. Eremita, *Itinerarium Germ.* ap. Menzel, B. iii. S. 218.

we shall have occasion to relate, contributed greatly to enhance the sufferings of Germany during the Thirty Years' War. As the Emperor naturally preferred such good friends and semi-Catholic Princes as the Saxon Electors to the other claimants of the Cleves inheritance, he made no difficulty in granting to Christian II. the eventual investiture of the litigated fiefs; but, till a definitive judgment should be pronounced, he sequestered them into the hands of his cousin Leopold, Bishop of Passau, the brother of Ferdinand of Styria. This step, however, proved fatal to the Saxon cause. The Elector of Brandenburg and the Palsgrave of Neuburg, reckoning on the support of France and the United Provinces, resolved to make common cause; and regardless of the Emperor's prohibition to the subjects of the duchies to acknowledge any lord till the Imperial decision was awarded, they jointly occupied those territories, and assumed the title of "Princes in possession."

The reliance which the Protestant Princes placed on Henry IV. was not unfounded. In the autumn of 1602, Maurice, Landgrave of Hesse, surnamed "the Learned," had visited his court *incognito* with the view of effecting a German Protestant League under the protectorate of France. Schemes were agitated of procuring the Imperial Crown for Henry, or else for the Duke of Bavaria, who, with all his fellow-feeling for the House of Austria in matters of religion, harboured a secret jealousy of their greatness. The support of Bavaria would have brought with it that of all Catholic Germany; but the times were not yet ripe for action. Maurice and Henry, however, parted on the best terms; the latter assured the Landgrave that, in his inmost soul, he was still devoted to "the religion," and that he should make a fresh public confession of it before he died,¹ assurances which contrast strongly with those which he was always giving to the clergy, the French parliaments, and the Court of Rome, and forcibly illustrate Henry's own admission that the law of necessity made him say one thing while he meant another. He was easily induced to listen to the applications of the Elector of Brandenburg and the Palsgrave for assistance, and on his representations the States of Berg, Cleves, the Mark, and Ravenstein consented to put their fortresses into the hands of those Princes, but on condition that the Roman Catholic worship should be maintained. The city of Jülich, on the other hand, which was under the influence of the Margravine

¹ It is the Landgrave himself who relates this anecdote. See *Correspondance*

de Henri IV. avec Maurice le Savant edited by Rummel, ap. Martin, t. x. p. 521.

of Burgau, fourth sister of the late Duke, declared for the opposite party, and admitted the captain of the Archduke Leopold, who had already assembled an army, and who was supported by the Belgian Archdukes (December, 1609).

It has been attempted, by means of Henry's amorous foibles, to throw a false air of romance over the last great political act of his life; and the most recent historian of France has, in his eloquent pages, gravely ascribed Henry's projected expedition to Jülich to his new love for Charlotte de Montmorenci.¹ It is true that, at the age of fifty-five, Henry had conceived a passion—if such a term can fitly be applied to the numerous amours of the volatile King—for Charlotte, then in the bloom of seventeen: and with the view at once of gratifying and concealing his inclinations, had given her in marriage to his cousin, the Prince of Condé, whom he called his nephew; a young man of sullen, unsocial temper, suspected of shameful vices, and supposed to be no genuine scion of the illustrious house whose name he bore. Condé, however, proved not so compliant as his "uncle" had hoped and imagined; he carried off his young wife into Picardy; and Henry, to obtain a sight of the object of his adoration, committed many follies ill becoming a grey-haired lover; travelling the country in disguise, and moving the pity, or contempt, of Charlotte, by handing her into her coach in the garb of a servant. The jealous husband, in a gloomy November night, compelled his young spouse to enter his carriage, conducted her into Belgium, and placed her under the protection of the Archdukes Albert and Clara Eugenia; whilst he himself took shelter at Cologne, and afterwards set off for the Court of Philip III. On his way thither he published in Lombardy an absurd manifesto, denouncing the grievances of the French people, which he affirmed he had studied in their cottages; and he accused Sully of a design to usurp the Crown!

Inflamed at once by disappointed love, the ingratitude of a kinsman, and the treason of a subject, Henry had warned the Archdukes not to shelter his "nephew," under pain of incurring his hostility. Albert and Clara Eugenia, according to their custom, beat about till they had received instructions from the Court of Spain; which, while it affected to interpose between Henry and Condé only for the good of both parties, recommended the Archdukes to give the fugitives an asylum. But that this was the real cause of war cannot for a moment be supposed. We

¹ *Correspondance de Henri IV. avec Maurice le Savant*, edited by Rommel, ap. Martin, t. 5. p. 555.

have already seen that, however addicted to women, Henry was not weak enough to sacrifice to them his policy and the interests of France. His conduct on this occasion, instead of being the inspiration of love, was guided by the advice of the cold and politic Sully; who pointed out that now, when the House of Habsburg was hampered by its domestic quarrels, was the moment to strike a blow; and he contrasted the disorder of the Empire with the unity of France, and the prosperous state of her finances. Long, indeed, before the flight of Condé the French arsenals had resounded with the din of preparation, and negotiations had been opened which embraced the greater part of Europe. Early in 1610 Henry had concluded at Hall, in Suabia, a treaty with the German Protestant Union to uphold the rights of the inheritors of Cleves, and to drive from Jülich the Archduke Leopold. France promised to raise 10,000 men; the confederated Princes as many more; the Dutch, who entered warmly into the affair, in the hope of seizing the Spanish Netherlands, engaged to provide 17,000 or 18,000 men; the King of Denmark favoured the cause, and even the unwarlike English King, James I., embarked in the quarrel and promised a contingent of 4,000 men.

The views of Henry IV. and Sully embraced the wresting of the Imperial sceptre from the House of Austria; a scheme which appeared to be feasible only by enticing the Duke of Bavaria with the hope of obtaining it. The Elector of Brandenburg and the Elector Palatine had consented to accept a Catholic Emperor, but with guarantees for religion; the vote of Ernest of Bavaria, Elector of Cologne, uncle of the candidate, might be reckoned on; but a fourth vote was still necessary to secure a majority. The only other Protestant Elector was Christian of Saxony, a Lutheran, but, as we have said, devoted to the Imperial House. It was resolved, therefore, that if he obstinately adhered to that alliance, and continued to betray the common cause of Protestantism, the act by which Charles V. had deprived John Frederick of the Saxon Electorate should be declared null and void, and that dignity be restored to the Ernestine branch of the House of Saxony. It was hoped that the resistance of the Imperial family would be paralyzed by the distracted condition of their dominions, and that anti-dynastic revolutions might be excited in Hungary and Bohemia, and national Princes substituted there for the ruling house. French and German envoys were employed to propagate these schemes even in Transylvania and Wallachia; while from the north the King of Sweden and his son had assured

Henry of their good wishes. It does not appear how far Maximilian of Bavaria himself had entered into this plan for transferring to him the Empire, although Sully positively asserts that he gave his consent to it;¹ yet it is certain that he remained perfectly quiet at the time of the French King's projected invasion, notwithstanding that the members of the Protestant Union had taken up arms.

The preparations of Henry IV. were on the grandest scale. Besides the armies destined for Italy and Spain, as already mentioned, he had prepared, instead of the 10,000 men promised to the German Princes, an army of more than 30,000, which he intended to lead in person to Jülich. The plan of the campaign was to seize all the passages of the Meuse, and to surprise Charleroi, Maestricht, and Namur, while at the same time the Dutch were to blockade the Flemish harbours; the Belgian democracy was to be invited to rebellion; the nobles who possessed any jurisdiction were to be expelled; and a Republic was to be proclaimed. A junction was to be formed at Düren or Stablo with the German Princes and Maurice of Nassau; in case of prompt success in the north, Franche-Comté was next to be attacked; and then, according to circumstances, the King was either to march into Italy or Bohemia, and to call upon the Germans to decide the great question about the Empire. The Pope, alarmed at these mighty preparations, endeavoured to effect an accommodation. The Emperor and the Catholic King were disposed to make large concessions; the Belgian Archdukes granted a passage to the French army, and agreed to send back the Princess of Condé; and even Henry himself felt some natural hesitation on the brink of so momentous an enterprise. His plans had been differently received in France, according to the tempers and views of men. They were of course regarded with an evil eye by the old fanatical Catholic party, whose resentment he dreaded. The Jesuits were at work spreading sinister rumours; it was said that the King meant to destroy the Catholic religion in Germany; the cries of the soldiers were commented on, who declared that they would follow the King anywhere, even against the Pope; and sermons were daily delivered containing invectives against the Edict of Nantes, and the government and person of the King. Nay, even the Queen herself, and her favourite Concini, were in secret correspondence with Madrid.

¹ *Mémoires*, t. viii. p. 229 (Petitot). Cf. Menzel, *Neuere Gesch. der Deutschen*, B. iii. SS. 130, 176.

The cares of Henry were aggravated by a presentiment of his own approaching fate. Unacquainted with fear on the battlefield, he dreaded the knife of the assassin; dark rumours of conspiracies were floating about, and he communicated to Sully his conviction that he should be murdered on the occasion of the first great public solemnity. Such an occasion was approaching. On the 20th of March, 1610, Henry had issued a decree conferring the regency on his consort, Mary de' Medici, during his absence from the kingdom, but subject to a council of fifteen persons, with whom all the effective authority would lie. As the Queen, like any other member of it, had only a single vote, Mary's self-love was sorely wounded by this step; but she used the conjuncture to persuade Henry to complete the long-deferred ceremony of her coronation, although he grudged both the expense of that pageant and the delay which it would cause in his departure.

And now everything was arranged for carrying out that grand scheme of policy which Henry had so long been meditating. The troops had begun to move; the Queen had been crowned with great pomp at St. Denis by the Cardinal de Joyeuse, May 13th; her solemn entry into Paris was fixed for the 16th; and three days afterwards the King was to set off for the army. But on the 14th, while passing in his carriage from the Rue St. Honoré into the Rue de la Ferronnerie, its progress was arrested by two carts; and at this moment a man mounted on the wheel and stabbed the King with a knife between the ribs. Henry threw up his arms, exclaiming "I am wounded;" and the assassin seized the opportunity to repeat the blow more fatally, by stabbing him to the heart. He never spoke more. The murderer was seized by the King's suite, and turned out to be one François Ravillac, who had begun a noviciate in the convent of the Feuillants at Paris, and had afterwards been a schoolmaster in his native town of Angoulême. In his examination he assigned as his motives for the deed, the King's having neglected to convert the Hugonots, and his design of making war upon the Pope; that is, in Ravillac's notion, on God himself. In this view his crime was the result of fanaticism, inflamed by the discourses and sermons which he heard; but the Spanish Court, Mary de' Medici, and Concini, gained so much by the act, that there were not wanting some who suspected them to be privy to it; together with the Duke of Epermon, who was in the coach with Henry at the time, and to whom the town of Angoulême belonged. Nay, it is even said that Ravillac, during the last dreadful tortures of his

execution, denounced their names; but the papers containing his depositions were suppressed.¹ These charges, however, rest on no certain foundation.

Thus perished Henry IV., and with him his extensive projects, at a time when his robust constitution, at the age of nearly fifty-seven, still promised many years of life. The main features of his character will have been gathered from his history, for his virtues and defects were alike without concealment. In the more private intercourse of life his tastes and habits were of the simplest kind. He preferred the bagpipe and hautboy to more refined and artificial music; he loved to mix and talk with the people in the taverns or ferry-boats whither his hunting-parties led him; and when campaigning he would sit with the soldiers and partake of their black bread. He frequented the fairs and markets, and often made purchases, but he always offered the lowest price, and it was observed to be of no advantage to deal with the King.² Some parts of his conduct it would be difficult to defend; but it may be easier to rail at his faults and weaknesses than to imitate his virtues.

¹ See Michelet, *Henri IV. et Richelieu*.

² Ranke, *Französ. Gesch.* B. ii. S. 100.

CHAPTER XXX.

NO sooner had the murder of Henry IV. been perpetrated, than the Duke of Epernon, who had been an eye-witness of it, hastened, in his capacity of colonel-general of the French infantry, to appoint the guard at the Louvre, and to occupy with troops the principal places of the capital. The ministers of the late King, Sillery, Villeroy, and Jeannin, with whom Epernon and Guise agreed, advised Mary to seize the regency before the Princes of the blood should have time to dispute it with her; and Epernon proceeded to the convent of the Augustinians, where the Parliament had been assembled, and overawed it by his language. That body, however, was of itself sufficiently inclined to exert a privilege which did not constitutionally belong to it. Henry had been murdered at four o'clock in the afternoon; before seven, the Parliament brought to Mary de' Medici an *arrêt* conferring upon her the regency; to which, indeed, she had already been appointed by Henry, though for a different purpose, and with less extensive powers.

In these proceedings, Sully, the prime minister of Henry, was conspicuous by his absence. At the time of the King's murder, Sully was waiting for him at the arsenal: instead of Henry came a gentleman of his suite, bringing the knife, which still reeked with his blood. Sully's first impulse was to mount his horse and ride towards the Louvre; in the Rue St. Honoré he was met by Vitry, the captain of the guards, who, with tears in his eyes, implored him to go no further; it was rumoured, he said, that the plot had been hatched in high places, had many ramifications. Sully turned his horse's head, and shut himself up in the Bastille; whence he sent a message to his son-in-law, the Duke of Rohan, then in Champagne, to hasten to Paris with the 6,000 Swiss of whom he was colonel-general. But the Queen sent to assure Sully of her confidence; and on the following morning he appeared at the Louvre; Mary brought to him the infant Louis XIII., and while Sully embraced the heir of his late friend and master, the Queen besought him to serve the son as he had served

the father. Deceitful words! Concini was already director of Mary and the State. On the same morning, the regency of the Queen was solemnly confirmed in a *Lit de Justice*, at which the youthful King presided, and in infantine tones appointed his mother to be his tutor. Not many weeks after we find him exploring the guardian he had himself appointed not to apply the horsewhip too severely;¹ for personal chastisement was among the means of his education.

The Regency of Mary de' Medici was not unpopular. She was now in the meridian of womanly beauty; a well-developed person and a majestic air procured for her the admiration of the Parisians, and in her progresses through the capital she was received with the acclamations of the people. But they also lamented the loss of Henry, whose merits were not appreciated till he was dead. It was difficult to save Ravailiac, when proceeding to execution, from the fury of the populace; his remains, instead of being burnt pursuant to his sentence, were seized by the crowd and torn to pieces; even the peasants of the neighbourhood carried off portions of them to burn in their villages. The Sorbonne, at the instance of the Parliament of Paris, issued a decree condemning the principles from which the assassination had proceeded, and the Parliament itself ordered the book of Mariana, in which that Jesuit sanctions regicide, to be burnt. Yet Henry had courted that Society, apparently to propitiate their power of doing him mischief. To gratify his confessor, Père Cotton, he had appointed by his will that his heart should be entombed in their church at La Flèche, and one morning early, before Paris was awake, several of the fraternity carried it off secretly in a coach, escorted by many of the nobility on horseback. 'It was a prize, as L'Estoile maliciously observes, for which they had long been waiting.'²

Mary de' Medici had stolen a march upon the Princes of the blood, whose characters did not render them very formidable. Condé, as we have seen, was absent in Italy; of his two uncles, one, the Prince of Conti, was almost imbecile, the other, the Count of Soissons, who had absented himself from Court, was entirely venal. He arrived in Paris on the 17th of May, but abandoned all his pretensions for a sum of 200,000 crowns and an annual pension of 50,000. Henry of Condé, first Prince of the blood, was, as already related, in a state of rebellion against

¹ Michelet, *Henri IV.* p. 208.

² *Journal de Louis XIII.* t. v. p. 8 (Petitot). Cf. Michelet, *Henri IV.* p. 206.

Henry IV.; but he protested his devotion to the young King, and finding that he should be well received, returned to Paris in the middle of July, when most of the nobility, who were disgusted with the conduct of Concini, and other rapacious favourites by whom the Queen was surrounded, went out to meet and welcome him; and he entered the capital at the head of 1,500 gentlemen.¹ But Condé was as meanly venal as his uncle. At his first interview with the Queen, Mary was all grace, the Prince all submission. The treasure amassed by Henry IV. in the Bastille for his projected war supplied Mary with unlimited means of seduction, and the County of Clermont, a pension of 200,000 livres, the Hotel Gondi, with 30,000 crowns to furnish it, together with a seat in the Council, converted Condé from a rival into a subject. The Queen also gained the leading nobles by giving them pensions and governments;² the people by remitting several unpopular ordinances and taxes; the Hugonots by confirming the Edict of Nantes. Her new situation seemed to have roused a fresh spirit in her. She was up at sunrise to receive her privy council; she devoted the whole morning to business; after dinner she admitted to an audience all who demanded it; and in the evening she discussed her affairs with confidential friends.

But there was one man who was not to be gained. Sully viewed with aversion both the domestic and foreign policy of Mary, so contrary to all his former projects. He resolved to retire, and in October, during the *sacre* of Louis XIII. at Rheims, he obtained leave to visit his estates, and set off with a determination never to return. His administrative talents were soon missed; nothing went right in his absence; and, at the pressing solicitation of Mary and her ministers, he again returned to the helm. He was now about fifty years of age, in the full maturity of his powers, and ambitious to employ his talents in those schemes for the benefit of France which had so long engrossed his attention; but he met with a furious opposition from the rapacious courtiers and nobles; his life was even threatened, and in January, 1611, he found himself compelled finally to relinquish office. From this time till his death in 1641, at the age of eighty-one, his life was passed in retirement on his estates of

¹ *Mém. d'Estrées* (in Petitot, 2^de sér. t. xvi. p. 189). If the Queen had not persuaded some gentlemen to remain with the King, says Fontchartrain (*Mém. t. i. p. 418*), not one would have stayed in Paris.

² Jeannin admitted to the States-Gen-

ral in 1614 that pensions, which under Henry IV. had been less than two millions per annum, then figured for a sum of 5,650,000 livres! *Relation des Etats-Gén.* in the *Arch. Curieuses*, 2^de sér. t. i.; Fontenai-Mareuil, t. i. p. 134.

Rosni, Boisbelle, Sully, and Villebon; and it was reserved for him, at length, to see his plans realized in part by Richelieu.¹

Except in one point the policy of Henry IV. and his great minister was entirely abandoned. The Queen had always favoured a Spanish alliance, and particularly desired the Spanish match proposed during the lifetime of her husband, in which views she was supported by Concini, his wife La Galigai, and the Duke of Epernon. Even the ministers Sillery, Villeroy, and Jeannin were for conciliating Spain; but at the same time they recommended that the alliances with Great Britain, the United Provinces, the German Protestant Princes, and the Turks should be confirmed; and though three-fourths of the army of Champagne were disbanded, they persuaded the Council, in spite of the opposition of the Jesuits, that the treaty of Hall should be carried out. It was a sort of compromise between the parties, and the last concession to the policy of Henry IV.

The Bishop and Archduke Leopold had already begun to think of treating for the surrender of Jülich, when the news of Henry IV.'s assassination determined him to a vigorous resistance; and Rauschenberger, his commandant in that city, had succeeded in defending it not only against the two German Princes, but also against Maurice of Nassau, who had appeared before it in the last week in July. In August, however, the besieging forces were joined by some 14,000 French, under the Marshal de la Châtre, with the Duke of Rohan for his lieutenant, and on the first of September Rauschenberger found it necessary to capitulate. A Prince of the House of Brandenburg now obtained the government of Jülich and its territory, although the Emperor Rodolph had, in June, formally invested with it Christian II., Elector of Saxony.² The Archduke Leopold continued to maintain some troops in Alsace, which committed terrible disorders, till the Union sent an army against him, compelled him to dismiss his troops and enter into the treaty of Willstatt. The Elector Palatine, Frederick IV., one of the chief leaders of the Protestant Union, died in September, 1610, leaving by his will the Duke of Zweibrücken (Deux-Ponts), a Calvinist, the guardian of his minor son, Frederick V.; although the Palgrave of Neuburg, a Lutheran, was his nearest kinsman.³ The Duke of Zweibrücken now became a director of the Union.

¹ For Sully and his fall, see, besides the *Économies Royales*, the *Mémoires* of Fontenai-Mâreuil, of Pontchartrain, and of the Duke of Rohan.

² Menzel, B. iii. S. 210.

³ Frederick V.'s mother was the celebrated Louisa Juliana, whose life has been written by Spanheim (*Mémoires de*

The politics of the French Court now underwent a complete change. The idea began to spread that the union of France and Spain, the two greatest monarchies of Europe, was necessary to the peace and happiness of Christendom; though Mary de' Medici, in adopting it, was guided principally by considerations of domestic policy. She was alarmed at the conduct of the Prince of Condé, who held several governments in France, and who had strengthened himself by connections with some of the chief nobles; as his uncle Soissons, the Duke of Nevers, Lesdiguières, Count Bucquoy, and others, and especially the Duke of Bouillon and his party.¹ Condé wanted to obtain the chief voice in the executive as well as in the Council, and the promise of the constablership on the next vacancy; but he cloaked his personal ambition by making demands for what seemed the public good. The Queen preserved awhile the peace of France by conciliating Condé and the disaffected nobles by large gifts, governments, and pensions. The Hugonots had also begun to stir, whom it was not possible thus to conciliate. They still formed a very formidable power in the State. At the beginning of the century they possessed 760 parish churches, and about 200 fortified towns; they counted in their ranks 4,000 of the nobility, and could easily bring into the field an army of 25,000 men.² They demanded to hold their assemblies, as in the time of Henry IV., threatening to do so without leave if permission were not granted; and in the summer of 1611 they had a stormy meeting at Saumur. All these things were motives with the Queen for pressing the alliance with Spain. The Spanish Court was also anxious for it; and the Duke of Feria had been despatched to Paris with the friendly message that all grounds for hostility had vanished on the death of Henry IV. The negotiations for the marriages between Louis XIII. and Doña Anne, the eldest Infanta of Spain, and between Louis's eldest sister, Elizabeth of France, and Don Philip, Prince of the Asturias, were not, however, brought to a conclusion till August, 1612. In these contracts, Don Philip renounced all future pretensions to the French Crown, and Doña Anne gave up all claim to the Spanish inheritance.³ With the marriage treaties another was also arranged by which each govern-

Louise Juliane Electrice Palatine. Leyden, 1645).

¹ Henry de la Touffe, Viscount of Turenne, had obtained the Duchy of Bouillon by his marriage with Charlotte de la Marck.

² *Relazione* of Badoer, ap. Ranke, *Popes*, vol. ii. p. 440.

³ The definitive treaties, signed August 25th, 1612, are in Dumont, t. v. pt. ii. p. 215; cf. *Arch. de Simancas*, ap. Capefigue, *Richelieu et Mazarin*, t. ii. p. 112 sqq.

ment engaged not to support, either directly or indirectly, the rebellious subjects of the other: a point of great importance to France, but of very little moment to Spain since the conclusion of the truce with Holland. The alliance of the two leading Catholic Powers was welcome to the clergy, and especially to the Pope, who did all he could to promote it. He hoped to derive advantage from it not only with regard to the Protestants, but also the Gallican Church: for the peace of Christendom, as it was called by the contracting Powers, concerned only that of the Catholic world.

The Spanish marriages furnished materials for complaint and sedition to the malcontent French Princes. In 1614, Condé, Mayenne, Nevers, Bouillon, and other nobles attempted an absurd revolt, which was soon put down, and terminated by the peace of Ste. Menehould, May 15th. In one of the articles, Condé insisted upon the convocation of the *Etats-Généraux*; which the Queen accordingly assembled at Paris in the following October, although the Prince secretly let her know that he was not in earnest in the matter. This assembly of the States-General is chiefly remarkable as being the last under the French monarchy before 1789. It ended in the dismissal of the *Tiers Etat* (March, 1615); their chamber was locked up, and they were forbidden again to meet. Their next assembly, in 1789, was the beginning of the downfall of the French monarchy. The *Etats* of 1614 are also memorable as being the first occasion on which Richelieu appeared in public life. Although not yet thirty years of age, he was already so distinguished by his talents that he was elected spokesman of the clergy; and he displayed in that capacity, by his masculine eloquence, the genius which was to wield for a period the destinies of France.

Armand Jean du Plessis, the third son of a gentleman of Poitou, who, besides the estate of Plessis, in that province, also inherited the lordships of Richelieu, Beçay and Chillou, was born at Paris, September 5th, 1585. His father had been a captain in Henry IV.'s guard, and Armand also chose the military profession; with which view he acquired all the accomplishments of a cavalier, and especially a skill in horsemanship, on which he piqued himself through life. But the family was in straitened circumstances. Henry IV., who loved to reward his old servants, had indeed bestowed on the eldest brother a pension of 1,200 crowns, and on Alphonse the second, the bishopric of Luçon, besides other preferments. But Alphonse, a prey to religious fanaticism, soon resolved to resign his bishopric, and turn

Carthusian; and the family, unwilling to see that valuable preference pass from their hands, procured from the Court the nomination of Armand to the see in place of his brother. Armand, with the energy natural to his character, resolved to qualify himself for his new career; and, shutting himself up in a country house, near Paris, with a doctor of Louvain, he devoted himself for a year or two to the study of theology with an application which is said to have injured his health. The depths of learning are not, however, so easily fathomed, nor does Richelieu's genius seem to have been adapted to the patient toils of the closet; it is at all events certain that some specimens he has left do not convey any high notion of the profundity of his acquirements,¹ and he was dissuaded by his friends from studies that seemed alike injurious to his health and to his fortunes.

Nevertheless Richelieu entered on his episcopal functions at the early age of twenty-one, after making a journey to Rome for his consecration (April, 1607), where he is said to have charmed Pope Paul V. by an elegant Latin oration. After his return to France he appears to have applied himself with some diligence to his episcopal duties, though he paid occasional visits to the Court. His election to represent the clergy of Poitou, Fontenai, and Niort, in the States-General, must have afforded no little gratification to a man of his ambitious temper; and the speech which he delivered as the organ of the priesthood laid the foundation of his political fortune.² To a modern reader, indeed, it may appear somewhat prolix and old-fashioned; but on the whole it marks an era in the progress of French eloquence, especially by the absence of the tedious and impertinent display of erudition then in vogue. In an eloquent passage he vehemently denounced the exclusion of the clergy from all share in the government; and complained that so debased was the Gallican Church that it seemed as if the honour of serving God rendered its priests unfit to serve the King, His image upon earth. He was to see this grievance remedied in his own person, as he perhaps anticipated; but though he proved well enough that a prelate may be a politician, he overlooked the other side of the question, and neglected to inquire whether the occupations of a statesman are compatible with the duties of a bishop. He concluded his speech with some compliments to the Queen, and by expressing a wish to see the

¹ On this subject see Dreux du Radier, *Bibliothèque Hist. du Poitou*, t. iii. p. 374; Le Clerc, *Vie du Card. de Richelieu*, t. i. p. 5.

² In Fetitot, 2^{me} sér. t. xj. p. 201 sqq.

Spanish marriages accomplished. After the close of the assembly he did not return to his diocese, but remained at Paris, in the hope, apparently, of obtaining such employment as he had hinted at; but he had yet to wait a year or two for the attainment of his object.

Just before the meeting of the States-General, Louis XIII., who had entered his fourteenth year, September 27th, had been declared major; a step by which Mary de' Medici, in losing the title of Regent, only fixed her power on a firmer basis, so long as the King, still by nature a minor, continued to be obedient to her counsels. In order to effect the Spanish marriages as speedily as possible, she arranged a journey into Guienne, when the French and Spanish princesses were to be exchanged. On the 9th of August, 1615, Condé published a hostile manifesto, demanding the postponement of the marriages till the King was really of marriageable years; and being supported by several of the nobles, as well as by the Hugonots, then holding their triennial assembly at Grenoble, he began to levy soldiers. The Parliament of Paris, aware of the support which they might expect from Condé's faction, had also displayed the most refractory symptoms; they had addressed the Queen in a violent remonstrance, and in particular they had complained of the employment in high offices, of certain persons, whom they did not name, some of whom were foreigners; but Condé supplied the omission by naming the Marshal d'Ancre, the Chancellor, and two or three others. Concini, Mary's brilliant favourite, although he had never borne arms, had been dignified in November, 1613, with the *bâton*, and the title of Marshal d'Ancre. Vain, presumptuous, devoid of ability, Concini had by his insolence incurred the hatred of all, and especially of the lawyers of the Parliament. He had insulted that assembly by keeping on his hat; and he had incurred the rebuke of the venerable President Harlai, in the *Lit de Justice* held after the assassination of Henry IV., by directing in a loud voice the proceedings of the Queen. Alarmed by the denunciations of the Parliament, backed as they were by Condé, Marshal d'Ancre and his wife implored the Queen to postpone her intended journey; but Mary on this occasion, contrary to her usual custom, displayed considerable ill-humour towards her favourite; bade him repair to his government of Picardy, to maintain there the royal authority; and ordered various measures to be adopted against the attempts of Condé and his confederates. She then took the road to Bordeaux with the King and Court, escorted by

a military force under the Dukes of Guise and Epernon. Condé and his confederates set off with some 5,000 or 6,000 men; and the Duke of Rohan, with the same view, took the command of the Hugonot forces in Guienne. But Rohan had been deceived as to their real strength; he was not able to obstruct the Queen's passage; the road to Spain was open, and the double marriage was celebrated by proxy at Bordeaux and Burgos, October 18th. The two princesses were exchanged at Hendaye, on the Bidasoa, November 9th. Guise, at the head of 5,000 men, conducted the new Queen of France to Bordeaux, and on the 25th of November, the union of Louis XIII. and Anne of Austria—strange mixture of the blood of Henry IV. and Philip II.—was solemnized in the cathedral of that city by the Bishop of Saintes. The principal subject of contention being thus at an end, an accommodation was soon afterwards effected with the malcontents, by the treaty of Loudun, May 3rd, 1616. By a supplementary article, one and a half million livres were assigned to Condé for the expenses of the war, and the other Princes received in proportion. The rights and privileges of the Hugonots were confirmed.

After this peace Richelieu was employed by the Queen-Mother in conducting some negotiations with Condé, whom the Court wished to gain over, and to convert into a mediator with the great nobles. Richelieu had now obtained through the interest of Leonora Galigai, the wife of Marshal d'Ancre, the place of first-almoner to the Queen-regnant, Anne of Austria,¹ an office of no political importance, but which he afterwards sold for a considerable sum. Soon afterwards he was also made a *Conseiller d'Etat*. He discharged his mission to Conde with success, and persuaded that Prince, who was residing in jealous retirement in Berri, to come to Paris. In November, 1616, the Bishop of Luçon was named ambassador-extraordinary to Spain, on the subject of some differences which had arisen between Spain and the Duke of Savoy. His effects were already packed up, when a change having occurred in the French ministry, by the dismissal of Du Vair, the Keeper of the Seals, Richelieu was appointed a secretary of state in the place of Mangot, promoted to the seals. He marked his entrance upon office by asserting the pre-eminence of the Church, and demanded a special *brevet*, giving him, though a younger man, precedence over the other members of the council. Villeroi, compelled to cede to him the post of first secretary, retired, though still retaining the emoluments belonging to that

¹ Aubéry, *Mém. de Richelieu*, t. i. p. 11.

dignity.¹ Richelieu obtained his promotion through the favour of Marshal d'Ancre and his wife. Long before the bishop's entrance into office, the marshal had been in the habit of telling his friends that he had in hand a young man capable of reading a lesson *a tutti barboni*, to all the old long beards, or dotards, as he called them, the former ministers of Henry IV.² Thus Richelieu began his political career as the devoted servant of the Queen-Mother, and the instrument of her Spanish policy; a course directly opposed to his subsequent views after he had obtained the entire management of the affairs of France. By one class of French historians this has been viewed as a blot on the judgment and consistency as well as on the patriotism of the great statesman;³ whilst others have acquitted him of these charges, but at the expense of his honour and humanity. According to these writers, the Bishop of Luçon accepted place only with the view of cheating Spain, and deceiving and supplanting his patron Concini;⁴ and of this assertion it must at least be said that some parts of Richelieu's conduct show him not incapable of such motives. These, however, must remain in obscurity, if according to the dictum of Michelet, even the Cardinal's own memoirs are not to be trusted.⁵ That self-advancement was his object can hardly be doubted, yet he was not like the Briçonnets, the D'Amboises, and others, of that vulgar class of politicians who seek their own interest only; he had a soul for those of his country also, and in the view of his more capacious genius, the glory of France, the result of his administrative talents, was reflected back upon himself.

Richelieu's patron already stood on the brink of a precipice. Several of the great nobles, at the head of whom were Mayenne and Bouillon, had conspired to take Concini's life, and they had induced Condé to join them. The French nobility, it must be confessed, had much degenerated. The leagues and revolts of the preceding century had, by profession at least, been for great principles, contended for in the open field; they were now miserable intrigues for the sole object of personal aggrandizement. The first princes of the land were ready to sacrifice their prin-

¹ Richelieu's commission, dated Nov. 30th, 1616, expressly provides that his right of *préséance* is not to form a precedent. Aubéry, *Mém.* t. i. p. 15.

² Richelieu, *Mém.* liv. vii.; Capefigue, *Richelieu*, &c. t. ii. p. 275.

³ See Michelet, *Henri IV. et Richelieu*, ch. xxi., who asserts that Richelieu was Spanish to the age of forty, and the rest

of his life anti-Spanish.

⁴ Martin, *Hist. de France*, t. xi. p. 107.

⁵ "Si l'on veut ignorer solidement et à fond Richelieu il faut lire ses Mémoires." — *Henry IV. et Richelieu*, p. 363. The author proceeds to compare them with those of Sulla, Tiberius, and others written, "pour rendre l'histoire difficile."

ciples, and even their ambition, for a sum of money or a government; and now they were leagued together to murder a foreigner who offended them indeed by his insolence, but whose greatest crime was that he intercepted some of those emoluments and honours which they coveted for themselves. Condé, however, had neither the firmness nor the discretion necessary for a conspirator; he secretly let Concini know that he could protect him no longer, and both the Marshal and his wife set off for Caen. But though Condé spared the favourite, he only pushed with more vigour the plans which he had formed against the Queen and government. His return had been hailed by the Parisians with a loudness of acclamation which had excited the jealousy of the Court. He seemed to partake, and even to eclipse, the authority of the Queen. He was assiduous at the Council, of which, by the treaty of Loudun, he was the head; the finances were abandoned to his direction; no ordinance was issued without his signature; and while the Louvre was deserted, such were the crowds that resorted to his hotel that it was difficult to approach the gates. He treated the Queen-Mother with an insolence which completely alienated her. He attempted to debauch the populace, to gain over the guilds, as well as the colonels and captains of quarters, and to animate the pulpits against the government; and as all his conduct seemed to indicate that he aimed at nothing less than seizing the supreme power, and perhaps even the throne itself, Mary, by the advice of her ministers, resolved on arresting him; which was accordingly effected. Being sent to the Bastille, he betrayed the meanest pusillanimity, and offered to reveal all the plots of his accomplices; who, on the first notice of the Prince's capture, had fled from Paris. Condé's mother, proceeding on foot to the Pont Notre-Dame, exclaimed that Marshal d'Ancre had murdered her son, and called on the populace to avenge her. The mob gazed with astonishment and pity on so strange a sight; and Picard, a little red-haired; grey-eyed shoemaker, the domagogue of Paris, who had had a mortal quarrel with Concini, seized the moment to lead them to the hotels of the marshal and his secretary, Corbinelli, which were plundered and destroyed.¹ Meanwhile the Duke of Nevers was meditating open force, and Mayenne and Bouillon were preparing to join him. Concini trembled in the midst of his enormous wealth, and thought of securing it by retiring to Italy; but from this project he was

¹ *Mercure Français*, t. iv. p. 201.

diverted by his wife; and when the confusion and astonishment created by the arrest of Condé had somewhat subsided, he took heart and returned to Paris. After all it was not by the disaffected nobles that he was to be overthrown, but by a domestic revolution in the palace.

Louis XIII., now in his sixteenth year, was beginning to act for himself. As a child he had been sullen and refractory; as a youth he grew up disassembling, distrustful, and melancholy. His features were handsome, but the expression of his countenance was at once harsh and irresolute; his eyes and hair were black, his countenance tawny as a Spaniard's, but without the vivacity of the south. He neither loved literature, nor play, nor wine, nor the society of ladies; art touched him somewhat more, especially music, his chief solace. He had shown some ability in the mathematical and mechanical sciences, and had early become a good artilleryman and engineer. Although of an unsound constitution, he was not deficient in bodily strength and activity, and hunting and hawking were his favourite diversions. He blew the horn himself; he knew the names of all his hounds; it was his supreme delight to see the pack assemble before him, or to watch his falcons soar into the air and swoop on the scared and fluttering birds which sought refuge in the trees or under the battlements. Observing his passion for fowling, M. de Souvré, his governor, had placed about him a person particularly skilled in that pastime; a gentleman about thirty years of age, of equivocal descent, the natural son or grandson of a canon of Marseilles and an Italian woman who claimed to belong to the Florentine family of the Alberti. Hence the King's falconer called himself Charles d'Albert, and from a small property on the Rhone, Sieur de Luynes. Two younger brothers bore the names of Brantes and Cadenet, from two lordships of such slender dimensions that a hare, says Bassompierre, could leap over them; nor was the nobility of these three Provençal brothers very magnificently supported by a pension of 1,200 crowns which Henry IV. had settled on the eldest, who religiously shared it with his juniors.

Luynes seemed dull and harmless enough, with no ideas beyond his birds; and Concini had not only tolerated him, but even procured for him the government of Amboise. Louis, however, having on the occasion of his marriage employed Luynes to compliment his young Queen Anne at Bayonne, the marshal conceived a jealousy of the falconer; and on the return of the Court to Paris in May, 1616, he took no pains to conceal his enmity. From this

time Luynes used every endeavour to incite the King both against his mother and the Concini; he sought friends on every side; he made an offer to the Spanish ambassador to sell himself for a pension; he entered into correspondence with the malcontent princes, and courted the friendship of Richelieu. This minister had not answered the marshal's expectations. In placing the bishop in office, Concini had expected to find him a sort of humble clerk, the subservient tool of all his wishes. But Richelieu was made of other materials, and was resolved to act for himself. "It is wretched for a man of spirit," observes Richelieu in his Memoirs,¹ "to be bound to persons who wish for flatterers and not friends, whom we must deceive in order to serve, and who prefer what is agreeable to what is useful; but if this evil is great, it is also common. Under the sway of favourites, there is none whose head does not turn by mounting so high; none who does not wish to convert a servant into a slave, and a councillor of state into a tool of his passions; thus attempting to dispose of the honour, as well as the hearts, of those whom fortune has made his inferiors." It is probable that the sagacious bishop perceived Concini to be tottering to his fall; it is certain that a violent quarrel took place between them, and the marshal addressed to Richelieu a letter, displaying all the rage of a madman.² The bishop, however, had no concern in Concini's death; the blow came from Luynes alone. That favourite even suspected that Richelieu and his fellow-secretary Barbin, were in a plot against him with Concini; and to avert the apprehended storm, Luynes had proposed to marry one of the marshal's nieces at Florence; but Leonora would not give her consent. This refusal cost her and Concini their lives.³ Luynes now redoubled his machinations against the marshal; and he had recourse to a thousand little stratagems and insinuations to ruin him with the King. He set Concini's frequent journeys, arising from the agitation of his mind, in a suspicious light; he represented him as meditating rebellion, and with that view raising an army in Normandy and Flanders; he denounced him as consulting astrologers respecting the King's life. He also poisoned the mind of Louis against his mother, by painting in vivid colours the insupportable dominion she would obtain over him after she had reduced the rebel nobles; nay, he even revived the old Hugonot tales about Catharine de' Medici having killed her children in order to prolong her power; and he pointed out that Mary, like Catharine, was surrounded by Italians, poisoners, and magicians.⁴

¹ Liv. viii.² *Ibid.* t. ii. p. 290.³ *Ibid.* liv. viii.

The impression made by these stories on the young King's mind is evident from a story told by Bassompierre. Louis one day said to him, "I must practise the horn, which I play very well, and shall continue at it all day." Bassompierre remarking that it was bad for the lungs, and had caused the death of Charles IX., the King replied, "You are mistaken; it was not playing the horn that killed him, but his offending his mother Queen Catharine at Monceaux, and quitting her to go to Meaux. And if Marshal de Retz had not persuaded Charles to return to her, he would not have died so speedily."¹

Luynes succeeded by his artifices in persuading the King to consent to Marshal d'Ancre's arrest; his assassination, which Luynes had also proposed, Louis would not sanction, except in case he should resist; under the circumstances a mere *salvo* for the King's conscience. The execution of this enterprise Luynes intrusted to the Marquis of Vitry, captain of the guards, a resolute man, and an enemy of the marshal's. Vitry was directed to proceed at night to a certain spot, where he would meet some persons who would communicate to him the wishes of the King. Great was Vitry's surprise to find at the appointed rendezvous, Tronçon and Marsillac, men of infamous reputation, creatures of Luynes, together with Déageant, a fraudulent clerk of the secretary Barbin, and a gardener employed at the Tuileries. But Vitry had gone too far to recede, and was induced by the prospect of a great reward to undertake an act which he must have been conscious would result in murder.

Concini occupied a small hotel at the corner of the Louvre towards the Seine, near the Queen's apartments, to which there was a bridge, called by the people "Le Pont d'Amour." On the morning of April 24th, 1617, the marshal, accompanied by some fifty of his friends and servants, was proceeding to his wife's apartments in the palace, to wait as usual for the Queen's rising. He had reached the middle of the drawbridge over the fosse of the Louvre, when Vitry, who was accompanied by some twenty gentlemen, seized him by the arm, exclaiming that he arrested him in the King's name. Concini laid his hand on his sword, but immediately fell, pierced by three pistol bullets. His nosegay and one of his cloaks fell into the fosse. His followers made a show of resistance, but, as the swords of Vitry's band gleamed in the morning sun, suddenly disappeared, and the cry of "Vive le Roi" resounded through the precinct of the Louvre. Twenty or

¹ Bassompierre. *Mémoires*, t. ii. p. 154 (Betitot).

thirty horses stood ready saddled in the court of the Tuileries, to insure the escape of the King and his followers in case the enterprise should fail; Louis, trembling and anxious, was awaiting its result, when Colonel d'Ornano, in breathless haste, informed him of Concini's death. Then Louis, seizing a sword and carbine, presented himself at a window, exclaiming, "Thank you, my friends; I am now a King!" The tumult had roused his mother from her morning slumber, and she inquired the cause of it. One of her ladies, thrusting her head out of window, asked Vitry, who was at the head of the guards in battle array, what was the matter. "Madame," replied Vitry, "Marshal D'Ancre is dead." "And who has done this fine deed?" continued the lady. "I," replied Vitry, drily, "and by the King's command." "Poveretta di me!" exclaimed Mary de' Medici, on hearing the news. "I have reigned seven years, and now the crosses and the crowns of Heaven are all that remain to me!"

Thus was consummated this palace-revolution. The King declined to hold any conversation with his mother; her guards were withdrawn from the Louvre and replaced by his own, and several of the doors leading to her apartments were walled up. The Marshal's wife, Leonora, was arrested as she lay in bed, endeavouring to conceal some of the crown jewels, and the plate and furniture of her apartments were seized. The marshal's body was carried into the little tennis-court of the Louvre, where, covered with an old cloak, the face exposed, and on the breast a paper inscribed *Traître au Roi*, it lay till nine o'clock in the evening, when it was buried, without any funeral rights, under the organ-loft in the church of St. Germain l'Auxerrois.¹ Concini's death was celebrated by the mob with bonfires. On the next day his body was dug up and dragged through the streets; a monster roasted and devoured his heart. The conduct of the young Queen, Anne of Austria, was no better than that of the mob. Concini's house was searched and stripped; the very bed was taken from under his son, the Count della Penna, a youth of twelve. He was thought to dance a *saraband* well, and Anne of Austria had the inhumanity to make him perform one before her a few hours after his father's murder!² The Parliament and all the municipal bodies went to congratulate the King, whom Luynes had mounted on a billiard table, in order that he might be the

¹ *Hist. tragique du M. d'Ancre* (Arch. Cur. 2^{de} sér. t. ii.); *Mém. de Pontchartrain*, t. ii. p. 221 sqq.; *Mém. de Richelieu*, liv. viii.; Capefigue, *Richelieu*, t. ii. p. 308.

² *Manuel de Dupuy*, in *Arch. Cur.* t. ii. p. 20, 2^{de} sér.; Richelieu, liv. viii.; Pontchartrain, t. ii. p. 223.

better seen, an act afterwards compared to the ancient custom of the Franks in lifting their monarchs on their shields to receive the congratulations of the army on their election. Flattery perverted the simplest principles of right, and the surname of the "Just" was bestowed upon Louis, for having killed a man without a trial.

One of the first acts of the King was to recall his father's old ministers, except the greatest of them all, the Duke of Sully. Richelieu heard of Concini's murder while at the house of one of the rectors of the Sorbonne; and on consulting his colleagues, Mangot and Barbin, it was resolved that, as Richelieu stood best at Court, he should go first to receive the King's commands. Accounts vary respecting his reception: Luynes at least showed much apparent kindness, and pressed him to enter the council then sitting. But Richelieu's office was now occupied by Villeroy; and of his two colleagues, Mangot was dismissed and Barbin arrested. Thus ended Richelieu's first ministry, after it had lasted about seven months. On the day of Concini's assassination he had sent a message to the Queen-Mother to assure her of his devotion, and during the next few years he attached himself to her fortunes. The revolt of the princes and nobles was terminated by the death of Marshal d'Ancre, and they were pardoned a rebellion which was ascribed to his tyranny. Condé, however, was not released, but was transferred from the Bastille to Vincennes. Louis XIII. bore a great antipathy to his cousin; it would not have been convenient for a third to share the government with the King and his falconer; and the Prince's former friends troubled not themselves about his fate. Mary de' Medici was banished to Blois. Before her departure a formal interview was arranged with her son, in which, while she endeavoured to hide her tears with her handkerchief and fan, she reminded the King, with audible sobs, of her disinterestedness, and the care she had taken of his interests. Louis replied coldly, but with more than his usual stammer, that it was time for him to govern, and that he should always show himself a dutiful son. Then he called his favourite away to a window of the palace, where they feasted their eyes with the spectacle of the departing Queen's *cortège*, as it defiled through the streets and over the Pont Neuf.¹

The Parliament of Paris gave their formal sanction to the murder of Concini, which, indeed, was acceptable to all parties; his possessions were confiscated in favour of Luynes; and a

¹ *Mercure Français*. t. iv. ; *Bassompierre*. t. ii. p. 150 (Petitot).

criminal prosecution was instituted against the marshal's wife, La Galigai; the principal charge against her being the wealth which she had accumulated by selling the royal favour. But as a conviction on such grounds would not have been capital, she and her dead husband were arraigned on fantastic crimes. They were accused of Judaism and sorcery; of consulting astrologers and soothsayers; of sacrificing a cock and pigeons; of possessing waxen images, talismans and amulets; of drawing the horoscope of the Queen-Mother and her children. In the presence of misfortune, Leonora Galigai had thrown off the melancholy vapours which had haunted her in prosperity; and to the charge of having used witchcraft with the Queen, she replied that her sorcery was but the charm which a strong mind necessarily exercises over a weak one.¹ She was condemned to be burned on the Place de Grève, but had the favour of being previously beheaded, and met her fate with the greatest fortitude. On seeing the multitude assembled to behold her execution, she exclaimed, "What a crowd to look at a poor afflicted woman!" and added, striking her teeth with her thumb, "I care no more for death than that."

The first acts of Louis XIII.'s government were sufficiently popular. Franco intervened between Spain and Savoy; a French army under Lesdiguières appeared in Piedmont; the Spanish Court, occupied with the affairs of Germany, hastened to renew a peace; a disarmament was agreed on between Milan and Savoy, and the places taken were restored on both sides. Christina of France, the King's second sister, was given in marriage to the Prince of Piedmont. This policy had been chalked out by Richelieu, but Luynes obtained the credit of it. The first care of this favourite was to push his own fortune. He had recently married Mary de Rohan, daughter of the Duke of Montbazon, afterwards known by her genius for intrigue. Her artful graces, and the well-directed artillery of her eyes, obtained for her some influence over the cold and melancholy Louis, and helped to advance the fortunes of her husband, who obtained the government of the Isle of France. Luynes put the Queen-Mother under military surveillance at Blois, and surrounded her with spies, who reported all her words and actions. It must be confessed that Richelieu seems to have been little better than one of these. He had procured a written leave to accompany the Queen; he would

¹ La Galigai had a supreme contempt both for mother and son. Her usual epithet for Mary was *balourde*; for Louis

idiot. Pontchartrain, t. ii. p. 228; Richelieu, liv. viii.

not accept the post of chief of her council till he had obtained permission from Paris ; and during the month which he passed with Mary at Blois, he rendered to Luynes from time to time an exact account of her proceedings.¹ But all this circumspection did not save him from suspicion. He received a hint from the King that he would do well to retire to his diocese, where he seems to have employed himself in theological studies. Even there, however, suspicion still pursued him, and in April, 1618, he was directed to take up his residence at Avignon. The Queen-Mother was treated with the greatest indignity. Blois was surrounded with troops ; her rides and walks were circumscribed, and she could receive no visitors without express permission. The marriage of her second daughter had been arranged without asking her consent or even informing her of it. Luynes and the King talked of shutting her up in the Castle of Amboise, or even forcing her into a convent. Mary resolved on making her escape ; and by means of the Abbé Rucollai, an intriguing Italian and a priest of the Oratory, she persuaded the Duke of Epernon to help her in her design. On the night of the 22nd of February, 1619, the Queen descended a rope-ladder from a window of the castle, and crossing the bridge over the Loire, found an escort of cavalry and a carriage and four mules waiting for her, which conveyed her to Loches, a town of which Epernon was commandant. Here she wrote a letter to the King to justify the step which she had taken, and on the following day she proceeded to Angoulême. The Court was filled with consternation. The Queen, it was thought, would not have ventured to fly unless she could count on the support of a large party of the nobles ; which, however, was far from being the case. In their alarm, the King and Luynes lent a ready ear to the counsels of Father Joseph, a Capuchin friar, the devoted friend of the Bishop of Luçon ; who advised them that the best way to appease the Queen and prevent her from adopting violent courses, would be to despatch Richelieu to treat with and pacify her. Du Tremblai, Father Joseph's brother, was accordingly sent to Avignon, with the King's autograph letter to Richelieu, intreating him to repair to Angoulême ; and he immediately set off for that place. Richelieu exhorted the Queen to moderation ; in April an accommodation was effected which placed Mary in a much more favourable position, and in the following August the King met his mother at Tours, when a cordial reconciliation seemed to be established.

The government of Luynes was as favourable to both branches of the House of Austria, and consequently to political and religious despotism, as that of the Queen-Mother could have been. In Spain, the fall of the Duke of Lerma had astonished all Europe (1618). To defend himself against the jealousy and hatred of the nobles, Lerma had procured from the Pope a Cardinal's hat, which in case of extremity would insure him a retreat at Rome; and as another resource he had surrounded the King with persons whose fortunes depended on his own; as Don Rodrigo de Calderona, and the Duke of Osuna, and especially his own son, the Duke of Uzeda, whom he had instructed in the arts with which he might enchain Philip. But Uzeda repaid his father with the basest ingratitude. It was observed that Philip was no longer so familiar with Lerma after that minister had become a Cardinal; and Uzeda at the head of a party of the nobles began to conspire his father's ruin. Complaints were made against Lerma's government; the King's confidence in him was alienated, and his friends and partisans were dismissed from Court. Lerma, however, still clung to office till Philip sent him an autograph letter of dismissal. Uzeda succeeded to most of his father's places, and conducted the government during the last years of Philip III.'s reign; to whom he rendered himself agreeable by diverting his melancholy with fêtes, processions, tournaments, and bull-fights.

Luynes courted the favour of the Spanish Court by denouncing to it the plot of the Duke of Osuna, Viceroy of Naples, to seize the Two Sicilies, and thus lost the opportunity of delivering Italy from the Spanish yoke. After the overthrow of the Duke of Lerma's ministry in Spain, Osuna, fearing that he should be recalled by the new government, formed the design of making himself King of Naples and Sicily, and with that view entered into negotiations with the French Court and with the Duke of Savoy. Luynes at first entertained the project, but changed his mind and acquainted the Spanish cabinet with it; Osuna was recalled and arrested, and languished in prison the remainder of his life. A little before, Osuna, together with Don Pedro de Toledo, Governor of Milan, and the Marquis of Bedmar, had been engaged in a conspiracy to bring Venice into the power of the Spanish Crown; for which purpose Osuna hired, as his principal agent, Jacques Pierre, a celebrated French pirate. In August, 1617, Pierre proceeded to Venice, and pretending to have had a quarrel with Osuna, induced the Venetians, by the vehement

hatred which he displayed against the Viceroy, to give him a command in their navy. Another Frenchman, Renault de Nevers, also took an active part in the plot; and in nocturnal interviews with Belmar, the Spanish Ambassador at Venice, they arranged all their proceedings. Osuna was to despatch a fleet from Naples, commanded by one Elliott, an Englishman, while the Governor of Milan was to assemble his forces on the Venetian frontier. But the execution of the plot was delayed by a violent storm, which dispersed the Spanish fleet; and, meanwhile, some of the conspirators, and especially one Jaffier, warned the Signory of their danger. Many persons were in consequence apprehended, and more than fifty quietly put to death.¹

The period was now arrived which was to desolate Germany thirty years by a war carried on in the name of religion. The policy of the French Court assisted the initiation of that tremendous effort of bigotry and despotism. Characters like William the Silent and Henry IV: still formed rare exceptions amidst the general reign of intolerance; nor must the reproach be confined exclusively to the Catholics. We have already adverted to the bigotry displayed by the Saxon Lutherans; it found its counterpart among the Calvinists of Holland; where, stimulated by political rancour, it gave rise to the worst excesses. Among the divines of that country had arisen Arminius (Jacob Harmensen), who had dared to question the terrible doctrine of predestination and absolute decrees. A storm of reprobation arose against the innovator, who, however, died quietly in his bed in 1609, though his doctrines were destined to prove fatal to others. His tenets had prevailed in the University of Leyden, and had been adopted by most of the higher and educated class, and among them by Olden-Barneveldt, the illustrious Advocate of Holland, and Hugo Grotius; but by the populace they were viewed with a fanatical abhorrence, fanned and excited by the rigid Calvinist clergy. The latter party, from one of their chief divines named Gomarus, obtained the name of *Gomarists*, while their opponents were called *Arminians*; and subsequently, from a paper which they addressed to the States of Holland in 1610, *Remonstrants*.² The storm first broke upon the head of Vorstius, the successor at Leyden to the

¹ The reality of this plot has been questioned by Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, liv. xxxi., but without adequate reason. See Botta, *Storia d'Italia*, lib. xviii.; Ranke, *Ueber die Verschwörung gegen Venedig im Jahre, 1618*. The story has been related and embellished by the Abbé de St. Réal,

La Conjuración contre Venise.

² The "Five Points" of the Remonstrance, drawn up by Uytendogaert, and the "Seven Points" of the Gomarite Counter-remonstrance, are in Motley's *Life of Barneveldt*, vol. i. ch. viii.

chair of Arminius, who, at the instigation of our James I., was driven from Holland, but escaped with his life; though the royal theologian had charitably hinted to the States, *that never heretic better deserved the flames*.¹ Barneveldt was not so fortunate, to whose fate political rancour likewise contributed. For it was not only a theological question, but also a political one, as it involved the point whether the State should govern the Church, or the Church the State. In accordance with the doctrine of Erastianism, or the supremacy of the civil magistrate in matters of religion, the Arminian magistrates of Holland, Overyssel, and Utrecht proceeded to control the excesses of the Gomarists and to make some changes in the mode of nominating the pastors. This excited the anger of the Stadholder, Maurice of Nassau; who had long entertained a secret hatred of Barneveldt for having thwarted him in his ambitious designs to seize the sovereignty. They had continued to be opposed to each other even after the conclusion of the Spanish truce, and especially on the subject of an alteration which Prince Maurice wished to make in the constitution. The government of the United Provinces was vested in the States-General, which consisted of deputies from all the provinces assembled at the Hague, under the presidency of the Stadholder. The number of deputies which each province sent to the States-General was undefined, and indeed immaterial, as every province had only a single vote. The States-General had no power to make laws for the separate provinces, which were governed by their own; but they determined all those questions which concerned the general interests of the confederacy. In this assembly Olden-Barneveldt had great influence. By virtue of his office of Advocate of Holland he was a constant member of it; he had a right to propose subjects for deliberation; and, as Holland paid more than half the taxes raised for the Republic, his voice had of course great weight. In order to obtain a more unrestricted power, Maurice had proposed that the States-General should only have a voice respecting peace and war, and that all other affairs should be conducted by a Council of State, of which he himself should be the president; but Barneveldt had frustrated this design. These and other things of the like kind had embittered Maurice against the Advocate, and the religious disputes seemed to offer an opportunity of revenge. Barneveldt was the head of the Remonstrants, Maurice of the Counter-remonstrants, and there was a struggle between the two parties for the possession of the

¹ King James's *Works*, p. 355.

churches. In an assembly of the States of Holland, Maurice clapped his hand on his sword, and vowed that he would uphold the religion of his father.¹ It was evident that the dispute must be decided by force. The Gomarists had proposed a national synod to settle the religious question; but Barneveldt persuaded the States of Holland to reject it, and to authorize the governors of cities to enrol soldiers for the preservation of the peace. In case of complaints arising therefrom, the States of Holland alone were to be appealed to. Prince Maurice and his family were to be requested to support this decision, which obtained the name of the "Sharp Resolve." The dispute was now evidently reduced to the question whether, in the last resort, the authority lay with the States or the Stadholder—a point which the constitution does not appear to have determined.

Maurice had gained several of the Provinces, and had also with him the clergy, the army, and the mob; and, in spite of the opposition of the Arminian provinces (Holland, Utrecht, and Overyssel), a synod was summoned at Dort. Before it met, Barneveldt, Grotius, and a few more Arminians, were illegally arrested at the Hague on the sole authority of the Stadholder, and all the Arminian magistrates were arbitrarily deposed (August, 1618). All the reformed Churches in Europe had been invited to send deputies to the synod of Dort, which was attended by English, German, and Swiss ministers. By this assembly the Arminians were condemned without a hearing; 200 of their pastors were deposed and 80 of them banished (May, 1619); but such a victory was not enough for Maurice, who thirsted after Barneveldt's blood. He and Grotius were arraigned before a tribunal composed of their personal enemies or the most virulent of the Gomarists. There was no categorical indictment against Barneveldt; no counsel was employed on either side, nor were any witnesses called. One of the most serious charges against him was that he had received bribes from Spain.² The civil dissensions in the Netherlands had inspired that Power with the hope of recovering those provinces, but there was not a shadow of proof that he was implicated in the scheme. He was also charged with damaging the Prince's character by declaring that he aspired to the sovereignty; which may have been truer, yet hardly capital. Barneveldt, who had

¹ Motley, *Life of Barneveldt*, vol. ii. ch. xiv.

² For the charges, or rather interro-

gatories, see *ibid.* vol. ii p. 366 sq. (cabinet ed.)

done more than any man, except perhaps William the Silent, to found the liberties of his country, was condemned to death, chiefly on the charge of having intended to betray it. The verdict pronounced against him was, in substance, that he had deserved death for having sought to dissolve the union between the provinces, and because he had vexed the Church of God, by asserting that each province had the right to order its own religious constitution; also because he had hindered the exercise of true religion, raised troops of his own power, hindered the execution of sentences pronounced by courts of justice, and accepted presents from foreign Powers. It was a judicial murder. Maurice, who had the prerogative of mercy,¹ insisted that the venerable statesman and patriot should solicit him for a pardon; but to this Barneveldt would not condescend. He was beheaded May 13th, 1619. This act must ever remain a blot on the character of Maurice of Nassau;¹ and he afterwards expiated it by loss of popularity and remorse of conscience. Grotius was condemned to perpetual imprisonment; but escaped in 1521 through the devotion of his wife, and took refuge at Paris, where he composed his famous work on international law (*De jure belli et pacis*).

In Germany the persecutors and the persecuted were more evenly matched, and the struggle could not be decided without a long and almost internecine war, in which most of the European Powers became involved. But in order to understand the state of parties in that country, and the causes which immediately led to the Thirty Years' War, it will be necessary to resume from an earlier period a brief view of German history.

It was soon discovered that the Emperor Rodolph intended not to observe the *Majestäts Brief*, or Royal Charter to the Bohemians, which had been extorted from him (*supra*, p. 80); and that he was endeavouring to deprive his brother Matthias of the succession to the Crown of Bohemia. Nothing could be more wretched than Rodolph's administration. He was surrounded at Prague by valets, painters, and alchymists; ambassadors or councillors who attempted to consult him on business could not obtain an audience for months; all offices were sold, but the purchasers were soon turned out to make room for other buyers; and the conduct of affairs was left in the hands of a vice-chancellor and a corrupt secretary.² After much negotiation between Rodolph and his

¹ Maurice had assumed the title of "Prince of Orange" after the death of his brother, Count Buren, in 1618.

² See Hurter, *Ph. Lang. Kämmerdiener Kaiser Rodolphs II.*; Von Hammer, *Leben des Card. Klesel*, B. ii.

brother Matthias, matters were at length brought to a crisis between them by the proceedings of the Archduke Leopold, who, after being driven from Alsace (*supra*, p. 94), had marched his troops into his Bishopric of Passau, where they subsisted by plundering all around, and especially by robbing merchants on their way to Linz. Leopold kept these troops together on pretence of the affair of Jülich; but their true destination, as Matthias well knew, was to wrest Austria and Moravia from him, and afterwards Bohemia from the Emperor Rodolph. At last, in December, 1610, the Bishopric of Passau being exhausted, a large body of these mercenaries crossed the Danube into Upper Austria, committing all sorts of violence, robbery, and devastation. On Matthias preparing to march against them from Vienna, Leopold threw off the mask, and proceeded with his hordes to Prague, where, contrary to the wish of the citizens, they were admitted by Rodolph. During the two or three months that they held possession of Prague, they treated it like a town taken by assault; but on the approach of Matthias and his army, in March, 1611, they deemed it prudent to withdraw to Budweis. Rodolph now became a sort of prisoner of the Bohemian provisional government, consisting, as we have said, of thirty Directors, ten from each estate, to which had been added a council of nine, three from each estate, chosen by the people as their representatives. Count Thurn, one of the leaders of the patriot party, took possession of the castle with his forces, telling the Emperor that he had come to guard him. Rodolph sent a humble message to his brother, offering him lodgings in the castle; to which Matthias, or rather his minister, Cardinal Klesel, replied, that he had been invited to Prague by the States, but that he would always behave like a faithful brother. Matthias entered that capital in great pomp, March 24th. The reign of Rodolph in Bohemia was now, of course, at an end. The States assembled on the 11th of April, demanded of Rodolph to be released from their allegiance; but they also required from Matthias that on receiving the Crown he should confirm all their rights and liberties. Rodolph resigned with reluctance a power which he had not known how to use, and, from a window that looked out upon the town, uttered a solemn curse on Prague and all Bohemia. Matthias took possession of the Hradschin, and on the 23rd of May received the crown and the homage of the Bohemians; recognizing, however, their right to elect their Kings, and engaging to observe the charter granted by Rodolph. Matthias

remained in Prague till near the end of August without having once seen his brother; and on his return to Vienna he married his cousin Anne, daughter of the Archduke Ferdinand of Tyrol. He was now fifty-five years of age.

Rodolph, whose derangement had rendered his deposition necessary, did not long survive these transactions; he died January 20th, 1612, and, in the following June, Matthias was elected Emperor in his place. The Protestant cause gained little by the change. Matthias was almost as incompetent as his brother; and, if Rodolph was governed by Spaniards and Jesuits, Matthias was led by Klesel and other fanatical opponents of toleration. The beginning of his reign was marked by fresh religious disturbances in Bohemia, Austria, and Hungary; while the matter of Jülich still afforded the most dangerous materials for dissension. The Elector of Brandenburg, on the death, in 1613, of his brother, the Margrave Ernest of Brandenburg, who governed Jülich for both the "Princes in possession," placed the government of it in the hands of his own son, George William. This arrangement was by no means satisfactory to the Palsgrave of Neuburg and his son, Wolfgang; and the latter now took a step unexpected even by his father. The Palsgrave had consented to the marriage of his son, whom he deemed to be still a Protestant, with Magdalen, a younger sister of Duke Maximilian of Bavaria; but Wolfgang, as the Pope knew, had already secretly gone over to the Roman Catholic faith; and he therefore readily granted a dispensation for the marriage, which was necessary, not only on account of kinship, but also of the presumed heresy of the bridegroom. The marriage was celebrated at Munich in November, 1613, and, of course, created an open enmity between the Neuburg and Brandenburg families. In the spring of 1614, Wolfgang occupied Düsseldorf, drove out the officers of the Brandenburg government, and seized as many other places as he could; then, after a well-acted comedy of conversion, he publicly embraced the Roman Catholic faith: an act which is said to have given his sick old father a shock which occasioned his death. About the same time, John Sigismund, Elector of Brandenburg, also changed his religion, and from a zealous Lutheran became a Calvinist. Previously to these events, Frederick V., the young Elector Palatine, had been betrothed to Elizabeth, daughter of our James I., and, in 1612, the wedding was celebrated with great pomp and magnificence in London. In honour of the nuptials, Jonson and Davenant wrote masques,

which were set to music by Lawes; while Inigo Jones, assisted by the most eminent painters, contrived the scenery.¹ Frederick's guardian, John II., Duke of Zweibrücken, had made an alliance with England in the name of the German Protestant Union, of which he was director; and also, in the same capacity, negotiated a treaty with the Dutch Republic for a term of fifteen years, which was signed at the Hague in May 1613.

Of the two great parties into which at this time we find Germany divided, namely, that of the Protestant Union and that of the Catholic League, the former, consisting of Calvinistic Princes and States, was incontestably the more powerful, and formed a kind of state within the state. Besides the English and Dutch alliances, it counted on the support of Venice and the Swiss reformed Cantons; and a meeting of its members at Rothenburg, in 1611, had not only been attended by ambassadors from these countries, and from Holland, but also by envoys from the Emperor Rodolph, as well as from the malcontent members of his family. On the other hand, the power of the Catholic League was paralyzed at that period by the quarrels of the Imperial house, and by the dissensions between Maximilian of Bavaria and the Archbishop of Salzburg, as well as by a sort of schism of the spiritual Electors, who established a Rhonish section of the League, of which they made the Elector of Mentz director. Maximilian of Bavaria, indeed, had been on the point of abandoning the League altogether, when, in 1613, the dissensions in Jülich already mentioned, an insurrection of the Protestants in Austria, and a correspondence between Matthias's minister Klesel and the Elector of Mentz, induced him to revive it. Maximilian regarded the government of Matthias, as conducted by Klesel, with no favourable eye; and he was particularly embittered against that Cardinal for having hindered him from applying the funds of the League to his own use. Klesel was equally detested by Ferdinand and Leopold of Styria; and, indeed, his government had conciliated neither Protestants nor Catholics. The German Lutheran Princes and States seemed to stand aloof from both parties; but the Elector of Saxony, now John George, was, in fact, sold to Austria and the Jesuits, and hoped to be invested by the Emperor with Jülich; while the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt also courted Matthias, in the hope of plundering the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel.

¹ James I. appears to have expended on these nuptials 146,572*l.*, a sum that would have gone some way to maintain

his unfortunate son-in-law on the Bohemian throne. Harte, *Gust. Adolphus*, vol. i. p. 239.

Some religious disturbances at Aix-la-Chapelle, and a quarrel between Cologne and the Protestant town of Mühlheim, afforded Wolfgang of Neuburg a pretence to solicit the Emperor to call the Spaniards into Germany. Matthias, in spite of the protest of the Elector of Brandenburg, had caused these disputes to be settled in a partial manner by his Aulic Council, and he intrusted his brother the Archduke Albert, in the Netherlands, with the execution of the decree. Albert obtained the permission of the Court of Spain to use the Spanish troops in this affair; and in 1614 he despatched Spinola with them to Aix-la-Chapelle and Mühlheim. After taking Aix-la-Chapelle and expelling the Protestant Council, Spinola proceeded to Mühlheim. On his march he was joined by Wolfgang of Neuburg with 5,000 foot and 800 horse; Mühlheim made no defence, and Spinola, after destroying its fortifications, laid siege to Wesel, which he took in three days; but, as this was a regular attack on the allies of the Dutch Republic, Prince Maurice, who was in the neighbourhood with a small army, immediately occupied, in the name of the House of Brandenburg, Rees, Emmerich, Kranenburg, and Gennep. Thus a German territory, disputed by German Princes, was occupied by the Spaniards for one party and by the Dutch for the other; the Electoral Prince of Brandenburg resided at Cleves, and the Palsgrave of Neuburg at Düsseldorf, while the members of the German Union contented themselves with producing long papers and speeches. In a conference held at Xanten, a treaty was made by which the territories in dispute were divided between the contending parties, but the execution of it was prohibited by the Spanish Court.

Meanwhile, the Emperor Matthias, whose government occasioned great discontent, was growing daily weaker both in body and mind. Neither he nor his brothers had any legitimate offspring; and the Archduke Ferdinand of Styria was straining every nerve to obtain the succession both to the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria and to the Empire. The Archdukes Maximilian of Tyrol and Albert of Belgium, as well as Philip III. of Spain, supported Ferdinand's claim; for though Philip believed his own pretensions to be preferable to those of the Styrian line, he waived them in favour of Ferdinand, seeing that the state of Germany required the hand of a strong and able ruler. In 1616, Maximilian and Albert tendered to Matthias the resignation of their claims in favour of their cousin Ferdinand; and though Cardinal Klesel did all he could to oppose the

nomination of that Prince, Matthias found it necessary to comply with the wishes of his brothers. In June, 1617, Ferdinand received the Crown of Bohemia with the consent of the States, and in the following year (July 1st) he was acknowledged in Hungary as the successor of Matthias.

Ferdinand, who could when he pleased assume a winning mildness and affability, had made a favourable impression on the Bohemians; but the clergy and nobles of his party soon effaced it by their persecuting and intolerant conduct. The Bohemians were not long in discovering their discontent. The Emperor-King Matthias, having in 1617 proceeded to Vienna, left at Prague a regency consisting of seven Catholics and three Utraquists. Among the Catholics were William Slawata and Martinitz, two men notorious for their fanaticism. A dispute having arisen respecting the building of some Protestant churches, the Utraquists pleaded the sanction of Rodolph's Charter for what they had done, and addressed a warm remonstrance to Matthias; to which he replied by an angry rescript, denouncing the leaders in the matter as insurgents, and threatening to punish them as such. The Protestant malcontents, excited by this step, found a leader in the fiery Count Henry of Thurn, who had just received a mortal offence by being deposed from the dignity of Burg-graf of Karlstein, to which was attached the custody of the Bohemian crown and of the charters of the Kingdom. When the imperial rescript arrived in Prague, the four members of the regency then present in that capital, namely, Slawata, Martinitz, Adam von Sternberg, and Diepold von Lobkowitz, caused those members of the States who had signed the remonstrance to be summoned before them, and communicated to them the Emperor's answer; when the Remonstrants observed that they would come again in a month with a reply. Accordingly on the 23rd of May, 1618, they appeared at the head of a large body of men, among whom were some of the first nobles of the land, all completely armed; and they marched straight to the Royal Castle where the regents were waiting to receive them. After surrounding the Castle with their followers, so that nobody could escape, they consulted in the Green Chamber as to what they should do; when Count Thurn, in an animated address, persuaded them that so long as Slawata and Martinitz lived they could hope for nothing but persecution. His speech was received with loud applause, and he and his companions then proceeded to the Council Hall, where Sternberg addressed them with friendly words, and entreated

them to lay aside their demonstrations. "We have nothing to allege against you and Lobkowitz," exclaimed Kolon von Felz; "we complain only of Slawata and Martinitz."—"Out at window with them, after the good old Bohemian fashion," cried Wenzel von Raupowa. No sooner said than done. Sternberg and Lobkowitz were conducted out of the hall, and five nobles, seizing Martinitz, hurled him from one of the windows; after which they seemed to stand aghast at their own deed. "Here you have the other," cried Thurn, pushing to them Slawata, who was exhausting himself with deprecations and excuses; and Slawata followed his companion. Then came the turn of Fabricius, the secretary of the regency. The window was about seventy feet above the ground, yet all three men were almost miraculously saved by falling on a large heap of rubbish which stood directly under it. Slawata alone was somewhat hurt by a contusion on the head. Fabricius immediately jumped on his feet and hastened off to Vienna, to carry the news to the Emperor. Martinitz and Slawata were carried off by their servants to the house of the Chancellor Lobkowitz, whither they were pursued by Thurn and his people; but the beautiful Polyxena Lobkowitz interceded for them and saved their lives. Martinitz afterwards escaped in disguise to Munich. Under the conduct of Thurn a regular revolt was now organized in Bohemia; a government was appointed consisting of thirty Directors, and steps were taken to form a union with the Protestants of Austria and Hungary. This revolt proved the fall of Cardinal Klesel, whose temporizing conduct being suspected, he was seized and carried off to the castle of Ambras near Innsbruck, belonging to his enemy the Archduke Maximilian; and it was not till 1627, that, through the intercession of the Pope, he was permitted to return to his diocese.

In Bohemia Proper only three Catholic towns—Pilsen, Budweis, and Krummau—had remained faithful to the Emperor; but the annexed province of Moravia refused to join the rebellion, and offered its mediation, which the insurgents declined, and pressed forward with a considerable army towards the Austrian frontier. The Silesians had also refused to declare against the Emperor, but they sent 3,000 men to maintain "the cause of religion." By means of Spanish gold, the Emperor Matthias, or rather King Ferdinand, contrived to raise two armies of mercenaries, one of which was under the command of Count Bucquoi, a Walloon general of note, while the other was intrusted to Henry Duval,

Count of Dampierre. Duke Maximilian of Bavaria, expecting to profit by the misfortunes of Ferdinand and Matthias, evaded their pressing applications for help. The Bohemians, on their side, applied for aid to the young Elector Palatine, Frederick V., as Director of the Union, but it was not till October that Count Ernest of Mansfeld was despatched to them with 1,000 horse, raised with the money of the Duke of Savoy. Bucquoi and Dampierre had already entered Bohemia in August; but Dampierre was defeated at Czaslau and Bucquoi at Budweis, by Count Thurn. In November Mansfeld laid the foundation of his military fame by capturing, after an obstinate resistance, Pilsen, the most important town in the Kingdom, after Prague. The Bohemians, under Count Schlick, hung upon the retreating army of Bucquoi, carried off his cattle, his booty, and his military chest, and, pressing over the Austrian border, seized the town of Swietla. Matthias now stood in a critical position. The attitude even of the Austrian States was threatening; they had refused to raise troops for the Emperor's defence, nor would they allow ammunition or provisions required for his service to pass through their territories. In vain, during the winter, King Sigismund III. of Poland by threats, and the Saxon Elector John George I. by persuasions, had endeavoured to make the Bohemians lay down their arms. But in the midst of this state of things the Emperor Matthias suddenly died, March 20th, 1619, and Ferdinand succeeded to his dominions.

At the time of Ferdinand's accession Budweis was the only town held by the Austrian party in Bohemia. The new Sovereign attempted to conciliate his subjects in that Kingdom. He proposed a truce, and offered to confirm all their rights, privileges, and liberties; but the Bohemians could not trust a Prince led by the Jesuits, which Society they had driven from the country in the preceding June, and the insurgents did not even deign to answer his letter.¹ At first the campaign seemed to go in favour of Ferdinand. Count Thurn had proceeded into Moravia with the main body of his army, with the intention of revolutionizing that marquisaté, and afterwards Austria; and he occupied the towns of Znaim, Brünn, Iglau, and Olmütz; but while he was thus engaged Bucquoi broke out of Budweis, and took town after town. It was at this time that Albert of Wallenstein, afterwards the renowned and dreaded leader of the Thirty Years' War, attracted the notice and favour of Ferdinand II. by the bravery with which, at the head of only a single regiment, he opposed

¹ *Theatrum Europæum*. Th. i. S. 186,

the Bohemians. Born in 1583, of a family belonging to the Bohemian gentry and of the Utraquist faith, but of German extraction, Waldstein, or Wallenstein,¹ having been left an orphan at the early age of ten, was sent by a Roman Catholic uncle to Olmütz, to be educated by the Jesuits, by whom he was, of course, converted. He afterwards studied at Padua, then, next to Bologna, the most renowned University of Europe, where he acquired a good knowledge of Italian, at that period the fashionable language. On a journey which he made through the principal countries of Western Europe, including England, in company with a young friend, and under the superintendence of Peter Verdungus, a celebrated astrologer and mathematician, Wallenstein imbibed from the latter that fondness for astrology which marked his future life. It was still further increased by the lessons which he received at Padua from Argoli, the Professor of Astrology, or, as we should now say, of Astronomy, who also initiated him in the mysteries of the Cabbala. Wallenstein had already served the Emperor Rodolph in Hungary, and the Archduke Ferdinand in a war with Venice, in which he distinguished himself. Meanwhile he had acquired a large fortune by marrying an old Bohemian widow, with whom his wedded life was a short one, and afterwards he ingratiated himself still further with the future Emperor Ferdinand by marrying the daughter of his favourite Count Harrach.

After obtaining possession of Moravia, Thurn marched into Austria, and on the 5th of June, 1619, he appeared in one of the suburbs of Vienna, in which city both the Catholic and Protestant States of the Duchy were assembled round the Emperor. But instead of pushing his way into the city, Thurn suffered himself to be amused for six days with parleys. In this crisis Ferdinand II. displayed considerable energy and determination, and when pressed to save himself and his children by flight he refused to quit his capital.² At the expiration of six days, as a deputy named Thonradel was pressing Ferdinand with threats to sign a confederation of Austria with the Bohemians, St. Hilaire, who had been despatched by Dampierre with 500 horse, entered Vienna by the Water-Gate, which Thurn had not been able to secure.

¹ Waldstein is the true family name, and still continues to be borne by the members of it in Bohemia. For his life see Förster and Hurter.

² The Emperor's Jesuit confessor Larmorain, in his treatise *De virtutibus*

Ferdinandi II., says that Ferdinand in his distress threw himself before a crucifix, which uttered the words, "Ferdinande, non te deseram." The miraculous image was afterwards preserved in the Imperial treasury. Menzel, B. iii. S. 340.

At the sound of their trumpet the deputies hurried from the palace, and Ferdinand immediately issued directions for vigorous measures. Thurn remained some days longer before Vienna, and bombarded it, till he was recalled by a message from the Directors at Prague, to the effect that Bucquoi, having defeated Count Mansfeld at Budweis, June 10th, and afterwards formed a junction with Dampierre, was now threatening the capital of Bohemia.

When this danger was over, Ferdinand hastened to Frankfort in order to his election as Emperor, which was hurried on, in order to put an end to the vicariate of the Elector of Saxony and of the Elector Palatine, the latter of whom was desirous of excluding the House of Austria from the Imperial throne. The Palatine had turned his eyes on the Duke of Bavaria; but Maximilian was not dazzled with the prospect of the Empire, nor inclined to contest it with his old friend Ferdinand. All the Electors voted for Ferdinand, and even the Palatine ultimately joined the majority. As the Electors were leaving the *Römer*, or Town Hall, of Frankfort, tidings that the insurgent Bohemians had chosen the Elector Palatine for their King occasioned a great sensation. The Emperor Ferdinand II. received the Germanic crown, with the usual ceremonies, September 9th; but his reign was inaugurated with the prospect of that bloody struggle that was to last thirty years.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE acceptance or rejection of the Bohemian Crown was a question of the most vital importance, not only to the Elector Palatine himself, the youthful Frederick V., but also to the whole of Germany. It could not but be foreseen that, if he should accept it, a war, of which no man could foretell the end, must inevitably ensue between the great parties already organized against each other by the confederacies of the Catholic League and the Evangelical Union. In this perplexity, Frederick summoned a meeting of the Princes of the Union at Rothenburg on the Tauber, and submitted the matter to their consideration. The opinions of the assembly appeared to be equally divided. The Margraves of Baden and Ansbach, and Prince Christian of Anhalt, advised Frederick to accept the proffered crown; while the Landgrave of Hesse, the Margrave of Culmbach, and the Duke of Würtemberg, dissuaded him from it. Frederick now hastened back to Heidelberg and took anxious counsel with his friends. Not only were the divided opinions of the Union itself calculated to stagger him in his course, but he had also received a written warning from the whole Electoral College not to engage in so rash an undertaking. Frederick had also privately consulted Maximilian of Bavaria, who, in a friendly and father-like letter, remarkable for its good sense and the keen view it took of the actual state of Germany, strongly dissuaded him from his ambitious views; and even politely hinted that he could not stand quietly by and see Bohemia wrested from the House of Austria. On the other hand Frederick was encouraged to persevere by Christian of Anhalt, who had been a kind of tutor to him, and to whose advice he attributed great weight; as well as by his minister Camerarius, and his wife Elizabeth of England.¹ The latter especially, whose violent and ambitious temper, combined with considerable talent, has procured for her the reputation of

¹ His court-chaplain, Scultetus, has also been charged with persuading Frederick to accept the Crown; but he denies it in his Autobiography.

a princess of spirit, vehemently incited him to the enterprise; and is said to have asked him why, as he had had courage enough to woo a King's daughter, he had none to stretch out his hand and seize a sceptre which seemed offered to him by Heaven? ¹ From his father-in-law James I., however, he could expect but little help; for though that Sovereign would gladly have seen his daughter a Queen, his pacific policy forbade him to appeal to arms for such an object; and he gave no decided opinion on the matter. ² But from two other foreign princes, Maurice of Nassau, the hereditary enemy of the House of Austria, and Bethlem Gabor, ³ the Protestant Voyvode of Transylvania, Frederick received assurances of support. Frederick himself, now only twenty-two years of age, was naturally ambitious; in temper grave, melancholy, and proud, he would eat in company with none but Princes, and commanded the tables at which the councillors and nobles dined in his father's time to be removed. ⁴ It may be, too, that the doctrine of predestination, which formed part of his faith, had some influence in determining his judgment; his wife seems to have persuaded him of his regal destiny; ⁵ and he was also guided by passages in the Prophets and the Apocalypse, and by the aspect of the stars. Thus, by his own weakness, the ambition of his consort, and the injudicious advice of his friends, he was lured to his destruction. Towards the end of October, 1619, he proceeded to Prague, and on the 4th of November he solemnly received the Bohemian crown.

Circumstances seemed at first to favour the ambitious enterprise of Frederick. Bethlem Gabor, who was in alliance with Count Thurn, had, during Ferdinand's journey to Frankfort, declared war against his representative, Leopold; had occupied in a very short time Upper Hungary, where the malcontents flocked to his standard in great numbers, and had thence pressed on, burning and plundering, into Lower Austria, so that Leopold even found himself hampered at Vienna, and was forced to recall Bucquoi from Bohemia (October, 1619). Gabor had betrayed

¹ Puffendorf, *De Rebus Svecicis*, lib. i. § 27.

² Afterwards, however, James expressed his disapprobation of the course taken by Frederick, and instructed his ambassador not to give him the title of King. In a letter to the Chancellor of the Palatinate Camerarius writes: "Niemand schadet *nostræ causæ* mehr denn König in gross Britannien, *sua ornamentatione et tricis philosophicis*."—Londorp. Th. i. S. 987.

³ The Transylvanians having a custom of subjoining the Christian name to the surname, instead of prefixing it, the proper appellation of this prince according to European custom would be Gabriel Bethlem. Harte, *Gust. Adolphus*, vol. i. p. 213, note.

⁴ *Relazione di Germania*, 1617, ap. Ranke, *Popes*, vol. ii. p. 461.

⁵ See *Letter of Elisabeth*, in Moser, ap. Menzel, B. iii. S. 359.

the native treachery of his character in the way in which he had obtained possession of his dominions. After the death of Stephen Bocskai, without heirs, in December, 1606 (*supra* p. 23 sq.), who, by the peace of Sitvatorok, had been established as Voyvode of Transylvania, that dignity, after a short enjoyment of it by Sigismund Rakoczy, came to Gabriel Bathory, who was elected by the Transylvanian States, though not without some contentions between the Emperor and the Porte. But Gabriel Bathory acted so tyrannically, that, at length, even the Protestants of Transylvania rose against him and appealed to the Porte. Unluckily for himself, Bathory employed Bethlem Gabor to mediate for him with the Pasha of Temesvar. Gabor made the Pasha large presents, and still larger promises; and through his influence the Grand-Signor ultimately invested Gabor with Transylvania, October, 1613; and a few days after Bathory was murdered by some of his own officers. Although these proceedings were viewed with displeasure at Vienna, neither the Emperor nor the Hungarians were inclined to go to war with the Turks. Gabor was recognized; the Porte sent a splendid embassy to Vienna, and in July, 1615, a new peace was concluded there for twenty years on the basis of that of Sitvatorok. Gabor, with the aid of the Turks, now sought to wrest from Ferdinand the Crown of Hungary, though he had declined that of Bohemia. The news of his proceedings in conjunction with Count Thurn reached Ferdinand II. at Munich, where on his return from Frankfort he was staying with Duke Maximilian; and he immediately applied to that Prince for the help of the League, which was readily accorded on the conditions set forth in the treaty of Munich. Of these conditions it is necessary to our purpose to mention only two. By the third article of the treaty, the Emperor and the House of Austria engaged all their possessions to indemnify the Duke against any loss of territory that he might sustain in the war, as well as all expenses in excess of his ordinary contributions to the League; while, by the fifth article, any portion of the Austrian territories that Maximilian might succeed in wresting from the enemy was to remain in his possession till he should have been remunerated for all the damages and extraordinary expenses which he might have incurred.

The fortunes of the Austrian House seemed desperate when Count Thurn, who had followed the retreat of Bucquoi, now stood, for a second time in the same year, before Vienna, united with Gabor, and at the head of an army of 80,000 men. Bucquoi had

broken down the bridge over the Danube, and thrown himself into Vienna, where also the Emperor had arrived, but without any troops. The capture of that capital might at once have decided the war; but circumstances prevented the Allies from maintaining the siege. Neither Thurn nor Gabor had money to pay their troops; the want of provisions was such that 2,000 Bohemians are said to have died of hunger,¹ and news was brought to Gabor that in his absence his general, Ragotski, had been defeated in Transylvania by the Imperialists (December). Meanwhile the Palatine Frederick was playing the King at Prague. He did nothing but amuse himself with skating-parties and other entertainments throughout the winter; and, as it was the only one which he passed in Bohemia, he obtained the name of the "Winter King." Neither did his manners, nor those of his consort,² recommend him to his new subjects; but all these matters would have been of little importance had he possessed the energy and talent requisite for the station to which he had so ambitiously aspired. Especially he betrayed a want of dignity and self-assertion to which the Bohemians had not been accustomed in their Sovereigns. Early in December he had convened the members of the Union at Nuremberg, at which assembly Count Hohenzollern presented himself as ambassador from the Emperor, and was admitted without question. At his entrance the assembly rose to meet him, King Frederick among the rest, though sitting in royal state under a canopied throne; when the Count, without ceremony, advanced and occupied the King's vacant throne, who was compelled to take a seat on the Count's left.³ The Union, however, did nothing but send ambassadors to Munich to treat and parley, after the good old German fashion, with Maximilian; although these men must have seen the warlike preparations making in Bavaria, and that Spain and the Jesuits were zealously supporting the League. On the other hand the members of the League, who met at Würzburg in December, voted an army of 25,000 men, and invested Maximilian with the control of all their funds. Neither could Frederick look for help from abroad. His father-in-law would do nothing; Prince Maurice was too much engaged with the affairs of Holland to attend to those of Bohemia; and in January, 1620, Bethlem Gabor had concluded a truce with the Emperor till the 20th of September, in order to

¹ Khevenhiller, Th. ix. S. 696.

² Elizabeth is said to have offended the Bohemians by her British pride, and to have shocked their prejudices by her

low dresses. *Letter of Camerarius*, in Londorp, Th. i. S. 861.

³ Slawata, *Hist. MS.*, ap. Menzel, B. iii. S. 367.

negotiate a peace;¹ an interval which enabled Ferdinand to seat himself firmly on the Imperial throne.

It was fortunate for the Emperor that France was at this time governed by the counsels of Luynes, who had been gained by the promise of a rich heiress of the House of Péquigny, a ward of the Belgian Archduke's, for his brother Cadenet. Hence Louis XIII., although pressed by Venice, the United Provinces, and Savoy to resume the plans of Henry IV., would attempt nothing against the House of Austria at this critical juncture; on the contrary, in reply to an Imperial embassy which arrived in France towards the close of 1619, French ambassadors were despatched into Germany, who, in the spring of 1620, did all they could to help the Catholic League. France was, indeed, at this time occupied by a domestic rebellion. Luynes, in order to satisfy his grasping ambition, had conciliated Condé, Guise, and Lesdiguières, but set the rest of the nobles at defiance, and refused to pay their pensions. The consequence was a revolt, headed by Mayenne, Longueville, Vendôme, and his brother the Grand-Prior, the Count of Soissons, the Dukes of Nevers and Retz; while other nobles joined the Queen-Mother at Angers. But the rebellion was quenched by the vigorous measures of the Court before it could grow to a head; the troops of the Queen were defeated at Pont-de-Cé (August, 1620); yet she obtained from the King the same terms as in the preceding year; a reconciliation was even effected between the two courts, and Richelieu married his niece, Mademoiselle du Pont-Courlay, to Combalet, a nephew of Luynes. The most remarkable result of this rebellion was the annexation of Béarn to the Crown of France. The Hugonots of that viscounty, headed by La Force, the Governor, had long defied the King and the Pope; but Louis XIII., now finding himself at the head of a considerable body of troops, marched to Pau, and compelled the newly-created Parliament of that place to register an edict uniting Béarn and Lower Navarre to France. But to return to the affairs of Germany.

Frederick V. seemed bent on alienating the hearts of his new subjects. Calvinism had but few followers in Bohemia; neither the Utraquists, nor the Lutherans, could endure churches with naked walls, and without an altar and its adjuncts; yet Scultetus, the Court divine, ordered the crucifixes and other ornaments to

¹ It appears from some intercepted letters that this treacherous and inconstant Prince was from the beginning prepared

to betray Frederick. Harte, *Gust. Adolph.* vol. i. p. 244.

be cleared out in an indecent manner from the cathedral; and he published a book against the Bohemian mode of worship, which of course occasioned endless bitter replies and controversies. At the same time Frederick offended his two best generals, Count Thurn and Ernest of Mansfeld, by placing them under Christian of Anhalt and Count Hohenlohe, who possessed no military talent. Meanwhile Maximilian of Bavaria, who was the soul of the Catholic party, induced the Pope to contribute some considerable subsidies; he secured the neutrality of the Saxon Elector and the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt; and he advised the Emperor to publish some threatening warnings before the breaking out of the war. Hence the Landgrave Maurice of Hesse-Cassel was the only Prince of any importance who ventured openly to embrace Frederick's cause. The new Elector, George William of Brandenburg, had indeed acknowledged Frederick as King of Bohemia, but from the disturbed state of his own dominions, he declined to take any active part in his affairs. The only other princely house, besides Anhalt, that adhered to Frederick was that of Weimar, great-grandsons of the unfortunate Elector John Frederick. By the advice of the President Jeannin, the Duke of Angoulême, the French ambassador in Germany, brought about such a treaty at Ulm, where the Union was assembled, between that body and the League, as neither the Emperor nor Maximilian could have expected (July 3rd). A mutual peace was established, but the conditions were so framed as to leave the League free to act with regard to Bohemia and Austria. Both sides were to allow the passage of troops into Bohemia, and the Union consented, on the proposition of Bavaria, to omit the Archdukes Albert and Isabella Clara Eugenia from the treaty; though they were members of the Empire, as Sovereigns of the Circle of Burgundy; and though the evangelical Princes must have perceived the drift of this proceeding to be that Spinola might enter the Palatinate, and that the whole weight of the war might fall on the King of Bohemia.¹ As, in addition to all this, the Elector of Saxony declared for the Emperor, promised to occupy Lusatia and to defend Silesia, and as Sigismund III. of Poland sent 8,000 Cossacks² to the aid of Ferdinand, the contest was already virtually decided before the army of the League appeared in Bohemia.

¹ The treaty is in London, *Acta Publica*, Th. ii. S. 48.

² The name of *Kosack* or *Cossack* is of Turkish origin, and signifies *robber*. It

was at that time applied to bands of freebooters in Poland, who were quite distinct from the Cossacks of the Don, to whom the ominous appellation has since

Preparatory to the Bohemian war, the Emperor, before the end of 1619, endeavoured to conciliate his Protestant subjects in Austria, and, with the consent of the Pope,¹ he offered entire religious freedom to the States of Lower Austria, on condition that they should renounce their alliance with the Bohemian rebels; and though they at first hesitated they were soon reduced to obedience. Immediately after the treaty of Ulm, Maximilian, with the greater part of the army of the League, had occupied Upper Austria, which was made over to him as security for his expenses. Towards the end of August he began his march towards Bohemia; and being joined by Bucquoi and his forces, the united army amounted to 32,000 men, to whom Frederick could oppose little more than 20,000. In Maximilian's army² Tilly held the second command; a name only inferior to that of Wallenstein in the annals of the THIRTY YEARS' WAR. John Tzerklaes, Count Tilly, whose uncouth name is said to be a compound of Herr Klass, or Nicholas, was a native of Brabant; but having been bred at the Court of the Infanta at Brussels he affected something of the Spaniard. This ferocious soldier was remarkable for his morality and religion. If business broke in upon his usual hours of prayer, the lost time was made up at night; and he had the reputation of inviolate sobriety and chastity.³ He was a little man, and Marshal Gramont, who once saw him at the head of his army on the march, describes him as mounted on a white Croatian pony, and dressed in a green satin doublet with slashed sleeves, and trousers of the same material. On his head he had a little cocked hat, with a drooping plume of red ostrich feathers that reached down to his loins; round his waist a belt two inches broad, from which hung his sword, and a single pistol in his holsters; which, as he informed Gramont, he had never fired, though he had gained seven decisive battles.⁴

The most disgraceful part of these transactions for the German Princes was, that they stood by and saw their country spoiled by the Spaniards; for Count Khevenhiller, Ferdinand's ambassador at Madrid, prevailed upon Philip III. to lend him the help of

been transferred. Engel, *Gesch. der Ukkraïne und der Kosaken*, §§ 53, 56, 116, in the *H. Russische Allg. Weltgesch.*

¹ Khevenhiller, Th. ix. p. 1175.

² René Descartes, the celebrated metaphysician, was in the Bavarian army as a volunteer. For the Thirty Years' War may be consulted: Westenrieder's *Gesch. des dreissigjährigen Krieges*; Barthold's *Geschichte des grossen deutschen Krieges*

(for the latter half of it, after the death of Gustavus Adolphus); Gindely, *Gesch. des 36en. Kriegs and Rudolph II. u. seine Zeit*; Hurter, *Gesch. Kaiser Ferdinands II.* Schiller's work on the same subject will be read rather for its style than its facts.

³ Zschokke, *Bayerische Gesch.* B. iii. S. 221.

⁴ *Mém. de Gramont*, t. i. p. 12 sq. (ed. 1717).

Spinola and the Spanish troops in the Netherlands before the twelve years' truce with the Dutch should have expired. Had not the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt promised to stand by the Emperor, Spinola would never have ventured so far from his base of operations, as to enter, as he did in the autumn of 1620, the Lower Palatinate with 20,000 Spanish and Netherland troops, while the army of the Union retreated before him, first from Oppenheim and then from Worms. Early in November the Spaniards ravaged all the fertile districts between the Rhine, the Moselle, and the Nahe, and pressed on into the Wetterau. The Dutch, observed by another Spanish army under Velasco, faithfully kept their truce with Spain, which did not expire till April, 1621, and thus allowed time enough for the overthrow of Frederick, the warmest supporter of the synod of Dort. At the same time the Elector of Saxony entered Lusatia with his army, thus depriving the Bohemian King of all hopes of relief from that marquissate and from Silesia. James I. did nothing for his son-in-law except allow Colonel Grey to raise some 3,000 men, who were disembarked in the Elbe in May, 1620; but they were inhospitably received, especially at Berlin, and, being attacked with sickness, few succeeded in reaching Bohemia. Thus Frederick's expectations were deceived on all sides. His fall, which could not perhaps have been averted, was hastened by his own misconduct. The troops of the Emperor and the League were in a terrible state of destitution and sickness; the Bavarian army alone lost 20,000 men, and Tilly himself, exclaiming, "I am dying of hunger," is said to have snatched an apple from the hand of a Carmelite.¹ Although the Bohemian army was in as bad a condition, it is possible that Frederick, by remaining within the walls of Prague, might have worn out his enemies; but he was advised to offer them battle on the White Hill, near that capital. His army, commanded by Christian of Anhalt and Count Hohenlohe—for Count Mansfeld, his best general, disgusted at being postponed to those commanders, kept aloof at Pilsen—was routed and almost annihilated in a single hour (November 8th, 1620). In the forenoon of that eventful Sunday, Frederick had heard a sermon by Scultetus, and had sat down to dinner with his Queen, when news of the attack was brought. He mounted his horse with the intention of proceeding to the field; but from the ramparts he beheld that his army was already routed; horses were running about without their riders, and officers and soldiers

¹ Zachokke, *Baierische Gesch.* B. iii. S. 225, Anm.

were clambering up the fortifications in order to enter the city. At a council at which Digby the English ambassador assisted, it was resolved that the King and Queen should fly, for neither the troops nor the townspeople could be trusted. But whither? In grasping at the shadow Frederick had lost the substance. The Lower Palatinate, with the exception of Lautern, Mannheim, Heidelberg, and Fränkenthal, was already in possession of Spinola and his Spaniards. Frederick, therefore, took the road to Breslau with his family, and with such haste and confusion that he lost his Order of the Garter. On the same day the Imperialists entered Prague, and shortly afterwards the Bohemians swore allegiance afresh to Ferdinand II.¹

Frederick was received with respect at Breslau; the States of Silesia showed a friendly disposition; but the ex-King saw no hope of making head against his opponents, and on the 3rd of January, 1621, he quitted Breslau for the March of Brandenburg. Elizabeth, who was pregnant, gave birth to Prince Maurice at Küstrin, January 6th; and after she had recovered from her accouchement, the exiled Sovereigns proceeded into Holland. On the 23rd of January, Frederick, together with Prince Christian of Anhalt, the Margrave John George of Brandenburg-Jägerndorf, and Count Hohenlohe were put under the ban of the Empire. An offer was made to Elizabeth some years after, that, if her eldest son were permitted to receive his education and religion at Vienna, matters might be accommodated, and that he might espouse one of the Emperor's daughters; but though she was advised to accept this offer by her brother Charles I., Elizabeth replied, "that she would sooner cut her son's throat with her own hands."²

Forty-three Bohemian gentlemen who had not been fortunate enough to escape were condemned at Prague; twenty-seven of them were put to death, and the remainder sentenced to lighter punishments. Thirty more who had fled, and among them Count Thurn, were put under ban and deprived of their lands. A systematic plan, which we shall here pursue to its conclusion, was now adopted by Ferdinand II. to root out Protestantism in Bohemia and the annexed States, as well as in his Austrian dominions. Soon after the battle of Prague, all Calvinists were expelled the city. In May, 1622, a mandate was issued, directing, under the severest penalties, all who had taken any part in

¹ Harte, *Gustavus Adolphus*, vol. i. p. 245.

² *Ibid.* vol. i. *Introd. Essay*, p. xlix. and *Hist.* p. 290.

the disturbances to acknowledge their guilt before the Stadholder, when 728 landed proprietors appeared, and sued for mercy. The lives of these men were spared, but their property was confiscated, either wholly or in part, and incorporated with the Crown lands, or made over to those who had adhered to the Emperor and to the Catholic religion. After the Diet of Ratisbon, in 1623, Ferdinand II. went into Bohemia, the Papal Nuncio, Caraffa, preceding him by a day's journey. The feelings and prejudices of the Bohemians were now insulted in the most wanton and childish manner. The sepulchre of John Ziska, at Czaslau, was destroyed; at Prague, the stone cup, which in the time of George Podiebrad was placed in the Tein-Kirche, or principal church in the Altstadt, was removed; the bones of Rokyzana and of the Utraquist bishop Augustine Lucian were dug up and burnt in the churchyard. The use of the cup in the Lord's Supper, which had been conceded by Pope Pius IV. in 1564, after the Council of Trent, to subjects of the Austrian dominions, was now forbidden. On the other hand, the revenues transferred during the predominance of Protestantism were restored to the Catholic churches and convents: but to fill these last it was necessary to bring monks from Poland. In 1626 a mandate was issued forbidding those who would not return to the Catholic faith to exercise any trade or profession. These proceedings of course excited partial disturbances, but the times were over when the Bohemians could hope to resist the royal power. Yet 30,000 families, and among them 185 of noble or knightly rank, adopted the alternative allowed them of quitting the Kingdom. The places of the emigrants were filled by Germans. Many peasant families, however, secretly retained their religious faith; and when a century and a half later, in the reign of Joseph II., religious freedom was proclaimed, the numbers who declared themselves Protestants excited much surprise. Ferdinand II. attempted not, however, to infringe the civil rights of the Bohemians; on the contrary, in May, 1627, he confirmed all their privileges, except the *Majestäts-Brief*, or Royal Charter of Rodolph; from which he tore off the seal and cut away the signature: and to gratify the national pride of the Bohemians, and to provide them another hero in place of Ziska, he caused statues to be erected, especially on bridges, to John Nepomuk; who, according to tradition, had by order of the Emperor Wenceslaus been thrown into the Moldau in 1383, for refusing to reveal what had been intrusted to him by the Empress in confession. Nepomuk

was at length canonized in 1729. Ferdinand proceeded in a similar manner with his Protestant subjects in Upper, and ultimately in Lower Austria; as well as in the States dependent on Bohemia, though in Silesia, some traces of Protestantism were preserved, through the care of the Elector of Saxony.

James I., besides that his theory of the divine right of Kings caused him to regard with displeasure the acceptance by his son-in-law of the Bohemian Crown, was also unwilling at this time to break openly with the House of Austria, in consequence of the prospect held out to him by Gondomar, the Spanish ambassador, of a marriage between Charles, Prince of Wales, and the second Infanta of Spain; yet as the English nation and Parliament manifested the most enthusiastic interest in the cause of the Palatino, which they identified with that of Protestantism, he could not with decency withhold all assistance from that unfortunate Prince in endeavouring at least to maintain him in his hereditary dominions. Towards the end of 1620 James raised a considerable English force, which, uniting with the Dutch under Prince Frederick Henry, marched into the Palatinate, and succeeded in defending Frankenthal, Heidelberg, and Mannheim against Spinola, who was in possession of all the other towns and was ravaging the open country. Had these forces been adequately supported by the German Union, the restoration of Frederick in the Palatinate might probably have been effected; but the Elector of Mentz, and Louis Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, persuaded the Duke of Würtemberg and the Margrave Joachim Ernest of Brandenburg to join them in concluding a treaty with Spinola, April 12th, 1621, by which Frederick was left to his fate, and the Palatinate abandoned to the Spaniards. These Princes engaged that the Union should meddle no more with his affairs; and, indeed, after a last meeting at Heilbronn, in May, 1621, that confederacy was dissolved. The only Princes who staunchly adhered to the Palatine's cause, were Count Ernest of Mansfeld, Prince Christian of Brunswick, and George Frederick, Margrave of Baden-Durlach. After the battle of Prague Mansfeld had maintained himself awhile against the superior forces of Maximilian and Tilly, first in Bohemia and then in the Upper Palatinate; and at last succeeded in escaping the united forces of both by a masterly retreat through Nuremberg, Windsheim, and Rothenburg, into the Lower Palatinate; and, at his approach

¹ The Upper Palatinate, with Amberg for its capital, adjoined the western frontier of Bohemia.

in September, 1621, the Spaniards were compelled to raise the siege of Frankenthal. The truce between Spain and the United Provinces having now expired, Spinola, with the main body of the Spanish army, had been compelled to descend the Rhine in order to defend the Netherlands; and Gonzales de Cordova, who had been left behind with the remainder, had been engaged in a severe struggle with the troops of the Palatine and with the English; but nothing decisive was done, and Tilly, approaching by the Bergstrasse, and devastating everything before him, from Ladenburg to Mosbach, in vain summoned Heidelberg to surrender. During the autumn and winter the contending armies supported themselves by ravaging the Palatinate and the surrounding countries. Christian of Brunswick, in an attempt to penetrate into the Palatinate from Westphalia, was defeated in the Busecker Thal, in the Wetterau, by the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt in conjunction with the Bavarians, and compelled to return into Westphalia.

Frederick at length determined to join his people, who were fighting so bravely for him; and in April, 1622, he proceeded from the Hague to Heidelberg. In Mansfeld and George Frederick of Baden-Durlach he found most disinterested friends. Mansfeld had resisted very tempting offers from the enemy, while the Margrave had, at his own expense, raised for Frederick a considerable army. The united forces defeated Tilly at Mingolsheim with great loss, April 17th; but knew not how to use their victory. Mansfeld and the Margrave did not agree; and having separated their armies, while Tilly and Gonzales had united theirs, the Margrave was completely defeated, after a well-fought battle, at Wimpfen, May 6th; his army was dispersed, and he himself compelled to seek refuge at Stuttgart. This reverse deterred the Duke of Würtemberg from taking part with Frederick. This Prince, who was with Mansfeld's army, resolved on a bold attempt to join Christian of Brunswick, and making a sudden rush from Mannheim seized the town of Darmstadt. The Landgrave and his son were captured in their flight; but after a month's detention were liberated at the intercession of the German Princes, though on hard conditions. Christian, who was no friend to the clergy, had maintained his army in Westphalia at the expense of the Church as well as of the inhabitants, and had recruited it by holding out the hopes of plunder. At Paderborn he converted the silver shrine of St. Liborius into coin bearing the superscription, "The friend of God and foe of priests." He did the

same with the twelve silver apostles, remarking that he should thus help them to go forth in the world and convert the heathen. In May Christian had again marched through Fulda into the Wetterau; but he was not remarkable for military talent, and instead of forming a junction with Mansfeld, he encamped at Höchst. Here he committed another blunder by accepting a battle offered to him by Tilly, to whose eighteen guns he could oppose only three, besides being deficient in cavalry. The consequence was a signal defeat (June 20th). Half of his troops were left on the field; a part of the rest were dispersed, or perished in the Main and its morasses; and with the remainder he contrived to join Mansfeld in the Bergstrasse. Their united forces were still equal to those of Tilly; but at this juncture James I. persuaded his son-in-law to give up the contest, in order to become, like himself, the victim of the Spaniards, who had persuaded James that if Frederick would humble himself, and resign for a brief period his territories into the Emperor's hands, he would be pardoned and reinstated. Accordingly, in July, Frederick dismissed Christian and Mansfeld; who, in their retreat from the Palatinate, were pursued by Gonzales de Cordova, and defeated in a bloody battle at Fleurus, in which Christian lost his arm; but they succeeded in reaching Holland with part of their troops. Mansfeld retired into East Friesland.

Frederick, who retired first to Sedan, and afterwards again into Holland, soon discovered how miserably he had been cheated. Long negotiations had been opened at Brussels, under the mediation of the British King; but, whilst they were going on, Frederick was deprived both of his Electoral dignity and of the Upper Palatinate. Duke Maximilian, who, as we have said, was in possession of Upper Austria, which he claimed to hold under the treaty of Munich till he should have been reimbursed his expenses, had brought in an account of thirteen million florins; and Ferdinand II. resolved to satisfy him at the cost of the unfortunate Palatine. At a Diet held at Ratisbon, in January, 1623, in which but few German Princes took part, the Emperor persuaded the Catholic members to transfer the Upper Palatinate, together with the Electoral dignity, to Maximilian; who, in spite of the protests of Saxony and Brandenburg, was solemnly invested for his lifetime with Frederick's Electorship, and the annexed office of *Erztruchsess*, or Imperial steward, March 6th. Meanwhile Tilly had completed the conquest of the Lower Palatinate. Heidelberg surrendered September 15th, 1622, and the Castle on

the 19th; on the following day, Tilly laid siege to Mannheim, which place, though bravely defended by Sir Horace Vere, was compelled to capitulate, November 1st. Frankenthal held out till the following spring. By the instructions of his master Maximilian, Tilly acted with the greatest harshness towards the Protestants^o of the Palatinate; they were deprived of their churches, and all ecclesiastical property was restored to the Roman Catholics. Tilly also seized the library at Heidelberg, famed among the learned throughout Europe for its collection of manuscripts. Many cart-loads of these were despatched to Munich; and Maximilian afterwards presented the greater portion of them to the Pope. Thus the unhappy Palatine was irretrievably ruined, chiefly through the selfish anxiety of his father-in-law, James I., to effect a match between his son and the Infanta; a union highly unpopular with the English people, who, on the other hand, were anxious to venture their blood and treasure in support of Frederick and the Protestant cause. In 1621 James had indeed addressed a long Latin letter to Bethlem Gabor (October 19th), beseeching him, if possible, to reduce Hungary, and proceed next year into Bohemia; and promising, with the full consent of his Parliament, a subsidy of 80,000*l.*¹ That fickle-minded leader, however, who had gained some successes and suffered some reverses in Hungary, concluded a peace with the Emperor at Nikolsburg, January 7th, 1622; by which he renounced Hungary and the title of King, in consideration of receiving in that country seven *Gespanschaften*, or counties, and the town of Kaschau, together with the principalities of Oppeln and Ratibor in Silesia, and a yearly pension of 50,000 florins.² In 1623, however, Bethlem Gabor resumed the war against the Emperor, relying on the assistance of the German Protestants, as well as of the Turks: the history of which last people begins about this period to be again so much mixed up with that of Europe as to demand a brief retrospect.

The unimportant reign of Sultan Achmet I., with whom Austria had concluded the peace of Sitvatorok, was closed by his death, November 22nd, 1617. Nothing can more strongly testify the sunken state of the Turkish power than that it was possible to raise from a dungeon to the throne Achmet's imbecile brother, Mustapha I. It was one of the pastimes of this Prince to throw

¹ Letter from the Hamilton MSS. in Hormayr's *Archiv.* ap. Menzel, B. iii.

² The treaty of Nikolsburg is in Kalona,

t. xxx. p. 709 sqq. and in Dumont, t. v. pt. ii. p. 407.

gold to the fishes of the Bosphorus; but the Kialar-Aga persuaded the Divan that the precious metal would be better employed in furnishing the donatives customary on a new reign. After three months' enjoyment of the sceptre, Mustapha was led back to his prison, and, on the 26th of February, 1618, Osman II., a boy of fourteen, the oldest of seven sons of Achmet, was saluted Padishah by the venal troops. Osman displayed a spirit and ambition beyond his years.¹ Strong and active, and inured to all soldier-like exercises, Osman was a bold rider and an unerring marksman with the bow; but with all his energy, he lacked the perseverance without which nothing great can be accomplished, while his meanness alienated from him the hearts of the rapacious Janissaries. Osman longed to flesh his maiden scimitar in a war with Poland, between which country and the Porte bickerings had for several years existed; and he esteemed its conquest so easy that he divided the spoil beforehand. Desolating inroads had been made by the Tartars into Poland, by the Cossacks into the Turkish dominions, which in 1620 ended in open war. Poland was then ruled by the Swedish Prince Sigismund III., of whom we shall have to speak further on. Caspar Gratiani, Voyvode of Moldavia, had courted the favour of Sigismund by sending to him the intercepted letters addressed by Bethlem Gabor to the Porte, complaining of the incursions of the Polish Cossacks and freebooters. Gratiani was deposed on the discovery of his proceedings; but he would not yield without a struggle: he called upon the Poles for help, who sent him an army of 50,000 men. Against these, posted in a fortified camp near Jassy, in Moldavia, Iskander Pasha, Governor of Silistria, led a force of double their number, composed of Osmanlis and Tartars; and on the 20th of September, 1620, a great battle was fought, in which 10,000 Poles were slain. The remainder, after a fruitless attempt to defend their entrenched camp, retreated towards the Dniester; in the passage of which river most of them perished. Gratiani himself fell in the retreat.

It was this success that incited Osman to attempt the conquest of Poland, against the advice of his ministers, and even the wishes of his army; and in the spring of 1621, clothed in a suit of mail which had belonged to Soliman the Magnificent, he placed himself at the head of 100,000 men. But the march proved difficult and destructive; the mercenary troops were alienated by Osman's reluctance to pay the customary gratuity; and it was the end of

¹ See his character in Sir Thomas Roe's *Negotiations*. p. 43.

August before the Turks arrived on the Dniester. Here Sigismund had encamped 40,000 Poles and Cossacks, and 8,000 Germans sent to him by the Emperor; while another army of reserve of 60,000 men, under the Crown-Prince, lay at Kaminietz. A first assault on the Polish camp was attended with some success; but the following ones were repulsed, although in the sixth and last the Sultan in person led one of the storming columns. A Polish winter set in early; men and horses perished by thousands; a mutiny broke out, and Osman, after opening negotiations for a peace, began his retreat. On the 28th of December, 1621; he entered Constantinople in triumph; for, though he had lost 80,000 men, he pretended to claim a victory. But his ill-success, his unpopularity with the army, the clearness of provisions, and the strictness of his police, which he superintended in person, by visiting the wine-houses and other places of resort, soon produced symptoms of revolt among the Janissaries. As these degenerate troops¹ were averse to the warlike schemes meditated by Osman, he resolved to destroy them. The scheme he formed was bold and well designed, and, if successful, might have revived the sinking fortunes of the Turkish Empire. Under pretence of a pilgrimage to Mecca, Osman was to raise a large army at Damascus, march with it to Constantinople, and annihilate the refractory Janissaries: but his preparations, and some incautious words, prematurely betrayed his intentions. On the 18th of May, 1622, on the report that the Sultan's tent was about to be transported to Scutari, the Janissaries, associating themselves to the Spahis, rose in rebellion, repulsed with insults their Aga and other officers, who had been sent to hear their complaints; and demanded from the Mufti a categorical answer to the inquiry, "Whether it was permitted to put to death those who misled the Padishah, and devoured the substance of the Moslems?" The Mufti having answered in the affirmative, the mutineers hastened to the palaces of the Grand-Vizier and of the Chodsha, who were thought to be the authors of the plan for their destruction; these ministers saved themselves by flight, but their palaces were plundered and destroyed. On the following day the insurrection assumed a still more formidable aspect. The Sultan having refused to give up the six authors of his pilgrimage, though he

¹ " . . . who now, contrary to their institution, being married and fathers of a family, entered into trades, receiving nothing in war more than in peace, *præter pericula et labores*, are not easily drawn

from their own chimneys."—Roe's *Negotiations*, p. 48. Sir Thomas Roe was English ambassador at the Porte, 1621—1628.

consented to renounce the pilgrimage itself, an attack was made on the Seraglio; and, in the midst of the confusion, a cry of Mustapha Khan for Sultan, echoed by thousands of voices, became the watchword of the revolution. The unhappy Mustapha, wasted to a shadow by want of air and food, and expecting death rather than a crown, was dragged from his obscure dungeon, carried to the throne room, and saluted Padishah. Osman, contemplating flight when it was too late, abandoned his Grand-Vizier and Kisklar-Aga to the fury of the soldiers, by whom they were horribly murdered; the Janissaries, who would listen to no terms, though large offers were made, occupied the Seraglio, and directed all the actions of the Sultana Valide, the mother of the crazy Mustapha; and Constantinople was abandoned to plunder and devastation. Osman, who had fled to the palace of the Aga of the Janissaries, was dragged from his hiding-place, and conducted, with abuse and derision, first to the barracks of the mutineers, and then to the Seven Towers. On the way, his faithful adherent, Hussein Pasha, was murdered at his feet; and he himself was soon after put to death, by order of the Valide and her Vizier, Daud Pasha.¹ During the brief second sultaniship of Mustapha I. a peace with Poland was the only event of importance, effected chiefly through Sir Thomas Roe. On the 30th of August, 1623, a counter revolution took place at Constantinople. Mustapha was deposed with the consent of the Janissaries, who even renounced on this occasion the accustomed donative, and the eldest surviving son of Achmet I., now fourteen years of age, ascended the throne with the title of Amurath IV. The unhappy Mustapha survived his deposition sixteen years.

James I. during these events, the Spanish match being still in hand, had instructed Sir Thomas Roe to maintain peace between the Porte, the Emperor, and the King of Poland; although, as we have seen, the British King had secretly afforded some trifling aid to his son-in-law the Palatine, both by sending him a few troops, and by endeavouring underhand to excite Bethlem Gabor to action. In 1623 this Prince, whom Sir Isaac Wake, the English minister at Venice, characterized as a Janus with one face towards Christendom and another towards Turkey, renewed the war against Ferdinand; and, though he could then count but little on the help of the Turks, he entered Hungary, took several places, and even threatened Pressburg, Raab, and Comorn. On the approach of

¹ For this revolution see Antoine Galland, *Le Mort du Sultan Osman*; and the *Despatches* of Sir Thomas Roe.

winter, however, he was compelled to dismiss his army; when the Tartars, of which it was partly composed, carried off 20,000 Hungarians into slavery. In May, 1624, Gabor again concluded a peace with the Emperor, which did not differ much from that of Nikolsburg. As the Spanish match had now gone off, we find secretary Calvert instructing Roe, May 28th, 1624, to do all in his power to keep well with the Transylvanian Prince.¹ While Poland was attacked in the south by Osman and the Turks, Sigismund III. had to defend himself in the north from his kinsman, the renowned Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden: and as this last country, as well as Denmark, by the part which they took in the Thirty Years' War, were now about to become of great importance in the European system, it will here be proper to take a brief review of their history.

We need not carry our retrospect beyond the Union of Calmar in 1397; by which the three northern Kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden were joined together under the famous Danish Queen Margaret.² The most noteworthy articles of the Act of Union were: that the right of electing a Sovereign should be exercised conjointly by the three Kingdoms; that a son of the reigning King, if there were any, should be preferred; that each Kingdom should keep its own laws and customs; and that all should combine for the common defence. But this confederacy, which seemed calculated to promote the power and tranquillity of Scandinavia, proved the source of much discontent and jealousy and of several bloody wars. Margaret was succeeded on her death, in 1412, by Eric of Pomerania, the son of her sister's daughter. Eric, who was at that time in his thirtieth year, had married, in 1406, Philippa, daughter of Henry IV. of England, a lady distinguished by her understanding, goodness, and courage. In 1428 Philippa defended Copenhagen against the combined fleet of Holstein and the Hanse towns, whilst Eric lay hid in a convent at Sord.³ Eric's reign was tyrannical and turbulent. In 1439 the Danes and Swedes renounced their allegiance; and Eric, who was then in the island of Gothland, had henceforth to eke out a subsistence by piracy. The Kingdoms elected in Eric's stead Christopher of Bavaria, son of his sister Catharine by John, Duke of the Upper Palatinate; but, after Christopher's death, in 1448,

¹ Roe's *Negotiations*, p. 244.

² For these countries may be consulted, Mallet, *Hist. de Danemarck*; Allen, *Haandbog i Fædrelandets Historie* (übersetzt von Falck); Vertot, *Révol. de Suède*;

Geijer, *Gesch. Schwedens* (translated from MS. by Leffler).

³ Philippa herself died in the convent of Wadstena, in 1430, without issue. Geijer, *Gesch. Schwedens*, B. i. S. 197.

the Calmar Union was dissolved. The Danes now elected for their King Count Christian of Oldenburg; while the Swedes and Norwegians chose Charles Knutson. But in the following year Charles was compelled to resign Norway to Christian, and in 1457 he lost even Sweden through an insurrection led by the Archbishop of Upsala. Christian was at once chosen in his place, and crowned at Upsala; and in the following year the Councils of all three Kingdoms, assembled at Skara, recognized Christian's son John as his successor.

King Christian I. became still more powerful by being chosen to succeed his maternal uncle in Sleswick and Holstein.¹ He had, however, to strive for a long while with Charles Knutson for the throne of Sweden, and after Charles's death, in 1470, with Sten Sture, a nobleman of Dalecarlia, to whom Charles had bequeathed the administration of the realm. In 1471 a battle was fought on the Brunkebjerg, a height now enclosed in the city of Stockholm, in which the Danish King was utterly defeated, though, of course, he continued to hold the old Danish lands beyond the Sound, viz., Scania, Halland, and Bleking. Christian died in 1481, and was succeeded in Denmark and Norway by his son John. The Swedes, in 1483, acknowledged John's supremacy by renewing the Union of Calmar; yet, in spite of all his efforts and the domestic dissensions prevailing in Sweden, John could never really establish himself in that country. Sten Sture's regency had excited much discontent in Sweden. In 1503 he died, and was succeeded by Swante Sture, who, though a namesake, was no kinsman. Swante Sture, after some struggles and vicissitudes, succeeded in retaining the regency, and on his death in 1512, his son, Sten Sture the younger, was elected in his place.

King John died in 1513. The education of his son and successor, Christian II., recalls the patriarchal ages, and shows how rude were the manners at that time even of the highest classes in Scandinavia. Young Christian was put to board with one Hans, a bookbinder, till Hinze, a canon, took charge of him, taught him his catechism and to sing in the choir: and he was then handed over to Master Conrad of Pomerania to be instructed in Latin. As he approached adolescence he was lodged in the palace, where his unruly habits often procured him a beating from his father, for he would scour Copenhagen at night drinking and amusing himself wherever he was invited. In 1502, being in his twentieth

¹ Holstein was erected into a Duchy in favour of Christian by the Emperor Frederick III. in 1474. Pffeffel, t. ii. p. 43.

year, he was sent as Viceroy into Norway to quell an insurrection, which he effected in the most brutal manner; and during the eight years that he remained in that country he almost annihilated the nobility. At Bergen, where he resided, then the staple of the northern Hanseatic trade, he fell in love with a girl called Dyveke, or Little Dove, daughter of Sigbrit, a huckstress of Amsterdam, who had set up a tavern at Bergen. From these women, who completely ruled him, Christian seems to have imbibed the democratical principles common in the Netherlands. He was the enemy of nobles and prelates, and opposed the oppression which they exercised over the peasants, who in Denmark were then nothing but serfs. It must be recollected, however, that the constitution of Denmark, as well as of Norway and Sweden, consisted then of an aristocracy, or rather oligarchy, of nobles, which left the King but little real power, and which he of course regarded with aversion. After Christian's accession, in 1513, he openly lived with his mistress Dyveke, and she and her mother continued to retain their influence over him in spite of his marriage with Isabella, a sister of the Emperor Charles V.

It was during the reign of Christian II. that Denmark first began to have much connection with the rest of Europe. In the year of his accession, he allied himself with the Wendish group of towns of the Hanseatic League, whose capital was Lübeck; and he subsequently formed alliances with Russia, France, England, and Scotland, with the view of obtaining their aid in his contemplated reduction of Sweden; but he deferred any expedition against that country till a favourable opportunity was presented through Gustaf Trolle, Archbishop of Upsala, who, with many of the old Swedish nobility, hated the Sture family. In 1517 Trolle levied open war against the administrator Sten Sture, in which Christian supported him with a fleet; but Sten Sture succeeded in capturing Trolle, had him deposed from his see in a Diet convened at Arboga, and razed to the ground his strong castle of Stäket. In the next year Christian again appeared before Stockholm with a fleet and army, in which were 2,000 French sent by Francis I. Christian was defeated by Sten Sture in a battle near Bränkirka, after which he sought an interview with the regent, in the meantime demanding hostages till he should have safely returned to his ships. Six noble Swedes were accordingly placed in his hands, and among them the young Gustavus Ericson who had carried the Swedish banner in the battle; but, with an infamous breach of faith, Christian had no

sooner got back to his ships than he carried the hostages off with him to Denmark.

The Archbishop of Upsala having gone to Rome to complain of Sten Sture, the Pope appointed in Denmark an ecclesiastical commission, which excommunicated the administrator and his party, and laid all Sweden under an interdict. This proceeding, which served to pave the way for Sweden's acceptance of the Lutheran reformation, afforded Christian II. a pretence for getting up a crusade against that country, and levying money both on clergy and laity; and he employed the year 1519 in gathering a large army, to which adventurers flocked from all parts of Europe. Early in 1520 this army invaded Sweden, under command of Otte Krumpe, who caused the Papal interdict to be placarded on all the church doors. Sture was defeated and wounded in a battle fought on the ice at Aasund in West Gothland; and a traitor offered to lead Krumpe into Upland, by avoiding the *abuttis* with which the passes had been protected. At this news Sten Sture, in spite of his wound, hastened to the defence of Stockholm, but died on the way in his sledge on Mälar Lake. The Swedes were routed in a second battle near Upsala, after which a treaty was concluded to the effect that Christian should reign in Sweden, agreeably to the Union of Calmar, but on condition of granting an entire amnesty. Christian now proceeded to Stockholm, where in November his coronation was performed with great splendour. Christian at first behaved in a most friendly manner, and promised to be not only a King, but even a father, to the Swedes; yet he had no sooner received the crown than he took the most inhuman vengeance on his confiding subjects. Two bishops, the Jurgomaster of Stockholm, the town council, and many nobles, were beheaded in the market-place; other executions, often preceded by torture, followed, during a space of four days; and the city was given up to be plundered by the soldiers like a place taken by storm. Orders were despatched to Finland to proceed in a similar manner, while the King's progress southward was everywhere marked by executions.

These cruelties, for which Christian was reproached by his brother-in-law, Charles V., procured for him the name of the Nero of the North, and brought on insurrections in all his dominions. That in Sweden was led by Gustavus Ericson, the hostage already mentioned, a young man remarkable alike by his origin, talent, and courage; whose family, for what reason is not

precisely known, afterwards assumed the name of Vasa, which was borne neither by himself nor by his forefathers.¹ During his captivity in Denmark, Gustavus Vasa had been intrusted to the custody of his kinsman, Eric Baner, a nobleman of Jutland, who kept him in his castle of Kallö. At his keeper's table Gustavus heard of the preparations for war with Sweden, and was insulted by the boasts of the young Danes, how they would divide Swedish lands, how they would cast lots for Swedish maidens, so that he could rest neither day nor night. He escaped one morning from Kallö, disguised himself as an ox-driver, and, in September, 1519, reached Lübeck in safety, where he remained eight months. In May, 1520, soon after the death of Sten Sture, and when the Danes under Christian were besieging Stockholm, the Lübeckers landed Gustavus secretly at Stensö, near Calmar; but he found among his countrymen no response to his appeals to them to arm, and was fain to fly. How he spent the summer, disguised and wandering in by-paths in order to escape recognition—for a price had been set upon his head—is not known. It was September before he arrived at Tarna, the estate of his brother-in-law Joachim Brahe in Södermanland; whom, however, he could not dissuade from attending Christian's coronation. Brahe went to Stockholm, which city, as we have said, had been entered in the autumn by Christian, and there met his death. The father of Gustavus was among those who had signed the deed conferring the Swedish Crown upon Christian, but he was, nevertheless, as well as his son-in-law, one of the victims of that monster. At Räfna, his paternal estate, to which he had proceeded on leaving Tarna, Gustavus heard the news of the massacre, and he mounted his horse and fled, attended by a single servant, who robbed and forsook him. Gustavus now took the road to Dalecarlia, a land noted for its love of freedom and hatred of Danes. Here he worked in peasant's clothes, for daily wages, in hourly danger from his pursuers, from whom he had many narrow escapes; and was once wounded with a lance as he lay hidden under a heap of straw. His adventures, which remind us of those of our own Alfred, are still related in that neighbourhood; the barns at Rankhytta in which he thrashed oats, the building near Ornäs where his life was saved by a woman, are preserved as national monuments; the spot near Marnaas where he lay hid under a felled pine trunk,

¹ Geijer, B. ii. S. 1. Modern writers, which we shall retain. The year of his however, give him the name of Vasa, birth was probably 1496. *Ibid.* S. 3.

the hill near Asby surrounded with marshes, where he found refuge, the cellar in the village of Utmetland, where he hid himself, are still pointed out.

The news of Christian's "blood bath" procured Gustavus Vasa many followers; he was elected for their leader by a great assembly of peasants at the Mora Stone, and found himself at the head of thousands of men; whom, though undisciplined and armed only with spears, clubs, bows, swords, and such weapons as chance afforded, he soon rendered fully a match for the Danish troops. His situation was embarrassing as well as difficult; for the Danes, besides possessing all the fortresses and castles in the Kingdom, had carried off as hostages some of the most distinguished Swedish ladies, including the mother and two sisters of Gustavus himself. Nevertheless, he boldly went to war, and in June, 1521, he invested Stockholm; but the siege, for want of proper artillery and engineering skill, was protracted two years. During this period his command was confirmed in a *Herrendag* or assembly of nobles, at Wadstena, August 24th; the Crown was proffered to him, which he declined, but accepted the office of Regent. The Danes were now by degrees almost entirely driven out of Sweden; and Christian II., so far from being able to relieve Stockholm, found himself in danger of losing the Danish Crown. He had quarrelled with his uncle, Duke Frederick of Holstein; he had offended his own Danish subjects, as well as the Hanse towns, by his commercial regulations, and especially by an ordinance forbidding the sale of agricultural produce to foreigners, and directing it to be brought to Copenhagen and there sold to Danish merchants; and he had alienated the nobles by laws, good and just in themselves, but contrary to the capitulation he had entered into on his accession; among which was, that they should not be allowed to sell the peasants with the land. He had made enemies of the clergy by prohibiting them from buying farms, unless they should marry like their forefathers. He had also done many acts of barbarity and cruelty; and to escape the odium which they brought upon him, he caused Didrik Slaghøek, whom he had made Archbishop of Lund, to be burnt alive as the author of them.

By his connection with the House of Austria, as well as through the influence of Sigbrit, Christian had been led in his commercial policy to favour the Netherlanders at the expense of the Hanse towns; and the cities of Lübeck, Dantzic, Wismar, and Rostock now took their revenge by declaring for Gustavus

Vasa, ravaging the Danish coasts, seizing Danish ships, occupying Bornholm, and plundering Helsingör. The same towns also concluded an alliance with Christian's uncle Frederick, who had formed secret connections with the Danish nobles, and induced them to renounce their allegiance to his nephew, and place himself on the throne with the title of Frederick I. The Union of Calmar was now again dissolved. The Norwegians, indeed, agreed to accept Frederick's sovereignty; but when Frederick called upon the Swedish States to recognize his title in conformity with the Union, they replied that they had already chosen Gustavus Ericson for their King; which was done at the Diet of Strängnäs, June 7th, 1523. Three weeks after Stockholm surrendered to Gustavus. Bewildered by this revolution, Christian II. fled from Copenhagen in April, before there was any necessity to do so; indeed that city, Malmö, Kallundborg, and some other places, did not acknowledge Frederick till the beginning of 1524; at which time the island of Gothland was all that remained faithful to Christian. From Copenhagen Christian and his wife sailed to the Netherlands.

Meanwhile, in Sweden, Gustavus was consolidating his power, partly by moderation and mildness, partly by examples of necessary severity. He put himself at the head of the reformation, as Frederick I. also did in Denmark; and he acted with that mixture of softness and dissimulation, combined with boldness in action, which always distinguished him. Luther's doctrines had been first introduced into Sweden in 1519, by two brothers, Olaus and Lawrence Petri, who had studied at Wittenberg. The Petris soon attracted the attention of Gustavus, who gave them his protection, and entered himself into correspondence with Luther. The designs of Gustavus were helped by the circumstance that, at his accession, four out of the six Swedish bishoprics were vacant; and Gustaf Trolle, Archbishop of Upsala, who had taken part against him, had been declared an enemy of his country. As in other parts of Europe, the nobles were induced to join the movement by the prospect of sharing the spoils of the Church; and in a great Diet at Westerås in 1527, the reformation was introduced. The castles and lands of the prelates were then seized; convents were suppressed, and their inmates turned adrift; and many were inclined to withhold even the tithes of the parochial clergy, had not the King issued an order for their payment. There seems to have been no great difficulty in introducing the Reformation among this simple people, for the majority of the Swedes

were so ignorant as not to know the difference between Romanism and Lutheranism. Gustavus I. always denied that he had introduced a new doctrine; and even under his son and successor, John III., a great part of the people still believed themselves to belong to the Romish faith.¹ The Reformation in Sweden was not, however, unaccompanied with disturbances on the part of the higher classes, and many years elapsed before it was completely established.

Meanwhile Christian II., a wanderer and an exile, was seeking the aid of foreign Princes to re-establish himself on the throne of Denmark. The merchants of the Netherlands whom he had befriended, as well as some of the German Princes, were in his favour; and, in 1531, the government of the Netherlands allowed him to raise in Holland an army of 8,000 or 10,000 men, who were embarked in Dutch ships with the intention of landing them in the Danish province of Halland, beyond the Sound; but the fleet was driven by stress of weather on the coast of Norway, and towards the end of autumn a landing was effected at Opslo. Here, during the winter, Christian was secure from the attacks of Frederick and Gustavus, who had combined against him. Christian had been a convert to Lutheranism, but, as his faith sat easy upon him, he now declared himself the protector of Catholicism in Norway; the whole country, except a few fortified places, declared in his favour, and he was even proclaimed King of Norway.² In the spring of 1532, however, when the ice had broken up, a Swedish army had entered Upper Norway; the Danish and Wendish Hanse fleets landed a large force at Opslo; and Christian, whose men were daily deserting because he had no means to pay them, was compelled to shut himself up in the castle, and enter into negotiations with the Danish commander. By a treaty signed at Aggerhuys, July 1st, it was agreed that Christian should be carried into Denmark, to treat in person with his uncle Frederick; and that he should be at liberty to quit the Kingdom if no agreement should be concluded: but such was the hatred of the Danish nobles towards him, that they compelled Frederick to condemn him to perpetual imprisonment, and to give eight written promises to that effect into the custody of four Danish and four Holstein noblemen. The unhappy Christian was immured in the Castle of Sonderborg; all the windows of his vaulted chamber were walled up, except one, through which his food was conveyed; and a half-witted dwarf was appointed to be his only attendant

¹ Geijer, B. ii. S. 218.

² *Ibid.* B. ii. S. 81.

and companion. In this miserable prison he continued seventeen years, till in 1549 he was removed to the Castle of Kallundborg, and there during the remainder of his life, which lasted till 1559, he was treated with something like royal dignity; but his health and spirits had already been completely broken.

Frederick I. died at Gottorp, his usual residence, in 1533, when a contest began for the Danish Crown. The Diet was assembled, but the election of a King was deferred for a year by the State Council, who during the interregnum exercised supreme power. The city of Lübeck, now governed by two enterprising democrats, Marcus Mejer, and George Wollenwewer, seized the opportunity to endeavour to place a protégé of their own on the throne of Denmark, and thus revive the waning power of the Hansa; and they associated in their undertaking the burgomasters of Malmö and Copenhagen. As Duke Christian of Holstein, eldest son of Frederick I., would not submit to the terms which they prescribed as the conditions of helping him to the throne, they employed Count Christian of Oldenburg to invade Denmark on pretence of restoring Christian II. The Count having raised an army with the money of Lübeck, demanded from the Duke of Holstein the liberation of the imprisoned King, and passed over into Denmark with the Hanse fleet. He was favourably received in Maluö and Copenhagen; all Scania and Seeland submitted to him as the representative of Christian II.; and the peasants of Jutland were also in his favour. Alarmed at these proceedings, the Council now chose the Duke of Holstein for their King, with the title of Christian III. (July, 1534); but the Count of Oldenburg maintained himself in Denmark throughout the year, till the new Sovereign was helped by the arms of the King of Sweden.

Gustavus was now at variance with the Wendish Hanse towns. They had, indeed, liberally assisted him in his struggle in Sweden; but they made exorbitant claims upon his gratitude. They demanded that the Netherlanders, with whom Gustavus had concluded a treaty in 1526, should be excluded from the commerce of the Baltic; and Lübeck required with such impatience the repayment of a loan of 28,000 rix-dollars, that Gustavus, to satisfy the demand, was compelled to order every parish to contribute one of its church bells. As the strict and vigorous government of Gustavus had occasioned considerable discontent in Sweden, the Lübeckers took advantage of it to declare war against him. Among the malcontents was the King's own brother-in-law, the Count of Hoya, who fled to Lübeck with his wife and children;

where Gustaf Trolle and other dissatisfied nobles gathered around him. All these embraced the cause of the Count of Oldenburg and Christian II., against the new King of Denmark. But as his own Kingdom was threatened, Gustavus's army entered the Danish provinces lying beyond the Sound; the Lübeckers were driven out of Scania, Halland, and Bleking; in January 1535, Christian of Oldenburg and Marcus Meyer were completely defeated in a battle near Helsingborg; and the Hanseatic fleet was also vanquished by that of Denmark and Sweden. In Denmark Proper, the invaders sustained a disastrous defeat from the King's troops in Funen, in which Gustaf Trolle was mortally wounded; and though Copenhagen held out a year, under the extremities of famine, it was at length forced to capitulate. After this defeat the party of the invaders fell to pieces; and Lübeck found it expedient to conclude a peace with Christian III. (February, 1536). The commercial privileges of the Lübeckers were renewed, and they were invested with Bornholm for another fifty years. After this war, which was called "the Count's War," Christian III. and Gustavus Vasa put the finishing hand to the Reformation in their respective dominions, and to the temporal power of the clergy. Christian caused all the Danish bishops to be arrested on the same day, and then proceeded to confiscate ecclesiastical property. Lutheranism was formally established in Denmark in the autumn of 1536. At the personal interview between Christian and Gustavus at Brömsebro in Calmar in 1541, the two Kings arranged some differences which still existed between them, and a peace of twenty years was concluded. While Sweden, in 1540, had with the consent of the States been converted into an hereditary Kingdom, Christian III. found himself obliged to weaken his power by dividing Denmark, according to German fashion, with his two brothers, John and Adolf. Admonished, however, by the difficulties and dangers which had attended his own election, he took care betimes that his son should be appointed his successor, who was elected in 1542, and on the death of his father in 1559, succeeded to the Crown, with the title of Frederick II.

Gustavus Vasa died in September, 1560. Under his sway Sweden attained to great prosperity, and the latter half of his reign was accounted the happiest time that country ever saw. He bestowed great care on trade, and especially on mining and working in metals; and he restored public order by a strict police, then very necessary in that country. He was a rigid

economist, and during the Reformation not only laid his hands on all the plate and movables of the churches and ecclesiastical foundations, but even looked after the copper kettles and tin basins of the convents. He personally engaged in agriculture, mining, and trade, and lived a long while in rural fashion on his farms in Finland. After the death of Gustavus, Sweden again fell into confusion, and almost barbarism. His eldest son, who succeeded him with the title of Eric XIV., though possessing talents and accomplishments, was subject to occasional fits of mental derangement; and Gustavus, to avert the danger threatened by his reign, had made his other three sons nearly equal to Eric in power. To John he gave Finland; to Magnus, East Gothland; and to Charles, Scædermanland, which provinces they ruled as hereditary Dukes. But of these brothers Magnus was still more deranged than Eric, while John and Charles were unfeeling and cruel. Eric had been one of Queen Elizabeth's suitors; who, however, with less than her usual coquetry, seems to have written to Gustavus to dissuade his son from a hopeless suit.¹ Eric, in one of his insane fits, afterwards married the daughter of a corporal of his guard.

Eric soon found himself engaged in hostilities with the Danes, the Russians, and his three brothers. After the dissolution of the military order of the Knights of the Sword, which had ruled in Esthonia, Livonia, and Courland, like the Teutonic Order in Prussia, the Russians attempted to seize Livonia. Magnus, brother of Frederick II. of Denmark, had in vain attempted to protect the Livonians, who now appealed to Eric; and in 1561 the Swedish King landed an army at Revel, and compelled the Russians to a peace. But shortly afterwards Eric fell into a quarrel with his brother John, Duke of Finland, who, contrary to Eric's will, had married Catharine Jagellonica, a sister of Sigismund II., the last male of the house of Jagellon; a union which opened to him a prospect of the Polish throne. The Archbishopric of Riga having on the death of the Archbishop been made over to Sweden by his coadjutor, but the transfer being disputed by the Poles, Eric called on his brother John to aid him with a fleet and money in taking possession. John, considering himself an independent Sovereign, refused to comply, upon which Eric summoned both John and his wife before his tribunal at Stockholm, and on their refusing to appear, caused the Swedish States to condemn John to death as a rebellious vassal, and besieged

¹Geijer, B. ii. S. 141.

and captured him in his castle at Abo, August, 1563. John and Catharine were confined at Gripsholm, where they were kept shut up for four years. A war which broke out with Denmark about the same time, entailed great misery on Sweden, and the acts of cruelty committed by Eric in his insanity, which had now become more confirmed, set everybody against him. * At last, in one of the paroxysms of his disorder, Eric repaired to the prison of his brother John, fell at his feet, saluted him as his Sovereign, and gave him his liberty. The first use that John made of his freedom was to conspire with his brother Charles against Eric. In September, 1568, John and Charles having collected around them at Wadstena all the malcontents of the Kingdom, proceeded to Stockholm, into which they were admitted by the citizens; Eric surrendered himself, and early in 1569 John caused him to be deposed by the States, and condemned to death; his marriage was declared null, and the offspring of it illegitimate. At the intercession of the Queen-dowager, Eric's stepmother, his sentence was commuted to perpetual imprisonment; and John was elected King in his place, January 24th, 1569. The unfortunate Eric survived these events eight years, although John and Charles endeavoured by ill-usage to put an end to his life. He was treated like a common malefactor; and in the autumn of 1574, on the discovery of some plans to effect his release, he was thrown into the frightful tower of Orbyhuys in Upland. Two or three years after, John procured from the clergy a sanction to offer him up "for the good of the people,"—in other words, to murder him; and he was poisoned with some soup, February, 1577, in his forty-fourth year.

Frederick II. of Denmark died in 1588, after a long and prosperous reign. Frederick kept a splendid Court, patronized art and science, and spent large sums in the astronomical pursuits of his favourite, Tycho Brahe, at Uranienborg. His son and successor, Christian IV., who had been elected in 1586, was still a child; but the reputation of his father shed a glory over his accession, which, however, was destined to fade in the Thirty Years' War. It must be recollected that at this period Denmark held beyond the Sound several old Danish lands now belonging to the Kingdom of Sweden, comprising a fifth part of the inhabitants; and by the peace of Stettin, concluded with the Swedish King, John, in 1570, the possession of Scania, Halland, Bleking, Herjedalen, Jemtland, Bohus, and Wyck, was confirmed to the Danes.

King John, with the many friends of his consort Catharine Jagellonica, had in 1587 procured their son to be elected King of Poland, with the title of Sigismund III. This was an unfortunate event for Sweden, from the contests which it afterwards occasioned. Catharine was a zealous Catholic, led by the Jesuits, who had been introduced into Sweden; and Sigismund was brought up in his mother's faith. It was generally believed that John himself had turned Catholic; but he was not willing to sacrifice his Crown for the Pope, especially as he saw that his brother Charles was endeavouring to form a party as head of the Protestants. John was prudent enough to banish the Jesuits, to dissolve their college at Stockholm, to fill the professorial chairs with their opponents, and to threaten with exile all those who had gone over to the Catholic Church.

King John died November 17th, 1592. His brother Charles had been for some time the virtual ruler of Sweden; and, as his nephew Sigismund was in Poland at the time of his father's death, Charles continued to hold the Regency, although the government should have been intrusted to seven Councillors. Charles had been endeavouring to deprive Sigismund of the Swedish succession, on the ground of his religion; and he was helped in his views by the circumstance that both the Poles and the Swedes demanded the constant residence of their Sovereign among them. In the autumn of 1593, on the approach of Sigismund with an army, Charles indeed found it necessary to lay down the government, and his nephew received the Swedish Crown; but in the following year Sigismund was compelled to return to Poland, and he left his uncle Charles to govern Sweden with royal powers. Charles used his authority to make preparations for seizing the Crown. Sigismund returned to Sweden to dispute it with him, but was ultimately defeated in a battle at Stångebro in September, 1598. In the following February, the Swedish States conferred the government upon Charles, with the title of "Ruling Hereditary Prince;" and in July they declared that if Sigismund did not immediately send his son Ladislaus into Sweden, to be educated in the Lutheran faith, he and his posterity should be excluded from the Swedish Crown. Charles now sought to establish his power by numerous cruel executions, chiefly of the nobles; for by the peasants and clergy he was regarded as their deliverer from the papistry of Sigismund, and he even obtained the name of "the peasants' friend." At length, in 1604, Charles,

having filled all the chief offices of the Kingdom with his adherents, assumed, as Charles IX., the title of "King Elect, and Hereditary Prince of the Swedes, Vandals, and Goths;"¹ Gustavus Adolphus, then in his tenth year,² his eldest son by his marriage with Christina, daughter of Duke Adolf of Holstein-Gottorp, and granddaughter of Frederick I. of Denmark, was at the same time recognized as Crown-Prince, and his brother Charles Philip as Hereditary Prince, with remainder, in default of male issue, to their sister. The last years of Charles IX. were spent in war with Russia, Poland, and Denmark. Christian IV. of Denmark, who was only eleven years of age at the time of his father's death, did not obtain the government of that Kingdom till 1596; and, when it was at length committed to him, he was compelled, like his predecessors, to sign a capitulation, which circumscribed his power even more than theirs. During his minority the Council of State had contested the regency with his mother and uncle, and assigned it to four of their own members: and no attention was paid, except in the Duchies of Sleswic and Holstein, to the letters of Rodolph II. pronouncing Christian of age in his seventeenth year. Christian I. had conferred on these provinces the right of choosing their own Regent, and the pretensions of the Danish Council were consequently excluded there.

The first years of Christian IV.'s reign were prosperous. He chose the oldest and most experienced statesmen for his counsellors; he was himself intelligent and industrious; he founded the prosperity of Norway on the ruins of the Hansatic League, and personally surveyed the coasts of that country to find convenient havens for trade; nor did Iceland, in its remote and icy ocean, escape his vigilance and cares. The power of Denmark was then superior to that of Sweden, nor was Christian disinclined to use it in a contest with the Swedish King, between whom and himself an ill feeling prevailed. This festered still more rancorously in Christian's breast after Charles IX. had been solemnly crowned King of Sweden in 1608; but the Danish Council, on which Christian was dependent, was averse to open hostilities, and he was constrained to gratify his hatred by fomenting the rebellions of the Swedish nobles. Charles, on his side, was unwilling to engage with his powerful neighbour in a war for which no pretext could be alleged, except the three crowns displayed in

¹ Geijer, B. ii. S. 335.

Castle of Stockholm, December 9th, 1594

² Gustavus Adolphus was born in the O. S.

the armorial bearings of both Sovereigns, the asylum given to Swedish fugitives by Christian, the contested possession of the Lap Marks, and of the island of Oesel, alike valueless to both countries. Denmark, however, was longing to extend her possessions beyond the Sound; and in April, 1611, after some correspondence between the Danish and Swedish Kings, which might not disgrace Billingsgate, Christian IV. declared war.

Charles IX. had been disabled by a stroke of palsy from any active exertions, and he committed the conduct of the war to his son Gustavus Adolphus, now in his seventeenth year. The campaign went in favour of the Danes, who took Calmar. Before the end of the year Gustavus became King of Sweden. Charles IX. died in October, 1611; and in the following December, Gustavus Adolphus, with the consent of the States, succeeded to his father's title of "King Elect of the Swedes, Goths, and Vandals." Gustavus had been well educated. He was master of several modern languages, as well as Greek and Latin; he had been early trained to business; and in the art of war, in which he was to acquire so much renown, he had the advantage of the instructions of two famous captains, Ewert Horn and the Baron de la Gardie, a French noble. In the report of a Dutch ambassador at the Court of Sweden, two or three years after the accession of Gustavus, he is described as slim and well-formed in person, of pale and rather long countenance, with light hair and pointed beard, inclining to yellow. He had the reputation of courage, combined with humanity and good temper, of prudence, vigilance, and industry; he possessed eloquence, and was amiable and affable in his intercourse with everybody; so that great expectations were entertained of him.¹ These expectations were not to be disappointed. Under Gustavus, Sweden first made its might felt and respected as a European Power; and during the brief period that he took a part in the Thirty Years' War, he was by far its most prominent figure.

Gustavus was naturally impetuous, and easily governed by his ideas; but at his accession he chose for his chancellor and minister Axel Oxenstiern; a man who, though only about ten years older

¹ *Journal der Legation ghdan.*, 1615 ende 1616, ap. Geijer, *Gesch. Schwedens*, B. iii. S. 92. When Gustavus Adolphus is described as *slim*, it was, perhaps, according to the Dutch standard, and in his youth. In after life, though never cor-

plent, he was large-limbed and bony; so that, when clothed in armour, no Swedish horse could carry him. Harte, *Gustavus Adolphus*. For his history, see also Gfrörer, *Gustav Adolph*.

than himself, was already, at the age of twenty-eight, distinguished as a cold, practical statesman, the very model of a diplomatist. By this man were the affairs of Sweden for a long period to be directed. The first step of the youthful monarch, who found himself hampered with a Russian as well as a Danish war, was to endeavour to make peace with Christian IV.; but the Danes repulsed his herald, and would not even allow Gustavus the title of King. He was therefore constrained to take the field; and in a battle with the Danes on the frozen lake of Widsjö, he nearly lost his life; the ice broke under the weight of Gustavus and his horse, and he was with difficulty rescued.¹ The war went rather in favour of Denmark; but both sides were exhausted, and in January, 1613, a peace was concluded by English mediation. It was in favour of the Danes; but Gustavus was anxious to conclude it, in order that he might take a part in the affairs of Russia. That country was now in a state of prostration. The throne was vacant and contested; four impostors, under the name of Demetrius, had successively claimed it; the Swedes had penetrated to Neva and Novgorod, the Poles to Moscow and Smolensk; the successes of the Swedes under La Gardie had inclined a large party of the Russians to choose Charles Philip, brother of Gustavus, for their Czar; but early in 1613 Michael Romanoff was elected, the founder of the present HOUSE OF ROMANOFF. The Russian war continued four or five years. Gustavus took a personal share in it, and he and La Gardie at first gained considerable advantages; but after his failure at the siege of Pleskow, the King of Sweden began to lower his demands, and in February, 1617, a peace was concluded at Stolbova, through the mediation of James I., and Gustavus acknowledged Michael Romanoff as Czar. By this peace the ground on which St. Petersburg now stands was included in the limits of Swedish territory.

After the Russian peace the war with Poland broke out afresh. In the summer of 1621 Gustavus began his campaigns against that country by the siege and capture of Riga. In the preceding year he had married Mary Eleanor, sister of George William, the new Elector of Brandenburg. He had previously visited Berlin *incognito*, to judge for himself of his future consort, and he had also proceeded to the Court of the Elector Palatine. The Polish war lasted nine years; but to detail its operations would afford neither instruction nor amusement. It was concluded in September, 1629,

¹ Geijer, B. iii. S. 86.

by the six years' truce of Altmark, by which Gustavus retained Livonia and the towns of Elbing, Braunsberg, Pillau, and Memel. He was preparing to take a part in the Thirty Years' War of Germany, to which subject and the affairs connected with it we must now revert. For that enterprise his campaigns in Russia and Poland had served to qualify him, in which he had not only acquired the experience of a general, but, at the cost of more than one serious wound, had displayed the most brilliant valour.

CHAPTER XXXII.

IN the year 1614 the struggle in Germany assumed a new aspect, through the interference in it of Denmark and France. The return of Cardinal Richelieu to power, which from this period he continued to hold till his death, gave an entirely new direction to French politics; and it will therefore be necessary briefly to resume the history of that country, as well as of Spain, which played an important part in all the events of this period.

In spite of the good understanding between the French and Spanish Courts during the administration of Luynes, the grasping policy of Spain in Italy was near producing a war between those countries. Ever since the Spaniards had become masters of the Milanese, they had not ceased to covet the Valtellina, which had been ceded to the Grison Leagues by the last of the Sforzas. It was not for its extent or fertility that they desired to possess that country, but because it would secure their communication with the Austrian dominions, as well as the command of the passes leading into the Venetian territories; for the Valtellina, a long narrow valley watered by the Adda, stretched from the Lake of Como to the S.W. frontier of Tyrol. After the breaking out of the Thirty Years' War, the possession of this valley became doubly important to facilitate the communication between Spain and Austria; and the religious grievances of the inhabitants seemed to the Spanish Court to offer a favourable opportunity for seizing it. The natives of the Valtellina, mostly Catholics, bore with impatience the sway of the Protestant Grisons, and stimulated by the Spanish Governor of Milan, they rose against their masters, seized the towns of Tirano, Toglio, and Sondrio, massacred all the Protestants they could lay hands on, and called in the Spaniards to defend them from the vengeance of the Grisons (July, 1620). The Spaniards now occupied all the strong places in the valley; and although the Grisons appealed to Bern and Zürich for help, yet they were unable to regain the revolted valley, as the Catholic Forest Cantons sided with the Valtellinese.

The French were already beginning to repent of their policy

in Germany, and of the treaty of Ulm, which had enabled Maximilian to march into Bohemia, and Spinola into the Palatinate. When it was too late, Sully's brother, M. de Béthune, one of Louis XIII.'s envoys, represented to his Court the necessity for saving the Palatinate; and Louis was obliged to content himself with making some representations to Ferdinand II. in favour of the Palatine, renewing the alliance with the Dutch provinces, and despatching Bassompierre to Madrid to require the evacuation of the Valtellina. These negotiations were interrupted by the death of Philip III., March 31st, 1621, close on the age of forty-three. His health had been some time in a declining state; but he is said at last to have fallen a victim to etiquette. The weather being cold, a brazier was brought into his council room, the fumes of which affected his head. A lord in waiting told a gentleman of the chamber to have it removed; the gentleman replied that it was the duty of the steward to do so; but before that officer arrived, the King, who had remained fixed in his seat with all the decorum of Castilian ceremony, was seized with a fever, which degenerated into the purples and carried him off.¹ Philip III., except from his station, was wholly insignificant.

The new Catholic King, Philip IV., who was close on sixteen years of age at his accession, began his reign by dismissing his father's minister, the Duke of Uzeda, and substituting for him Don Gaspar de Guzman, Count of Olivarez, who had previously been his favourite, and who continued to govern him, as Lerma had Philip III. The first measures of the new reign were peaceable. Spain, intent upon the English marriage, seemed inclined to join England in settling the affairs of the Palatinate, and to conciliate the French with regard to the Valtellina, the seizure of which had, indeed, been disapproved of by Philip III.; and a treaty for the restitution of that valley, which, however, it does not appear to have been the intention of the Spanish Court to fulfil, was signed at Madrid, April 25th, 1621.² This treaty had been mediated by the Pope, now Gregory XV. Paul V. had died in the preceding January, and Gregory (Cardinal Ludovisio) was elected February 9th. He was a native of Bologna; a small man, of placid and phlegmatic temper, and a skilful negotiator, but was governed by a brilliant nephew, Ludovico Ludovisio, a zealot for the Church.³

Louis XIII. was at this time meditating an expedition against

¹ *Mém. de Bassompierre*, t. ii. p. 228 (Petitot).

² Dumont, t. v. pt. ii. p. 395.

³ Ranke, *Popes*, vol. ii. p. 463.

La Rochelle, where the Hugonots, headed by Rohan, were in a state of revolt. Luynes, though utterly unversed in military affairs, was to conduct the enterprise, and at the moment of its commencement received the sword of Constable (April 3rd, 1621). The campaign was at first conducted with some success; but the Royal army was badly led and managed; it failed in the siege of Montauban; and the ultra-Catholic party loudly accused Luynes not only of incompetence, but even of treason. To efface this disaster, the Constable laid siege to Monheur, a little town on the Garonne, which he was sure of taking, and which surrendered December 12th; but two days after, while it was still being plundered and in flames, Luynes died of fever, regretted by nobody, not even by the King. He was not deficient in intelligence, but he had neither heart nor mind for the high station into which he had thrust himself. The favourite, but a few days before so powerful, was completely deserted at his death. Fontenay-Mareuil saw his coffin on the road for interment, on which some valets were playing at picquet, whilst their horses were feeding round about.¹

The war with the Hugonots, which we forbear to detail,² was concluded by the peace of Montpellier, October 19th, 1622. The Hugonots suffered much by this ill-advised revolt; the only strong places which they succeeded in retaining were Montauban and La Rochelle. Rohan, besides other leaders, asked the King's pardon in his camp; but he received 200,000 livres down, besides large promises, and the governments of Nîmes and Uzès. After the death of Luynes, the veteran commander Lesdiguières renounced the Calvinist faith for that of Rome, and was rewarded with the sword of Constable. In September Richelieu received from the King's own hands a Cardinal's hat, which had been procured for him through the influence of Mary de' Medici.)

The time was now approaching when that prelate, who still remained in the service of the Queen-Mother, was to assume the direction of the French counsels. The existing ministry had become exceedingly unpopular. In May, 1623, the Parliament of Paris sent a deputation to the King at Fontainebleau, to complain that mal-administration was the cause of all the misery of France. The Marquis de la Vieuville, sensible of his own incompetence, cast his eyes on Richelieu, with whose abilities he was well acquainted, and he imagined he might use them for his

¹ *Mémoires*, t. i. p. 525 (Petitot).

² It is very fully related by Bassompierre, t. ii.

own service, without intrusting him with the whole secret of affairs. Louis XIII. had a prejudice against the Cardinal, and La Vieuville thought it might be possible to make him the head of an extraordinary council for foreign affairs, without his enjoying the privilege of approaching the King's person. It was one of those schemes often formed by ordinary men for appropriating the brains of one superior to themselves; but in this case, as sometimes happens, La Vieuville had made a wrong estimate of his tool. Richelieu had no objection to be minister, but he was resolved to be prime minister. He feigned the greatest reluctance to accept place, though it had been the object of his ambition through life; he raised all sorts of difficulties and objections; he pleaded ill-health; he made his acceptance of office a favour and a condescension; and, seeing that he was indispensable, he prescribed his own terms. On the 4th of May, 1624, Richelieu, for the second time, took his seat at the council board, which he was henceforth to retain for life. He was now in his thirty-ninth year. His appearance and address were rather striking and imposing than attractive or calculated to inspire confidence. His complexion was pale, his hair black and flowing; his eyes, though large, were lively and penetrating, and their effect was heightened by strongly marked brows. His forehead was high, his nose aquiline; his well-chiselled mouth was surmounted with a moustachio, whilst a small pointed beard completed the oval of his countenance. His features wore an expression of severity; his walk, though noble, was somewhat brusque; his discourse wonderfully lucid, though without much charm or attraction.

Richelieu lost no time in casting La Vieuville, his pseudo-patron, from the ministry, whose disgrace was effected in about three months. La Vieuville's manners, as well as his policy, were unpopular. Richelieu, who soon obtained an ascendant over the King, shook his confidence in La Vieuville even while he affected to defend him; he is even thought to have had a hand in some of the numerous pamphlets which were published against that minister; and, when he thought him sufficiently shaken, he shouldered him out. On the 12th of August La Vieuville was arrested at the breaking up of the Council, and committed to the Castle of Amboise, on a charge of malversation. No further steps were taken against him, and when it was thought that he was sufficiently harmless he was suffered to escape. Richelieu's reign—for he it was who governed the destinies of France—may now

be said to have begun, although the Cardinal de la Rochefoucauld continued to be the nominal President of the Council.¹

Richelieu had formed a grand scheme of foreign policy, which may be briefly characterized as a revival of that of Henry IV. and Sully. His Spanish policy had probably never been sincere; and he is said, when quite a youth, to have submitted to the Chancellor Sillery a plan for the abasement of the House of Austria.² After his accession to the ministry, hatred and fear of Spain were visible in all his actions. The suspicion that Spain was aiming at a universal monarchy had been increased after Philip III.'s death by the addition to the Spanish arms of a globe surmounted with a cross.³ With these views, Richelieu naturally sided with the enemies of the House of Austria, and courted the Protestants of Germany, England, and Holland, although he persecuted those of France; a contradiction more glaring in the Cardinal, a high churchman, than in Henry IV. and his Hugonot minister.

Richelieu's first measures were, the renewal of the Dutch alliance; the conclusion of a treaty with England, fortified by a marriage between Charles, Prince of Wales, and Henrietta, youngest sister of Louis XIII.; and a vigorous interposition in the affair of the Valtellina. Scarcely was Richelieu seated in the ministry when a special embassy arrived from the Dutch Provinces to request help against the House of Austria; and the Cardinal, in spite of the opposition of his colleagues, concluded at Compiègne a treaty with that Republic, June 20th, 1624, by which some commercial and other advantages were secured to France.⁴ The negotiations for the English marriage had begun before Richelieu's accession to office. The romantic journey of the Prince of Wales and Buckingham to Spain early in 1623; the admiration which Charles conceived for the French Princess Henrietta on his way through Paris; the flattering reception of Baby Charles and his dog Steenie, now the two "Mr. Smiths," at the Court of Madrid; the insolence of Buckingham; his offensive gallantries towards the wife of Count Olivarez; and the final breaking off of the Spanish match, if, indeed, it had ever been seriously contemplated, the Court of Spain, are well known to

¹ It was not till November, 1629, that Richelieu was officially declared prime minister. Capéfigue, t. iv. p. 45, note.

² Aubery, *Hist. du Card. de Richelieu*, liv. v. ch. 2.

³ *Mercure Franc.* t. x. p. 94. Richelieu even opposed the King of Spain's

vainglorious assumption of titles, and instructed M. de Béthune to move the Pope not to sanction that of Emperor of the Indies. Capéfigue, *Richelieu*, t. iii. p. 324.

⁴ Dumont, t. v. pt. ii. p. 461.

all readers of English history. In the negotiations with France La Vieuville had led the English ambassadors, Lords Carlisle and Holland, to expect that no difficulty would be experienced on the score of religion; and they were therefore much surprised to find that on this head more rigid conditions were insisted on than had been required by the bigoted Court of Spain; the number of ecclesiastics who were to attend Henrietta into England was increased; and, while by the Spanish contract the children of the marriage were to be educated by their mother in the Catholic faith only till the age of ten, Richelieu prolonged the term till their thirteenth year;¹ an important clause, which incidentally paved the way for the fall of the Stuart dynasty. The marriage contracts were completed in November, 1624. Richelieu brought the Pope to grant a dispensation for the union, partly by threats and partly by the inducement of a secret engagement in favour of the English Catholics. But though Richelieu warmly advocated this marriage, and entertained the same views as the English Cabinet with regard to Germany, he was not yet prepared for open interference in the affairs of that country, but had resolved to confine himself to granting secret subsidies, and conniving at French subjects entering the service of German Protestant Princes. His policy at this moment embraced four principal objects: to incite the English to recover the Palatinate for Frederick; to help the Dutch in defending Breda against Spinola; to make an attack upon Genoa, the faithful ally of Spain; and to liberate the Valtellina, now held by the Pope in favour of the Spanish Court. By this last stroke, and by the capture of Genoa, he intended to cut off the communication between Spain and Austria; by the restoration of the Palatine he would disturb the communications between Austria and the Spanish Netherlands; and by assisting the defence of Breda he would find employment for Spinola's arms. But, what was the most difficult part of his policy, he wished to effect all these things without provoking a declaration of war on the part of Spain, and without absolutely renouncing the engagements which France had entered into with the Duke of Bavaria.

With regard to the Palatinate, it had been agreed with the English ministers that Count Mansfeld should be employed; he was to raise an army in England, and France was to advance six months' pay. Buckingham seems also to have received a pro-

¹ Aubery, *Richelieu*, liv. ii. ch. 2. Cf. Rushworth, pt. i. pp. 88 and 152; Dumont, t. v. pt. ii. p. 476.

mise that Mansfeld should be permitted to march through France with his army. Christian IV. of Denmark, who was now beginning to take a part in the affairs of Germany, was also to be subsidized. Mansfeld, when on his way into England, was received at Paris with the most marked distinction, although the King affected that he would not see him;¹ but, when, in the winter of 1624, he appeared before Calais with a fleet containing 12,000 English troops, he was refused permission to land. The Marquis of Effiat, the French ambassador, and Brienne, then employed in England about the marriage, struck with surprise and confusion at this breach of faith on the part of their government, repaired to Buckingham to explain and apologise;² and the English minister, who had been completely outwitted, having no formal agreement to appeal to, was forced to content himself with a few excuses, and some vague promises of future help. The English fleet, after some weeks had been wasted in fruitless negotiations for permission to land the troops, sailed off to Zealand, where it met with no better success; and two-thirds of the army were carried off by a contagious disorder arising from the detention.

Richelieu's Italian policy was more open and decisive, but yet coloured with such plausible pretences as might prevent Spain from having any *casus belli*. In October, 1622, the Archduke Leopold had repressed a rising of the Grisons against the treaty imposed on them, and had subdued the greater part of one of the Three Leagues. Venice and the Duke of Savoy were even more vitally interested than France in this state of things; and in February, 1623, an alliance had been concluded between these three powers in order to take the Valtellina from the House of Austria. To avert the blow, Spain had proposed to place the fortresses of the valley in the hands of the Pope, who was in fact acting in concert with that Power, till the question should be decided; and in May the Valtellina was occupied by 2,000 Pontifical troops. At the same time, however, the Austrians continued to keep their hold upon the Grisons; and La Vieuville, who then directed the counsels of France, had tamely submitted to this temporizing policy.

Shortly after this transaction Pope Gregory XV. died, July 8th, 1623; and was succeeded by Cardinal Maffeo Barberini, a Florentine, who assumed the title of Urban VIII. Barberini, then aged

¹ Le Vassor, *Hist. de Louis XIII.* t. iv. p. 666 (ed. Amst. 1702).

² Brienne, *Mémoires*, t. i. p. 392; Richelieu, *Mém.* liv. xv. and xvi.

fifty-five, was a vain man, with a great conceit of his own abilities; hence he seldom convened a Consistory; and when an argument was once advanced against him from the old Papal constitutions, he replied that the opinion of a living Pope was worth more than the maxims of a hundred dead ones. He wished to be regarded as a temporal Prince; he was more addicted to profane than spiritual learning; he studied fortification, read the newest poems; nay, professed to be himself a disciple of the Muses, and turned some of the Psalms into Horatian metre! It was this Pope who made Cività Vecchia a free port; and the consequence was that the Barbary corsairs sold there the plunder of the Christians.¹

Such was the man with whom Richelieu had to deal respecting the Valtellina. He determined to call on Venice and Savoy to act on the treaty of 1623. The Archbishop of Lyon, the French ambassador at Rome, was instructed to insist on the evacuation of the Valtellina by the Papal troops; and when that prelate, thinking Richelieu a novice, pointed out in a long letter the crooked and dilatory policy which it was necessary to pursue at that Court, the Cardinal laconically answered, "The King will no longer be amused; tell the Pope that he will see an army in the Valtellina." And lest the ambassador, who was aspiring to the cardinalate, should play false, M. de Béthune, a Calvinist, was sent to supersede him.² For the attack on Genoa, which would not only engage the attention of the Spanish troops in the Milanese, but also stop the supplies of money furnished to Spain by that Republic,³ France pleaded that she was bound to assist her ancient ally, the Duke of Savoy, in his quarrel with Genoa respecting the fief of Zucarello; but though Richelieu asserted, and pretends in his Memoirs, that this was a lawful cause of war, Girolamo Priuli, the Venetian ambassador, at a conference at Susa, rejected the scheme with indignation, as both unjust and impolitic.⁴ Richelieu, however, steadily pursued the plans he had formed for the liberation of the Valtellina, in justification of which the alliance with the Grisons was also appealed to; and it was alleged that France, in helping them against their rebellious subjects, afforded neither Spain nor any other power a reasonable cause of offence. An attack upon the Papal troops did not inspire the Cardinal with any scruples: it was as often his method to plead the reason of

¹ Ranke, *Popes*, vol. ii. p. 556.

² Anquetil, *Intrigue du Cabinet*, t. ii. p. 201.

³ The Genoese acted as the bankers of

Spain, for which they were always in advance. *Mercurie Franç.* t. x. p. 24.

⁴ Sismondi, t. xv. p. 476.

state with the Pontiff, as to weigh the respect and forbearance due to the Holy See. Already in June, 1624, the Marquis of Cœuvres had been sent into Switzerland, and succeeded in arming the Calvinist Cantons in favour of the Grisons. The ambassadorial functions of Cœuvres were suddenly converted into those of a general; 4,000 Swiss and Grisons were joined by 3,000 French infantry and 500 horse; in November he received from M. de Béthune at Rome the concerted signal, entered the Valtellina, and soon drove out the Papal troops; whose captured standards were returned with marks of great respect to the Pontiff. Loud was the outcry, not only at Rome and Madrid, but even amongst the ultra-Catholics in France, against the "State Cardinal." The Pope, however, who feared Richelieu as much as he hated him, was less noisy than his partisans; and, instead of the censures with which the Cardinal had been threatened, it was precisely at this time that the dispensation arrived for the English marriage. Urban had received a hint that if it were not forwarded it would be itself dispensed with.

The expedition against Genoa was interrupted by a Hugonot insurrection. The French government had not faithfully fulfilled the treaty of Montpellier. Fort Louis, near La Rochelle, instead of being demolished had been strengthened; Rohan, yielding to the impulse of the inhabitants, made advances to the Spanish ambassador, and a monstrous agreement was effected, by which the Hugonots received the money of Spain, just as France helped the Dutch.¹ In January, 1625, Rohan's brother, Soubise, seized the Isle of Ré, and, surprising the French fleet in the roads of Blavet in Brittany, carried off four vessels. The revolt gradually spread into Upper Languedoc, Quercy, and the Cévennes. Nevertheless the old Constable Lesdiguières, and Duke Charles Emmanuel, invaded Liguria in March with 28,000 men, and most of the places in it were captured. Lesdiguières, however, declined to attempt Genoa itself without the assistance of a fleet; the ships furnished according to treaty by the Dutch being required against the French rebels. It is probable that the Constable acted according to secret instructions from Richelieu, who wished not to see Genoa fall into the hands of the Duke of Savoy, and was only intent on diverting the Spaniards from the Valtellina.² An Austrian army passing through the Swiss Catholic Cantons

¹ Ranke, *Französische Gesch.* B. ii. S. 285.

² See a Letter from Marshal Créqui to

Louis XIII., quoted by Le Jay, *Hist. du Ministère du Cardinal de Richelieu*, t. i. p. 54, note.

and over the St. Gothard, compelled the French and Piedmontese to evacuate Liguria, and even assumed the offensive against Piedmont and the Valtellina; which, however, with the exception of Riva, the French succeeded in retaining.

It was in the midst of these affairs that the marriage of Charles and Henrietta was completed. The unexpected death of James I. after a short illness, March 27th, 1625, compelled the royal bridegroom to celebrate his nuptials by proxy; which were solemnized, May 11th, by the Cardinal de la Rochefoucauld, on a scaffold erected before the western portal of Notre-Dame, with the same ceremonies as had been observed at the marriage of Henry IV. and Margaret of Valois. The English King was represented by the Duke of Chevreuse. Buckingham afterwards arrived in Paris for the purpose of escorting Queen Henrietta-Maria into England; when that handsome, vain, and insolent favourite inspired many with astonishment and admiration at his magnificence, a few with disgust and aversion at his presumption.¹ Buckingham had given offence in Spain by making love to the wife of the prime minister; in France he was presumptuous enough to address the Queen herself. Anne of Austria, now twenty-four years of age, was tall and well-shaped, with an air at once majestic and engaging. Her eyes were full and soft; her nose rather too large perhaps for perfect beauty; her mouth small and ruby, with just enough of the Austrian feature to give it additional charms. Her bright chestnut hair fell in luxuriant tresses. But her distinguishing attraction was the dazzling whiteness of her skin; more remarkable, however, in her neck and hands than in her face; as she never wore a mask, as was the custom in those days, to preserve her complexion. She had little of the gravity of a Spanish education, and what she had brought with her had not been increased by the manners of the French Court, then abounding with coquettes, among whom the handsome and intriguing Duchess of Chevreuse shone conspicuous. All Anne's charms, however, had made but little impression on the cold and apathetic Louis, who did not live with her like a husband. The dominant passions of that King, after the chase, seem to have been an inordinate penchant for gingerbread, and an almost morbid aversion to red hair.

Louis XIII., his brother, the Queen-Mother, and Queen Anne accompanied Henrietta some way on her road to England. The

¹ They who are curious in such matters may see in the *Mémoires d'un Favori*, by Bois d'Annemets, an account of the impression Buckingham produced, and a

description of one, and that apparently not the most splendid, of the twenty-seven suits which he took with him. (*Archives Cur.*, t. iii. p. 293, 2^e sér.)

King went no further than Compiègne; and at Amiens the three Queens were detained some days by the illness of Mary de' Medici. It was here that Buckingham carried his audacity to extremes. As the town afforded but little accommodation, the three Queens lodged in separate houses. To that of Anne of Austria was attached a large garden, skirting the Somme, where the Court was accustomed to promenade. One fine evening, Anne of Austria, who was fond of prolonging her walks till a late hour, was strolling in this garden attended by Buckingham, whilst the handsome but effeminate Lord Holland gave his arm to the Duchess of Chevreuse. The turning of an alley having suddenly separated the Queen and her cavalier from the rest of the party, Buckingham, emboldened by the shades of evening, seized the opportunity to make advances incompatible with the honour of Louis XIII. The Queen shrieked, her equerry arrived and arrested the Duke, but was discreet enough to let him depart; and the rest of the company coming up, it was agreed to keep the affair as secret as possible. The English ships being detained at Boulogne by rough weather, Buckingham and Lord Holland returned to Amiens, where Anne of Austria still lingered; and, in spite of the insult she had received, admitted Buckingham to an interview in her bedchamber, though in the presence of one of her ladies.¹

The English alliance was useful to France in the Hugonot rebellion. The Cardinal, relying on the warmth of a new connection, succeeded in obtaining the loan of some English vessels, but without their crews; for the English² sailors, almost to a man, refused to serve against the Hugonots, and it was not deemed expedient to treat them like the Dutch, on board of each of whose vessels the Cardinal insisted on putting a hundred French soldiers, in order to prevent any treachery on the part of the sailors. Soubise was now attacked in the Isle of Ré; and on the

¹ It has been said by some writers that Richelieu was also an admirer of Anne of Austria, and that he was jealous of Buckingham's reception; but there seems to be no adequate foundation for these statements. The Cardinal, however, was addicted to gallantry, and is said to have been one of the very numerous lovers of the celebrated Marion de l'Orme, as well as of Mademoiselle de Fruges, a cast mistress of Buckingham's. When engaged in these intrigues, the Cardinal used to exchange his ecclesiastical dress for that of a cavalier, with a mask and green breeches. See De Retz, t. i. p. 11 sq. (ed. Amst. 1731);

Le Vassor, *Louis XIII.* t. v. p. 168 sq.

² M. Martin, indeed, asserts the contrary: "Les huit vaisseaux, promis par Jacques 1^{er}, avaient enfin été envoyés par son successeur et garnis de soldats Français, au grand dépit du peuple et surtout des matelots Anglais. . . . Les marins Anglais de la flotte royale ne manœuvrèrent que l'épée sur la gorge," &c.—*Hist. de France*, t. xi. p. 220 sq. But this statement is totally unfounded. The only Englishman who consented to serve was a gunner. See the Article, proffered against Buckingham in Rushworth's *Collections*, pt. i. p. 332.

15th of September, 1625, he was completely defeated; on shore by Toiras, at sea by Montmorenci. Soubise succeeded in escaping to England with two or three ships which he had saved; and his cause was so popular in that country that the government could not refuse him shelter. Here he employed himself in making interest with the parliamentary leaders; and Buckingham, to whom the loan of the English vessels was imputed as a crime, found himself compelled to demand them back.

The misunderstanding between the two Courts had been increased by complaints of ill treatment made by Queen Henrietta and her attendants; whose grievances had begun before they landed on the shores of England. As a mark of respect, some of the largest vessels in the English navy had been sent to Boulogne to convey the Queen and her suite to Dover; and the French officers complained that they had been compelled to embark and disembark in boats! When the Queen had landed at Dover, June 24th, 1625, she was lodged in the Castle, which was said to be badly furnished; and when Charles visited her on the following day, he came ill attended, and without a shadow of the grandeur which distinguished the King of France. The Catholic priests were put under arrest on the evening of their arrival, and were released only at the Queen's earnest entreaty. On the journey to London Henrietta was separated from her ladies; and could at last obtain a place for one of them in her carriage only through the intercession of the French ambassador. The reception in London was equally sombre and disagreeable. The state-bed was one of Queen Elizabeth's, so antique that the oldest person could not remember one of such a fashion. That many of these grievances were imaginary and exaggerated appears from the testimony of Brienne, who accompanied Henrietta to England. Dover Castle, he says, had been fitted up with the royal furniture, and a magnificent supper was given there. He mentions not the imprisonment of the Catholic priests; and though he relates that some English ladies were put into the Queen's carriage, he is silent about her tears. This, indeed, was only a usual practice at all Courts, and the French themselves had pursued the same course with Anne of Austria. If Henrietta was received with less than-usual state at London, it was because the plague had broken out in that capital.¹ These real or imaginary affronts Henrietta

¹ See Brienne, *Mémoires*, t. i. p. 407 sqq. Compare Charles I.'s account of these matters in his Instructions to Sir D. Carlton (Harris, *Lives of the Stuarts*,

vol. ii. p. 24). It is painful to read this detail of his matrimonial squabbles, drawn up with his own hand.

resented by a pouting sullen behaviour, highly offensive to the King, and which drew upon her disagreeable remonstrances from Buckingham.

Some more tangible grievances threatened to produce an open rupture between the French and English Courts. Buckingham, to conciliate the Parliament, then sitting at Oxford, neglected to observe the engagements he had secretly entered into with the French cabinet in favour of the English Catholics; and he offered to dismiss all the Queen's French attendants. But the Parliament was of opinion that the promises made to the French King should be observed; and that the authors of them should be punished if they contained anything contrary to the laws. Blainville, who had come to London on an extraordinary embassy respecting these matters, was treated with studied indignity. Buckingham, besides refusing to restore the ships which Soubise had carried into Portsmouth, and which Richelieu charged him with having stolen, went to the Hague, and, without consulting the French ambassador, concluded a treaty with the Dutch and with Denmark. While in Holland he expressed a wish to go into France; but the French ambassador having refused him a passport till he should have given Louis XIII. some satisfaction, Buckingham, out of revenge, induced the Dutch to recall their ships. The English fleet, returning from an unsuccessful expedition to Cadiz, fell in with and captured several French vessels, on the ground of their having Spanish goods on board; and the ships were carried into English ports and sold under the very eyes of Blainville. Reprisals were in consequence made on English ships in French harbours.¹ Richelieu, however, had no wish to break with England; he rightly attributed the conduct of the English Court to Buckingham's humours and caprices; to his desire to make the Queen renounce her faith, in order that he might acquire with the Parliament the reputation of a zealous Protestant; as well as to his wish to foment an ill understanding between Henrietta and Charles, and thus prevent her acquiring too much influence over her husband.² Richelieu therefore determined to conciliate the capricious, but all-powerful Buckingham. Bautrec, a man of wit and talent, was despatched into England; the Duke was assured that he would be very well received in France; the refusal of his passports in Holland was explained to be quite a mistake; above all it was repre-

¹ *Mercur. Franç.* t. xi. p. 1052; t. xii. p. 259.

² Richelieu. *Mémoires*, liv. xvi. : cf.

Clarendon, *Rebellion*, vol 1; *Mémoires Franç.* t. xii. p. 260.

sented that the Duchess of Chevreuse, with whom Buckingham was supposed to have an intrigue, and with whom and her husband he had kept up a correspondente, which Richelieu denounced to Louis as traitorous, would be obliged to quit the Court if matters did not mend. Bautrec completely succeeded in his mission, and brought back with him to Paris, as extraordinary ambassadors, Lord Holland and Sir Dudley Carlton. This turn of affairs very much helped the Cardinal in making a peace with the Hugonots; which, though reprobated by the high Catholic party in France, and by the Pope's Nuncio Cardinal Spada, was necessary to Richelieu's foreign policy. To Spada he observed: "I know that I am regarded as a heretic at Rome; but ere long the Pope will canonize me as a saint."¹ Richelieu had already conceived the plan of destroying La Rochelle, but it was not yet ripe for execution; and with that extraordinary talent he possessed for making everybody serve his purposes, he effected a peace with the Hugonots chiefly by means of the English ambassadors.² A treaty was signed at Paris February 5th, 1626, under the tacit guarantee of England, by which the Hugonots were left in much the same condition as at the beginning of the war.

The English expedition against Cadiz, just mentioned, was undertaken in consequence of the breach with Spain in regard to the marriage treaty. Buckingham, before he quitted Madrid in 1623, insulted Olivarez with threats of vengeance, which that minister heard with the greatest composure; and accordingly, in 1625, a fleet and army were despatched, under Viscount Wimbledon, to take Cadiz; but Wimbledon lost so much time in fortifying Puntal, that the Spaniards found an opportunity to throw reinforcements into Cadiz, which saved the place. The quarrels of Charles I. with his Parliament, and the difficulty he experienced in obtaining supplies, were not calculated to render him a very formidable opponent in any foreign war; and he, in common with the other allies of France, was, soon after this expedition, astonished and discouraged by an unexpected peace between that country and Spain.

After the French successes in the Valtellina, Urban VIII. had despatched his nephew, Cardinal Barberini, as Legate to Paris, where he arrived May 21st, 1625, and was received with the

¹ Fontenai-Mareuil, t. ii. p. 29.

² It appeared from an intercepted letter from Rohan to Soubise, that the Hugonots were chiefly induced to submit by

a threat of the English ambassadors to abandon them if they declined. Richelieu, *Mémoires*, liv. xvii.

magnificence due to his quality. Barberini was authorized by the Spanish cabinet, as well as by the Pope, to treat for peace, with which view he made the following propositions: a suspension of arms; satisfaction to the Pope for what had occurred in the Valtellina; and security for the maintenance of the Catholic religion in that valley, by preventing its restoration to the Grisons. The negotiations went off, chiefly on the third condition; yet Richelieu, as we have already remarked, was very unwilling to embark in an open war with Spain. The more zealous French Catholics were scandalized at his policy in attacking the troops of the Pope, in marrying the King's sister to a Protestant King, in summoning the hordes of Scandinavia to restore a heretic Prince in the Palatinate; and this sentiment was so strong among the sovereign courts and municipal bodies, as to cause the Cardinal to fear that he might soon have to struggle with another Catholic League, as well as with the Hugonots. It was chiefly to relieve himself of his fears and responsibility, that, after the departure of the Legate Barberini, Richelieu advised the King to summon an Assembly of Notables at Fontainebleau. In this assembly Richelieu spoke in favour of peace, but of such a peace as might be concluded on honourable and advantageous conditions; and he was supported by a great majority, although the Cardinal de Sourdis was for an immediate suspension of arms. Spain appeared to have become more moderate; especially as in the winter Marshal Bassompierre succeeded in obtaining a fresh declaration of the Swiss Diet in favour of the Grisons; and after the departure of Barberini, the Spanish Court renewed the negotiations through the Marquis of Mirabel, their ambassador at Paris, and also made advances to Count du Fargis, the French ambassador at Madrid. Richelieu's instructions to Du Fargis had been purposely vague; and that minister, hearing that the Pope was about to send 6,000 men into the Valtellina, had somewhat precipitately signed a treaty with Spain, January 1st, 1626. Most of the conditions desired by France had been obtained; yet Richelieu disavowed the treaty, founding his objections chiefly on matters of form; though his real motive was probably his fear that the allies of France would get scent of it before his arrangements with the Hugonots were completed. At all events, soon after the peace with the insurgents, Du Fargis concluded a fresh treaty with Olivarez at Monçon, in Aragon, March 5th; which, though Richelieu again pretended to be very angry at it, was, with a few amendments, ratified at Barcelona a

month afterwards.¹ The principal articles of the treaty of Monçon were: that the affairs of the Grisons and the Valtellinese should be replaced in the same state as they were in at the beginning of 1617; that no other religion but the Roman Catholic should be tolerated in the valley; that the Valtellinese should have the right of electing their magistrates, subject, however, to the approval of the Grisons; that the forts in the Valtellina, as well as in the bailiwick of Bormio and district of Chiavenna, should be razed by the Pope; and, in consideration of the privileges granted to them, the Valtellinese were to pay to the Grisons such an annual sum as might be agreed on.²

The news of this treaty was received with equal surprise and indignation at London, Venice, Turin, and among the Grisons. The allies of France had all been duped; and, besides the general insult of making none of them a party to the treaty, each found in it some particular cause of complaint. The rights and interests of the Grisons had been bartered away without their consent; the Swiss were offended at the part they had been made to play in the affair, to the detriment of their confederates; the Venetians thought themselves wronged by the demolition of the forts, which they deemed necessary to secure their right of way; the Duke of Savoy saw all the hopes cut off for which he had entered into the war, and himself insulted to boot by a pretended commission to his son, the Prince of Piedmont, to be the Lieutenant-General of Louis in Italy at the very time of the conclusion of the treaty. The Dutch and the English, and especially the latter, had no less reason to complain. France had amused them with a pretended league, merely for the purpose of procuring better terms from the Hugonots and from Spain; and the English ambassadors had actually been made the tools for arranging a peace with the former.

Richelieu evidently chuckles in relating these tricks, though affecting the greatest candour and pretending to throw all the blame on the precipitation of Du Fargis.³ His next task was to pacify his angry allies, in which he perfectly succeeded. The Duke of Savoy was flattered with the prospect of obtaining the title of King through the influence of France; the Grisons and Venetians were mollified with compliments and excuses; the English ambassadors were assured that France, whose hands were

¹ Richelieu even pretends to express his dissatisfaction at it in his *Testament Politique*, ch. i.

² Dumont, t. v. pt. ii. p. 487. The sum agreed on was 25,000 crowns.

³ *Mémoires*, liv. xvii.

now free, would act with more vigour than ever in the affair of the Palatinate, and that a French army of 11,000 or 12,000 men should join the English forces on the Rhine. At the same time the Cardinal dropped all complaints about Queen Henrietta and the marriage treaty. Thus Richelieu gained his point, but at some cost to his reputation. All Europe began to regard him as a slippery politician whom no engagements could bind; and the indignation which brooded in the hearts of those whom he had deceived only awaited a favourable opportunity to display itself.¹

These events were followed by a conspiracy against Richelieu, which we can only briefly notice, as having little reference to the general history of Europe. The ostensible object of the plot was to prevent a marriage which had been arranged between Gaston, Duke of Anjou, the King's brother, commonly called Monsieur, and Mademoiselle de Montpensier; but it included the murder of Richelieu, and probably the deposition of Louis XIII., and a marriage between Gaston and Anne of Austria. The principal leaders of this conspiracy were the Marshal d'Ornano, who had been Gaston's governor, the Duke of Vendôme and his brother the Grand-Prior, the Dukes of Longueville and Epernon, and several more of the malcontent nobles. Even Anne of Austria took part in it. The plot was frustrated by the coolness and vigilance of Richelieu; who succeeded in completely overawing Gaston, and compelling him to perform the marriage (August 6th, 1626); after which he assumed the title of Duke of Orleans, which had belonged to his elder brother, dead some years ago. The King also distinguished himself by the slyness with which he personally effected the arrests of Ornano and Vendôme, as he had formerly done in the case of Condé. Such an employment had something very captivating for the mind of Louis XIII. It had in it something analogous to his field sports, and afforded the same sort of excitement that he felt in capturing his game. Indeed, he had himself become a King as it were by stratagem. Nothing could exceed the cool and imperturbable dissimulation with which he watched for the favourable moment, and secured his unsuspecting victim.

Richelieu thus triumphed over his domestic enemies, as he had over the enemies, or rather the allies, of France. Yet even this consummate politician had his weak point. The strong-willed

¹ M. Martin (*Hist. de France*, t. xi. p. 229, note) has undertaken against Sismondi the defence of Richelieu in this matter. The gist of his argument is that

the Cardinal's conduct was justified by the manners of the period, and that he was no worse than his brother diplomats.

and sagacious minister was a believer in judicial astrology; and it is said that he did not decide upon Gaston's marriage till he had caused that Prince's horoscope to be drawn.¹ Of the conspirators, one, the Count of Chalais, was beheaded, others were imprisoned, some were pardoned. Ornano died in confinement, September 2nd, and thus escaped a trial. Anne of Austria herself was summoned before her offended consort in full council, when, with a bitter smile, Louis reproached her with wanting another husband. Anne never forgot nor forgave this disagreeable scene, which she imputed entirely to the contrivance of Richelieu.²

The most important result of this conspiracy was, that it enabled Richelieu to make some salutary reforms. During the investigations respecting it the Court had proceeded to Nantes, and while he was at that city Louis published two important edicts. By one of these the office of Admiral of Brittany, which had been held by the Duke of Vendôme, as Governor of that province, was suppressed; by the other, it was ordered that all castles, fortresses, and strong places throughout the Kingdom, not on the frontiers, or otherwise necessary to its defence, should be razed (July 31st, 1626). This last measure, part of Richelieu's plan to weaken the nobility, was hailed with joy throughout France. It was the last blow dealt to anarchy and feudal tyranny. In carrying it out, all useless devastation was avoided. Everything capable of resisting cannon was demolished; but the old town walls of the middle ages, as well as the donjons of the nobles, were preserved. A little after, the two great offices of Constable and Admiral of France were suppressed; the Duke of Lesdiguières, the last Constable, having died in September, 1626, no fresh appointment was made. In the following month the Duke of Montmorenci was bought out of the Admiralty; when Richelieu, without the title or office of Admiral, was appointed head and general superintendent of the French marine, navigation, and commerce.³ Buckingham laughed at the Cardinal's assumption of this post, and called him "a freshwater Admiral;"⁴ but Richelieu was soon to show that he was competent not only to the commercial, but also to the military cares which it involved. He endeavoured to direct the national genius of France to coloniza-

¹ *Vie du Père Josef* in the *Archives Curieuses* (t. iv. p. 191, 2^{de} sér.). Richelieu's belief in astrology peeps out in too many places of his writings to render the story improbable.

² *Mém. de Mad. de Motteville* (Petitot, t. xxxvi. p. 353); Richelieu, *Mém.* liv. xvii.

³ *Mercuré Franç.* t. xiii. p. 359.

⁴ *Montglat*; t. i. p. 41.

tion and commerce, in emulation of Spain, England, and Holland ; and he planned the creation of a formidable navy to protect the trade, which he intended to call into existence. The Company of Morbihan, to trade with the two Indies, was established, and it is no fault of Richelieu's if these projects did not meet with the success which he anticipated.

While these things were going on in France, the aspect of affairs between the French and English Courts was daily growing more threatening. After the peace of Monçon, the English ambassadors quitted Paris ; and upon their arrival in London, Blainville also departed for France. The misunderstanding between Charles I. and his Queen, fomented by the bigoted and intriguing priests by whom she was surrounded, as well as by Buckingham's ill humour with the French Court, grew daily worse. Henrietta was accused of making a procession with her priests to Tyburn, where, in the early time of the Reformation, some Catholics had suffered martyrdom, but which was now the place of execution for common malefactors, and of there offering up her prayers for the souls of the martyrs ; and it was resolved to punish an act which seemed not only degrading to her Majesty, but also an open and deliberate insult to the English nation, by the dismissal of those who had counselled it ; and accordingly, in spite of the Queen's tears and entreaties, not only were her priests, but even her French domestics, sent back into France. The meddling and offensive behaviour of the French priests and others who had accompanied Queen Henrietta, and especially of the Sieur de Bérulle and the Bishop of Mende, is admitted by Richelieu himself, as well as by Bassompierre, who was sent as special ambassador to London on the occasion of this quarrel ;¹ and as France was not then in a condition to cope with England on the sea, the Cardinal was willing to compromise the matter by a transaction. After some negotiation, it was arranged that the Queen should be allowed to have twelve priests, besides a bishop for her almoner ; and to select some French officers for her service, as well as two French ladies and two French maids for her chamber. The Cardinal, however, was but ill content with this treaty, especially as the English continued to seize French vessels under the very nose of Bassompierre ; and though Richelieu was not in a condition to declare open war, he secretly joined Spain in an enterprise which Philip IV. and his ministers were contemplating against England.

¹ Richelieu, *Mémoires*, liv. xx. (Petitot, t. xxv. pp 63 and 75) ; Bassompierre, *Mém.* t. iii. p. 87 sqq.

In the spring of 1627 a treaty was concluded between France and Spain, by which Richelieu agreed to contribute ten ships to be employed in any descent upon Great Britain which might be attempted before June, 1628. But this treaty had no result. England took the initiative by interdicting all commerce with France (April 28th, 1627); and during three months the English harbours resounded with the din of hostile preparation. The destination of the English fleet was not known, but was suspected to be La Rochelle. Soubise and a French abbé, a creature of the Duke of Orleans, were in England inciting the Court to succour and protect the Hugonots;¹ an agent had been despatched to the Duke of Rohan, to engage him to raise that party in the south of France; and Montague had been sent to the Duke of Lorraine and Duke of Savoy, whose discontent, it was thought, might incite them to take up arms against France.

Towards the end of June Buckingham left Portsmouth with a fleet of eighty vessels, ten of which belonged to the royal navy, having on board an army of 6,000 or 7,000 men; and on the 20th of July he cast anchor off the Isle of Ré, which lies at the mouth of the inlet, or channel, leading up to La Rochelle. On the following day he published a manifesto detailing the grounds for this invasion: the principal of which were, the neglect of the French government to raze the fort of St. Louis, which, by the treaty of Montpellier, they had agreed to do; and their having constructed new forts in the Isle of Ré to overawe the Rochellois in contravention of a treaty which England had guaranteed.²

Richelieu's answer to this manifesto must be allowed, on the face of it, to be successful. He showed that the English Court, so far from having publicly manifested any sympathy for the Hugonots, had not even mentioned them in the marriage treaty, although France had stipulated for the relief of the English Catholics;³ and he triumphantly alluded to the fact, that Louis XIII. had employed the vessels of England against the Hugonots with the entire consent of the English Court. He denied that England had intervened in the treaty which the King of France had compelled his rebellious subjects to accept; and it must be admitted that such intervention had not been recognized in any public manner; though it cannot be doubted that Sir D. Carlton

¹ Rushworth's *Collections*, pt. 2, p. 423 sq.

² *Mercure Franç.* t. xiii. p. 803 sqq.

³ In a secret article signed by James I. See the answer put in by the French

Court during Bassompierre's negotiations, in the *Mercure Franç.* t. xiii. It is remarkable for vigour of language, and was probably from the pen of Richelieu himself.

and Lord Holland had been very instrumental in bringing about the peace, and had led the Rochellois to suppose that England was to guarantee it. This seems to have been the public impression even in France;¹ though it would appear that the only foundation for the supposed guarantee was some words addressed by the French chancellor, to the Hugonot deputies when they were suing for peace: the meaning assigned to which words Richelieu disavowed. It is certain that the name of England appears not in the treaty; and Richelieu even asserts, in his answer to Buckingham's manifesto, that, to prevent any pretence of interference on the part of England, the English ambassadors were repeatedly told that, though their good offices with the Hugonots would be accepted, their intervention could not be allowed.² The other main prop of Buckingham's manifesto, the non-demolition of Fort Louis, also breaks down; for though its destruction had been agreed upon by the peace of Montpellier, yet its maintenance had been expressly stipulated by the subsequent treaty of 1626. The general charge of an ultimate intention to reduce La Rochelle, the Cardinal affected not to deny; and he met it with the allegation that the French King had a right to make himself master of one of his own towns; and that if he intended to attack La Rochelle, it was no business of the English.

Thus Buckingham was completely outwitted by the noble Cardinal; though it cannot be denied that, at bottom, he had some very just grounds of complaint. He was in the situation of a dupe who has been overreached, yet is without the means of proving his case; and the consciousness of this made him all the more angry. To his failure as a diplomatist he was now to add an equally signal one as a general. No sooner had the fleet anchored than Buckingham despatched Sir William Boucher, his secretary, accompanied by Soubise, to La Rochelle, to incite the inhabitants to arms; who replied, that they must first consult with the rest of their party. Buckingham, nevertheless, on the evening of the 22nd July, proceeded to land his troops at the Point of Samblanceau, which operation, being covered by the guns of the fleet at point-blank range, was effected without much loss. But he now committed some fatal mistakes. Instead of at once seizing the fort of St. Martin, he lost four days in reconnoitring the country; and when he at length marched against that place, which had meanwhile been provisioned, he left the fort of La Prée behind him, by means of which succours were

¹ *Mém. de Brienne*, t. i. p. 423.

² *Mercuré Franç.* t. xiii. p. 825.

thrown into the island. These Richelieu provided by extraordinary exertions, advancing large sums from his own funds, and even pledging his plate and jewels; and he personally hastened the march of his troops. It is unnecessary to pursue all the details of this paltry and inglorious campaign. Suffice it to say that, after Buckingham had thrown away his advantages and his time, Marshal Schomberg succeeded in landing a large French force in Ré in the night of November 1st. Buckingham found himself compelled to raise the siege of St. Martin, November 5th, after a general assault, which was repulsed; and the English were followed in their retreat to the ships by the French, who inflicted on them considerable loss. Every horse in the English army was captured, including that of Buckingham; besides forty-six colours and arms for 3,000 men. The troops, however, were safely embarked, and, after waiting for a wind, the fleet sailed for England, November 17th.

This unfortunate expedition was the immediate cause of the fall of La Rochelle. Richelieu had brought the King, with the French army, into Poitou; and no sooner had the English evacuated Ré, than he urged Louis vigorously to prosecute the siege of La Rochelle. The inhabitants of that place, as we have said, had not at first joined Buckingham, and on the 10th of August they even admitted into the town some of the royal troops, sent principally to ascertain the state of the fortifications. But on the 20th the Duke of Angoulême having begun to construct a fort within a quarter of a league of the city, the Rochellois opened fire on his troops, and followed up this step by a declaration of war. In October Louis took up his head-quarters at Estré, a village not far from La Rochelle. Little could be done while the English held possession of Ré; but no sooner were they gone than Richelieu resolved to execute that scheme for the reduction of the Hugonot stronghold which he had brooded over so many years. We shall not minutely enter into the details of the siege, though it displays in the strongest light both the moral courage and the military talents of the great Cardinal. The dike across the inlet; by which all succour from the sea was cut off, and the Rochellois thus finally reduced through hunger, was planned by Richelieu, and built under his inspection. Indeed the whole glory of the enterprise belongs to the Cardinal; for Louis XIII., wearied with the tedium of a blockade, which afforded little excitement, left the army in February (1628) to hunt at Versailles, appointing Richelieu Lieutenant-General of

all his forces in Poitou, Saintonge, Angoumois and Aunis;¹ and Angoulême, Schomberg, Bassompierre and the other captains were enjoined to obey him as they would the King himself. Richelieu had all the qualities of a great general, and, had not his genius been diverted into another channel, it may be safely affirmed that he would have become a renowned commander instead of a consummate minister and statesman. The fall of La Rochelle, hermetically sealed both on the sea and land side, was of course only a question of time. The inhabitants held out to the last extremity, animated by the exhortations and examples of Jean Guiton, their mayor; who, throwing a poignard on the table of the chamber in which the town-council assembled, obtained leave

to thrust it into the bosom of the first man who talked of surrender.² After an unaccountable delay, an English fleet, under command of the Earl of Denbigh, at length appeared, and attempted the relief of La Rochelle (May 11th); but on reconnoitring the dike, and finding it impregnable, Denbigh got a certificate to that effect from some captains belonging to La Rochelle, who were on board his fleet; and after cannonading at a distance the French vessels in the inlet, he sailed home. Still the town held out in expectation of fresh aid from England, and in spite of some insurrections of the starving citizens. The English succours were delayed by the assassination of Buckingham at Portsmouth (August 23rd). This event delivered Richelieu from an adversary whom he at once feared and despised. "The King," he observes, "could not have lost a more rancorous nor a more foolish enemy. The enterprises which he undertook without reason were executed without success; yet they put us in great peril and did us much harm; the folly and madness of a foe being more dangerous than his wisdom. For, as the fool acts on no principle common to the rest of mankind, reason loses her art of fence, and thus one is never secure. He will attempt everything, even though it be contrary to his own interest, and is arrested only by the impossibility of executing his designs."³

On the 28th of September the English fleet, under command of the Earl of Lindsey, was again despatched from Ré. But the chance of success against the dike was still less than before. It was now completely finished, and strengthened by many additional works. On the 3rd of October the English fleet made an attempt to force the passage, and delivered many broadsides

¹ *Mercure Franç.* t. xiv. p. 154.

² *Le Vassor*, t. v. p. 690 sq.

³ *Mémoires*, liv. xix. (Fetivet, t. xxiv. p. 163; cf. t. xxiii. p. 183).

against the dike, as close as they could come ; but they were soon compelled to retire by the ebbing tide, which on those coasts falls a great many feet. On the following day the attempt was renewed with the same result ; nor did some fire-ships, launched by the English, do any harm. The case seemed hopeless ; the English vessels drew too much water to come sufficiently near to deliver an effective fire, and after another general attack on the 22nd of October, the enterprise was abandoned. On the following day a deputation of the starving inhabitants of La Rochelle repaired to the Cardinal to treat for a surrender, which they were obliged to accept on his terms ; and on the 30th the royal forces took possession of the town. Rushworth states that out of a population of 15,000 persons, only 4,000 remained alive, so great had been the famine ;¹ but this account is probably exaggerated. Louis XIII., who had returned some months before to the siege, and who had pointed the cannon and exposed his life before the walls—for he inherited at least the courage of his father—entered the town on horseback and fully armed, November 1st. On the following Sunday a solemn *Te Deum* was sung. On the Saturday, the King, who was a great lover of sacred music, sat up till midnight, arranging and rehearsing the chanting and musical accompaniments ; and he himself led off the melody.²

The fall of La Rochelle, as consummating the subjection of the Hugonot party, and thus strengthening the hands of the French King, was an occurrence sufficiently important to rouse the hopes or fears of the various European States, according to their interest or politics. At Rome the event was celebrated by a *Te Deum* in the church of St. Louis, and gave occasion to Urban VIII. to exercise his poetical skill by composing some odes in honour of the French King. Richelieu's brother, now Archbishop of Lyon, was made a Cardinal, contrary to the constitution of Julius III. forbidding that dignity to be conferred on two brothers. But, in spite of the favour of the Holy See, Richelieu used his victory with moderation. In his answer to Buckingham's manifesto, he had declared with a liberality in advance of the age, and which was not observed in the next reign, that the time of religious martyrdom was past, and that Louis XIII. waged war, not with liberty of conscience, but with political rebellion. These principles he adhered to after his success ; and though, as an insurgent

¹ *Collections*, pt. i. p. 636.

² A contemporary writer compares him to King David, "citharam percutientem

coram arca Dei." *Mémoires Franç.* t. xiv. p. 619.

city, La Rochelle was deprived of its municipal privileges, the citizens were allowed the free exercise of their religion.

During the progress of the siege a Spanish fleet had appeared off La Rochelle; but it was sent only to amuse the French with a false show of friendship, as appears from a letter of Philip IV. to his ambassador at Paris;¹ and no sooner did news arrive that the English were preparing an expedition for the relief of La Rochelle than, in spite of the remonstrances of Richelieu, the Spaniards retired. The famous captain, Spinola, had also paid a visit to the French camp in the quality of ambassador; when Louis took him round the works, and flattered the Italian by remarking that he was imitating his example at Breda. Spinola had taken that town, after a two months' siege, in June, 1625. The Spanish Court had set its heart upon the capture, and Philip IV., with a mock sublime, had written to Spinola, in half a line, "Marquis, take Breda." Prince Maurice, after a four years' struggle with Spinola, had died 23rd April, 1625, not without the mortification of seeing that Breda must at length yield to the Spanish arms; but his brother and successor, Frederick Henry of Nassau, who was elected Captain-General of the United Provinces, assisted by Mansfeld, whose efforts Richelieu had diverted from the Palatinate, arrested the progress of the Spaniards in the Northern Netherlands. Frederick Henry, who shared not the political ambition and the religious prejudices of his brother, was also elected as their Stadholder by the three provinces of Holland, Zealand, and West Friesland. But the operations of the Dutch in Europe are not of much importance at this period, though it witnessed the growth of their possessions in the East Indies, and the establishment of their naval power at the expense of Spain.

The struggle in Germany had now assumed a new phase by the intervention of Denmark. Christian IV. had from the first beheld the proceedings of the Emperor with alarm; as a Protestant Prince, he was disposed to support the unlucky Palatine Frederick; he had, at the instance of his brother-in-law, James I. of England,² advanced several large sums of money to Frederick; and so early as the beginning of 1621 had agreed upon an alliance between Denmark, England, and the Dutch Republic; negotiations, however, which had resulted only in some representations to the Emperor and a letter to Ambrose Spinola. Christian IV. had also a personal, or rather a family, interest in the great

¹ In Capefigue, *Richelieu*, &c. ch. xlii.

² James I. had married in 1589 Anne,

second daughter of Frederick II. of Denmark.

question which agitated Germany. He had procured his son Frederick to be appointed coadjutor and eventual successor of the titular lay Archbishop of Bremen, and had also purchased for him the Bishopric of Verden; and thus, in common with the other Princes of the Circle of Lower Saxony, he feared to be deprived of the ecclesiastical principalities which he had obtained. The headship of Lower Saxony had been long in the hands of the ducal Welfic House; but its various lines, Lüneburg, Wolfenbüttel, Zelle, Harburg, and Dannenberg were now at variance with one another respecting the Principality of Grubenhagen; while Frederick Ulrich, head of what is called the middle line of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, was not only a weak man, but also without the means of supporting an army. The Princes of Lower Saxony had thus begun to look towards Christian IV. for protection; who, by virtue of his Duchy of Holstein, was a member of the Empire and of their own Circle, and by his prosperous reign in Denmark enjoyed at that time a high reputation in Europe. Many volunteers among the Lower Saxons had in 1623 joined Duke Christian of Brunswick, whose defeat by Gonzales de Cordova and flight into Holland in 1622 has been already described (*supra*, p. 135). Christian was a very different man from his brother Duke Frederick Ulrich, into whose dominions he had returned with his old troops. He had begun his adventures with ten dollars in his pocket, nor would he abandon them after two defeats and the loss of an arm. Christian took the command of the forces levied by the Lower Saxon volunteers, in conjunction with those which he had raised himself; but Tilly hastened towards the north, compelled the Lower Saxon Circle to expel Christian, overtook that Prince as he was retreating into East Friesland to rejoin Count Mansfeld, and entirely defeated him near Stadtlohn, in Westphalia (August 9th, 1623). The Dutch now advised Mansfeld to disband his army, and the League troops and Spaniards established themselves on the Weser.

Duke Christian, after his defeat, had given the King of Denmark a still further interest in the German question by transferring to that monarch his Bishopric of Halberstadt; besides which, Christian IV. had procured another see in Mecklenburg for his younger son. The menacing position taken up by the troops of the League in Westphalia, rendered some decisive step necessary. Christian IV., who had assembled an army, was elected military chief of the Circle of Lower Saxony in May, 1625; and on the 18th of that month he addressed a letter to Ferdinand II.,

which may be regarded as a declaration of war. He announced to the Emperor his election as head of the Lower Saxon Circle; declared his determination to put an end to the quartering of troops and other burdens with which some of the Princes belonging to that Circle were oppressed, contrary to the Religious Peace and the laws of the Empire; and he reminded Ferdinand that he had neglected to fulfil his promises to himself and his ally, the King of Great Britain, with regard to the Elector Palatine. Ferdinand answered politely, postponing the consideration of the questions urged, though he went on increasing his forces; whilst Tilly, in the Emperor's name, summoned the King of Denmark to lay down the military headship of the Circle, on the ground that it could not be intrusted to a foreign Sovereign. Meanwhile Christian IV. marched his army from the Elbe to the Weser. He had communicated to Gustavus Adolphus the steps which he intended to take, and intimated that his help would be welcome; but the Swedish King, at that time intent on an expedition into Livonia, though he received Christian's message in a friendly spirit, was not then in a position to afford him any succour. Gustavus's campaign in Poland was, however, indirectly beneficial, by preventing the Poles from fulfilling their promise to the Emperor of supporting him by an irruption into Brandenburg.

Hostilities were begun by Duke Christian of Brunswick and Count Mansfeld; who having reassembled an army of some 12,000 or 15,000 men, entered the Duchy of Cleves, encamped in the neighbourhood of Wesol, and thence proceeded into the territory of Cologne. Tilly despatched against them the Count of Anhalt, and having been himself reinforced with some Spaniards, laid siege to Höxter. Christian IV. having received some subsidies from Charles I., now King of England, had also begun his march. James I. had repented of neglecting his son-in-law, the Elector Palatine, and on his death-bed had exhorted Charles to use every endeavour to reinstate his sister and her children in their dominions.¹ But Charles, who deemed it better to seek the Palatinate in Spain, fitted out an expedition against that country, the ill-success of which has been already related; so that he could afford but little aid to his brother-in-law. In July Christian IV. had marched to Hameln, where his career was arrested by an unfortunate accident. In riding round the ramparts, he fell into a vault twenty feet deep, that had been negligently

¹ *Mém. de l'Electrice Palatine Louise Juliane*, p. 279.

covered; his horse was killed on the spot, he himself lay three days insensible, and it was several weeks before he entirely recovered. The campaign went in favour of Tilly, who took Hameln and Minden, and defeated a large body of Danes near Hanover. He had appealed to the Emperor for assistance against the King of Denmark; and this was the occasion of bringing the renowned Wallenstein into the field.

Wallenstein, for the loyalty and valour he had displayed during the Bohemian revolt, had been rewarded by Ferdinand II. with the lordship of Friedland and other confiscated domains of the insurgent Protestant nobles, and had been raised successively to the dignities of Count of the Empire, Prince, and, a little after, Duke of Friedland. The appearance and habits of this celebrated leader were calculated to render still more remarkable his military talents and his enormous power. In person he was tall and lank; the oval of his face was strongly delineated by his black hair, brushed up from his forehead and hanging down on each side in curly locks, and by his black beard and moustache; his complexion was sallow, his nose short, but hawked, his forehead high and commanding. His eyes were small and black, but penetrating and full of fire, and the awe they inspired was enhanced by dark eyebrows, on which hung a frown of threatening severity. The whole expression of his countenance was cold and repulsive; his demeanour haughty but dignified. With these traits his habits corresponded. Of few words and still fewer smiles, indefatigably employed in a retreat whose tranquillity was secured by sentinels planted to enjoin silence on all who approached—for even the clink of spurs was offensive to him—Wallenstein's whole appearance was calculated to throw around him a mysterious interest, increased by his known addiction to astrology.¹

At the time of Tilly's application for aid, Wallenstein, who had always been a warm supporter of the Emperor and of despotism, was a member of the Imperial Council of War; and he offered to raise at his own expense an army of 20,000 men for the Emperor, the troops to be supported by requisitions wherever they were cantoned.² His offer having been accepted, a hundred patents of colonelcies were sold by Wallenstein to the greater nobles, on condition of their providing officers and men. These colonels in turn sold patents to their captains, the captains to their subalterns,

¹ For his character, see Hurter, *Zur Gesch. Wallensteins*, Kap. 20.

² The old story, now discredited, was that Wallenstein offered to raise 50,000

men, assigning the apparently paradoxical reason that he could maintain an army of that force, but not one of 20,000 Khevenhiller, t. x. p. 803.

without any reference to the Imperial Government; and thus was created an army, which, like those of the Italian *condottieri*, looked up to Wallenstein as their lord and proprietor. The troops were at first directed to be cantoned in Franconia and Suabia, in order that they might live at free quarters upon the inhabitants; and on marching through Nuremberg, Wallenstein compelled that town to contribute 100,000 gulden, although it had done nothing whatever to incur the displeasure of the Emperor.

Wallenstein, with an army that went on daily increasing, marched, in the autumn, into the Bishoprics of Halberstadt and Magdeburg; while Tilly, as already related, was taking place after place in Westphalia and Lower Saxony. It was fortunate for the Protestant cause that a mutual jealousy subsisted between Tilly and Wallenstein; hence, as neither would recognize the other as his superior, both armies acted without any concerted plan. At the instance of the Protestants a peace congress was held at Brunswick in the winter; but though Maximilian of Bavaria and his general were not indisposed to an accommodation, Wallenstein, who had formed the project of obtaining a principality for himself, rejected it with brutality. When the campaign opened in the spring of 1626, Wallenstein, instead of joining Tilly, marched eastward. The Protestants, however, committed errors on their side. Count Mansfeld, instead of forming a junction with Christian IV., who had now again taken the field, and thus opposing their united forces to Tilly, resolved to march into Bohemia, excite the inhabitants to rise, and call Bethlem Gabor again into the field; but after two abortive attempts on the bridge of Dessau, Mansfeld was forced to retreat before Wallenstein (April 25th), and his army was dispersed with the exception of about 5,000 men, with whom he entered the March of Brandenburg. By the aid of French subsidies, however, with which he levied men in Mecklenburg, and being joined by 1,000 Scots, 2,000 Danes, and 5,000 men under John Ernest of Saxe-Weimar, he increased his army to about 20,000 men, with whom he marched through Frankfort-on-Oder, Crossen, Glogau, Breslau, Oppeln, Ratibor, to Jablunka, where Bethlem Gabor had promised to meet him. But the fickle Transylvanian Prince again proved faithless, and made peace with the Emperor; Mansfeld on the approach of Wallenstein, who had followed him through Lusatia into Silesia, was compelled to disband his army; part of his troops he assigned to John Ernest of Saxe-Weimar, and he himself proceeded into Dalmatia, intending by a secure, though

circuitous way, to reach again the scene of action ; but he fell sick and died in that country at the age of forty-five.

Mansfeld's movement had, however, diverted Wallenstein and his troops from taking part against Christian IV., when the Danish King was on the point of fighting a decisive action with Tilly. Early in 1626, Christian had fixed his head-quarters at Wolfenbüttel, whence his forces were extended on one side into Brandenburg, while another portion was posted in the Bishopsrics of Osnabrück and Münster. He unfortunately lost the services of Prince Christian of Brunswick, who died in May, just at the moment when his reckless valour might have been useful. Among the Danish army, however, appeared Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, who was afterwards to play so distinguished a part in the Thirty Years' War. Tilly was detained some months in besieging Münden, which he at last took after a murderous assault, and the loss of many men (June 9th), when the greater part of the garrison were massacred. Tilly next laid siege to Göttingen, which detained him till the 11th of August. He was soon after driven from that place as well as from Nordheim ; but by forming a junction with the troops left by Wallenstein on the Elbe, he prevented the King of Denmark from penetrating into Thuringia, and joining the Saxon Dukes and the Landgrave Maurice of Hesse. Tilly had compelled Maurice, according to a decree of the Imperial Council, to cede the whole district of Marburg to Hesse-Darmstadt ; to renounce all alliances with the Emperor's enemies ; and to permit on all occasions the passage of the Imperial troops through his dominions. Christian had marched southward as far as the Eichsfeld, whence he now found himself compelled to retreat towards Wolfenbüttel ; but on the march he fell in with Tilly and his army, and an action ensued near the little town of Lutter, August 27th. After a bloody battle, in which Christian, by Tilly's own account, displayed great activity and valour, the general of the League achieved a decisive victory. The Danish King nevertheless, though he had lost several thousand men, succeeded in holding Wolfenbüttel and Nordheim till the following spring, when the operations of Wallenstein gave a new turn to affairs. That commander, after the retreat of Mansfeld, had maintained and increased his army in reconquered Silesia at the expense of the unfortunate inhabitants. He himself spent the winter at Vienna ; but in the spring of 1627 he returned into Silesia, and marched with his army towards the Baltic.

Directing his Colonel Arnim to occupy the two Mecklenburg duchies, and to summon the towns of Rostock and Wismar to admit Imperial garrisons, he himself entered Dömitz with another division of his forces. The approach of his army was announced by strange harbingers, which showed its irregular, and lawless composition. Bands of gipsies of from ten to fifteen men, each provided with two long muskets, and bringing with them women on horseback with pistols at their saddle-bows, appeared simultaneously in many places; they boasted that they were in Wallenstein's pay, marched by byeways and tracks, concealed themselves in the bushes and underwood, and plundered wherever they found an opportunity.¹ It appears from Wallenstein's letters at this period, that he had formed the design of seizing the Mecklenburgs for himself; and the Emperor, regarding the two Dukes of Mecklenburg as rebellious vassals, abandoned their territories to that commander.

Christian IV., threatened on one side by Wallenstein, on the other by Tilly, found himself compelled to retreat into his own dominions, whither he was pursued by the united forces of the Imperialists. Tilly, after some success in Holstein, proceeded to the Lower Weser, as it was reported that the Dutch were about to send a fleet into that river; while Wallenstein advanced through Sleswick into Jutland, and compelled the King of Denmark and his army to fly into the islands. During the winter of 1627-1628, Tilly maintained his troops at the expense of Bremen, Brunswick, and Lünenburg, while Wallenstein cantoned his army in Brandenburg, and treated the unfortunate Elector, George William, like a conquered enemy, although he was completely submissive to the Emperor's will. Brandenburg, as well as Mecklenburg and Pomerania, were forced to make large contributions for the support of Wallenstein's army. Gustavus Adolphus, then engaged in the war with Poland, would willingly have helped his brother-in-law; but George William dreaded the Swedes even more than the troops of Wallenstein. The character and talents of Gustavus, however, filled Wallenstein with awe; and he addressed to him, though with great misgivings, propositions to enter into an alliance with the Emperor against Denmark. A project had been formed to dethrone Christian IV., and to place the Emperor, or perhaps even Wallenstein himself, on the throne of Denmark; while Schönén and Norway were to have

¹ Von der Decken, *Herzog Georg von Braunschweig*, ap. Geijer, B. ii. S. 141.

been allotted to Gustavus as the price of his aid.¹ But these negotiations had no result. Among other schemes of Wallenstein at this time was one for obtaining the command of the Baltic. He dreamt of reviving the trade and power of the Hanse towns, which had been crushed by Denmark, and of giving them a monopoly of the Spanish trade. With these thoughts he procured the Emperor to appoint him "Admiral of the Ocean and of the Baltic Sea;" and he made some preparations for the building of a fleet, which, however, he found not so easy an enterprise as the raising of an army. The same schemes also urged him to get possession of the Baltic ports.

The designs of Ferdinand II. seemed now to be wafted onwards on a full tide of success. Not only were his arms everywhere victorious, but his civil policy also encountered no serious resistance. The tyranny and extortions of Wallenstein, who exercised an almost uncontrolled dictatorship, had indeed excited serious discontent in many of the Catholic as well as in the Protestant States; even Maximilian of Bavaria himself, when his ends had been accomplished by the transfer to him of the Upper Palatinate and the Electoral dignity, began to look with jealousy on Wallenstein's career, and to sympathize with the misery which his brutality created. An assembly of the Catholic States had been held at Würzburg in 1627 to consider these evils, and the means for their redress; but the timidity of some, the jealousy of others, and the animosity of all against the Protestants, deprived their deliberations of any result. On the other hand, at a meeting of the Electoral College held soon after at Mühlhausen (October), the policy of the Emperor entirely prevailed. Ferdinand II. was not naturally cruel, but he was bigoted to the last degree; he considered that there was no salvation out of the pale of the Roman Catholic Church; and, being led by the Jesuits, he thought that he was only acting for the welfare of his subjects in compelling them, by whatever means, to return to that faith. He had entirely abolished in his hereditary dominions the exercise of the Protestant religion, and he was now contemplating the re-establishment of the Roman Catholic Church throughout the Empire, and the restoring to it of those temporal principalities and other property of which it had been deprived by Protestant Princes

¹ These negotiations were first revealed by the publication of Wallenstein's letters. See the letters to Arnim, December 13th and 20th, 1627; January 3rd and 6th, 1628, in Förster, B. i. SS. 162. 168; B. ii.

S. 10. It appears from a letter addressed to Christian IV. by Gustavus Adolphus (October 21st, 1627) that the Crown of Denmark had been offered to him. Geijer, B. iii. S. 142.

since and against the Treaty of Passau. At Mühlhausen the fanatical party was predominant. In accordance with the views of Ferdinand and his confessor, the spiritual Electors, supported by the Nuncio Caraffa, determined on a complete Catholic reaction, to begin in South Germany, and thence to extend to the north; and orders for the restoration of Church property were accordingly issued to the Duke of Würtemberg, the towns of Strasburg, Ansbach, Nuremberg, Hall in Suabia, Ulm, and others. A majority of this assembly also confirmed the deposition of the Elector Palatine; and by a deed executed at Munich in February, 1628, Maximilian of Bavaria was now solemnly invested with the Electorate, as well as with the Upper Palatinate, and that part of the Lower, which lay on the right bank of the Rhine. These dominions were the pledge of 13,000,000 florins advanced by Maximilian for the war; who in return restored to the Emperor Upper Austria, which he held as security, but on the understanding that if he were driven out of the Palatinate, his former pledge was again to be put into his hands.

In April, 1628, the Emperor formally made over to Wallenstein, now created Prince of Sagan in Silesia, the dominions of the two rebellious Dukes of Mecklenburg in pledge, and the States of Mecklenburg were compelled to do homage to him. The plans of Wallenstein rendered the occupation of the Pomeranian town of Stralsund very desirable, while the Kings both of Sweden and Denmark were as much interested in preventing him from obtaining possession of that port. The town itself sent a message to the Emperor, professing loyalty and devotion, and offering money, but at the same time made the utmost exertions to defend itself against his general. Although Ferdinand returned a favourable answer to the citizens, Wallenstein ordered Colonel Arnim to bombard and storm the town, and is said to have sworn that he would have Stralsund were it fastened with chains to heaven. The enterprise, however, was not an easy one. Christian IV. threw in provisions and reinforcements, among which was a Scotch corps under Monroe, and he subsequently appeared himself off the port with a fleet of six ships of war and 150 other vessels, which took up such a position as obliged Wallenstein for a time to withdraw his batteries. When Christian retired, who was then contemplating a peace, the inhabitants of Stralsund entered into a treaty with Gustavus Adolphus, and, besides a large quantity of ammunition, he reinforced their garrison with 6,000 Swedes, under Fritz Rosladin, and subsequently

with another corps under Alexander Leslie¹ (Earl of Leven) and Nils Brahe. At length Wallenstein, after losing near half his army, found it necessary to raise the siege (August 3rd).

As the war with Denmark had, on the whole, been successful, and cost the Emperor nothing, he would have been inclined to continue it, had not the disputes which arose in Italy about the Mantuan succession rendered it desirable to despatch some troops in that direction, which so weakened Tilly's army that Christian drove him with great loss out of Jutland, Sleswick, and Holstein. The advances of the King of Denmark were therefore entertained; conferences were opened at Lübeck, and on the 22nd May, 1629, was signed the PEACE OF LUBECK. By this treaty Christian IV., reinstated in all his hereditary possessions, engaged to interfere no further in the affairs of Lower Saxony, except in his quality of Duke of Holstein; and he renounced, in the name of both his sons, the German Bishoprics which he had procured for them.² He shamefully abandoned the Dukes of Mecklenburg and all the German Princes his allies, nor could the representations of England, France, and Holland induce him to make the least stipulation in favour of the Elector Palatine; wherefore those Powers refused to accede to the treaty. Gustavus Adolphus had sent a plenipotentiary to the congress at Lübeck; but Wallenstein refused to treat with him so long as a Swedish garrison remained in Stralsund.

¹ Leslie, who eventually became a Swedish field-marshal, was so illiterate that he could not read; and Count Brahe was therefore appointed to assist him

and read the King's orders. Geijer, B. iii. S. 155, Ann.

² Dumont, t. v. pt. ii. p. 584.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE Peace of Lübeck, and the withdrawal from the German Protestants of the protection of Denmark, encouraged the Emperor to carry out the EDICT OF RESTITUTION, which had been published two months previously (March 29th, 1629). This celebrated edict forms a turning point in the Thirty Years' War. Hitherto matters had gone prosperously with Ferdinand; but this measure excited desperate opposition, and was one of the chief causes that brought Gustavus Adolphus into Germany. The general object of the edict was to restore ecclesiastical affairs to the state they were in at the Peace of Passau in 1552; and the three main points in it were: 1. That the Catholics were to receive back all the *mediate*¹ convents and other *mediate* ecclesiastical foundations, of which they had been deprived since that treaty. 2. Members of the Confession of Augsburg holding *immediate* bishoprics and prelacies were to surrender them back to the Catholics. 3. Catholic States were to enjoy the right of making their subjects conform to their faith, and of removing those who would not, after paying proper compensation; just as the Princes of the Augsburg Confession had acted on that principle. The Emperor further declared that the Peace of Passau, as submitted to Charles V., included only Catholics and members of the Lutheran Confession; and that all other sects, present or future, were not entitled to its benefits, and ought not to be tolerated.²

After the promulgation of the Edict of Restitution, Ferdinand proceeded to appoint his son, the Archduke Leopold, who already enjoyed so many bishoprics, to the metropolitan sees of Bremen, and Magdeburg.³ This last appointment attacked the claims of the Elector of Saxony. When Wallenstein entered the Archbishopric of Magdeburg in January, 1628, the Protestant Chapter, in order to conciliate the Emperor, and at the same time to secure a

¹ Not held directly of the Emperor, but of some Prince.

² Edict in London, Th. fol. p. 1048 sq.

³ The Archbishoprics and Bishoprics which came under the operation of the

edict were, Magdeburg, Bremen, Minden, Verden, Halberstadt, Lübeck, Ratzeburg, Meissen, Merseburg, Namburg, Brandenburg, Havelberg, Lebus, and Camin.

Protestant head, had deposed the Margrave Christian William of Brandenburg, the lay Archbishop in possession, who had been put under the ban of the Empire; and had postulated in his stead Augustus, second son of the Elector John George, then only in his fourteenth year. Ferdinand, however, referred the matter to the Pope, who nominated Leopold; and John George, though vexed and alarmed by the Edict of Restitution, was soon pacified by the assurance that his ancient secularized possessions should not be touched. In Augsburg, Kaufbeuren, Würtemberg, Halberstadt, and other places, the edict was forcibly carried out; the evangelical preachers were expelled, the Protestant churches shut up, and even private worship forbidden under severe penalties.

The Emperor had been assisted in his plans by the want of spirit and patriotism displayed by most of the German Protestant Princes. The Duke of Würtemberg, the Landgrave of Hesse, and the Thuringian Dukes alone showed any anxiety to vindicate the cause of their country and their religion: the political as well as the religious liberties of Germany were to be saved by a foreign Prince. Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden had viewed with alarm the progress of Wallenstein, and especially the plan for extending the domination of Austria to the Baltic. He had been offended by the exclusion of his ambassadors from the congress of Lübeck, and by the help given to the Poles by the Imperialists. He was also, no doubt, being himself a zealous Protestant, moved with indignation at the oppression exercised against the Protestants of Germany: although this was properly no *casus belli*, and was not even alluded to in the manifesto which he published shortly after his landing in that country.¹ Gustavus was also induced to engage in the great German struggle by the help of France. Richelieu, to effect so favourable a diversion to the war then carrying on in Italy between France and the House of Austria respecting the Mantuan succession, had, through his ambassador, Charnacé, negotiated a truce between Sweden and Poland, and promised to furnish Gustavus with an annual subsidy. It must not, however, be supposed that the support of France, though of course important, was the main cause of bringing Sweden into the field. Gustavus began the war before he had concluded any agreement with that Power, in order both to be and to show him-

¹ Thus Oxenstiern said, in 1637, in the Swedish Council: "Zum Teutschen Krieg war kein, *scopus principalis defensio religionis* — deren *arma spiritualia sunt*, als *preces* et *lacrima* — sondern dass

Regnum Suecic et Consortes Religionis möchten in Sicherheit sitzen, *tam in statu ecclesiastico quam in politico.*" — *Palm-skoldsche MSS.* ap. *Gesch. Schwedens*, B. iii. S. 367.

self independent. The treaty of Bärwalde between France and Sweden was not definitively signed till January 23rd, 1631, several months after Gustavus had landed in Germany; nor, as Voltaire remarks, was the stipulated subsidy of a million livres per annum alone sufficient to have induced the Swedish King to enter on such a war.¹

Gustavus Adolphus set sail from the harbour of Elfsnabben, May 30th, 1630. Before his departure he took a formal leave of the States assembled at Stockholm, when he presented to them his little daughter, Christina, not yet six years of age; and tenderly embracing her, commended her to their fidelity as heiress of his Kingdom in a speech which drew tears even from those northern eyes. To conduct the government in his absence, he appointed a Council of Regency consisting of ten persons, who were to reside constantly at Stockholm. After an adverse and tedious navigation, he landed with an army of some 15,000 men in the isle of Usedom, off the coast of Pomerania, June 24th. Another division of his army was conveyed to Stralsund. Gustavus prided himself on being the first to set foot on German soil. No sooner was he landed than he seized a pickaxe and began to open a trench; after which he fell upon his knees and offered up a prayer.² In his army were several thousand British soldiers, most of whom had served in the German wars. After taking possession of the isles of Usedom and Wollin, which lie off the mouth of the Oder, Gustavus proceeded towards Stettin, the residence of Boguslaus XIV., Duke of Pomerania. Boguslaus after a vain attempt to assert his neutrality, found himself compelled to submit to the Swedes; and being old and childless, made little difficulty in promising that the Duchy of Pomerania should remain in the hands of Sweden till the costs of the war were paid. Gustavus caused Stettin to be fortified anew, and then proceeded to occupy Damm and Stargard. By the junction of the troops at Stralsund and others, his army was now increased to upwards of 25,000 men, and there was no force competent to oppose him; for the Imperial army was dispersed in various directions, and that of Tilly was far from the seat of war, in the Upper Palatinate, Franconia, and Westphalia. An imprudent step on the part of the Emperor increased the advantages of Gustavus.

Ferdinand II. had convened a Diet at Ratisbon in July, 1630, for the purpose of procuring the election of his son as King of the

¹ Dumont, t. vi. pt. i. Venice furnished in addition 400,000 livres annually.

² Harte, *Gustavus Adolphus*, vol. 1. p. 216.

Romans. The opportunity was seized to thwart and impede the Emperor's policy. Maximilian of Bavaria, jealous of the progress of Wallenstein, and having satisfied his own ambition by securing the Upper Palatinate and the Electoral dignity, would willingly have seen an end put to the war; and he resolved to clog the wheels of Austria by procuring the disgrace and ruin of the Duke of Friedland, and establishing a secret intelligence with the French Court. Wallenstein, in order to acquire new principalities, under pretence of carrying out the Edict of Restitution, had withdrawn his troops from Mecklenburg and the rest of Lower Saxony, thus leaving North Germany open to the invader. After ravaging the Archbishopric of Magdeburg, Wallenstein at last laid formal siege to that city; but as Ferdinand was then contemplating the nomination of his son as King of the Romans, and required for that purpose the votes of the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, both of whom had claims on Magdeburg, Wallenstein was ordered to abandon the siege. He then cast his eyes on the smaller lands and bishoprics. Wolfenbüttel, from which Duke Frederick Ulrich of Brunswick had been deposed by a decree of the Imperial Council, was to be made over as a principality to Wallenstein's general, Pappenheim; Calenburg was to be given to Tilly; Würtemberg had also felt the effects of military violence: and everywhere, in carrying out the Edict of Restitution, no particular inquiries were made whether the Church property seized had been secularized before or after the Treaty of Passau.

These proceedings had given great dissatisfaction, not only to Duke Maximilian, but also to other Electors and Princes. Maximilian openly joined the party which demanded the dismissal of Wallenstein and the reduction of the Imperial army as conditions without which they would not consent to the election of the Emperor's son, Ferdinand, as King of the Romans. The Emperor, the Elector of Bavaria, and the spiritual Electors appeared in person at Ratisbon, but Brandenburg and Saxony sent only deputies. At this assembly also appeared the French envoys, Leon Brulart and Father Joseph, ostensibly about the affairs of Italy, but with secret instructions to do all in their power still further to embitter Maximilian, who had already a secret intelligence with the French Court, and the spiritual Electors against Wallenstein, to effect the disarmament of the Empire, and to prevent the election of Ferdinand's son.¹ In all these objects they were completely successful. The Emperor, after a long

¹ See Richelieu, *Mémoires*, pt. x.

struggle, consented to dismiss Wallenstein, and to reduce the Imperial army to 40,000 men, while the League still kept on foot a force of 30,000; yet, so far from securing the election of his son by these concessions, the Electors even talked of making the Duke of Bavaria his successor on the Imperial throne. Wallenstein, after remaining at Halberstädt till January, had proceeded into Bohemia to reduce some of his Protestant peasants to obedience, after which he returned to the head-quarters of his army at Memmingen, in Suabia; and it was here that he received, in August, the order of the Emperor to lay down his command. He surprised all by his ready compliance with the Emperor's order, of which he had been previously informed by his cousin, Max Wallenstein. When the Imperial envoys appeared, he received them in a friendly manner, gave them a splendid entertainment, and when, after long hesitation, they began a carefully prepared speech, he interrupted them by reading a Latin paper, in which were indicated the nativity of the Emperor, that of the Elector of Bavaria, and his own, adding, "You may see, gentlemen, from the stars, that I was acquainted with your commission, and that the *spiritus* of the Elector dominates over that of the Emperor. I cannot therefore blame the Emperor; and though I grieve that his Majesty should support me so little, I shall obey."¹ He now again repaired to his Bohemian estates, but spent much of his time at Prague, where he lived with regal splendour. The dismissal of Wallenstein's army, which the policy of Richelieu had not a little contributed to effect, was, of course, most favourable to the operations of Gustavus Adolphus. Richelieu's envoys also succeeded in adjusting the affairs of the Mantuan succession, of which we must here say a few words.

Vincenzo Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua and Marquis of Montferrat, died December 26th, 1627. His next heir in the Duchy of Mantua was the Duke of Nevers, descended with Vincenzo from a common grandfather, Frederick II., though by a younger son of this Duke. Vincenzo's successor in Montferrat was his niece, Maria Gonzaga, who shortly before her uncle's death had been married to Charles Count of Rethel, son of the Duke of Nevers, in which House, therefore, the whole inheritance was united, and the Duke of Nevers took possession of it in January, 1628. The Court of Spain, however, was unwilling to see so important an Italian possession fall into the hands of a Prince long naturalized in France; and they raised up a counter-claimant in the person of

¹ Förster, *Wallenstein*, p. 147.

Cæsar Duke of Guastalla, descended from Ferdinand, a brother of Duke Frederick II., founding his pretensions on the circumstance that, though of the younger branch, he was the offspring of the *eldest* son of Ferdinand, while the Duke of Nevers sprang from the *third* son of Frederick. The Duke of Savoy also disputed the title of his grand-daughter, Maria Gonzaga, to Montferrat, and revived the claims of his house, made a century before, to that marquisate, but condemned by the Emperor Charles V. The Spaniards incited the Duke of Guastalla to appeal to the Emperor, as Suzerain of the Mantuan duchy, and made an alliance with the Duke of Savoy, promising to give him Trino and other places in Montferrat adjoining his dominions. As the Emperor delayed to give his decision, a Spanish force, under the Count of Montenegro, entered the Mantuan territory, whilst another body laid siege to Casale, the capital of Montferrat, Charles Emmanuel engaging to secure, meanwhile, the passes of the Alps against the advance of the French. After the fall of La Rochelle, Richelieu was hindered by the intrigues of the Queen-Mother from immediately interfering in the affairs of Italy; but early in 1629 he persuaded Louis XIII., whom he accompanied, to cross Mont-Génévre with his army; the Pass of Susa was carried against the Piedmontese (March), and the Duke of Savoy was compelled to accept a treaty, to which, as the French were preponderant in force, the Spanish Governor of Milan was also glad to accede.

The French, who held Casale, leaving a garrison of 6,000 men in Susa till the treaty should be ratified by Spain, now re-crossed the Alps, in order to reduce the last remains of the Hugonots, who, under the Duke of Rohan, still held out in Languedoc and other southern parts of France. The hands of Richelieu were left the more free for this undertaking by the peace concluded with England April 4th, 1629, by which Charles I., engrossed by his quarrels with his subjects, consented to renounce his protection of the Hugonots. The Court of Spain, despite its bigotry, entered into an agreement to assist Rohan and his heretics (May), but it was too late; the Hugonots were worsted in a struggle, into the details of which we cannot enter; suffice it to say that their extinction as a political party was consummated by the reduction of Montauban in August, 1629. Meanwhile an Imperial army, withdrawn, as already mentioned, from North Germany, had entered the territory of the Grisons, had seized Chur and the passes of the Upper Rhine, and on the 5th of June the French were summoned by proclamation of the Emperor to evacuate the

Imperial fiefs in Italy. The summer was spent in negotiations, during which, with an eye to future contests, the veteran captain, Spinola, was made Governor of Milan by Philip IV. At the end of September the Imperialists, under Collalto, descended into Lombardy, and laid siege to Mantua, whilst Spinola invaded Montferrat. Richelieu now raised an army, composed chiefly of foreign mercenaries, and, as Louis XIII. was detained at home by domestic occurrences, the Cardinal crossed the Alps at their head in February, 1630, with the title and authority of Lieutenant-General of the King. The ravages of disease had compelled the Imperial army to abandon the siege of Mantua; but the Duke of Savoy was intractable, and to put an end to his evasions, Richelieu made a feint on Turin, near which Charles Emmanuel was posted with his army. In this march the Cardinal appeared as generalissimo at the head of the cavalry, with cuirass, helmet, and plume, a sword by his side, and pistols in his holsters. But instead of marching on Turin, Richelieu suddenly retraced his steps towards the Alps, and seized Pinerolo after a three days' siege, thus securing the key of Italy. Louis, in person, effected the reduction of Savoy in June, whilst in Piedmont Charles Emmanuel was defeated at Vegliana by the Duke of Montmorenci, July 10th. Grief and vexation at these events caused the death of the Duke of Savoy, who expired July 26th, at the age of sixty-eight. To balance, however, these successes of the French, the almost impregnable fortress of Mantua was surprised and captured by the lieutenants of Collalto in the night of July 17th.

Victor Amadeus, the new Duke of Savoy, who had married a sister of Louis XIII., was not so uncompromising an enemy of France as his father. By the intermediation of Giulio Mazarini, the Pope's agent, a truce was signed, to last from September 8th to October 15th; and Victor Amadeus promised to join the French if a reasonable peace were not effected by the 13th of October. The town of Casale was put into Spinola's hands, who was at that time besieging it; the citadel was still held by the French under Toiras; who, however, engaged to surrender it, if not relieved before the end of October. On the 17th of that month, the truce being expired, Marshals La Force, Schomberg, and Marillac marched to the relief of Casale. Spinola had died during the truce. On the 26th of October, the French and Spanish armies were in presence before the town; a battle was on the eve of commencing, when suddenly a cavalier dashed from the Spanish line, and rode towards the French, waving a white hand-

kerchief, and exclaiming in Italian, "*Pace! pace! alto! alto!*" (Peace! peace! halt! halt!) He advanced at the risk of his life, for several of the French soldiers fired on him.

It was Giulio Mazarini, who was really the bearer of a treaty of peace effected by Brulart and Richelieu's factotum Father Joseph, at Ratisbon. Richelieu, however, declared that they had exceeded their commission; and it is not very clear whether they had been induced to hurry on a treaty by the news of the King's dangerous illness, of the factions which prevailed in the French Court, and the critical situation of Casale, the capture of which appeared inevitable, or whether the Cardinal, by what a French historian calls "a somewhat Machiavellian combination,"¹ had furnished his Capuchin with secret instructions to conclude a treaty which he might afterwards find a pretext to disavow. It was, however, accepted by the French generals. It was agreed that both the French and Spaniards should evacuate Casale and the rest of Montferrat; the town and citadel were to be given up to Ferdinand, second son of the Duke of Mantua; and the garrisons were to be composed entirely of native troops. The French, however, with very bad faith, left behind them some of their own soldiers, clothed in the Montferrat uniform; and when the Spaniards had recrossed the Po, two French regiments returned and introduced a convoy of provisions into Casale. Yet hostilities were not resumed. The appearance of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany induced the Emperor to abandon the war in Italy, in spite of the endeavours of Philip IV. to persuade him to continue it; and a treaty of peace was concluded at Cherasco, in Piedmont, April 6th, 1631. By this treaty Ferdinand II. agreed to invest the Duke of Nevers with Mantua and Montferrat, on his ceding a large portion of the latter, including Alba and Trino to Victor Amadeus, to whom also France was to restore all that she occupied in Piedmont and Savoy.² Richelieu, however, by a secret agreement with the Duke of Savoy, contrived to evade this part of the treaty, in so far as Pinerolo was concerned, which he had resolved never to restore.

Such was the conclusion of the war of the Mantuan succession, which forms a sort of episode in the great drama of the Thirty Years' War. Richelieu did not mean to let the Italian peace divert him from the less open warfare which he was pursuing against the House of Austria in Germany. Intrigues against the Cardinal during the dangerous illness of Louis XIII. had

¹ Martin, t. xi. p. 339.

² Dumont, t. vi. pt. i. p. 9.

threatened to overthrow his policy and put an end to his ministry, perhaps even to his life. They were frustrated by the unexpected recovery of the King; but space will not allow us to detail "the Grand Tempest of the Court," "the Day of Dupes," and the tyrannical manner in which Richelieu avenged himself on his enemies, which belong entirely to the domestic history of France. The frustration of the plots against him served to place his power and influence on a firmer basis, and to give him freer scope to pursue his plans of foreign policy. But to return to the Swedish invasion.

Having wrested Pomerania, with the exception of a few towns, from the Imperialists under Torquato Conti, Gustavus entered Mecklenburg, after concluding a treaty with the deposed Dukes of that country; but he in vain endeavoured to persuade the Elector of Saxony, and the Elector of Brandenburg, his brother-in-law, to ally themselves with him in defence of their religion. Gustavus was detained some time at Stralsund, engaged in negotiations with the French envoy, Charnacé, which ended in the treaty of Bärwalde, already mentioned. To the surprise of the enemy, the Swedes, according to their custom, continued the campaign during the winter; and Greifenhagen was assaulted and taken, under the conduct of Gustavus, on Christmas eve. Early in 1631, Kolberg, Frankfort-on-Oder, and Demmin yielded to his arms, before Tilly thought it prudent to oppose him. The Leaguist general, distrustful of the Elector of Saxony, whom the Emperor had offended in the matter of Magdeburg, demanded this town, as well as Leipsic and Wittenberg, on the ground that they were necessary for his operations on the Elbe; and, after taking New Brandenburg and putting the Swedish garrison to the sword, he proceeded to Magdeburg.

Gustavus expected that Tilly's attack upon a city to which the Electors both of Saxony and Brandenburg had claims, would procure him the alliance of those Princes; but as both of them continued to decline his proposals, he was compelled to leave Magdeburg to its fate. Early in 1631, John George had assembled the Protestant Princes and Free Cities at Leipsic to come to some decision respecting the Edict of Restitution and the wrongs done to the Protestants; but the Conventus of Leipsic, as it was called, though it roused the indignation and resentment of the Emperor, had, like most German meetings, little practical result. All alliance with Gustavus, the only man who could save Germany, was declined; but there was some talk, which ended in nothing,

of applying to the already vanquished King of Denmark. The King of Sweden had demanded from the Elector of Brandenburg Küstrin and Spandau; George William would grant only the former of these towns; and Gustavus finding, after an interview, that he could not persuade his brother-in-law, determined to march on Berlin. He approached that city with only 1,000 musketeers; but his whole army followed and encamped round it; and the Elector found himself compelled to abandon Spandau to the Swedes, on condition that it should be evacuated when Magdeburg had been relieved. But this it was too late to accomplish. Magdeburg, besieged since March, was taken by storm, May 10th, and dreadfully handled. Count Pappenheim, who served under Tilly, irritated by the prolonged resistance of some of the citizens, is said to have caused their houses to be fired: in the night the flames spread over the whole city, and left only the Cathedral, and some houses round about it, undestroyed. Between 20,000 and 30,000 inhabitants are said to have perished.¹

Gustavus was forced again to threaten Berlin before his brother-in-law would consent to join him; and at last, on the 11th of June, 1631, a formal treaty was concluded. George William agreed to pay 30,000 dollars monthly to the Swedes, and to place Spandau and Cüstrin at their disposal. But Gustavus could not plunge deeper into Germany till he had made terms with the Elector of Saxony, who had now on foot an army of 18,000 men under the command of Arnim, formerly a colonel of Wallenstein's. John George had refused to help the Swedes in their attempt to relieve Magdeburg, and had even contested their passing the Elbe. After the fall of Magdeburg, Gustavus therefore again marched northwards into Mecklenburg and Pomerania, and wrested Greifswald from the Imperialists. He and Tilly seemed to avoid each other; for Tilly proceeded into the middle districts of Germany to rob and hector the Protestant Princes. Duke William of Weimar fled before him to Leipsic; but Duke Bernhard, in conjunction with William, Landgrave of Hesse, resolved on a stout resistance; and the latter rejected Tilly's demands to surrender Cassel and Ziegenhain, and to pay a contribution. Upon the approach of Gustavus, who had crossed the Elbe, and established a fortified camp near the little town of Werben, opposite the confluence of the Havel, Tilly was obliged to withdraw his troops from Hesse,

¹ Tilly's conduct is extenuated by Harte, Schiller, and other historians. Yet those who have undertaken his defence will find it difficult to explain away

the admitted fact that it was not till the third day that he entered Magdeburg and proclaimed quarter. See Menzel. *Neuere Gesch. der Deutschen*, B. iv. S. 68 f.

and the Landgrave reoccupied his fortresses. While the Swedish army was at Werben, Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar entered the service of Gustavus, and the Landgrave of Hesse concluded with him at the same place the Treaty of Werben. The Swedish King supplied the Landgrave with money to levy troops, and appointed him general of all the forces that should be raised in the Rhenish Circles and Upper Germany. In August, the Dukes of Mecklenburg were solemnly reinstated in their dominions at Güstrow, although the Imperialists continued to maintain themselves at Rostock till October, and at Wismar till January, 1632. During the summer both Gustavus and Tilly had received considerable reinforcements; the Swedish King had been rejoined by General Gustavus Horn with 4,000 men, while the Imperial general had added to his army many of the troops dismissed from the war in Italy. Tilly was repulsed in an attempt to storm the camp of Gustavus at Werben; and afterwards by an impolitic endeavour to overawe the Elector of Saxony, who, as we have said, had excited the anger and suspicion of the Imperialists by the Leipsic Convention, he threw that Prince into the arms of Gustavus. The Imperialists, 40,000 or 50,000 strong, entered Saxony; Tilly proceeded with his usual ferocity, and when the Elector heard that 200 of his villages were in flames, he formed an alliance with Gustavus, and on the 5th of September joined the Swedes with an army of some 18,000 men. Tilly had entered Leipsic, but on the approach of Gustavus and John George he offered them battle at Breitenfeld, near that town. The BATTLE OF LEIPSIC, one of the most splendid victories of Gustavus Adolphus, was won entirely by the Swedes, September 7th, 1631; the Saxons, consisting of raw recruits, were speedily routed; the Elector, who had taken post in the rear, joined the flight with his body-guard, and stopped not till he reached Eilenburg; where he refreshed himself with a draught of beer. After an engagement of five hours, Tilly was completely defeated; he lost his guns and half his men, and he himself narrowly escaped with his life.

After this decisive victory Germany seemed to lie at the mercy of the Swedish King. Many were of opinion that he should have marched directly on Vienna, and among those who thought so were two of the most eminent statesmen of Europe, Richelieu and Gustavus's own chancellor, Oxenstiern. It does not, however, follow that the capture of Vienna would have put an end to the war. That capital had been taken before, yet Austria continued to subsist. Gustavus resolved to march to the Rhine: a course to

which he seems to have been determined by the advice of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar, by a pressing invitation from the Protestant States assembled at Frankfort-on-Main, and by the prospect of making the Catholic Bishops contribute to the support of his army. While the Saxons under Arnim were to proceed through Lusatia and Bohemia into Moravia, the Swedish King pressed on his march through the Thuringian forest, often continuing it at night by the light of torches. Tilly retired with the remnant of his forces by Halle into Westphalia; where he rallied all the dispersed bodies of Imperialists, intending to intercept the Swedes on their march through Franconia. A Swedish officer who preceded Gustavus, succeeded in gaining to his alliance the towns of Nuremberg, Ulm, and Strasburg; and Erfurt, Gotha, and all that lay on the road to Franconia, were occupied before the end of September. On the 13th of October, the Swedes appeared before Würzburg, which was soon captured, though the Castle held out till November 7th. Hanau was surprised; Frankfort opened its gates; Gustavus passed through the city, and on the same evening occupied Höchst (November 17th).

Tilly had in vain endeavoured to intercept the triumphant progress of the Swedes. He and Pappenheim had quarrelled; the latter had been offended by Tilly's ascribing to a mistake committed by him the loss of the battle of Leipsic. Pappenheim went into Westphalia, while Tilly, after a vain attempt to succour Würzburg, marched to Nuremberg. Gustavus heard, soon after his arrival at Höchst, that his enemies had separated: one portion of their force had been despatched to Bohemia, another to Bavaria, while the third and smallest portion remained in Franconia. Tilly, with tears, complained that Maximilian of Bavaria had forbidden him to undertake anything decisive, as his army formed the last reserve.¹ Yet Gustavus, who, on his march from Würzburg to Hanau, had only 7,500 foot and 4,000 cavalry, had never been seen so disturbed and indecisive as on the approach of Tilly.² Mentz surrendered to Gustavus, December 13th. The Emperor had observed, when he heard of the Swedish King's landing, that "he had got another little enemy;" and Gustavus had been called the "Snow King," whose forces, it was said, would melt away as he approached the south. It was, therefore, an extraordinary apparition to see him established, at Christmas, 1631, on the banks of the Rhine, the recognized head of Protestant Germany, accom-

¹ Khevenhiller, *Ann. Ferd.* Th. xi. S. 1884.

² Monro, *Expd. with McKay's Regiment*, pt. ii. p. 86.

panied by his consort, and surrounded by a crowd of Princes and ambassadors. His Chancellor, Oxenstiern, who brought thither some reinforcements from Prussia, viewed with dissatisfaction and alarm the many Princes who composed his staff. The Swedish arms appeared everywhere successful. Tott had completed the conquest of Mecklenburg by capturing Rostock, Wismar, and Dömitz; Horn, though beaten by Tilly at Bamberg, had succeeded in penetrating to the Neckar; Baner had taken possession of Magdeburg after its evacuation by Pappenheim; Duke Bernhard of Weimar had driven the enemy from the Lower Palatinate, with the exception of Frankenthal and Heidelberg; the Landgrave William IV. of Hesse had recovered his dominions, occupied Paderborn and Southern Westphalia, and raised a considerable army. Thus the greater part of Germany was in the hands of the Swedes and their allies. The Catholic League had been dissipated. Some of its members had lost their possessions to Gustavus; others had joined the Emperor, or thrown themselves into the arms of France. In February, 1632, the Elector Palatine Frederick V., at the invitation of Gustavus, joined that monarch at Frankfort-on-Main. He was received with great honour by Gustavus, whose behaviour, however, was equivocal. Frederick was in hopes that he should be restored to his dominions; but Gustavus was angry and disappointed at getting neither subsidies nor troops from Charles I., although that King was continually pressing for his brother-in-law's restoration. Frederick, however, continued to accompany the Swedish army, in the hope that he should at last obtain his rights.

But notwithstanding the apparently triumphant ascendancy of Gustavus Adolphus, clouds had already begun to obscure his success. He found that he could not rely upon the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, both of whom had joined him by compulsion; George William's minister, Schwarzenberg, a Catholic, was privately sold to the Emperor; Arnim, the commander of the Saxon army, an ex-colonel of Wallenstein's, remained secretly connected with his former general. When Arnim marched with the Saxons to Prague he did not disturb his old commander's tranquillity; he left his palaces and lands untouched; and when Wallenstein again assumed the supreme command, he made no attempt to hinder him from levying an army. John George he cajoled with the idea of making himself the head of a third party in Germany.

* The success of Gustavus had been more rapid and decisive than

Richelieu had hoped or expected, and seemed to threaten the existence of French influence in Germany. The Cardinal would rather have fomented the divisions in Germany by a league with the Duke of Bavaria and such other Catholic Princes and States as were opposed to the Emperor, than by assuming the protection of the German Protestants; but Maximilian still hesitated. The three ecclesiastical Electors had invoked the mediation of France in November. Louis XIII. and Richelieu had proceeded to Metz to reduce to obedience the Duke of Lorraine, who had placed some of his towns in the hands of the Imperialists, and had himself joined the army of Tilly. The French Court arrived at Metz soon after Gustavus had entered Mentz; and here Louis XIII. received the submission of the Duke of Lorraine, who had been advised to make his peace with the King. By the treaty of Vic, January 6th, 1632, Charles IV. of Lorraine descended from the rank of a Prince of the Empire to something very like a French vassal. He abandoned all intelligence with the Emperor and the King of Spain, promised to contract no alliance without the consent of Louis, and engaged not only to permit French forces to pass through Lorraine, but also to join them with his own. At Metz also arrived the now landless Bishop of Würzburg, to beseech the King and Cardinal for aid in the name of religion. A more important suppliant was Philip Christopher von Sötern, Archbishop and Elector of Treves. By the approach of Gustavus to the Rhine, and the entry of the French army into Lorraine, the Electorate of Treves was threatened on both sides. The Elector, who was at variance with his Chapter, by a treaty concluded with the French, December 21st, 1631, had made over to them the fortress of Philippsburg on the Rhine, in his Bishopric of Spires, also Coblenz and the opposite fortress of Hermannstein, now called Ehrenbreitstein. The French thus obtained a footing on the Rhine, which they maintained till the Peace of Westphalia. But the Chapter and municipality of Treves called in the Spaniards from the Netherlands, who anticipated the French in taking possession of Coblenz and Treves; and as France and Spain were then at peace, they could not, of course, be driven out without declaring war.

In this conjuncture, in which the views and interests of Louis and Gustavus seemed to clash, the Swedish King behaved with firmness and dignity. He declined an interview with Louis and Richelieu. He would make no concessions to those Princes of the Catholic League whose domains he had occupied, as the

Elector of Mentz and the Bishops of Würzburg and Worms; and he refused to restore them anything till a general peace. He reserved the right of punishing the Bishop of Bamberg, alleging that he had violated his capitulation. Towards the other members of the League he agreed to observe neutrality, and to restore what he had taken from the Duke of Bavaria and the Electors of Treves and Cologne, except Spire; but he demanded in return that the Duke of Bavaria and his allies should restore all that they had taken from the Protestants since 1618; though a brief delay was to be accorded to arrange, under the mediation of France and England, an accommodation between Maximilian and the Palatine.

The Duke of Bavaria could not resign himself to these conditions; he beat about to gain time and raise troops, and thus brought the storm of war upon his dominions. Gustavus, after a rapid march into Franconia, where he punished the Bishop of Bamberg, pursued Tilly and his retreating army into Bavaria. The Danube was passed at Donauwörth without opposition; but Tilly, strongly posted at the little town of Rain, disputed the passage of the Lech. The Swedes, under cover of their guns, with difficulty threw a bridge across that rapid stream, and succeeded in passing, despite the furious resistance of Tilly (April 15th): a cannon-ball having carried away that commander's thigh, the Bavarians abandoned their position. Maximilian, who came up towards evening, ordered a retreat to Ingolstadt, where on the following day the veteran Tilly died of his wound. Maximilian now took the sole command, and determined to procrastinate the war till he should be helped by the Imperialists.

After the battle of Leipsic Ferdinand II. had looked around in various quarters for assistance. He had invoked Spain, the Pope, the King of Poland, the Italian Princes, his son Ferdinand, now King of Hungary; but none of these could afford him any effectual succour. The only chance of safety seemed to be to recall the Duke of Friedland. The Emperor had remained on friendly terms with Wallenstein after his dismissal, and continued to address him as "Duke of Mecklenburg, Friedland, and Sagan." Wallenstein was first sounded about resuming the command in October, but he excused himself, pleading indisposition from gout; and the Emperor was compelled to make the most humble and pressing appeal to him for assistance. It was not till towards the end of December that he consented to raise another army, when he engaged to serve for three months only, declining,

however, the title of *generalissimo* and all the emoluments of the office. His conduct resembled that of a coquette, who seeks by feigned reluctance to enhance the value of her favours. As the term of the three months drew nigh, and the advance of the Swedes inspired fresh alarm, the Emperor's solicitations that Wallenstein should continue in command were redoubled. The sound of his drum attracted recruits from all quarters, and he was soon at the head of 40,000 men. The time was come when he might make his own terms. He drew up a capitulation for the Emperor's signature which seemed to reverse the situation of sovereign and subject. He insisted on being absolute commander, not only of the Imperial, but also of the Spanish troops in Germany; he stipulated that the Emperor's son, Ferdinand,¹ should not appear in the army, still less hold any command in it, and that when Bohemia was recovered he should reside at Prague, under a Spanish guard of 12,000 men, till a general peace was effected. Wallenstein demanded as his reward an Imperial hereditary estate, together with many other rights and privileges. No Imperial pardon or reward was to be valid except it was confirmed by Wallenstein, and he alone was to have the bestowal of confiscated lands. The Duke and his private interests, particularly his lost Duchy of Mecklenburg, were to be considered and provided for in any general peace. In short, Wallenstein usurped some of his Sovereign's most important functions; yet, such was Ferdinand's necessity, he submitted with apparent cheerfulness to all his general's demands; in which the latter might not unnaturally find a little satisfaction for the affront put upon him by his dismissal two years before, as well as a means of securing himself from any future caprices of the Emperor.

Before the end of May Wallenstein had driven the Saxons under Arnim from the greater part of Bohemia. Meanwhile Gustavus was pushing on his conquests. After a fruitless attempt on Ingolstadt, where his horse was shot under him, the Swedish King occupied Augsburg, and caused the citizens to do homage to him; and he prized as one of his highest triumphs the restoration of Protestantism in this cradle of its infancy. He then entered Bavaria, where, however, he encountered a formidable resistance from the fanaticism of the peasantry, forming a strong contrast to the reception he had met with in other parts of Germany. Munich was entered May 17th, and the Elector Palatine, who accompanied the Swedes, had the transitory satisfaction of

¹ Förster, *Wallenstein*, S. 179.

passing a brief time in the capital of his arch-enemy. Hence Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar was despatched with the van towards Tyrol. Vienna was in consternation; even Italy began to tremble. Wallenstein had now an opportunity to indulge his grudge against Maximilian, the principal author of his disgrace. The Duke of Bavaria found himself reduced to congratulate on his success the man whom he had so loudly denounced at Ratisbon, and to solicit his aid. Prague had been recovered early in May, and it would have been easy for Wallenstein to march into Bavaria; but he did not stir a foot till towards the end of June, and then on conditions the most humiliating to Maximilian. The Duke of Bavaria, who was in the Upper Palatinate with his army, was obliged to make a virtue of necessity, and put himself under the control of an upstart *condottiere* like Wallenstein. When they met at Eger all eyes were turned on two such enemies to note their bearing; and the inquisitive remarked that his Serene Highness the Elector had learned the art of dissembling better than the Duke of Friedland.¹ After the junction of their armies Wallenstein assumed the chief command. Gustavus, who had in vain endeavoured to prevent this junction, now hastened to seize Nuremberg, leaving Bernhard of Weimar and General Baner to protect his conquests in Bavaria and Upper Suabia. Nuremberg offered him many advantages both in a strategical and tactical point of view. He could easily communicate there with his allies both in North and South Germany, while the situation of the place rendered it easy of defence; and the town, with its immediate environs, was converted into one vast fortified camp, capable of sheltering 50,000 men. But Wallenstein, with equal tact, took up a position which neutralized all these advantages. On a height called the *Alte Feste*, a few miles north of Nuremberg, he also established a fortified camp, whence he infested the convoys and communications of the Swedes. Here the two great captains of the Thirty Years' War sat nine weeks watching each other. Wallenstein's forces were the more numerous; but, being mostly composed of raw recruits, he resolved to stand on the defensive. Gustavus, whose army, after calling in Duke Bernhard, Baner, and other generals, with their forces, amounted to the number mentioned, found difficulty in feeding them; and having in vain offered battle at the foot of the wooded height where

¹ "Doch haben die *curiosi* vermerkt, dass Ihre Kurfürstliche Durchlaucht die Kunst zu *dissimuliren* besser als der

Herzog gelernt."—Khevenhiller, B. xii. S. 24. .

Wallenstein was encamped, he was rash enough to attack the position; but after an assault which lasted ten hours, and in which every regiment in the Swedish army was successively engaged, he was repulsed with the loss of several thousand men (August 24th), and the capture of Torstenson, one of his best generals. In this affair the sole of Gustavus's boot was carried away by a cannon-ball. It was his first failure of any importance, and increased the reputation of Wallenstein. How critical the situation of the Swedish King was may be judged from the circumstance of his sending to Wallenstein proposals for peace; and the communications which passed between the two commanders on this occasion afterwards afforded the Court of Vienna a pretext for charging Wallenstein with having held a treasonable correspondence with Gustavus.¹ A fortnight afterwards (September 7th) Gustavus broke up from his entrenched camp, and again took the road to Bavaria, in the hope of inducing Wallenstein to follow him, and of thus saving Saxony. Maximilian separated from Wallenstein at Coburg, and marched to Ratisbon to defend his dominions, while Wallenstein proceeded into Saxony. Gustavus was preparing to besiege Ingoldstadt, when he received a pressing message for assistance from the Saxon Elector, and immediately took the road through Nuremberg, sending his Queen with three brigades of infantry by Schweinfurt. They met at Erfurt towards the end of October. When Gustavus reviewed his army at this place, he found that he had only 12,000 infantry and 6,500 horse. He was never, indeed, desirous of large forces, and he was accustomed to say that all above 40,000 men were an incumbrance; while Wallenstein, on the contrary, had a maxim that the Deity favoured strong battalions.² But though Gustavus's force was small compared with that of his adversary, it must be remembered that the Swedish army was composed of veteran troops of the best description, including a large body of British soldiers. In the campaign of 1632 Gustavus had in his service six British generals, thirty colonels, and fifty-one lieutenant-colonels.³

The Elector of Saxony was in a critical situation. The Saxon army under Arnim was in Silesia when the Elector's territories were entered by Wallenstein's troops, who had occupied Leipsic

¹ Förster's *Wallenstein*, S. 190 f. The barbarity of the war is shown by Wallenstein's rejecting another proposal of Gustavus, that quarter should be given, as in the Netherlands. *Ibid.*

² Harte, *Gust. Adolphus*, Introd. p. xxxviii.

³ *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 210. On this subject see Burnet's *Memoirs of the Dukes of Hamilton*, p. 16 sqq. (ed. 1677).

before the approach of the Swedes. The march of the latter, however, had been so rapid that Wallenstein was astonished to hear they were at Naumburg early in November. Gustavus had taken a tender leave of his wife at Erfurt, apparently not without forebodings of his impending death. Wallenstein had no idea that he should be attacked at that advanced season : he was putting his troops into winter-quarters, and had detached Pappenheim to the Rhine with a large force, though with orders to seize Halle on his way ; and he was at the latter place when he received an order from Wallenstein to rejoin the main body.¹ The Swedes had advanced through Weissenfels to Lützen, and stood in battle array on the great plain which stretches from that place to Leipsic (November. 16th). Wallenstein's infantry was drawn up in heavy masses to the north of the high road, the ditches of which had been deepened to serve as breastworks ; his right wing rested on the village of Lützen and the windmills before it ; his left stretched far along the plain, almost to the canal which connects the Elster and the Saal. It was on this side that Pappenheim was to join. To the left of the infantry were drawn up in strong squadrons Piccolomini's cuirassiers ; on the right were also large masses of cavalry, and again more infantry ; while at the extremities of each wing were posted the Croats. In front of the line, on the high road, was planted a battery of seven guns ; the remainder of the artillery was spread along the front in an oblique direction from the windmills. Wallenstein's strength has been variously estimated. He himself, in a letter to the Emperor after the battle, rated it at only 12,000 men, which is incontestably too low. It probably consisted of near 30,000 men. The Swedes were drawn up, as at Leipsic, in two lines ; the infantry in each six deep ; the cavalry on each wing, interspersed with platoons of musketeers. Gustavus himself led the right wing, consisting of six cavalry regiments, and was thus opposed to Piccolomini's cuirassiers ; Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar commanded the left wing, also composed of six cavalry regiments. Behind the infantry were two regiments in reserve, under Henderson, a Scotsman. Such were the preparations for the BATTLE OF LUTZEN.

After offering up a prayer, the Swedish troops sung Luther's hymn (*Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott*) ; and Gustavus then addressed them in those flowing words which, Richelieu observes, he had always at command ; while Wallenstein by his looks alone,

¹ The letter, stained with Pappenheim's blood, is preserved in the Archives of Vienna. Förster, *Wallenstein's Briefe*, B. ii. S. 273.

and the sternness of his silence, gave his men to understand that he would either reward or punish them according to his custom.¹ Gustavus, after concluding his address, which was received with loud cheers and the clash of arms, cried out, as he raised his eyes to Heaven, "And now, my hearts, let us bravely on against our enemies! Jesu, Jesu, let us fight to-day for the honour of Thy holy Name!" which said, he drew his sword, and waving it over his head while he gave the word "Forwards!" he himself advanced in front of all his army.²

Just at this moment Lützen was seen to be in flames; for Wallenstein, as a contemporary writer observes, usually marked his advance "like Jupiter in the poet, all in thunder and lightning, all in fire and tempest."³ The sun, which broke through the fog about ten o'clock, enabled the cannonade to begin. The Swedish infantry of the centre, led by Count Nils Brahe, passed the high road under a murderous fire, broke two columns of the enemy's infantry, and were attacking the third, when they were repulsed by the reserve and the cavalry. Gustavus now ordered a charge against the dark and threatening masses of the Imperial cuirassiers, clothed from head to foot in black armour; and putting himself at the head of the Smaaland horse, whose colonel had been wounded, he led the attack in person. His ardour carried him beyond his troops, and the fog again coming on, he got entangled, with two or three attendants, among the enemy's cuirassiers. His horse was shot in the neck, and a pistol ball having shattered his arm—for that day he wore no armour on account of a recent wound—he besought the Duke of Lauenburg to conduct him from the field. At this moment another shot brought him to the ground, and his horse dragged him some way by the stirrup. Lauenburg⁴ fled; of the King's two grooms, one had been killed, the other wounded; the only attendant who remained with him was a German youth of eighteen, named Leubelfing, who died a few days after of some wounds he had received. In his last moments Leubelfing testified that as the King lay on the ground, some of the enemy's cuirassiers rode up and asked who he was? The youth, pretending not to know, replied, he supposed it was some officer; but the King made himself known,

¹ Richelieu, *Mém.* t. iii. p. 258. Richelieu's account of this battle is a literal translation of the Report sent by Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar to Louis XIII. It is also in the Appendix to Förster's *Wallenstein's Briefe*, B. ii. S. 336.

² *Swedish Intelligencer*, pt. iii. p. 127.

³ *Idem*, pt. ii. p. 238.

⁴ It was universally believed by the Swedes, and has been asserted by some of their gravest historians, that it was the Duke of Lauenburg who shot the King; a story now rejected by the most competent inquirers.

when a cuirassier shot him through the head; others gave him some sword thrusts, and stripped him to his shirt. Leubelfing was also wounded for his evasion. The battle was still raging when Pappenheim came up with part of his cavalry. Soon after his appearance on the field, that commander was shot by Colonel Stålhanske, who had just borne off from the fray the dead body of Gustavus.¹ The arrival of Pappenheim's troops served to prolong the struggle; but the Swedes, now under command of Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, enraged by the death of their King, fought with a fury and desperation which nothing could resist; after a bloody struggle of nine hours Wallenstein's troops at last gave way, carrying away with them in their flight Pappenheim's infantry, which had come up about sunset.

Thus perished, in his thirty-eighth year, Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, the greatest Sovereign of his age. That his expedition into Germany was partly prompted by a love of glory and conquest can scarcely be doubted; his incessant wars, the part which he personally played in them, his professed admiration of Cæsar and Alexander, show him animated with the spirit of a conqueror. But his best title to immortality is, that he set a bound to religious persecution; and it is for this, as a Swedish historian observes, that all mankind may reckon him among their heroes.² His feats in arms and politics may be gathered from the preceding narrative; his more private and homely virtues may be described in the words of an adversary: "Never has a general been served," says Gualdo Priorato,³ "with more love and admiration; he made all content by giving them their due praise, by the friendly words which he addressed to them, and the hopes which he held out. Good services and deeds of valour remained ineffaceably on his memory. His conversation was lively and playful, his behaviour unostentatious and condescending towards everybody; he often anticipated people's wishes, and would ask what they were doing, how they were getting on, and what they wished. He was accustomed to say that the table was a good substitute for torture in the extracting of secrets, and served as a net to catch friendship and goodwill. He hated ceremony and flattery beyond all measure; and, when a man unacquainted with his disposition thought to employ them with him, he would say

¹ Geijer, B. iii. S. 235. Pappenheim died at Leipsic a day or two after of his wound.

² Geijer, B. iii. S. 247 sqq.

³ *Hist. delle Guerre di Ferdinando II.*

lib. v. p. 157 (ed. 1640). Gualdo Priorato, a Catholic and Italian, served a long while under Wallenstein in the Imperial army.

in a good-tempered joking manner, that "these elegances had better be kept for the ladies of the Queen."

The Finnish cavalry, under Stålhanske, who had rescued the King's body from the field, found it lying with the face towards the ground, trampled on, and disfigured with blood and wounds. They brought it on an ammunition waggon to the village of Meuchen in the Swedish rear, where a tradition is still preserved of its fate. At midnight a service was read over it in the village church, and a Swedish officer pronounced a funeral oration. The schoolmaster of the place, who was also a joiner by trade, made for it a simple coffin, in which it was conveyed to Weissenfels to be embalmed. One of the King's grooms, who had been wounded at his side, came with the corpse, and when he was convalescent, attempted, with the help of thirteen peasants, to roll a huge granite boulder to the spot where Gustavus had fallen, but they could not get it so far. The true place where Gustavus died, was forty paces further on, a balk or ridge formerly marked by an acacia tree. The boulder is still called "the Swede's stone." The King's body was afterwards carried to Stockholm.¹

The account of the battle transmitted by Wallenstein to the Imperial Court, led Ferdinand to think that he had won the day. A *Te Deum* was sung at Vienna and other places "for the glorious victory at Lützen;" while at Madrid popular festivals were given in honour of the occasion, and a melodrama, in which the death of Gustavus Adolphus was represented, was performed a dozen times before the Court. But meanwhile the reputed conqueror was glad to shelter himself behind the mountains of the Bohemian frontier. After the battle, Wallenstein found it necessary to evacuate Saxony in all haste; and, leaving garrisons at Leipsic, Plauen, Zwickau, Chemnitz, Freiberg, Meissen, and Frauenstein, he reached Bohemia without further loss, and put his army into winter-quarters. After his arrival at Prague, he caused many of his officers to be put to death for their conduct at Lützen, among whom were several who belonged to families of distinction, nor would he allow them to plead the Emperor's pardon. A few he rewarded. The harshness of his proceedings increased the hatred already felt for him by many of his officers, and especially the Italian portion of them, who gave him the name of *Il Tiranno*, or the Tyrant.²

Axel Oxenstiern, the Swedish Chancellor, succeeded, on the death of Gustavus Adolphus, to the supreme direction of the

¹ Geijer, B. iii. S. 239 f.

² Försten, *Wallenstein*, S. 209.

affairs of Sweden in Germany, and was invested by the Council at Stockholm with full powers both to direct the army and to negotiate with the German Courts. Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, retained the military command of the Swedish-German army, divisions of which were cantoned from the Baltic to the Danube. After driving the Imperialists from Saxony, Bernhard had hastened into Franconia, where the Bishoprics of Würzburg and Bamberg, according to a promise of Gustavus, were to be erected in his favour into a secular Duchy; but, after taking Bamberg, his assistance was invoked by General Horn, on the Upper Danube.

One of the first cares of Oxenstiern was to consolidate the German alliance; and, in March, 1633, he summoned a meeting at Heilbronn of the States of the four Circles of the Upper and Lower Rhine, Franconia, and Suabia, including of course deputies from Nuremberg, Strasburg, Frankfort, Ulm, Augsburg, and other Imperial cities. The assembly was also attended by ambassadors from France, England, and Holland; and on April 9th was effected the Union of Heilbronn. Brandenburg and Saxony stood aloof; nor was France, though she renewed the alliance with Sweden, included in the Union. The French minister at Heilbronn assisted, however, in the formation of the Union, although he endeavoured to limit the power of Oxenstiern, to whom the conduct of the war was intrusted. At the same time the Swedes also concluded a treaty with the Palatinate, now governed, or rather claimed to be governed, by Louis Philip, brother of the Elector Frederick V., as guardian and regent for the latter's youthful son, Charles Louis. The unfortunate Frederick had expired at Mentz in his thirty-seventh year, not many days after the death of Gustavus Adolphus. He had always rejected the hard conditions on which the Swedish King had offered to restore him; nor were those now accepted by Louis Philip much more favourable. Swedish garrisons were to be maintained in Frankenthal, Bacharach, Kaub, and other places; Mannheim was to be at the disposal of the Swedes so long as the war should last; and the Palatinate, besides paying a heavy contribution, was to be subject to all the burdens incident to the quartering of troops. Moreover, he was to give equal liberty to the Lutheran and Calvinist worship.

After the junction of Duke Bernhard with Horn, the Swedish army—for so we shall continue to call it, though composed in great part of Germans—endeavoured to penetrate into Bavaria; but the Imperial General Altringer, aided by John von Werth,

a commander of distinction, succeeded in covering Munich, and enabled Maximilian to return to his capital. The Swedish generals were also embarrassed by a mutiny of their mercenaries, as well as by their own misunderstandings and quarrels; and all that Duke Bernhard was able to accomplish in the campaign of 1633, besides some forays into Bavaria, was the capture of Ratisbon in November. Meanwhile Wallenstein, engrossed with building and planting at Gitschin and his other estates in Bohemia, had not crossed the frontiers of that Kingdom; and hostilities there were terminated by a truce which he concluded with Arnim, the commander of the Saxon army, June 7th, 1633; a step taken both by Wallenstein and Arnim without the knowledge of their respective Courts. Wallenstein also made proposals of peace to the Swedes, by whom, however, they were regarded only as a blind and deception;¹ and he entered into secret negotiations with the Marquis of Feuquières, the French ambassador extraordinary to the Protestant Powers of Germany, in order to obtain the help of France in procuring for himself the Crown of Bohemia. These negotiations have been represented by Wallenstein's defenders as only a snare laid for the French Court; but, however this may be, it is certain that Louis XIII. promised to assist him in his ambitious plans.² After the capture of Ratisbon, Wallenstein thought proper to display at least an attempt to aid Maximilian by entering the Upper Palatinate; but though he drew Duke Bernhard and Horn from Bavaria, the lateness of the season prevented any operations of importance, and after a little while he returned into Bohemia.

Wallenstein's unauthorized negotiations with Arnim, the Swedes, and Feuquières, had naturally roused the suspicion of the Imperial Court; a suspicion strengthened by the rigid capitulation he had exacted on reassuming the command, and by the jealousy he had displayed in excluding from any share of power the Emperor's son Ferdinand, King of Hungary. Wallenstein had moreover a strong party against him both at the Court of Vienna and in his own army, consisting of the priests and Jesuits who directed the Emperor's conscience, and of the Spanish, Italian, and Belgian officers who were subjects of Spain. He had

¹ Chemnitz, ap. Förster, *Wallenstein*, p. 214. Chemnitz, the Swedish historiographer, wrote his work under the inspection of Oxenstiern.

² See *Mémoire envoyé par le commandement du Roi au Sr de Feuquières, touchant l'affaire résolue au conseil d'état*

à Chantilly le 16 Juillet, 1633, ap. Menzel, B. iv. S. 120. See also for these negotiations, Siri, *Mem. reconditæ*, t. viii. p. 42 sqq.; Barthold, *Gesch. des grossen deutschen Krieges*, B. i. Kap. v.; Förster, *Wallenstein's Briefe*, B. iii. S. 401 ff.

given offence to the Emperor by neglecting his express orders, and returning into Bohemia instead of attempting to retake Ratisbon. Hence Ferdinand II. formed the resolution of depriving Wallenstein of his command; though he seems to have adopted it with reluctance, as he first of all sent Count Quëstenberg, whom he knew to be acceptable to Wallenstein, to endeavour to persuade him to march into Bavaria. Through his secret agents, Wallenstein was acquainted with all the Emperor's plans. In order to defeat them, he called early in January, 1634, a council of his officers at Pilsen; and through Field-Marshal Ilow, who was entirely devoted to him, he obtained from them an opinion that it would be impossible to march into Bavaria before the spring. But Wallenstein went further than this. He told his colonels he was so disgusted with the Court of Vienna that he was determined to lay down his command; a communication which was received with great dissatisfaction and anger. Most of his officers had spent all their substance in raising men and fitting themselves out; they looked to maintain themselves by the war; and if Wallenstein resigned they could expect no compensation from the Emperor. Led by Ilow and Count Terzka they protested against such an act; they reminded their commander of his promise to stand by them; and on the 12th of January, after a dinner at which the bottle had circulated freely, they signed a paper requiring Wallenstein to keep the army together, and promising to stand by him to the last drop of their blood. This document bore the signatures of forty superior officers, including Piccolomini's, who was no friend of Wallenstein.

It was this step, of which Wallenstein seems afterwards to have repented, that proved his destruction. Wallenstein, as we have said, had many enemies. Not among the least of them was Duke Maximilian of Bavaria, who had advised Wallenstein's dismissal in December, and who, towards the end of January, sent to the Emperor a detailed account of Wallenstein's practices, at the same time beseeching him to adopt some "sudden and heroical resolution."¹ The counsellors by whom Ferdinand was surrounded, and who possessed his ear, offered the same advice with perhaps more effect. Such were the Archbishop of Vienna, the Emperor's confessor Lamormain, Counts Eggenberg, Trautmannsdorf, and Schlick, the Emperor's son Ferdinand, and others. The Spanish ambassador Ôñate was one of the

¹ Förster, *Wallenstein*, S. 257.

foremost in these counsels; he blamed the Emperor's delays, and suggested that a dagger or a pistol ball would at once untie the knot.¹ It was some time before Ferdinand's confidence in his general could be shaken. At length secret commands were issued to Piccolomini and some of the officers known to be dissatisfied with Wallenstein, to withdraw from him the obedience of the troops, to incite them against him, and to transfer the command to General Gallas. On the 24th of January the Emperor issued a declaration, releasing the officers and soldiers of Wallenstein's army from all allegiance towards their general, and granting a pardon to all who had signed the document at Pilsen, with the exception of the Duke of Friedland himself, Ilow, and Terzka. This document was despatched to Gallas, with orders to seize the Duke of Friedland and bring him to some place where he might be put on his defence; and at all events to get possession of his person, whether dead or alive. Piccolomini, whom Wallenstein held to be his best friend, as the astrologers had cast the same nativity for both, and who could therefore, it was thought, the more easily deceive him, was ordered to enter, in a friendly manner, the town of Pilsen, with 2,000 cavalry and 1,000 dragoons, and there to lay snares against the Duke's life.² One of the worst features in this transaction is, that the Emperor, with extraordinary hypocrisy, continued a friendly correspondence with Wallenstein for three weeks after he had thus secretly deposed and outlawed him; and in his last letter, dated February 13th, 1634, only twelve days before Wallenstein's murder, particularly recommends Bohemia to his care, to the Crown of which country he was accused of aspiring.

It was not till the date of this last letter that Gallas issued public orders to the army no longer to obey the commands of Wallenstein, or his adherents Ilow and Terzka, but instead of them either his own, or those of Altringer and Piccolomini. Soon afterwards (February 20th) orders came from Vienna to employ force, and secret instructions were issued for the confiscation of Wallenstein's possessions: the grounds assigned being Wallenstein's and Terzka's "perjured rebellion and flight to the enemy," though they were still at Pilsen. On that very day Wallenstein had drawn up a document to explain and justify that of January 12th, in which he declared that it was not his wish that anything should be undertaken against the Emperor, or to the

¹ Forster, *Wallenstein*, S. 253, note.

² *Insidiare alla vita del duca.*—Siri, *Mem. reconq.* t. viii. p. 50.

detriment of religion. This paper was signed by himself and many of his adherents. He also required that his officers should continue to respect him as their generalissimo, as he had received no dismissal from the Emperor, and the order of Gallas he could only regard as an act of mutiny against himself. A day or two after he despatched two envoys to Vienna to assure the Emperor "that he was ready to lay down the command, and to appear and answer the charges against him wherever the Emperor might appoint." But both these envoys were arrested by Piccolomini and Diodati, and Ferdinand did not receive the message till Wallenstein was already dead.¹

When Wallenstein heard of the schemes against his power and his life—for he opened all secrets with a golden key—he resolved to proceed to the fortress of Eger, near the Bohemian frontier, where he thought he should be safer, as its commandant was one Gordon, a Scotchman, colonel of a regiment of his devoted friend and adherent Count Terzka. When tidings reached Wallenstein that the Imperial declaration had been openly posted at Prague, he left Pilsen, February 22nd, travelling in a litter on account of his gout, and taking with him only a few troops. The generals of the Spanish-Italian party, Piccolomini, Gallas, Maradas, Caretto, Marquis of Grana, and others, now broke up on all sides in order to follow him, and Diodati and Tavigni entered Pilsen without opposition. Wallenstein arrived at Eger on the afternoon of the 24th February with a few coaches and baggage-waggons, accompanied by his brother-in-law Count Kinsky, Terzka, Ilow, and Captain Neumann. He was escorted by two troops of cavalry, and 200 dragoons, commanded by Colonel Butler, an Irishman, who was already prepared to betray him, and who gave Piccolomini notice of all Wallenstein's movements.

At Eger, Wallenstein was lodged in the house of the burgo-master on the market-place, while apartments were assigned to Terzka, Kinsky, and their wives, in the back building which usually forms part of a German dwelling. On his road from Pilsen Wallenstein had determined to go over to the enemy, as his only chance of safety, and he had opened communications to that effect with Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar; which, however, from a suspicion of his real intentions, were coldly received. On arriving at Eger, he immediately opened himself to Gordon and his lieutenant Leslie, another Scot, as well as to Butler, whom he thought to be his friends, and especially Gordon, to whom he had

¹ Förster, *Wallenstein*, S. 274.

given a regiment only a little while before; he acquainted them with his intention of going over to the enemy, and left them to decide whether they would follow him or not. Gordon and Leslie promised to stand by him; but when, in Gordon's apartments in the Castle, Butler acquainted them with the Imperial declaration, and the orders of Gallas and Piccolomini, and painted to them in glowing colours the rewards and the booty they would obtain by betraying their general, they swore, with drawn swords, to kill the Duke of Friedland and the friends who accompanied him, and resolved that the assassination of the latter should be accomplished at a carnival feast to which they were to be invited by Gordon on the following evening.

Butler engaged in the plot Fitzgerald, the major of his regiment, with Captains M'Donald, Birch, Brown, and Devereux, and Pestaluz, a captain in Terzka's regiment; and Butler it was who also arranged all the details of the murder. At six o'clock on the evening of February 25th, Terzka, Kinsky, Ilow, and Neumann went together in a coach to Gordon's apartments in the Citadel, where they were received by the three conspirators; the drawbridge was raised behind the unsuspecting guests, who soon found themselves seated at a well-furnished table. In an apartment adjoining the banqueting-room was stationed Captain Devereux with twenty-four dragoons; in another, Major Fitzgerald, with six more. The servants of the guests had been sent away; the dinner was ended, the dessert served up, when about eight o'clock a preconcerted signal was given to the soldiers. On a sudden Fitzgerald, followed by his men, enters at one door, crying, "Long live the House of Austria!" on the other side appears Devereux, shouting, "Who's for the Emperor?" At these words Butler, Gordon, and Leslie seize each a candlestick, and drawing their swords, cry, *Vivat Ferdinandus!* The dragoons now rush upon their victims; Kinsky falls first under their blows; Ilow is stabbed in the back while taking his sword from the wall; Terzka alone succeeds in reaching his weapon. Planting himself in a corner of the room, he challenges in vain his treacherous hosts to mortal combat; two of the dragoons he cuts down, breaks Devereux's sword, and, protected by his doublet of elk-leather, holds out so long that his assailants take him to be, like Wallenstein, "frozen," or wound-proof. At last he falls. Neumann, after receiving some wounds, escaped from the apartment, but, not knowing the watchword, was cut down by the guard. When the bloody work was done, Butler, Gordon, and Leslie took counsel

together, and resolved to complete their plot by the murder of Wallenstein, who had remained at his quarters in the town. The execution of it was intrusted to Devereux and six of his dragoons. Butler undertook to guard the burgomaster's house and the market-place; Leslie meanwhile administered to the main guard, who belonged to Terzka's regiment, a new oath of fidelity to the Emperor, and a hundred dragoons patrolled the streets to prevent any attempt at rescue.

It was midnight. Wallenstein had been engaged in surveying the stars, and considered the constellations favourable; but Scni, his astrologer, was of opinion that the danger was not yet over. The Duke had not long retired to bed when he was startled by a noise in the street. Devereux had obtained admission into the house on pretence of delivering a message to Wallenstein, but was stopped in an ante-room by a valet, who begged him not to disturb his master's sleep. Devereux demanded with threats and imprecations the key of the Duke's apartments; and, on the valet delaying, burst open the door by force, and, followed by his dragoons, entered the Duke's room. Wallenstein, alarmed by the shrieks of Terzka's and Kinsky's wives, who had just learnt the murder of their husbands, had rushed to the window to inquire of the sentinels the cause of the tumult: at the entrance of the soldiers he turns, and, as Devereux exclaims, "You must die!" receives, with outstretched arms, a mortal thrust in his bosom. Next came the scene of plunder. Wallenstein's property was divided like the spoils of a conquered enemy. Piccolomini seized his military chest, his plate waggons, his horses, his baggage; and from the proceeds every man in the army was presented with two ducats. His officers vied with one another in endeavouring to obtain some part of the Duke's vast confiscated possessions; and among them Caretto, Marquis of Grana, distinguished himself by the meanness and importunity of his solicitations.

From meaner criminals our eyes involuntarily revert to the Emperor himself. There are, perhaps, few Princes of the House of Habsburg who have exhibited in a more striking light than Ferdinand II, the misery and weakness of an Empire supported, not by the affection of subjects, but by military power; and the wickedness to which a conscience may be seduced, which substitutes for the dictates of morality and true religion the advice of interested priests, and the casuistry of Jesuits and confessors. The death of Wallenstein is one of the basest political murders ever committed by the House of Austria. Not that we

hold, with his German biographer, that Wallenstein was innocent up to the last moment of his flight from Pilsen. We think, on the contrary, that from the Duke's whole conduct after his resumption of the command—the arrogant capitulation which he extorted, his constant refusal to obey orders from Vienna, his inactivity in Bohemia during the campaign of 1633, his negotiations and treaties with the Saxons, Swedes, and French,¹ and, lastly, the paper which he procured his generals to sign at Pilsen—the only inference which can be drawn is, that, as he had clearly set himself above the duties and obligations of a subject, it was his intention to extort from the Emperor, either through fear or force, the position of a Sovereign and independent Prince of the Empire, if not the Crown of Bohemia. But, on the other hand, it must be recollected that such designs had not been proved against him; that, as he had a large party against him in his own army, it might have been as easy to seize him and put him on his trial as to get rid of him by a base and cowardly murder, as was indeed shown by the ease with which the assassination was effected—for Wallenstein was served rather through fear than affection; above all, Ferdinand was bound to observe the greatest forbearance and generosity towards a man to whom he had twice owed the safety of his Crown. Yet he not only sanctioned Wallenstein's assassination, but also publicly praised and rewarded his murderers. Leslie, who brought him the report of what had been done at Eger, was made a chamberlain, a captain in the Imperial body-guard, and colonel of a regiment belonging to King Ferdinand. Butler was also received at the Hofburg with distinguished marks of approbation and honour; Ferdinand gave him his hand, caused the Archbishop of Vienna to place a gold chain round his neck, created him a Count and chamberlain, and presented him with some of the estates of Terzka in Bohemia. Colonel Gordon obtained the possessions of Count Kinsky. Devereux, who had stabbed Wallenstein with his own hand, received from the Emperor a gold chain, a present in money, and some confiscated property in Bohemia. Yet, while Ferdinand was thus rewarding the instruments of his crime, his superstition made him tremble for the consequences which it might have entailed on his victims; and, tortured by pangs of conscience, he paid for 3,000 masses to

¹ The Emperor appears to have been informed by the Duke of Savoy of Wallenstein's negotiations with the French Court; although, for political reasons, no mention was made of them in the Em-

peror's justification of the proceedings taken against Wallenstein. See Freiberg, *Neue Beiträge zur vaterländischen Gesch.* ap. Menzel, B. iv. S. 120.

redeem the souls which he had hurried into Purgatory unprepared, and with all their sins upon them !¹

A modern writer² has endeavoured to clear Ferdinand's memory from the charge of having authorized Wallenstein's murder ; but, as it appears to us, with more of that specious wire-drawing, with which some German writers can spin out long chapters in attempting to controvert a generally received opinion, than with any convincing result. His principal argument is, that the Imperial warrant, directing Wallenstein to be taken *dead or alive*, is not extant ; but this document may easily have vanished after a lapse of two or three centuries ; nay, may have been destroyed by command of the Emperor himself. It is hardly probable that Piccolomini and the rest of Ferdinand's officers should have taken upon themselves to authorize such a deed without his sanction, as he himself would surely be suspected of it. The murder seems to have been a common topic of conversation some time before it was perpetrated, which shows a prevailing opinion that at least it would not be disagreeable to the Emperor ; and, after it was done, it was commonly attributed to him. It is a damning fact that he rewarded with honours and emoluments the actual murderers, thus rendering himself an accomplice after the fact, and showing that he must have considered it desirable beforehand ; so that, in a moral point of view, the difference in criminality is small. Although not sanguinary by nature, a conscience like Ferdinand's, directed by Jesuits, and steeled by precedents in his own house, as well as by the lax political morality of the age, might easily have been led to such an act ; and the masses he ordered for Wallenstein's soul, for the welfare of which he, if guiltless, was not concerned, seem rather to have been intended as an expiation for his own crime.

The confusion which necessarily ensued in the Imperial army upon the murder of the generalissimo and his companions, and the apprehension of many other officers, was at length calmed by the dismissal of all suspected commanders, and by giving the dissatisfied regiments three months' pay ; after which, the Emperor's son, King Ferdinand, was appointed to the chief command, but under the direction of General Gallas. Neither the Swedes nor the Saxons took advantage of the conjuncture to attempt anything against the Imperialists ; and indeed the whole campaign of 1634 offers but few events of importance besides the battle of

¹ Förster, *Wallenstein*, S. 307.

² Hurter, *Wallenstein's vier letzte Lebensjahre*, xv^{tes} Buch.

Nördlingen. The Saxons under Arnim, in conjunction with the Swedes under Baner, gained a victory at Liegnitz, May 13th, which enabled them to invest Prague; but Arnim, who was negotiating with the Emperor for a peace, at length refused to assist Baner, and both generals evacuated Bohemia. Duke Bernhard had been more intent on establishing his Duchy of Franconia than on the progress of the war; the Swedish general Horn had obtained some successes in Suabia, and was preparing to invade the Austrian dominions when he was compelled to join Bernhard, threatened by the forces of Maximilian. The Duke of Bavaria assembled in the spring an army at Ingoldstadt, which, under Altringer and John von Werth, took Straubing, and proceeded to lay siege to Ratisbon, where they were joined by the King of Hungary and Gallas with the Imperial forces. Bernhard and Horn, after taking Landshut by storm, where Altringer was killed (July 22nd), marched to the relief of Ratisbon; but, hearing on the road the fall of that place, they again separated, while the Imperial army proceeded to Donauwörth. Bernhard employed himself with marches and counter-marches between the Danube and the Main, while Horn proceeded towards Tyrol, to dispute the passes with a Spanish army that was marching from Italy into the Netherlands. He had scarcely, however, reached Füssen, when the news that the Imperialists, after storming Donauwörth, were threatening Nördlingen, obliged him again to join Bernhard. This movement having left the passes free, the Spaniards entered Bavaria, and formed a junction with King Ferdinand under the walls of Nördlingen. They were under the command of the Cardinal-Infant Ferdinand, brother of Philip IV. of Spain, who was proceeding into the Netherlands as successor of Isabella Clara Eugenia in the government. He had the reputation of being the only Spanish Prince, since Don John of Austria, who possessed any military talent.

Bernhard and Horn, after uniting their armies at Günzburg, had also summoned from the Upper Rhine another force under the Rheingraf Otto Louis; but, as Nördlingen was hard pressed, Bernhard, against the advice of Horn, determined on an immediate battle, although their army was not only considerably less numerous than that of the enemy, but also inferior in quality. The engagement commenced on the evening of the 6th of September, and lasted through the following day, when the Spaniards, who had taken only a passive part on the first day, lending a vigorous assistance to the Imperialists, the Swedes were

completely defeated, with the loss of 12,000 killed, 300 standards, 80 guns, and 6,000 prisoners, among whom were Horn and three other generals. Duke Bernhard narrowly escaped the same fate. He was hotly pursued to Göppingen, where he met Otto Louis and his division.

The BATTLE OF NORDLINGEN was from its consequences one of the most important and decisive in the Thirty Years' War. Bernhard of Weimar's contemplated Duchy of Franconia vanished altogether from his sight, and instead of being an independent Prince, he found himself compelled to enter the service and accept the pay of France. Thus French influence acquired an immense ascendant in Germany; and it will be necessary to cast our eyes a little while on the affairs and policy of that country.

The death of Gustavus Adolphus was not altogether unwelcome to Richelieu, who had at first willingly conceded to the Swedish King the leading part in the great political drama; but the success of Gustavus had been more rapid and complete than was agreeable to the French Court; his appearance on the Rhine had created both jealousy and alarm; and after his passage of the Lech, Louis XIII. had observed to the Venetian minister, "It is time to set a limit to the progress of this Goth." When Gustavus fell at Lützen, Richelieu determined to seize the direction of the affairs of Europe. His policy was, to maintain the alliance between the Swedes and the German Protestants, to endeavour to effect a reasonable accommodation between them and the Princes of the Catholic League, and thus compel the Emperor to treat for a peace through the mediation of France. Maximilian of Bavaria was to be dazzled with the prospect of the Imperial Crown, in order to which it was necessary to prevent the election of a King of the Romans during the Emperor's lifetime. Another object was to prevent the Dutch from making a separate peace with Spain.

Besides his schemes against the Emperor, Richelieu was busy with plans for extending the French frontier towards the Rhine. Charles Duke of Lorraine had again given trouble, and was again reduced, and on the 25th of September, 1633, Louis XIII. entered Nanci, his capital. Richelieu now announced to the Duke that it was the King's intention to re-establish the French monarchy in all its primitive grandeur, and with that view to annex Lorraine, as part of old Austrasia, to France. Early in 1634 the French occupied the whole of Lorraine, crossed the Vosges mountains, and obtained a permanent footing in Alsace. A new

Parliament, called the Parliament of Austrasia, was erected at Metz, the jurisdiction of which was intended one day to extend to the Rhine. Thus was broken the last effectual link which connected the Three Bishoprics (Metz, Toul, and Verdun), with the Empire; appeals, which had been formerly made to the Imperial Chamber at Spire, were now heard by the new Parliament, and everywhere the Germanic eagle was displaced by the *fleurs-de-lis*.¹ Charles of Lorraine, finding resistance hopeless, abdicated the Duchy in favour of his brother, the Cardinal Nicholas Francis; and, betaking himself with what soldiers still remained to him into the service of the Emperor, became, instead of a bad Sovereign, a valiant adventurer and skilful leader. From this period the house of Lorraine long remained dispersed and fugitive.

The Duke's sister, Margaret, having escaped into Belgium, had married the King's brother, Gaston Duke of Orleans, then an exile in that country; which so offended Louis that he instituted a suit against the marriage. Both Gaston and his mother had retired into Belgium after Richelieu's triumph over his political enemies, and Mary de' Medici was received at Brussels with all the solemnity due to an illustrious ally. She was never again to enter France. Spinola, who had been called to Italy in 1629, was succeeded in military command in Belgium by Count van den Berghe, a good soldier. After Spinola's departure, Prince Frederick Henry of Orange resolved, by way of compensation for the loss of Breda, to take Herzogenbusch (Bois-le-Duc). The siege, which occupied the years 1629 and 1630, is among the most remarkable of that period in a military point of view; but the most important circumstance about it is, that by engaging the whole Spanish forces in the Netherlands, it facilitated the conquests of Gustavus Adolphus. Although Van den Berghe came to the relief of the town with 30,000 foot and 10,000 horse, he could not prevent its surrender. He was soon after superseded in the command by the Marquis of Santa Croce, who neither possessed much ability nor enjoyed the confidence of the Spanish Netherlanders. Hence Frederick Henry, whose military operations were supported with the greatest ardour by the Dutch, although deputies were appointed by the States to accompany all his movements, was able to find sufficient employment for the Spaniards. In the years 1629 and 1630 the Dutch had about 120,000 men in the field, who were partly supported by voluntary contributions. After the capture of Herzogenbusch, the Prince

¹ See *Mercure Fr.* t. xix. p. 106 seq.; Richelieu, *Mémoires*, t. viii. p. 466 (Petitot).

directed his operations chiefly against Gelderland, and in 1632 he took Maestricht. While the Prince was besieging this place, Santa Croce, with 15,000 men, not venturing to attack his fortified camp, Cordova, with 20,000 men, was recalled from Germany to Santa Croce's help; yet such was the strength of Frederick Henry's position that the Spaniards with their combined forces declined to assault it. The Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia now besought the help of Pappenheim, at that time in Westphalia, with a considerable army. Pappenheim led his veterans against the Dutch trenches, August 7th; but the Spaniards, offended by his boast that he would relieve Maestricht, would give him no aid, and coolly looked on while he suffered two bloody repulses on the same day. The Infanta, who was much beloved by the Belgians, and showed as much consideration for them as the Court of Madrid would allow, died in December 1633, after which Belgium again fell under the direct government of Spain.

Richelieu had been for some time desirous of entering into a close alliance with the Dutch; and in April, 1634, Charnacé had brought about a treaty by which France engaged to pay a subsidy of two million livres per annum, besides supporting a body of auxiliary troops. This treaty was followed in February, 1635, by a still more effective alliance, offensive and defensive, based on Richelieu's plans for extending the French frontier. Each of the contracting parties engaged to invade the Spanish Netherlands with an army of 30,000 men. The Belgians were to be invited to form themselves into a free and independent State; but a strip of land upon the coast, two leagues in depth, from Gravelines to Blankenberghe, besides the towns of Namur and Diedenhofen, was to be ceded to France; while the United Provinces were to have Hulst and the Pays de Waes, Breda, Geldern, and Stephanswend. If the Belgians persisted in their allegiance to Spain they were to be conquered and partitioned: France was to have Luxemburg, Namur, Hainault, Artois, Flanders, and the Cambrésis; while the share of the United Provinces was to include Antwerp, Brabant, and the coast of Flanders, north of Blankenberghe. England was to be invited to neutrality.¹

About the same time Richelieu had also made a new treaty with the Swedes. The defeat at Nordlingen, and the knowledge that the Elector of Saxony was endeavouring to effect a peace with the Emperor, left the Swedes no alternative but to throw themselves into the arms of France; and in September envoys

¹ Dumont, t. vi. pt. i. p. 80.

were sent to Paris to request that the 6,000 men so often promised should be despatched to their aid, and to urge the French King to break openly with Spain and Austria. Oxenstiern at length procured a treaty to be executed at Paris in November, 1634, by which France engaged to maintain 12,000 men, Germans or others, under the command of a German Prince, and to keep a body of troops on the Rhine, to act in case of need. France was to hold all fortresses conquered on the right bank of the Rhine, from Brisach to Constance; on the left bank she was to have Alsace and its fortresses, and the free use of the bridge at Strasburg, till a future peace. The Swedes, in the places which they should conquer, were not to molest the Catholics in the exercise of their religion.¹ By this treaty, France obtained a seat and vote in the Heilbronn League. Oxenstiern was very much dissatisfied with it, because Bennfelden was given up without payment, and still more because the generalissimo of the allied armies was to be a German Prince, a circumstance which lowered his position in the Empire; he therefore refused to ratify it, dismissed Loffler, the plenipotentiary who had made it, and early in 1635 sent Hugo Grotius to Paris to procure that it should be altered. Grotius having failed in his mission, Oxenstiern himself proceeded into France in April, and had an interview with Louis XIII. at Compiègne. Richelieu, however, would not consent to make any material alteration in the terms, and all that the Swedish Chancellor could obtain was that a fresh treaty should be drawn up for his signature.² Oxenstiern arrived in Sweden in the summer of 1636, and never returned into Germany.³

In these transactions Richelieu endeavoured to avoid an open breach with the Emperor, though the French and Imperial troops could not avoid coming into collision. In December, 1634, Marshals La Force and Brezé compelled the Imperialists and Bavarians to raise the siege of Heidelberg, defended by a Swedish garrison. In January, 1635, the Imperialists took Philippsburg from the French, and two months after a Spanish corps surprised Trèves, cut the French garrison to pieces, and carried off the Elector, Philip Christopher, a prisoner to Antwerp. This event had important consequences. Richelieu immediately demanded the Elector's liberation from the Cardinal-Infant, the new Governor of the Netherlands, and on his delaying, on the pretext that he must await the orders of the Imperial and Spanish Courts, war

¹ Dumont, t. vi. pt. l. p. 79.

² *Ibid.* p. 88.

³ Geijer, *Geogr. Schwedens*, B. iii. SS. 305, 342.

was openly declared by a French herald at Brussels, May 26th, 1635. So haughty was the tone adopted by France that the Spanish ambassador at Paris departed without taking leave, while the French ambassador at Madrid was arrested. On the 6th of June Louis XIII. published a declaration of the motives which had led to this rupture, a prelude to the colossal strife that was to follow. The Elector of Treves, who, like several other Princes of the Empire, had been put under the Imperial ban for admitting French troops into Ehrenbreitstein and other places, was finally carried to Vienna, where he was kept a prisoner ten years. Another grave cause of offence was his having named Richelieu his coadjutor, a step by which that Cardinal might have eventually secured a vote as one of the Imperial Electors; but his nomination was disallowed by Pope Urban VIII.

In Germany, meanwhile, affairs had assumed a new face by the peace of Prague. After the overthrow at Nördlingen, the only Swedish force consisted of Baner's army, encamped at Leitmeritz in Bohemia, which immediately broke up and proceeded into Thuringia. The difficulties of Baner's position were increased by his disputes with the Elector of Saxony. John George had been long wavering, and the disaster at Nördlingen determined him to go over to the Emperor. Negotiations were opened at Pirna; better terms were offered to the Elector than he might reasonably have anticipated, particularly the permanent cession to him of Lusatia, which had been made over to him as a pledge in 1621; preliminaries were signed at Pirna in November, 1634, and on May 30th, 1635, was definitely concluded the PEACE OF PRAGUE. By this treaty it was agreed, with regard to the affairs of religion, that all *mediate* possessions of the Church secularized before the Peace of Passau should remain to the Protestants for ever, and that all other *mediate* possessions, and such *immediate* ones as had been confiscated since the Peace of Passau, should remain to them for forty years, before the expiration of which term a mixed commission was to settle how such property should be proceeded with at the end of it. The immediate nobility and the Imperial cities were to be allowed the Lutheran worship, a privilege, however, granted only to Silesia among the lands subject to the House of Austria. With regard to political affairs, the hereditary right of the House of Austria to the Bohemian Crown was acknowledged; Lusatia was ceded to the Elector of Saxony as a Bohemian fief, and his son was invested with the administration of Magdeburg; Pomerania

was to be made over to the Elector of Brandenburg, in case he acceded to the treaty; a general amnesty was to be granted; all leagues were to be dissolved, and the paramount authority of the Emperor was to be everywhere acknowledged. It was also agreed that the Duke of Lorraine should be re-established in his Duchy. The Emperor could not be induced to make any concessions respecting the Palatinate or the Bohemian Protestants.¹ By an express article, the Elector was to assist in expelling the Swedes from Germany, and thus Saxony was pledged to a war. Such was the return made by John George to the Swedes, whose King had fallen in defending his Electorate!⁶

This peace brought a storm of obloquy on John George; he was accused of sacrificing the family of the unfortunate Palatine to the vengeance of the Emperor, and of arming Germany against the Swedes, who had thrice been the means of saving his dominions. Nevertheless by degrees all the Princes and States of the Empire acceded to the treaty of Prague, with the exception of Hesse-Cassel and the other Calvinist States. The Swedish Government also desired peace, and Oxenstiern, whom they accused of opposing it, while Richelieu was reproaching him with having lost all courage for the prosecution of the war,² was placed in a most difficult situation. The Swedish States, however, assembled in the autumn of 1635, recognized the impossibility of acceding to the Treaty of Prague. The Elector of Saxony, who had made it, was, after all, only a subject, and any treaty that Sweden should enter into must, with regard both to her dignity and safety, be made directly with the Emperor. But Oxenstiern's proposals to the Court of Vienna remained unanswered.³

Towards the end of May, 1635; the French, after defeating the Spanish forces under the Piedmontese Prince of Carignano, who had endeavoured to obstruct their passage, formed a junction with the Dutch at Maestricht, when the Prince of Orange took the command in chief of the allied forces. The campaign, however, went against the Allies. The brutality displayed by both armies at the taking of Tirlemont exasperated the Belgians, who, instead of listening to the offers of independence, threw themselves into the arms of the Spaniards. The Peace of Prague enabled the Emperor to send Piccolomini, with 20,000 men, into Belgium; another division threatened the Isle of Batavia; and the allies, instead of conquering Belgium, found themselves reduced

¹ The treaty is in *Londorp*, t. iv. p. 468; *Dumont*, t. vi. pt. i. p. 88.

² *Mémoires*, t. viii. p. 352; t. ix. p. 5.

³ *Geijer*, B. iii. S. 309 f.

to defend Holland. The Imperialists, under Galas, were also successful on the Rhine. The French, pressed on all sides, were compelled to abandon the Middle Rhine, the course of the Main and Neckar, and even of the Lower Moselle and Sarre, without fighting a single great battle.

The French campaign in Italy was not more successful. A league had been concluded at Rivoli, July 11th, 1635, between Louis XIII. and the Dukes of Savoy, Parma, and Mantua, for the invasion and partition of the Milanese.¹ The share of each Power was to be proportioned to the troops furnished, but France promised to renounce her portion in consideration of receiving some places in Piedmont. In general, however, the alliance of France was regarded in Italy with suspicion. Pope Urban VIII. was not disposed to join a league against the House of Austria, and had, as we have seen, shown himself hostile to Richelieu in the matter of the coadjutorship of Treves. Venice also excused herself, and Genoa was too closely connected, by commercial and other interests with Spain to undertake anything against her. The Duke of Rohan, who commanded some French detachments in the Valtellina, distinguished himself against the Austrians; but the projected invasion of the Milanese proved a failure, chiefly through the tardiness and want of zeal of the Duke of Savoy.

The Italian campaign in 1636 was not more glorious or important, while France herself was threatened by the progress of the Imperialists. In September King Ferdinand issued from his head-quarters at Breisach a manifesto in which he detailed the acts of hostility committed by Louis XIII. against the Emperor, and expressed his determination to invade France, but promised to protect the inhabitants.² In pursuance of this declaration, Gallas and the Marquis of Grana entered French Burgundy, in October, with 20,000 men, and took Mirebeau; but they were soon compelled to retreat, chiefly through the lateness of the season and the nature of the country, with great loss of artillery and baggage. At another point the Spanish Imperialists, under Piccolomini and John von Werth, had been more successful. They had crossed the Somme in August, and invaded Picardy; bands of Croats and Hungarians wasted the country between that river and the Oise with fire and sword, and filled Paris itself with terror. The roads from that capital swarmed with fugitives. Richelieu was loudly accused of having provoked

¹ Dumout, t. vi. pt. i. p. 109.

² Landerp, t. iv. p. 372.

the war; of his alliance with heretics; of leaving Paris unfortified while he was building his "Palais Cardinal." But the Imperialists, instead of marching on Paris, contented themselves with taking Corbie, whence, however, they were driven by a large force quickly raised by Richelieu. Their retreat was unmolested. In the same year the Spaniards made an abortive descent on Brittany. In the south they were more successful, where, crossing the Bidasoa, they occupied Hendaye, St.-Jean de Luz, and Socoa; but these places they were forced to evacuate in 1637 by their ill success in Languedoc. In the same year Rohan was driven from the Valtellina.

With regard to Germany, Duke Bernhard had concluded, in October, 1635, a treaty with the French Court, by which Louis XIII. engaged to pay him annually 4,000,000 livres for the maintenance of an army of 12,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. This was the commencement of the short but brilliant career which ended with Bernhard's death in 1639. His motives, in the situation of Germany at that time, could only have been selfish. He hoped to cut out for himself, amidst the chaos of confusion, a Kingdom, or at least a Duchy. By a secret article of his agreement with France he was to be invested with the Landgraviate of Alsace, together with Hagenau, and all the rights before possessed in Alsace by the House of Austria. On the other hand he agreed not to molest the Catholics in their religion.

After the Peace of Prague, Baner found himself in a critical situation, especially as the truce with Poland was on the point of expiring. King Wladislaus VII., who had ascended the throne of Poland on the death of Sigismund III., in 1632, seemed inclined for war, and the Swedes might thus be exposed to another enemy in their rear. The danger was enhanced by the suspicion that Denmark would also resort to arms; but Christian IV. was propitiated by ceding the Archbishopric of Bremen to his second son, Duke Frederick, who had been appointed coadjutor of the deceased titular Archbishop. Baner, to secure himself, determined on marching into Mecklenburg, and amused the Elector of Saxony two months with negotiations respecting his accession to the Treaty of Prague. He was relieved, in September, from any danger on the side of Poland by the prolongation for twenty-six years of the truce, effected through French mediation, assisted by ambassadors from England, Holland, and Brandenburg, on condition of the Swedes restoring West Prussia. Toratenson, the

Swedish commander in Prussia, was thus enabled to aid his countrymen with reinforcements. Baner had marched through Magdeburg to the Aller, where, on the west, he was threatened by Duke George of Lüneburg, on the south by the Saxons under Baudis. After Baner had concluded his pretended negotiations, the Saxon Elector appeared personally in his army, and directed Baudis to attack the Swedes. This is usually called the "Saxon Blood-Order." Baudis, however, could not prevent Baner from crossing the Elbe; and the Swedes even obtained a superiority over the Saxons by defeating, under the conduct of General Ruthven, a Scotchman, a Saxon division of 8,000 or 7,000 men near the little Mecklenburg town of Dömitz. Baner himself also gained some advantages at Goldberg and Kiritz; and, being joined by Torstenson and his troops from Prussia, he not only compelled the Saxons to evacuate Pomerania, but also found himself enabled to recross the Elbe. Early in 1636 he pressed forwards as far as Halle, and even sent parties over the Saale. The Saxons remained quiet till joined towards the end of March by the Imperial General Hatzfeld; when they attacked and defeated the Swedes near Magdeburg, and forced that town to capitulate. This reverse, however, was soon compensated by a decisive victory. John George attempting to form a junction with the Brandenburg general Klitzing, Baner attacked and completely defeated him at Wittstock (October 4th), capturing all the Elector's artillery, and even his baggage and plate. John George fled precipitately to Meissen. Instead of pursuing him, Baner first proceeded into Hesse, where the Landgrave, William V., had been gaining some advantages. William had been persuaded by his wife, Amelia Elizabeth, hereditary Countess of Hanau, a zealous Protestant, to break off all negotiations for acceding to the Peace of Prague, and to unite with Alexander Leslie, a Scotch general trained in the service of Gustavus Adolphus, who commanded, in Lower Saxony and Westphalia, some regiments raised with French money. In December Baner proceeded through Erfurt into Saxony, defeated the Saxons at Eilenburg early in January, 1637, and captured several of their regiments; when all the men and some of the officers entered the Swedish service. After a vain attempt upon Leipsic, Baner crossed the Elbe and took up a position at Torgau; but here he was surrounded by the enemy, and for nearly five months lay in a most critical situation.

This period was marked by the death of the Emperor Ferdi-

mand II., who expired at Vienna, February 15th, 1637, in the fifty-ninth year of his age. He was, in the main, a well-meaning man; but led into an ill-policy, arbitrary and illegal proceedings, and even crime, by the bigoted and sophistical ideas instilled into him by priests and Jesuits, and by mistaken notions of his duty as a Sovereign. He was succeeded by his son, Ferdinand III., who had been elected King of the Romans in the cathedral of Ratisbon only a little while before (December 22nd, 1656), by the Electors of Saxony, Brandenburg, Mentz, Cologne, and Bavaria; but as the Elector of Treves was then a prisoner, and as the son of the Palatine Frederick was also absent from Ratisbon, France and Sweden took occasion to protest against the validity of the proceedings.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

FROM his success at Nordlingen, Ferdinand III. was thought to possess military talent, and it was hoped that he would take the personal command of the army; but, on pretence of gout, he delegated that office to men like Gallas, Gotz, Hatzfeld, Piccolomini, and others, who were far inferior to Duke Bernhard and Baner. The 'Thirty Years' War was to linger on more than another decade; but, after the disappearance from the scene of its earlier heroes, Tilly, Wallenstein, Gustavus Adolphus, its incidents possess but little interest, except perhaps for the military student, and we shall therefore record them as briefly as possible. Its history assumes a most repulsive character. The war seems to be carried on merely for its own sake, without any great or even definite object, only to gratify the cupidity or ambition of a few leaders, excited by the subtle and selfish policy of France. Count Peter Brahe, who was despatched by the Swedish government into Germany to help Oxenstiern, describes in his *Journal* the German Princes as divided among themselves and pursuing only their own private ends, while both high and low were seduced by French gold.¹ Two armies in the pay of foreign Powers, yet composed for the most part of Germans, traversed the Empire in its breadth and length, plundering and maltreating their own countrymen, and reducing their fatherland to the condition of a wilderness. Even among the Swedes, the strict discipline at first maintained by Gustavus Adolphus had been gradually declining, and after the defeat at Nordlingen vanished altogether.² Such were the crimes and cruelties they committed, that Baner himself confessed it would be no wonder if the earth should open, and, by a just decree of Providence, swallow up the wretches who were guilty of them.³ To record these scenes would be to describe every atrocity which human nature, in its most savage and degraded state, is capable of com-

¹ Apud Geijer, B. iii. S. 294.

² See the complaints of the Elector of Mentz in Rose, *Herzog Bernhard der*

Grosse von Sachsen-Weimar, B. ii. S. 9.

³ Geijer, B. iii. S. 306, Ann.

mitting. The country was systematically wasted by the hostile armies in order to deprive their adversaries of subsistence, and hence a famine was engendered so grievous that the miserable inhabitants are said to have eaten carrion, and to have haunted the knacker's yard, nay, even the gallows and the cemetery, to obtain a meal. Parents killed their children to eat their flesh, and gangs of cannibals were formed, who hunted down their fellow-men like beasts of the field. The famine was accompanied with contagious pestilences, which carried off thousands of the soldiers as well as of the inhabitants. The crimes of the soldiery were too dreadful and disgusting to be described. The violation of women was frequently accompanied with mutilation or death. No age, no sex, was spared. Persons were made to swallow the most disgusting ordure; children, torn from their mothers, were hacked in pieces, or roasted on the ends of spears; men were baked in ovens, or set up as targets for the soldiery.¹ The effects on property and population may be estimated from a statement regarding the Duchy of Würtemberg alone, which between the years 1628 and 1650, is computed to have lost 118,742,864 florins, without reckoning the damage accruing from the uncultivated and desert condition of the lands. With regard to the population, 345,000 men are said to have perished between the years 1634 and 1641, and the Duchy, which had formerly contained about half a million inhabitants, counted in the last-named year scarce 48,000! Even six years after the Peace of Westphalia, when many of those who had fled into Switzerland had returned, there were 50,000 households less than there had been previously to the battle of Nördlingen.²

In June, 1637, Baner succeeded in extricating himself from his entanglement at Torgau, in gaining Pomerania, and crossing the Oder in the face of Gallas and a far superior force. At Schwedt, he was joined by General Wrangel, father of the celebrated Charles Gustavus Wrangel; but the Swedes had great difficulty in maintaining themselves in Pomerania in this and the succeeding year. The Imperial cause was partially successful in the south. In

¹ These horrible scenes are described in a sermon delivered at Nuremberg in April, 1638, and translated into English under the title of *Lachrymæ Germaniæ, or the Tears of Germany*. See p. 47 sqq.

² Spittler, *Gesch. Würtembergs*, ap. Schlosser, xiv. 283. The sad condition of Germany, from the effects of the Thirty Years' War, has been described by Paul Gerhardt, a contemporary poet:—

“Das drückt uns Niemand besser
In unsre Seel' und Herz hinein,
Als ihr zerstörten Schlösser
Und Städte voller Schutt und Stein;
Ihr vormals schönen Felder
Mit frischer Saat bestreut,
Jetzt aber lauter Wälder
Und dürre, wüste Heyd.”

— Gerhardt's *Leben und Lieder*, S. 704.

June, Ehrenbreitstein was compelled to capitulate by John von Werth. The French had before lost Coblenz, and now retained nothing in the Electorate of Treves. The year 1638 opened under more favourable auspices for France. Duke Bernhard, breaking up in January from his winter-quarters in the Jura mountains, seized Laufenburg, Seckingen, and Waldshut, three of the Forest Towns under the rule of Austria, and laid siege to Rheinfelden, the fourth. John von Werth, arriving with a large force to its relief, compelled Bernhard to retire upon Laufenburg (February 28th). In the fight which took place on this occasion, the Duke of Rohan, the son-in-law of Sully and illustrious head of the French Protestants, who was serving as a volunteer in Bernhard's army, received a wound which caused his death in a few weeks. Only three days after his defeat, Bernhard of Weimar, with unparalleled boldness, led his army against the Imperialists, who were still engaged in celebrating their victory, and were totally unprepared for an attack. In the battle of Rheinfelden, March 3rd, Bernhard captured all the enemy's artillery, baggage, and standards, besides the terrible John von Werth himself, and three other Imperial generals. The conquest of Rheinfelden, Freiburg, and the whole of the Breisgau was the fruit of this victory. Having been reinforced by several thousand French under Count Guébriant and Viscount Turenne, Bernhard laid siege to Breisach; which, however, held out till December 19th. After its fall, Bernhard marched into Franche-Comté, reduced the fortresses, and put his troops into winter quarters.

Louis XIII. and Richelieu looked upon these conquests as their own. Bernhard, it was imagined, might be bought; he wanted two million livres for a new campaign, and he was invited to Paris to treat on the subject. All France was then *en fête* for the birth of a Dauphin, afterwards Louis XIV. After twenty-two years of unfruitful marriage, Anne of Austria had given birth to a son, September 5th, 1638. On the occasion of the Queen's pregnancy, Louis XIII. realized a project he had previously formed, and put his Crown and Kingdom under the protection of the Virgin Mary, by what has been called "le Vœu de Louis XIII." The grand festivals that were to take place in honour of this event were held out to Bernhard as an inducement to visit Paris; but Grotius, then Swedish ambassador at the French Court, warned him not to come. Bernhard sent in his stead Erlach, a patrician of Bern, to whom he had intrusted the command of Breisach. Erlach was not exempt from that passion for French gold which then raged

like a contagion among the Swiss; he consented to become a spy on Bernhard, and promised that after the Duke's death all his conquests should be made over to France. The contemplated contingency was not long in arriving. Early in July, 1639, Bernhard took boat up the Rhine, intending to proceed by Neuenburg in the Breisgau, and thence into the interior of Germany. Although seized with a violent sickness at Hünigen, he persisted in continuing his journey, and died on board the vessel, July 18th, at the early age of thirty-six. He had had a misunderstanding, though not exactly a quarrel, with Richelieu on the subject of Breisach; whence arose a suspicion of his having been poisoned, for which, however, there was no foundation.¹ Richelieu wanted possession of that fortress, while Bernhard wished to make it the capital of his projected principality of Alsace and the Breisgau; which he contemplated enlarging by a marriage with Amelia Elizabeth, widow of the Landgrave William of Hesse.

Bernhard, by his will, had intrusted the administration of his conquests to Count Otho William of Nassau, the Baron von Erlach, and Colonels Ehen and Rosen, and had instructed these generals, who called themselves the "Directory" of the Weimar army, to offer them to a prince of the House of Weimar: but Erlach conspired with Guébriant to defeat the Duke's intentions; a project the more easy, as none of Bernhard's brothers would accept the command. Soon after Bernhard's death, Ehen and Nassau went to Worms, and Rosen proceeded against the Forest Towns; their enterprises were successful, but meanwhile they had left Erlach and Guébriant in Neuenburg, where they could carry on their intrigues with the French government undisturbed. Towards the end of September, the Weimarian generals having been again driven out of the conquests they had made, and being further embarrassed by the demands of their unpaid mercenaries, Erlach persuaded his brother Directors to leave everything to him. On the 9th of October a treaty was concluded with France, by which the Weimarian generals were to receive 2,100,000 livres per annum, and to retain the gifts made to them, and the governments intrusted to them, by Duke Bernhard.² On the other hand, they agreed to serve the French King, who was to name the commandants of Freiburg and Breisach, the garrisons of which places were to be half French, half German; and though the

¹ See on this subject Böse, *Bernhard*, B. ii. S. 328 ff., and Barthold in the *Gesch. des grossen deutschen Krieges*,

Th. ii. 206, Anm. The Austrian and Spanish courts were also suspected.

² Dumont, t. vi. pt. i. p. 185.

Directory retained the right of nominating the commandants in other places, yet both these and their soldiers were to take an oath of fidelity to Louis. The better part of Sraubia and Alsace was, in fact, sold to France; and Breisach, Bennfelden, Freiburg, the Forest Towns on the Rhine and throughout the Breisgau, hoisted the French colours. Thus France profited by the death of Duke Bernhard, as she had done before by that of Gustavus Adolphus, and inherited the fruit of exploits which she had indeed paid for, and in some degree partaken, but which she can hardly be said to have performed.

The object of Duke Bernhard's fatal journey was to form a junction with the Swedes, who were marching southwards from Mecklenburg and Pomerania in order to deliver a decisive battle. The latter of these principalities they had reduced to the condition of a Swedish province. Baner, after receiving reinforcements from Sweden in the autumn of 1638, as well as a supply of French gold, began to march southwards, while Gallas retreated before him, and the Saxons were vanquished in every encounter. After an abortive attempt on Freiberg, in March, 1639, Baner defeated the Saxon army at Chemnitz, and captured and destroyed Pirna. Hence he pressed on into Bohemia, and appeared before Prague, May 20th; but the position of the Imperialists on the White Hill appearing too strong to be assaulted, he retired to Leitmeritz till October; during which period his divisions wasted the country around, and penetrated into Silesia and Moravia.

Meanwhile Hatzfeld had destroyed in Westphalia an army raised with English money, and commanded by Charles Louis and Rupert, sons of the unfortunate Elector Palatine, neither of whom had any military talent. Hatzfeld surprised them in the spring of 1639 at Vlotho, routed their army, and captured Rupert; Charles Louis, who lost everything, and almost his life into the bargain in crossing the Weser, escaped to Minden; whence he afterwards retired to London. After the death of Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, Charles I. and the Prince of Orange, the nearest kinsmen of the young Elector, supplied him with money to purchase the services of the Weimar army, and in October, 1639, Charles Louis took the route through Paris in order to join it, travelling under the assumed name of Louis Stuart. Richelieu hearing of his designs, of which he had foolishly talked, caused him to be apprehended at Moulins and carried to Vincennes; and it was not till the following spring that he obtained his liberation through the intercession of Amelia Elizabeth of Hesse.

England, engaged at that period in working out her domestic liberty, could not assume in the wars and negotiations of the Continent a part befitting a great nation. The treaty between France and the United Provinces, which assigned so large a portion of the coast of Flanders to the former country, was clearly most inimical to English interests; and Richelieu had despatched the Count of Estrades into England in 1637, to assure himself of the neutrality of the English Court. Charles I. answered proudly and worthily, that not only would he not consent to such an appropriation of the Flemish coast, but that he would do all in his power to hinder it; and to Richelieu's offer to support him against his subjects, he replied, that his own authority and the law of the land sufficed. Queen Henrietta, now reconciled with her husband, was also found impracticable; and Richelieu, nettled by the rejection of his offers, declared that they should repent it within a year. He determined to revenge himself by exciting the malcontents both in England and Scotland. As early as 1635 the Scots appear to have reckoned on the support of France in opposing episcopacy. Richelieu employed one of his chaplains, a Scot named Chambers, as a go-between with the Covenanters, and when the disturbances broke out in Scotland, the French ministers were unable to conceal their joy.¹ In 1640 the secretary of the Covenant made a formal demand for the mediation of Louis XIII., which was, however, declined. The paper fell into the hands of the English ministry, but Louis XIII. disclaimed all knowledge of it, although both Richelieu and Bellièvre, the French ambassador in England, were privy to the demand. Richelieu had similar connections with the English malcontents, and Charles I. always regarded him as one of the chief promoters of his misfortunes. There was a French party in the House of Commons, which informed Richelieu of all that passed there regarding France; and the five members whom Charles had intended to apprehend are said to have absented themselves on a hint which they received from the French ambassador.² Charles revenged himself by giving an asylum to Richelieu's former friend, but now bitter enemy, Mary de' Medici, the Queen-Mother, who, after her expulsion from France, had hired an assassin to kill the Cardinal. Mary, hurt by the little attention paid to her by the Spaniards, quitted Belgium in the summer of 1638 for Holland, and afterwards went into

¹ Brienne, *Mémoires*, t. ii. p. 51; Siri, *Memorie recondite*, t. viii. p. 800; Dalrymple, *Memorials*, vol. ii. p. 47; Mazure, *Hist. de la Révol. de 1688*, t. iii. note 4^{ème} p. 402 sqq.

² Mazure, *Ibid.*, p. 429. Cf. Despatches of Richard Browne, November 29th, 1641, ap. Ranke, *Fransös. Gesch.* B. ii. S. 505.

England, where Queen Henrietta interested herself in favour of her mother. *But Louis XIII. would listen to the intercessions neither of the Dutch States nor Charles I. for her return into France, and could only be brought to offer her a retreat in Italy. Driven from England by the rebellion, Mary de' Medici again retired to Holland, and thence to Cologne, where she died, July 3rd, 1642.

Richelieu, whose fate it was, though a zealous advocate of the Romish Church and of absolute power, to be the supporter from political motives of heretics and rebels, adopted the same line of conduct in Spain as he pursued in England. The affairs of the Spanish peninsula were now assuming a threatening aspect; Biscay and Catalonia, the only provinces which continued to retain any independence, were ripe for revolt; while the Kingdom of Portugal was meditating the expulsion of the Spanish House and the restoration of the line of Bragança; a revolution accelerated by the intrigues of Richelieu,¹ Biscay and Catalonia shared neither the burdens nor the advantages of Castile; they were exempt from the heavy taxes of that country; but they were also excluded, as "foreign," from the commerce of the East and West Indies. Catalonia, with its dependencies Rousillon and Cerdagne, recognized the King of Spain only as Count of Barcelona, and even required that its envoys at Madrid should be treated on the same footing as foreign ambassadors. Philip IV. and his minister, the Count-Duke Olivarez, resolved to put an end to this anomaly. In the French campaign in Rousillon in 1639, the Catalans had at first displayed some zeal and alacrity. Salces having been taken by Condé, the States of Catalonia levied an army of 12,000 men to co-operate with the Spaniards under the Marquis de los Balbases for its recovery, which was ultimately effected. But this success was to cost Spain dear. During the long siege—the French commandant did not surrender till January, 1640—the Catalan ranks were thinned by desertion, and the municipal bodies were negligent in furnishing the military supplies. Olivarez seized the occasion to assert the authority of Spain. The Count de Santa Coloma, Vicergy of Catalonia, was directed to make the men proceed to the wars, even if it were necessary to send them bound hand and foot; the very women were to be compelled to carry on their backs corn, oats, and straw, for the use of the army. Articles required for the soldiery were seized without scruple; even the beds of the gentry were carried off. Matters became still worse

¹ Weiss, *L'Espagne depuis Philippe II.* t. i. p. 376

after the recapture of Salces. The King's army was distributed in winter-quarters in Roussillon and Catalonia, and the soldiers, a mixture of Castilians, Neapolitans, and Irish, were permitted, nay encouraged, to oppress the inhabitants in every possible way. As if they had been in an enemy's country, the women were outraged, the villages and even the churches were plundered.

It was not likely that such things should be tamely borne by a people in so rude a state of civilization as the Catalans, among whom it was then a common practice for a man who had got into difficulties to turn *bandolero*, or brigand: such a step was called "going to the mountains," and was far from being regarded as a disgrace. Olivarez, at the very moment when the population were thus exasperated, ordered the Viceroy to levy 6,000 soldiers in Catalonia, who, contrary to the privileges of that country, were to be sent abroad; they were to be taught that they must serve his Catholic Majesty in all quarters, like other subjects of the monarchy. At this order the amusements of the carnival were suspended at Barcelona; the Bishop of Gerona excommunicated the perpetrators of the violences and sacrileges which prevailed in his diocese; remonstrances were addressed to the cabinet of Madrid, but received with coldness and contempt. The Viceroy seized a sum of money belonging to the city of Barcelona wherewith to pay his troops, and imprisoned the magistrates who expostulated with him. But the day of vengeance was at hand. Annually, towards Corpus Christi day, it was customary for large bands of mountaineers to repair to Barcelona and its neighbourhood to hire themselves for the harvest—a rude, half-savage race, with knives at their girdles and huge horns depending from their shoulder-belts. As is usual in large gatherings, fury spreads as by contagion; one man animates another; they enter Barcelona, the burgesses join them, and every Castilian and foreigner that can be found is massacred. The Viceroy himself, while hastening to the port to embark on board ship, falls by the hand of an assassin (June 7th, 1640). All the towns of Catalonia and Roussillon followed the example of the capital; the King's army was dispersed, and of all the great towns succeeded only in retaining Perpignan.

The Court of Madrid was naturally filled with alarm; especially as symptoms of insubordination were manifesting themselves, not only in Portugal, but even in Aragon, the Balearic islands, and Naples. Olivarez resorted to negotiation and finesse. The Duke of Cardone, who succeeded Santa Coloma as Viceroy, was in-

CHAPTER III. TREATY OF FRANCE WITH THE CATALANS.

attempted to pacify the Catalans; but he speedily died of fear and confusion. The Bishop of Barcelona was then appointed, and in conjunction with Olivarez endeavoured to divide and amuse the Catalans. But the three deputies-general of the Catalan States, who formed the executive government of the province, were not to be duped. They entered into negotiations with the French Court, through Espenan the Governor of Lleucate, respecting the establishment of a Catalan Republic under the protectorate of France. As a last step the Cortes of Catalonia, assembled at Barcelona in September, intreated Philip IV. to recall the troops which occupied Rousillon, and to countermand those that were on the march to the Lower Ebro; and they declared that they would defend their liberties to the death. But, instead of listening to the envoys of the Cortes, Philip caused them to be arrested; and the Catalans forwarded to all Christian States and Princes a manifesto setting forth the injuries they had received. The war had begun in Rousillon, where the insurgents were assisted by Espenan, the French Governor of Lleucate. En Plessis Beaugon, the envoy of Louis XIII., in a public audience with the Catalan deputies at Barcelona, alluded to the bonds which had anciently united their principality to the Crown of France; and on the 16th of December, 1640, a formal treaty was entered into, and hostages given for the due execution of it by the Catalans. Louis XIII. engaged to find officers to command the Catalan troops, and to provide, at the expense of that province, an auxiliary corps of 3000 men. Catalonia and its dependencies bound themselves never to participate in any attack upon France, and to open their ports to the French fleets.¹

At the same time was consummated another event of still greater importance to the Spanish monarchy—the Portuguese revolution. Sixty years of union with Spain had only rendered Portugal more dissatisfied, because by the House of Austria she had been systematically oppressed, humiliated, and impoverished. None of the promises made by Philip II. were observed. The commerce of Portugal with the Indies had been taken from her and removed to Cadiz; her military and commercial marine had been almost annihilated in the wars provoked by the Spanish cabinet; while taxes raised on the first necessities of life were applied to the building of the palaces of Buen Retiro and Galinero near Madrid. Nevertheless, Portugal had long suffered in silence till the strife beginning between France and the House of

Austria opened a prospect of redress. Relations had been established between the French Court and some leading Portuguese as early as 1630; and the revolution would probably have broken out long before but for the feeble and irresolute character of John Duke of Bragança, whom the Portuguese patriots destined for the throne, as the Representative of their ancient Kings. An insurrection had actually occurred in 1637, when the insurgents proclaimed the Duke of Bragança, the grandson of him who had contended with Philip II. for the throne of Portugal (Vol. II. p. 408), for their Sovereign; but John, who had no inclination to risk his life and the large possessions still left to him, fled to escape the Crown that was thrust upon him.

The rebellion in Catalonia was the immediate cause of the Portuguese revolution. Portugal was then governed by Doña Margaret of Savoy, grand-daughter of Philip II. and dowager Duchess of Mantua, as Vice-Queen; but it was her secretary, Michael Vasconcellos, who actually directed the government. He and Diego Suarez, another Portuguese, who resided at Madrid with the title of Secretary of State, both men of infamous character, had disgusted the Portuguese by their insolence and extortion. Towards the end of 1640 an order had arrived from the Spanish Court, directing the Duke of Bragança and the principal nobles of Portugal to march against the Catalans. The Portuguese resolved to imitate them instead. Pinto Ribeiro, major-duomo of the Duke of Bragança, a man of courage and talent, was the principal leader of the insurrection. Pinto had for some time been endeavouring to incite the nobles, and he organized the revolt almost without his master's knowledge. He was well seconded by the Duke's Spanish wife, Doña Luisa de Guzman, sister of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, a lively, enterprising, and oburageous lady. Pinto gave the signal for insurrection by firing a pistol in the royal palace at Lisbon on the morning of December 1st, 1640. The confederates, who had flocked to the palace at an early hour, now began the work of liberation, and being helped by the townspeople, soon overpowered the German and Spanish guard. In the tumult none distinguished himself more than a priest, who, with crucifix in one hand and sword in the other, now exhorting his friends, now cutting down his foes, cleared the way wherever he appeared. Several of the Spanish ministers were slain. Vasconcellos, who had hid himself in a closet under a heap of papers, was despatched with a pistol shot and some other cuts, and his body thrown out of window. The cry *hasa* arose.

“The tyrant is dead! Liberty and Dom John for ever!” The Vice-Queen, who was arrested and kept as a hostage, was compelled by threats to order the Spanish commandant of the citadel to surrender; and the success of the insurrection being thus assured, a message was despatched to the Duke of Bragança at Villaviciosa to require his presence at Lisbon. He entered that capital in the very same equipage that had been provided for his journey to Madrid, whither he had been invited by Philip IV. Never was revolution of equal importance conducted more quietly, speedily, and successfully. It seemed as if John IV. ascended the throne of his ancestors in the regular course of succession. He was immediately proclaimed in the other towns of the Kingdom; the Portuguese colonies in India and Brazil, where the small detachments of Spanish troops could offer no effectual resistance, followed the example of the mother-country, and Ceuta, in Morocco, was the only settlement which Spain succeeded in retaining. The Portuguese Cortes, which assembled at Lisbon in January, 1641, confirmed the title of King John IV., and echoing the voice of liberty raised by the Dutch half a century before, asserted the inherent right of mankind to depose a tyrannical Sovereign, even were he legitimate, and not, like the King of Spain, a usurper.¹

John IV. hastened to contract alliances with France and the Dutch Republic, each of which Powers promised to furnish him with twenty ships of war. England and Sweden also recognized the new King of Portugal, but contented themselves with entering into commercial treaties.² The rebellion in Catalonia caused the success of that in Portugal. The whole disposable force of Spain, consisting of some 20,000 men under the Marquis de los Velez, the new Viceroy, had been despatched towards the frontier of Catalonia; and as the disturbances in that country, on account of its vicinity to France, were considered the more important, the troops were not recalled. The progress of Los Velez was marked by fire and blood. Xerta and Cambrils were taken and destroyed, together with their inhabitants; Tarragona was then invested, and as the Catalan army had been dispersed, Espenan, who had marched to its relief with 4,000 French, was glad to save his own force as well as the town by a capitulation. The Catalan revolution would have been crushed in the bud, but for the energy of

¹ On this Revolution see Giov. Batt. Stanga Aragona, *Stor. della divisione del Regno di Portogallo dalla corotta di Casimiro, Viceroy, Reipublicans de Portugal*;

Weiss, *L'Espagne depuis le règne de Philippe II. jusqu'à l'avènement des Bourbons* ;
² Dancourt, t. vi. pt. 1. pp. 202 sqq. 214 sqq.

Clarís, canon of Urgel, and of the French envoy, Du Plessis-Besançon. When the Spanish forces appeared before Barcelona, Clarís exhorted the citizens rather to bury themselves under the ruins of the town than submit to the butchers of their brethren; while the French envoy organized the means of defence with wonderful quickness and skill, and sustained the courage of the Barcelonese by the promise of speedy and abundant succour from France. In the minds of the Catalans the dejection of fear had been succeeded by the fury of despair. Everybody, even the monks, flew to arms; and the insurgents cut off the last hope of pardon, by converting the alliance with France, concluded the preceding month, into a treaty of permanent union with that country (January 23rd, 1641).¹ Baffled at Barcelona, Los Velez seized Tarragona, which he succeeded in maintaining against the French by defeating their fleet. For this defeat Richelieu banished to Carpentras the archbishop-admiral, Sourdis, and threatened to put him on his trial; whilst, on the other hand, Philip IV. imprisoned his admiral, Ferrandina, for not having destroyed the French ships!

Spain, during this period of domestic rebellion and revolution, was almost equally unfortunate in her foreign wars. In the campaign of 1688, indeed, the French had only doubtful success both in south and north. In Artois they were forced to raise the siege of St. Omer, but succeeded in taking the little town of Renti, and in Picardy they recaptured Le Câtelet; while in the south, where they had invested Fuentesrabia, they were entirely defeated and compelled to recross the Bidasoa. But by way of compensation a French fleet destroyed a Spanish one at Guetaria. In the following year the French were again unsuccessful in Artois, though victory attended their arms at Rousillon. The severest loss, however, which the Spaniards sustained in 1689 was the destruction by the Dutch of their fleet, the greatest which they had sent to sea since the Invincible Armada. The Spanish admiral, seeking refuge from the Dutch on the Kentish coast, was attacked, in neutral waters, under the very eyes of Admiral Pennington; nor could Charles do more than complain and accept an apology. In 1640 the French, besides their successes in Piedmont, where they took Turin, captured Arras, the capital of Artois, and long the rampart of the Netherlands against

¹ Dikmont, t. vi. pt. i. p. 197 sqq. By this treaty Catalonia remained united almost twelve years with France. In strange contrast with articles breathing

republican freedom, the Catalans stipulated for the maintenance of the Inquisition, subject to that of Rome! (Art. III.)

France. The inhabitants stipulated in their capitulation for the maintenance of the Artesian Parliament and States, exemption from the *gabelle*, or salt tax, and the proscription of Protestantism. In the following year the affairs of the Netherlands were not marked by any important event except the death of the Cardinal-Infant Ferdinand, who expired November 9th, 1641, of an illness caused, or at all events aggravated, by the fatigues of the war. Son and brother of two Kings remarkable for their incapacity, Ferdinand had distinguished himself in the defence of Belgium both by military and political talents of the first order. He was succeeded at Brussels by Don Francisco de Mello, an active and able captain.

Meanwhile in Germany the Swedes under Baner had been compelled, in the spring of 1640, to evacuate Bohemia, and to retreat through Saxony into Thuringia; and in May they formed a junction at Erfurt with the Weimarian army under the Duke of Longueville and Marshal Guébriant. The Swedish cause looked now more prosperous, as Amelia Elizabeth, the widow of the Landgrave William V. of Hesse-Cassel, and at that period one of the most remarkable rulers of Germany, had, after two years of hesitation and negotiations with the Court of Vienna, resolved again to appeal to arms. The Landgrave her husband had in 1636 been put under the ban of the Empire, and his possessions had been confiscated; the States of his own dominions were against him; he was compelled to become a fugitive in Holland and Germany, while Hesse became the prey of the Imperial soldiery. In the midst of these misfortunes he died (September, 1637), leaving his widow the guardian of their eldest son William, then eight years of age, and Regent of Hesse. That principality had been made over by the Emperor to the Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, and, to avoid the evils of war, the Landgravine's Council, as well as the Hessian States, and Melander, who commanded her army, pressed her to accede unconditionally to the Peace of Prague. But Amelia Elizabeth, who hated the Saxon Lutherans as much as she did her Imperial and Catholic enemies, would listen to no terms that did not place her Calvinist subjects on the same footing as the Protestants belonging to the Confession of Augsburg: she retired for a year into Holland, and afterwards, by protracting the negotiations with the Emperor, secured for a time the peace of her dominions. During this period she was her own minister and secretary, for Melander, who had been her adviser as well as her general, went over to the Imperialists,

and nobody could tell what her conduct would be. In the autumn of 1639, the Landgravine united her forces with those of Duke George of Lüneburg. Duke Augustus of Wolfenbüttel and other Guelph Princes afterwards acceded to this little League; but they agreed not to join the Swedes, except in case of extreme necessity.

This necessity arose when the Imperial generals Piccolomini and Hatzfeld threatened to attack the Swedes in Thuringia. The Emperor had now deprived Gallas of the chief command, and given it to his brother the Archduke Leopold William, who, as Piccolomini was always at his side, proved more fortunate than most ecclesiastical generals. Leopold, who was Bishop of Passau and Strasburg, archbishop of Olmütz, and claimant of the Bishoprics of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, though not exempt from that love of strong drink which was the failing of the age, had at least the appearance and reputation of sanctity. So remarkable was his asceticism and chastity that he denied himself the smell of flowers, and could scarce endure the presence even of his sisters; hence his father attributed a peculiar efficacy to his prayers, and gave him the name of "Angel." It was by command of Leopold that Piccolomini and Hatzfeld, uniting their scattered divisions, had gradually driven Baner into Thuringia. Baner approached Piccolomini near Saalfeld; but his position was too strong to be attacked, and the hostile armies went into winter-quarters without anything important having been done.

In mid-winter Baner persuaded Guébriant to assist him in a bold attempt to carry off the Emperor from Ratisbon. Baner, having been joined at Neustadt, on the Orla, by 6,000 of the Weimarian army, and a few hundred French cavalry, after a masterly march through the Upper Palatinate which completely deceived the Imperialists, appeared unexpectedly before Ratisbon, January 17th, 1641, in which city a Diet was holding to debate the conditions of a general peace. Ferdinand III. displayed great presence of mind on the occasion; he adopted excellent measures of defence, and, to show his contempt of the enemy, went out hunting with his usual state: a piece of bravado, however, which he had nearly cause to rue; for some of the Swedes, who had passed the river, seized a great part of his splendid equipage, and it was with some difficulty that he himself escaped. Ratisbon was saved by a sudden thaw, which prevented Baner crossing the Danube with the bulk of his army, and compelled him to a precipitate retreat; in which, as the roads were bad and the pursuit hot, the Swedes suffered much. Baner, however, succeeded in

reaching Halberstadt, where he shortly after died (May 10th). It was said that he and two or three more of the Protestant generals had been poisoned by a French monk; but his death seems to have been hastened by one of those terrible carouses then in fashion, held at Hildesheim in the preceding October. Of three other partakers in those orgies, Christian of Hesse and Otho of Schaumburg died in the following November, Duke George of Lüneburg in April. Baner, whose health was already declining, was so prostrated by the debauch that he was half dead when he appeared before Ratisbon.

The Elector George William of Brandenburg, the brother-in-law of Gustavus Adolphus, who had made so contemptible a figure in the Thirty Years' War, had also died in December, 1640. He was succeeded by one of the most distinguished Princes that Germany possessed during the seventeenth century—Frederick William, the "Great Elector." Circumstances, however, at first allowed him no opportunity to display his talents, and in July, 1641, he concluded an advantageous truce with the Swedes, which may be regarded as the first step towards the elevation of Brandenburg. After the death of Baner, the Swedes found in Torstenson a commander equal in military talent to Gustavus Adolphus. Generals Pful, Wittenberg, and Charles Gustavus Wrangel, who immediately succeeded Baner, achieved nothing of importance during the campaign of 1641, except defeating the Imperialists at Wolfenbüttel, June 19th; a victory, however, which led to no result, and they subsequently found it necessary to retreat into Westphalia. The Swedish army, or rather the Germans of whom it was chiefly composed, were in a state of destitution and mutiny, and were often compelled to sell their arms and horses to obtain food. When Torstenson, with some Swedish reinforcements, came to take the command of them in the middle of November he found them at Winsen-on-Aller.

The prospect before him was not encouraging. Pful and Wrangel had, for different causes, taken offence, and absented themselves from the army; Wittenberg had broken his leg; the Guelph Dukes had abandoned the Swedish alliance; Melander, the general of Amelia Elizabeth, had thrown off the mask, and changing his name to Holzapfel, was become a Catholic and Imperialist; Guébriant was gone with the Weimarian troops to the Rhine. Torstenson himself was so gouty that when he broke up from his quarters, in 1642, it was necessary to carry him in a litter. Yet his enterprises astonished all Europe. After

defeating the Imperialists, under the Duke of Saxe-Lauenburg, at Schweidnitz, taking that town and several other places (May), Torstenson marched through Moravia, captured Olmütz, and despatched marauding expeditions to within a few leagues of Vienna. These Moravian conquests, however, he was compelled to abandon and return into Silesia. Here he spent three or four weeks in besieging Brieg, till the advance of Leopold and Piccolomini again obliged him to retreat, July 21st; when he occupied a fortified camp at Guben, near the confluence of the Neisse and Oder. Being reinforced by 4,000 Swedes towards the end of August, he was enabled to resume the offensive, and compelled the Imperialists to raise the siege of Glogau; but, as they cautiously avoided a battle, Torstenson marched into the Saxon Electorate, and, towards the end of October, laid siege to Leipsic. Leopold and Piccolomini hastened to its relief, and on November 2nd was fought what has been called the Second Battle of Leipsic; in which the Archduke was completely defeated, with the loss of all his guns and baggage. Leopold and Piccolomini, who with difficulty saved themselves, fled to Prague, whither they succeeded in rallying a considerable portion of their troops; but, being disgusted soon after by the appointment of Gallas as generalissimo, they resigned their command, and Piccolomini entered the service of Spain. Torstenson, after his victory, again attacked Leipsic, which he took December 6th, and levied a heavy contribution on the inhabitants. Then, after a fruitless attempt on Freiberg, he again marched into Silesia and Moravia, with the view of supporting his army. Guébriant had been almost equally successful on the lower Rhine. After signally defeating the Imperial general Lamboy at Kempen, January 17th, 1642; he had succeeded in occupying nearly the whole Electorate of Cologne and the Duchy of Jülich.

Meanwhile in France the policy of Richelieu was hampered by his domestic enemies, and the plots of Gaston of Orleans, the Count of Soissons, and Cinq-Mars, the youthful favourite of Louis XIII., a son of Marshal d'Effiat. Early in 1642 Louis XIII. and the Cardinal proceeded to the south to encourage the army by their presence. In April, the French, under La Meilleraye, took Collioure and Elne, and blockaded Perpignan; while, in Catalonia, La Mothe-Houdancourt not only succeeded in defending that province, but even entered Aragon, captured Tamarite and Monçon, and threw forward his van to the gates of Saragossa. But Cinq-Mars, who followed Louis like his shadow, and exercised over him an almost unbounded influence, proposed

to the King the murder of Richelieu; nor does Louis appear to have been wholly averse to the enterprise, which seems to have failed only through the irresolution of the contriver. Cinq-Mars was at the same time holding secret communications with the Spanish Court, and concluded an agreement that Gaston, on his retiring to Sedan, should be assisted by Spain with men and money. Cinq-Mars was at the same time endeavouring to effect a peace with Spain; for there were at that time in France two parties, the *Cardinalists* and the *Royalists*, of whom the former were for war and the latter for peace.

Towards the end of April, Louis XIII., accompanied by Cinq-Mars, had proceeded from Narbonne to the French camp before Perpignan; Richelieu, then too ill for the journey, had remained behind; and subsequently, being doubtful of the King's disposition towards him, had gone to Arles. But reverses in the north, and especially the disastrous defeat of Marshal de Guiche at Honnecourt by Don Francisco de Mello, May 26th, brought Louis to his senses, who now addressed to his indispensable minister a letter assuring him of his unalterable affection and esteem. By Chavigni, the messenger who brought it, Richelieu sent Louis a copy of the treaty which Cinq-Mars had negotiated with the Spanish Court, and which had been forwarded to the Cardinal by some unknown hand. Cinq-Mars was immediately arrested, and the King hastened to the Cardinal, then at Tarascon, to assure him of his future fidelity. Both were now confirmed invalids. Richelieu was so ill that he could not rise from his bed to receive the King, and it was necessary to place another couch for Louis near the Cardinal's, in order that they might converse together. The King then set off for Paris, leaving the Cardinal with unlimited powers. The Duke of Orleans, as well as the Duke of Bouillon, the commander of the French army in Italy, who were both concerned in Cinq-Mars' plot, were arrested. Gaston, alarmed by threats of death, basely betrayed his companions, turned informer for the Crown, and furnished the necessary evidence against Cinq-Mars, Bouillon, and their accomplice De Thou, a son of the celebrated historian. Louis XIII. degraded himself almost as much as his brother Gaston. Cinq-Mars having asserted that he had undertaken nothing against the Cardinal without the approbation of the King, Louis addressed a letter to the Chancellor, who presided over the commission appointed to try the prisoners, in which he defended himself like an arraigned criminal; admitting that the proposal to murder the Cardinal had been made to him,

but asserting that he had rejected it with horror. Cinq-Mars and De Thou were condemned and beheaded at Lyon, September 12th. Bouillon escaped by surrendering his town of Sedan.¹ Richelieu, surrounded by his guards, returned by slow journeys to Paris, travelling sometimes by land, sometimes by water. His progress almost resembled a triumph. He was carried in a splendid litter, so broad and lofty that it could not enter the gates of the towns through which he passed, into which he was admitted through breaches made in the walls. He arrived at the Palais Cardinal at Paris, October 17th, but almost immediately retired to his favourite seat at Rueil.

The great Cardinal-Duke now beheld his policy crowned on all sides with success. Not only had he triumphed over his domestic enemies, but the French arms also were everywhere victorious. Francisco de Mello had derived but little advantage from his success at Honnecourt. In Spain, although Philip IV., bursting the torpid fetters in which Olivarez had enchained him, appeared at the head of his army at Saragossa, yet the fall of Perpignan was effected by a victory over the Spanish fleet, and, after suffering the extremities of famine, it surrendered September 9th, 1642. A little after (October 7th), La Mothe defeated the Spanish army under Leganez, which was threatening Lerida; an exploit which procured for him the Duchy of Cardona and the government of Catalonia, resigned by De Brezé. In Italy affairs were equally prosperous. After the death of Duke Victor Amadeus I., in 1637, a stormy minority had ensued in Piedmont. Louis XIII. compelled his sister Christina, the dowager Duchess of Savoy, to renew the alliance with France; but the regency was contested by her brothers-in-law, Cardinal Maurice of Savoy and Thomas Prince of Carignano, grandfather of the celebrated Prince Eugene. Spain declared for Maurice and Thomas, who seized several places in Piedmont. But the Cardinal of Savoy was defeated at Ivrea by the French under the Count of Harcourt, April 14th, 1641, who also obliged Prince Thomas to raise the siege of Chivasso. At length, in 1642, the two Piedmontese Princes recognized Christina as Regent and guardian of her son, and renouncing the Spanish alliance, entered into that of France; when Prince Thomas, being declared general of the French army in Italy, drove the Spaniards from all the places which they held in Piedmont

¹ Respecting this conspiracy, see the *Mémoires of Montresor*, the *Relation faite par M. de Fontenilles*, and the *Procès*, in

the *Archives Curieuses*, t. v. p. 283 sqq. (2^e sér.).

and Montferrat. But in the midst of these successes the life of Richelieu was drawing to a close. On the 2nd of December he had his last interview with Louis XIII. at the Palais Cardinal, and on the 4th he died, at the age of fifty-seven.

In spite of his brilliant qualities and the benefits which his policy had conferred upon France, Richelieu died unlamented by the French people. His maxims were too severe for them; he possessed not that *bonhomie* which had procured for Henry IV. so universal a popularity; nor could his vast schemes of policy be comprehended and appreciated except by a few among the higher and more educated class of Frenchmen. A large proportion even of that class have detested him as the founder of royal despotism; nor can it be denied that it was chiefly he who built up the absolute power of the French Crown. On the other hand, the experience of repeated revolutions has shown that a strong government, to use a mild term, and what has been called the centralization of power, seem to be indispensable for the peace, prosperity, and happiness of France; and, in this respect, Richelieu must be allowed to have thoroughly understood the genius and wants of the French nation. The France of that period, however, perceived not this necessity, and the death of the great statesman occasioned bonfires and rejoicings in various parts of the Kingdom.¹ Richelieu had in the spring dictated his will to a notary at Narbonne. He left the Palais Cardinal to the King, and directed that a million and a half of livres, which he kept in reserve for unforeseen exigencies of state, should also be handed over to Louis. His extensive library he bequeathed to the public. Almost with his last breath he had recommended Mazarin to Louis as his successor, who, almost immediately after Richelieu's death, was summoned to the Council. The other ministers named by Richelieu were also retained: for the recommendations of such a statesman were not to be neglected.

Louis XIII. did not long survive his great minister. After a protracted decline, he died May 14th, 1643, at the age of forty-one. In temper cold and melancholy, though not deficient in courage, he possessed neither eminent virtues nor extraordinary vices; and perhaps the greatest praise that can be accorded him is, that he was aware of his own mediocrity, and was content to resign himself to the direction of a man of genius. By his will he

¹ Griffet, *Hist. de Louis XIII.* t. iii. p. 579. Richelieu thus described to La Vieuville his method of acting:—"Je n'ose rien entreprendre sans y avoir bien

pensé: mais quand une fois j'ai pris ma résolution, je vais à mon but, je renverse tout, je fauche tout, et ensuite je couvre tout de ma soutane rouge."—*Ibid.*

appointed his consort, Anne of Austria, Regent of France during the minority of their son Louis XIV., then only in his fifth year; but, by way of check upon her, he named his brother, the Duke of Orleans, Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom; and, to control both, he instituted a Council, in which everything was to be carried by a majority of votes. It was composed of the Prince of Condé, Cardinal Mazarin, Boutillier, the superintendent of finance, and his son Chavigni. But Anne, by bribing Orleans and Condé, obtained the supreme direction of affairs, and granted to the Parliament of Paris, assisted by the Peers, the high privilege of abrogating the late King's will, and abolishing the compulsory Council.

Anne of Austria, now in her forty-second year, inspired universal sympathy by her good looks, her agreeable manners, and her past discomfords. She was not averse to gallantry, but of the serious, romantic, and Spanish sort; nor, from their letters now published, can it be doubted that she had a passion for Mazarin.¹ That Cardinal, who, however, had never received priest's orders, was of much the same age as herself, and in person eminently prepossessing. He is supposed to have been the son of either a bankrupt tradesman or artizan of Palermo, who settled at Rome, where he became the *cameriere*, and afterwards majordomo, of the Constable Colonna. His introduction to Richelieu, the origin of his fortune, has been already described; and he who could win and retain the esteem of so keen and severe a judge of mankind must have possessed no ordinary qualities. To the surprise of all, and disappointment of many, Anne chose Mazarin for her minister; who had to experience, like Richelieu before him, many intrigues against his power and his life.

The news of Richelieu's death reanimated the enemies of France. Philip IV. of Spain, instigated by the Emperor, by his own consort, Elizabeth of France, and by his nurse, had, as we have already hinted, begun to throw off his voluptuous indolence, and to take a more active part in the military and civil affairs of his country. In January, 1643, he dismissed his minister, Olivarez, whom his adversaries reproached with detaining the King from the camp and the council-board, and whose policy had of late been everywhere unfortunate. Never, perhaps, has the art of the courtier been exercised with a more brazen felicity than in the

¹ *Lettrés du Cardinal Mazarin à la Reine*, en 1651 et 1652, published by the *Soc. de l'Hist. de France*. Mazarin tells the Queen, *l'qu'il se meurt pour elle, qu'il voudroit pouvoir lui envoyer son cœur,*"

&c. Some persons have even thought that they were secretly married. See the *Préface* of M. Ravenel, p. x. Mazarin is said to have resembled Buckingham.

method in which Olivarez had announced to Philip IV. the revolution in Portugal. Entering the King's apartment with a smiling countenance, "Sire," he exclaimed, "I congratulate your Majesty on the acquisitions you have just made!" "What acquisitions?" inquired Philip. "The Duke of Bragança," replied the minister, "has taken it into his head to be proclaimed King, and your Majesty can therefore confiscate his immense domains." Instead of a confiscation to be acquired, he was announcing the permanent loss of a Kingdom.

A congress had now been appointed to assemble in Westphalia to arrange a general peace; Ferdinand III. and Philip resolved to strain every nerve before its opening, and the House of Austria vigorously resumed the offensive on all the theatres of war. On the side of the Netherlands, Don Francisco de Mello, at the head of a fine army, after threatening Arras, suddenly directed his march towards Champagne, and on the 12th of May, Rocroy was invested by his van. Here the Duke of Enghien, afterwards the renowned Condé, but then a young general in his twenty-second year, achieved his first victory (May 19th). In spite of the efforts to detain him of the veteran Marshal de l'Hospital, who had been associated with him as tutor and guide, Enghien flew from the banks of the Somme, routed the Spaniards, and sent 260 standards to Notre-Dame as tokens of his prowess. He next laid siege to Diedenhofen, the strongest place on the Moselle after Metz, and the key of Luxembourg. Diedenhofen surrendered August 10th, and remained thenceforth, until 1870, in the possession of France. Then, after taking the little town of Sierk, Enghien marched into Alsace, in order to support Guébriant, who had been compelled to recross the Rhine.

Spain, proportioning her efforts to her apparent grandeur rather than to her real strength, whilst thus exhausting herself in the struggle to maintain Belgium, was so weak at home, that, in order to attempt the reduction of Catalonia, she was compelled to expose unguarded to the ravages of the Portuguese the frontiers of Galicia and Estremadura. Philip IV., at the head of 12,000 men with Piccolomini, whom the Emperor had sent to direct his movements, was marching in person towards the Lower Ebro. This activity was brought on by the threats of the Aragonese to throw themselves, like the Catalans, into the arms of France, unless they were speedily succoured; for La Mothe-Houdancourt, after blockading the Spaniards in Tortona, Tarragona, and Rosas, the only places which they still retained in Catalonia, was making great

progress in Aragon. But Philip's army recaptured Monçon, and compelled the French to retire into Catalonia (November, 1643). At sea the French retained their superiority; and on the whole, chequered with some reverses, the Spanish campaign went this year in favour of the French.

The German campaign of 1643 presents little worth detailing. In the south, Guébriant was driven back into Alsace; but having been reinforced with some of Enghien's troops in October, he re-entered Suabia, and laid siege to Rothweil, which surrendered November 19th. Guébriant died a few days after entering the town, of a wound received during the siege. The confusion which ensued in his army upon his death enabled the Imperialists under the Duke of Lorraine, John of Werth, and other generals, to recover the place, and to scatter the Franco-Weimarian army. In the north, Torstenson had been able to do little more than maintain his former conquests. But a new enemy had now entered the field. Christian IV. of Denmark had reconciled himself with the Emperor, and was intent on playing the part of mediator in the negotiations that were to ensue for a general peace. Such a policy was viewed with jealousy and suspicion by Sweden; Oxenstiern sought a pretext for declaring war against Denmark; and, towards the close of 1643, Torstenson received secret instructions to invade the Danish territories. But the relations between these two countries will require a few words of explanation.

After the death of Gustavus Adolphus, the Swedish States had recognized his daughter, Christina, then six years of age, as "Queen Elect," and an oligarchical government had been established, from which the Queen-Dowager, as well as the late King's brother-in-law, the Palsgrave John Casimir of Kleeburg, were entirely excluded. By direction of Gustavus before he left Sweden, the regency was in the hands of a Great Council, consisting of five Colleges, viz.: the Aulic Court, War Council, Admiralty, Chancery, and Treasury; comprising altogether twenty-five persons; and the heads of these Colleges, who were severally the Constable, Marshal, Admiral, Chancellor, and Treasurer, formed the executive government. As the Chancellor Oxenstiern had procured the appointment of two of his kinsmen to the offices of Constable and Treasurer, he was enabled to conduct the government with almost absolute power. He controlled completely the education of the young Queen, and, though he procured for her the best instruction in art, science, and literature, the course pursued was calculated to extinguish all feminine qualities. The

Queen-Dowager was not unnaturally hurt at seeing herself excluded from all power and influence, and by the scanty allowance made her by the regency while the members of it were themselves in the enjoyment of enormous salaries and lucrative appointments. Hence she was weak enough to open communications with Christian of Denmark, holding out to him as a bait the hand of Christina for his eldest son; and Christian, though he perceived what a foolish and ruinous course she was entering on, did not hesitate to encourage her by his protection. In 1640 a Danish man-of-war was sent to Nyköping to bring her away, and she fled into Denmark, accompanied only by one lady and a Dane sent for the purpose. After some stay in Denmark, Mary Eleanor proceeded into Brandenburg, and did not return to Sweden till 1648.

This occurrence produced a coldness between Sweden and Denmark, which was further increased by Christian's subservient policy to the Emperor. An angry correspondence ensued between the two governments; nothing was wanting but a pretext to declare war; and this was afforded by a quarrel respecting the Sound dues. Sweden, by treaties with Denmark, was exempt from this toll, and she made use of the privilege to cover with her flag the goods of foreign merchants. The Danes retaliated by seizing three Swedish vessels, and Torstenson received in consequence the order already mentioned to enter Danish territory. He conducted the invasion in a manner remarkable both for boldness of design and finish of execution. His intention was kept entirely secret, and meanwhile his operations were calculated to avert all suspicion of his real design. He caused reports of his movements to be circulated which alarmed Bavaria; he threw bridges over the Elbe at points where he had no idea of crossing; and it was not till he reached Havelberg, December 6th, that he declared to his officers his intention of taking up his winter-quarters in Holstein, Sleswick, and Jutland.

The peculiar constitution of Denmark rendered that Kingdom an easy-prey to so enterprising an enemy. The King being tied down by rigorous capitulations, all the real power in the State lay with the nobles, who held Crown lands on condition of paying a fifth to the King, and maintaining the fortresses in an efficient state of repair; but this duty had been shamefully neglected. The Council, composed of seven members chosen by the nobles, would neither grant the King any extraordinary supply in this emergency, nor even suffer his German mercenaries to remain in the country. It is not surprising, therefore, that Torstenson,

who entered Holstein January 16th, 1644, when war was first declared, found it an easy task to overrun the Danish territory. Krempe and Glückstadt, in Holstein, alone defended themselves; the whole of the Danish peninsula was speedily overrun; but Torstenson's attempts to pass over to the islands were unsuccessful. At the same time Gustavus Horn and Lars Kagg entered the Danish province of Schonen in Sweden, took Helsingborg (February 17th), and then Landskrona; but Malmö, which was defended by Christian in person, resisted all their efforts.

The Emperor directed Gallas to follow Torstenson into Denmark; a step which, after the annihilation of Guébriant's army, might be ventured on with the more confidence. But Gallas, at best no very brilliant commander, seemed to have lost with advancing years what little military talent he had formerly possessed, and to have fallen deeper into his errors of over much caution and dilatoriness. He did not leave his quarters till May, and then marched with such deliberation that it was July before he reached Holstein; where, after taking Kiel, he resorted to his old method of a fortified camp. Torstenson, though seriously unwell, assembled his army at Rendsburg in the first week of August, newly equipped at the expense of the Danes. Sickness had not deprived him of his adventurous daring. Leaving a small force in Sleswick and Jutland, he offered the Imperialists battle; and, as Gallas did not think fit to leave his camp, passed it contemptuously with his whole army, without the loss of a single baggage-waggon, and reached Ratzburg in safety. Gallas was now compelled to retreat on Bernburg and Magdeburg, during which operation he lost a great part of his army, and on the 23rd of November his cavalry was annihilated.* He is said to have brought back only 2,000 men into Bohemia. At sea, meanwhile, the Swedish admiral, Klas Flemming, had appeared, in June, with a fleet of forty sail; the old King, Christian IV., went out to give him battle; an action ensued, in which Christian displayed conspicuous valour, and the victory at nightfall remained undecided. The Swedish admiral being killed a little after, Charles Gustavus Wrangel, the celebrated general, was appointed to succeed him, and was victorious at sea, as he had formerly been on land, defeating the Danish fleet between the islands of Femern and Laaland; but the summer of 1644 was unpropitious for naval operations, and little was done.

Early in 1645 Torstenson again penetrated into Bohemia, and in March, at Jankowitz, in the neighbourhood of Tabor, achieved

over the Imperialists one of the most signal victories of the Thirty Years' War. Of the three Imperial generals, John of Werth alone escaped; Götze was slain, Hatzfeld taken prisoner; 7,000 of their men fell in the action, and 70 colours became the trophies of the victors. In the north, General Königsmark drove Prince Frederick, son of the Danish King, out of the Bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, which had been relinquished to him by the Emperor Ferdinand II.; but the Swedes could not maintain themselves in Jutland, Sleswick, and Holstein, though at sea they captured the island of Bornholm. The Dutch and French had now begun to interfere in the quarrel in the interest of their commerce with regard to the Sound dues; they had pressed their mediation on the belligerents, and a congress had been opened at Brömsebro, while hostilities continued. Christina now reigned in Sweden, having assumed the reins of government on her eighteenth birthday, December 8th, 1644. The memory of her great father procured for her extraordinary respect and influence, and she fortunately reposed her confidence in Salvius, the advocate of peace. Oxenstiern and the Council were opposed to any accommodation; but after six months of negotiation she made the Chancellor lower his terms, and on the 14th of August, 1645, the peace of Brömsebro was concluded. The terms were still hard for Denmark. Swedish vessels were exempted from all tolls in the Sound and Belts; Denmark ceded Jämtland, Hejeadalen, and Oesel, for ever, Halland for thirty years—the same thing under a different name; Christian's son Frederick renounced Bremen and Verden. The further operations of Torstenson against the Emperor, after his victory at Jankowitz, were remotely supported by the Turks. The declining power of that people, whose history we have brought down to the accession of Amurath IV. in 1623,¹ now caused them to play only a subordinate part in the affairs of Europe, and for a long period there has been no occasion to advert to their proceedings; though, had they possessed their former might, the Thirty Years' War would hardly have been neglected as an opportunity of extending their dominions at the expense of the Empire. Yet they still commanded the means of annoyance, as they continued to occupy Buda and a considerable portion of Hungary on the left bank of the Danube.

The insubordination of the Janissaries had continued after the accession of Amurath, but at length, by their own moderation and submission, they restored peace to the distracted Empire.

¹ See above, p. 139.

Its affairs had altered so much for the better, that Sir Thomas Roe, in a letter to Sir Isaac Wake, April 6th, 1628, observes: "My last judgment is that this Empire may stand, but never rise again."¹ In 1632 the Janissaries attempted another abortive revolt, and after this period Amurath IV. displayed a cruelty and bloodthirstiness which had not before been observed in his character. From that year to 1637, he is said to have put to death 25,000 men, and a considerable number of them with his own hand.² The attention of Amurath was diverted from the affairs of Europe by his wars with Persia and the Druses. In 1638 he captured Bagdad, which had been fifteen years in the hands of the Persians; when he caused several thousand prisoners to be slaughtered before him as he sat upon a throne. In June, 1639, he entered Constantinople in triumph. But his constitution was already broken through fatigue, excitement, and debauchery; and being seized with a violent fever, the consequence of a carouse, he died February 9th, 1640, at the age of thirty.

Amurath was succeeded by his brother Ibrahim, whom, in the delirium of his mortal fever, he had ordered to be put to death. Ibrahim, now in his twenty-fifth year, was already completely unnerved by the dissolute pleasures of the harem, in which he had been kept secluded; he would willingly have declined the diadem; and he could not be persuaded that his brother was dead, till, swooning with fear of being strangled, he was dragged into the chamber where lay the corpse of Amurath. The change of rule, however, was tranquilly effected; and with the hope of enjoying better times under the new Sultan, even the Janissaries and Spahis were tranquil. Ibrahim, though not altogether destitute of talent and mother-wit, soon betrayed a total want of princely dignity, and passed his days in the inmost recesses of the harem, with women, jugglers, and musicians.

At the commencement of the new reign peace was renewed with the Christian Powers, many of which, as England, France, Venice, and Holland, now maintained resident ambassadors at the Porte. The only relations which seemed to threaten hostility were those with the Emperor; but in March, 1642, the peace between the two Powers was renewed at Szöny. The only open war waged during the reign of Ibrahim was that with Venice. In spite of many disputes between the Venetians and the Porte, the peace between these Powers had remained unbroken since 1573;

¹ *Négociations, &c.*, p. 809.

² *Relatione di Constantin, ap. Zinkeisen, Gesch. des osm. Reiches*, B. iv. S. 25.

but the bombardment of Valona by the Venetians in 1638, when in pursuit of some Barbary pirates who had taken refuge there, was an affront which the Porte found it difficult to digest, although Venice had expiated her offence by the payment of 250,000 sequins. In 1644 immense preparations were observed in all the Turkish arsenals, and it was readily and rightly conjectured that the object of them was Crete, the only important outlying possession that remained to Venice. The Turkish fleet, with a large army on board, the whole under the command of Yusuf, a Dalmatian renegade, left Constantinople in April, 1645. A landing was effected and the town of Canea taken; but the war dragged on several years, and it was not till 1648 that the Turks laid bootless siege to Candia, the capital of the island. The ill-success of this war, and especially the Turkish losses in Dalmatia, where the Venetians captured the almost impregnable fortress of Clissa, gave rise to serious discontent at Constantinople; most of the great officers of state, as well as the leaders of the Janissaries, rose against Ibrahim; the Mufti pronounced his deposition; and his son Mahomet IV., a child only seven years old, was saluted Sultan in his place (August, 1648). The unfortunate Ibrahim was soon afterwards strangled in the prison to which he had been committed.

Although during the period we have been surveying no open breach occurred between the Empire and the Porte, yet the Turkish Pashas who ruled in Hungary supported Ragotsky, Vovode of Transylvania, in an attempt upon Ferdinand's dominions which had been stimulated by the policy of Mazarin. On pretext that the Emperor had violated his promises to the Hungarian Protestants, Ragotsky incited a revolt in that Kingdom, and the Austrians had great difficulty in maintaining themselves in Presburg and some of the neighbouring Hungarian counties. Torstenson, after his victory at Jankowitz, united himself with Ragotsky (1645), threw a bridge over the Danube, and attempted to seize the Emperor at Vienna; but the wild and undisciplined troops of his ally proved rather a hindrance than a help, and Ragotsky himself concluded a separate peace with the Emperor. Torstenson, who was so ill that he could travel only in a litter, was soon after forced to raise the siege of Brünn. Being now determined to retire, he intrusted the maintenance of his conquests in Bohemia and Silesia to General Königsmark, but subsequently devolved the chief command on Charles Gustavus Wrangel. His last feat, before his retirement, was the capture of Leitmeritz. In the boldness and decision of his military genius Torstenson

more resembled his great master, Gustavus Adolphus, than did any other of that King's generals. He was accompanied in his last campaign by Charles Gustavus, son of the Palgrave of Kleeburg, who was subsequently to mount the throne of Sweden, and who, in the school of Torstenson, became a distinguished commander.

Negotiations for a general peace had been already opened. Ever since France had taken up arms, Pope Urban VIII. had not ceased to press that Power to abandon the Protestant alliance and reconcile herself with the House of Austria. In 1636 Urban had so far succeeded as to induce some of the Catholic Powers to treat at Cologne, whither he despatched Cardinal Ginetti as Legate and mediator; but, though the Emperor and the Catholic King sent representatives to Cologne, France declined to do so, regarding the assembly only as intended to separate her from her Protestant allies, the Swedes and Dutch, who could not be expected to treat under the mediation of the Pope. The Count of Avaux and John Adler Salvius, the ministers of France and Sweden, had renewed at Hamburg, March 15th, 1638, for three years, the alliance between those countries, with the express provision that neither should enter into a separate peace;¹ and, as at the commencement of 1641 the prospect of a general peace was as distant as ever, the alliance was again extended till such a peace should be effected.² Meanwhile the Emperor had conceived the impracticable design of treating with the States of the Empire alone, without the participation of foreign Powers; and it was with this view that he had summoned a Diet at Ratisbon in 1640; where, as already related, he had been so nearly captured by Baner. At length, in December, 1641, preliminaries were arranged at Hamburg between Conrad von Lützen, the Imperial ambassador, and Avaux and Salvius on the part of France and Sweden. It was agreed that the towns of Münster and Osnabrück in Westphalia, which were to be declared neutral, should become the seats of two congresses composed of the representatives of the Powers directly or remotely interested in the war, that is, of most of the States of Europe. The reasons for choosing two towns were, because one would not have sufficed to accommodate the crowd of ministers who were expected to attend; and because it was desirable to avoid any collision between the Papal Nuncio and the Protestant plenipotentiaries, as well as any disputes concerning precedence between France and Sweden. Hence, as a general rule, the repre-

¹ Dumont, t. vi. pt. i. p. 161.

² Dumont, t. vi. pt. i. p. 207.

sentatives of the Catholic Powers were to assemble at Münster, and those of the Protestant Powers at Osnabrück, but the Dutch plenipotentiaries were to treat at Münster with the Spanish, without any mediator; and as the affairs of the Empire were to come before both assemblies the Emperor was to be represented in both towns. The two congresses were, however, to be considered as one; and the towns mentioned were selected because they lay near each other, and had every facility of communication.

The conferences were to have been opened in March, 1642; but more than a year was lost in squabbling about forms and points of etiquette. At last, in July, 1643, the Imperial plenipotentiaries opened the congresses, and the ministers of the other Powers began to arrive; but it was not till October that the Spaniards appeared: the Venetian envoy came in November, and the French plenipotentiaries did not arrive till April, 1644. The Papal Nuncio, Fabio Chigi, Bishop of Nardo, afterwards Pope Alexander VII., and the Venetian senator Contarini, who subsequently became Doge of Venice, took up their residence at Münster, as mediators between the Catholic Powers; while the King of Denmark, as mediator between the Emperor and Sweden, had despatched to Osnabrück as his ministers Lipsius and Langermann. This attempt at mediation on the part of Denmark produced the war already related between that country and Sweden; and the functions designed for Christian IV. were ultimately transferred to Contarini.

Never before had such an assembly of the members of the European commonwealth met together. Not only were the greater States represented, but ministers from the Electors, spiritual and temporal Princes, and great cities of Germany, whom the Emperor with much reluctance at length consented to admit, as well as from such Powers as the Duke of Savoy, the Duke of Mantua, the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, nay, even from Catalonia, newly revolted from Spain, also appeared at the congress. The quiet little town of Münster, a century before the scene of the strangest suppression of all social distinctions, was now astonished and enlivened with Court ceremonies, splendid banquets, and the equipages of prelates, princes, and ambassadors; while the Papal Nuncio might behold, suspended from the tower of St. Lambert's church, the bones of that fanatical heretic who for a brief period had enjoyed a more absolute sway over his followers than had ever fallen to the lot of the haughtiest Pontiff. One nation alone accustomed to play a great part in the

affairs of Europe was conspicuous by its absence.¹ England was unrepresented in these important transactions. The civil troubles of that country had effaced her for a time as a member of the great European system; but it was perhaps fortunate for her liberties that the nations of the Continent were then engrossed by the vast struggle of the Thirty Years' War. While the hostile parties in England were during some years so equally balanced, the aid of a foreign Power might probably have turned the scale in favour of Charles and despotism.

Considering the extent, variety, complication, and importance of the interests at stake, it was not to be expected that the negotiations for a peace should be brought to any very speedy termination; but a still more efficient and dangerous cause of delay was the insincerity of some of the chief Powers, who had engaged in them rather by way of homage to public opinion than from any wish for their success. The generals and ministers of these States loved the war for its own sake, as it gave them employment and made them of importance. France and Sweden were intent on seizing as large a share as possible of the spoils of the Empire, while the Emperor himself felt a repugnance to negotiations which he saw could be completed only by vast sacrifices on his part. Since the fatal mistakes committed by Ferdinand II. in engaging in the Italian war and dismissing his army under Wallenstein, almost every year had been marked by signal defeats and losses. France had made herself mistress of Alsace and the Forest towns, as well as of several places in Luxembourg and in the Electorates of Treves and Cologne; the Swedes occupied Pomerania, and had garrisons in Saxony, Westphalia, Bohemia, Silesia, and Moravia; and the Emperor might sometimes see with his own eyes, from the ramparts of his capital, the ravages of the enemy and the burning of his villages. A portion of his own subjects was in arms against him; another large part of the Empire, comprising the Electorates of Brandenburg and Saxony and the dominions of the Dukes of Lüneburg, had declared its neutrality; and Ferdinand III. was thus reduced to recruit his armies from his hereditary dominions and those

¹ The other Christian Powers, besides England, not directly interested in the negotiations were Denmark, Poland, Russia, the Pope, and the Republic of Venice. The King of Denmark, however, had a resident at the Congress to watch over the interests of his son, as so-called Archbishop of Bremen, and his

own if necessary; the Pope and Venice were represented in their quality of mediators; and thus England, Poland, and Russia were the only countries that had no ambassadors at Münster or Osnabrück.—Garden, *Hist. des Traités*, t. i. p. 133 sq.

parts of Germany which remained faithful to him, now almost exhausted by the efforts and sufferings of so long a war. Yet he was still disposed to protract the struggle, and risk the fortune of events rather than immediately consent to inevitable sacrifices; and such were the instructions he gave to the Count of Nassau and M. Wolmar, his plenipotentiaries at Münster. Spain, also, mindful of her former grandeur and prosperity rather than of her present fortunes, could not persuade herself to make concessions to an enemy whom she both feared and despised. France, from the hopes of gain, adopted the same procrastinating policy. No sooner did the French ministers arrive at Münster than they began to raise questions respecting their right of precedence over the Spanish ambassadors, more for the sake of protracting the negotiations than with any other view;¹ whilst the Germans, without any such motive, but merely from a puerile love of titles and distinctions, followed their example. The title of "Excellence," a common one in Italy, borne by the Venetian minister, excited the jealousy of the Electors of Brandenburg and Bavaria, who insisted that their representatives were entitled to the same distinction; and when the Emperor conceded that title to such of them as were "persons of rank" (*Ständepersonen*), new disputes arose as to who were to be included in that category! While the conferences at Münster were thus embarrassed by the French, those at Osnabrück were suspended altogether by the war between Sweden and Denmark, which rendered the latter Kingdom a belligerent instead of a mediating Power; and, as the French would not take a step without the Swedes, the negotiations were for a time arrested. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the proceedings of the congress were prolonged several years, and made dependent on the events of the war, to which we must now return.²

Whilst Torstenson was pursuing his successes in Germany, as already related, the campaigns of 1644 and 1645 had also been favourable to France. In Flanders the French, under the nominal

¹ The French did not begin to think of treating seriously till the middle of 1645. —Garden, t. i. p. 142. The French and Swedes hauled in some propositions in June, but the answer of the Imperial ministers was delayed some months, so that the negotiations did not properly begin till early in 1646.

² For the negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück, see Bougeant, *Hist. des Guerres et des Négociations qui précédèrent le Traité*

de Westphalie, and *Hist. du Traité de Westphalie*. Bougeant's works are founded on the correspondence and documents which remained in the hands of the French plenipotentiary D'AVAUX. An account of the negotiations was also written by Adam Adami, the representative, at the Congress of the Abbots and Princes of the Empire (*Relatio Historica de Pacificatione Osnabrugo-Monasteriensi*, ed. Meiern, Lips. 1737).

command of the Duke of Orleans, but in reality under that of La Meilleraye, Gassion, and Ranzau, captured Gravelines, after a brave resistance, July 23rd, 1644, while about the same time the Prince of Orange had taken the Sas of Ghent. Enghien and Turenne, having marched to the Rhine, attacked the Imperial general Merci at Freiburg in the Breisgau (August); and, though they were repulsed, Merci found himself compelled to retire into Würtemberg. It is on this occasion that Enghien is said to have thrown his bâton into the enemy's lines, a story of somewhat doubtful authenticity. Turenne and Enghien now descended the right bank of the Rhine towards Baden, and captured Philippsburg, September 9th, where they found a hundred guns. Enghien established himself in this fortress, while Turenne, crossing the Rhine, took Worms, Oppenheim, and Mentz, without firing a shot. Bingen, Bacharach, Landau, and Kreuznach were also occupied by the French, who thus commanded the course of the Rhine from Basle to Coblenz. When Enghien entered Mentz, and, to the Latin harangue of the chapter and municipality, replied with facility in the same language, he astonished the Germans almost as much as by his victories. The French campaign in Germany in 1645 was also brilliant, but chequered. Enghien, quitting the valley of the Rhine, entered that of the Danube, and laid siege to Nördlingen. Merci flew to its rescue, but was defeated on the heights near the town, August 3rd, chiefly by means of the German cavalry. Merci was killed in this battle, while John of Werth, abandoning his artillery, retired upon Donauwörth. Nördlingen and Dinkelsbühl now fell into the hands of the French, who were, however, soon obliged to retire on the Neckar. Enghien was compelled by illness to return into France, but Turenne recrossed the Rhine in November, captured Treves after a short siege, and re-established the Elector in his capital, who, at the instance of the French and Swedes, had been released from his captivity in order to take part in the congress. The French arms had also, on the whole, been successful in the Netherlands. Mardyck, Linck, Bourbourg, Cassel, St.-Venant, Béthune, Lillers were captured; and, after forming a junction with the Prince of Orange, other places were taken; but before the end of the year Cassel and Mardyck were recaptured by the Spaniards. In Spain itself the French had not been so successful. In 1644 they were driven out of Aragon, and Philip IV. then undertook, in person, the siege of Lerida, which covers the western frontier of Catalonia, and defeated, with great

loss, La Mothe-Houdancourt, who endeavoured to defend it, May 15th. Lerida having capitulated, July 31st, the Spaniards next took Balaguer, and threatened Barcelona; but at this juncture Philip was recalled to Spain by the dangerous illness of his Queen, who died October 6th, and by the progress of the Portuguese in Galicia and Estremadura. In consequence of his ill success, La Mothe-Houdancourt was recalled to France and put upon his trial, and the Count of Harcourt was appointed his successor as Viceroy of Catalonia. In May, 1645, Du Plessis-Praslin took the important maritime town of Rosas; and Harcourt, crossing the Sogre, defeated the Spaniards under Cantelmo at Llorens, June 23rd. That commander was also subsequently driven from Balaguer, which capitulated, October 20th.

In Italy also matters had not gone so favourably for France. Pope Urban VIII., who died in July, 1644, was succeeded by Innocent X. (Cardinal Pamphili), who showed himself decidedly hostile to French interests; and he directed against Mazarin a bull depriving all Cardinals who absented themselves from Rome, without permission of the Holy Father, of the right to assist at the Conclave. To alarm the Pontiff, Mazarin, with the help of Duke Thomas of Savoy and the Genoese, embarked a French army at Genoa (May, 1646), and laid siege to Orbitello, a Spanish possession on the coast of Tuscany; where, however, Duke Thomas was defeated, and compelled to retreat with the loss of all his guns and baggage, by a Spanish army, which had marched from Naples through the Roman States. This disgrace was retrieved by another expedition, which sailed from Toulon under La Moille-raye, and succeeded in taking Piombino and Portolongone (October, 1646). The French, by thus establishing themselves on the coast of Italy, compelled the Pope to a more humble deportment; but the success was purchased by neglecting Catalonia; and in November, Leganez, whom Philip IV. had restored to favour, compelled the French to raise the siege of Lerida.

The French campaign in Flanders in 1646 had been successful. Enghien took Courtrai, and made himself master of the greater part of the course of the Lys. Great things were anticipated from a contemplated junction between the French and Dutch armies; but these hopes were frustrated by the insanity of Prince Frederick Henry of Orange, with which malady he had been some time threatened. Antwerp was saved from attack by this circumstance, but Mardyck was retaken August 25th, and in October Dunkirk yielded to the arms of Enghien, assisted by some French

vessels and a Dutch fleet under Tromp. The success of Turenne this year in Germany was no less striking, and by compelling the Bavarian Elector to a truce, was one of the causes which immediately led to the Peace of Westphalia. Descending the Rhine, which he crossed at Wesel, and marching round through Westphalia and Hesse, Turenne formed a junction on the Lahn with Wrangel and the Swedes (August 10th); when the united force penetrated by rapid marches to Augsburg, and pushed its van up to the very gates of Munich. The old Elector, Maximilian, was weary of the war, and had already, in the preceding year, sent his confessor to Paris, to negotiate a separate treaty, which, though entirely conformable to the interests of France, had gone off, from the suspicions entertained of Maximilian's sincerity. The latter now sued for peace, and in March, 1647, a treaty was signed at Ulm, by which Maximilian, and his brother the Elector of Cologne, engaged to remain neutral so long as the war should last. The Elector of Mentz and the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt were soon after compelled to follow this example. Thus did the Emperor become completely isolated solely by superiority in manœuvring, and without fighting a single battle. He was now in a condition which appeared to render a capitulation necessary; yet he contrived to hold out another year or two.

The first result of the congress at Münster was a treaty between Spain and the United Provinces, which was quite unexpected, as the Dutch, by their treaty with France, had bound themselves not to enter into a separate peace. But the situation of Spain rendered it absolutely necessary for her to bring to a close the war in the Netherlands. The serious nature of the Catalan revolt has been already seen, while the independence of Portugal seemed to be established beyond all hope of recovering that Kingdom, except by the most gigantic efforts. An abortive conspiracy of the Archbishop of Braga had only resulted in establishing King John more firmly on the Portuguese throne. John had won the hearts of his subjects by his generous and patriotic conduct, in devoting the revenues of his private domains to the public service, and by leaving it to the States to impose the necessary taxes in their own way; in return for which, they raised for him a supply of double the amount that had been demanded. In 1643 the Spaniards had been defeated in Estremadura, with great loss, by the Portuguese under Dom Matthias Albuquerque; and the demands made on the Spanish resources by the war in the Netherlands and in Catalonia obliged Philip IV.,

for the present, to neglect Portugal. His affairs in Italy were in no better condition, where a revolt had broken out in both Sicilies. His necessities had led him to exhaust those provinces both of men and money; the people groaned under the weight of enormous taxes, rendered all the more hateful and galling through the ecclesiastics, barons, and high officers of state being exempt from them; and the misery having been increased by a year of famine, the popular discontent exploded. An insurrection at Palermo, led by a manufacturer named Alessio, who was slain in a riot, was put down without much difficulty; but a more terrible one had broken out at Naples, where the sufferings had been greater than in Sicily, and where the harshest oppression had been aggravated by the most brutal and insolent tyranny. The last Viceroy, indeed, Don Alfonso Enriquez, Admiral of Castile, had resigned his dignity rather than be the instrument of the extortions of the Spanish government; but a man of different stamp was appointed his successor, the Duke de los Arcos, who bade those who could not raise money to pay the taxes by disposing of their furniture, to sell their wives and daughters. The lower classes had no untaxed food left but fruit and vegetables and, to meet the expense of the French war, Arcos put a tax upon fruit.

Two abortive attempts at insurrection had already been made, when Tommaso or 'Mas Aniello, a poor young fisherman, put himself at the head of the Neapolitan populace, and became for a moment master of Naples. The soldiers were routed, the bureaux of finance destroyed, the houses of obnoxious financiers and unpopular grandees were stormed and plundered, the Viceroy was seized in his palace, and compelled to abolish the more oppressive taxes in order to save his life. He was then shut up in the Castle of St. Elmo, and forced to re-establish by a formal treaty the immunities enjoyed during the reign of Charles V. But the success of 'Mas Aniello turned his head. He accepted an invitation from the authorities to a banquet of reconciliation; the people, disgusted by his extravagances, forsook him, and he was murdered by the satellites of Arcos (July 16, 1647). The anarchy, however, was not an end. The populace buried 'Mas Aniello with great pomp, and on the 21st of August a fresh explosion ensued, the people massacred all the Spaniards they could seize, blockaded the Viceroy in Castel Nuovo, and in place of a poor fisherman, chose for their leader the Prince of Massa; who seems to have accepted the office by an understanding with the government, and in the hope of effecting an accommodation.

The insurrection now began to assume the form of revolution. One party desired a Republic, another was for the Pope, a third wished to exchange the rule of Spain for that of France, and with this view made advances to the French Court.

After the open declaration of war against Spain in 1635, the French ministry had been bent on wresting Milan and Naples from the Catholic King through the aid of Italian Princes; and a plan was formed to make the Duke of Savoy King of Naples, while his own dominions were to be divided between the Cardinal, his brother, and France; the latter taking Savoy, Nice, and Villafranca. Pope Urban VIII. was to aid the undertaking, and an independent state was to be erected in the Neapolitan territory for Cardinal Antonio Barberini. But this scheme was never carried out, and was put aside by the death of Urban and accession of Innocent X., an opponent of French interests. The Neapolitan revolt of 1647 induced France to attempt something for herself. The desire for a Republic prevailed among the Neapolitans, who despatched a deputation to Rome to solicit the aid of France through the French ambassador in that city. The envoys made the acquaintance of Henry II., fifth Duke of Guise, then residing at Rome with the view of procuring a divorce; and they offered him the same post in their new Republic as the Prince of Orange held in Holland. The French agents in Italy appear to have approved this arrangement, though it was never sanctioned by Mazarin; who suspected that Guise aimed at procuring the Crown of Naples for himself, while the Cardinal-minister wished to place it on the brow of Louis XIV. Mazarin's chief view, however, was at all events to wrest Naples from Spain; and he did not, therefore, oppose Guise, though he lent him no warm support. Descended on the female side from the ancient Angevin Kings or Pretenders of Naples, there can be no doubt that Guise was meditating the seizure of what he considered his hereditary rights, though it is pretended in his memoirs that he was labouring only for France. It appears, indeed, from Mazarin's letters, that Guise was striving to render the French hateful and ridiculous at Naples; he asserted that he himself was no Frenchman, but a Lorrainer, and now an Italian by adoption; and he left off writing anything but Italian even to his friends in France.

A piece of cowardly treachery on the part of the Spanish government promised to improve Guise's chances. A Spanish fleet, commanded by Don John of Austria, an illegitimate son of

Philip IV., appeared off Naples, October 4th, and the Viceroy, after communicating with Don John, proclaimed that the Catholic King had ratified the ancient franchises of Naples, and granted a general amnesty. This announcement was received with shouts of joy. Next day, however, both the castles and fleet opened fire on the unsuspecting city, and Don John landed several thousand soldiers; but the populace, armed with tiles and stones, and such like weapons, compelled them to retreat. Cries now arose on all sides of "Long live the Republic!" The portrait of Philip IV. was dragged through the streets with every mark of contumely and insult; Massa was executed as a partisan of Spain, and an armourer, named Gennaro Annese, was chosen leader in his place. Passing through the Spanish fleet in a swift-sailing felucca, Guise landed at Naples amid the acclamations of the people, November 15th. But the opportunity of wresting Naples from the Catholic King was lost through the supineness and ill-policy of the French Court. The French fleet did not appear off Naples till December 18th; and when it arrived the Duke of Richelieu, its commander, a great-nephew of the Cardinal's, would not recognize Guise, although the people had elected him Duke of Naples; and the French fleet, after an affair of small importance with that of Spain, returned to Portolongone, January, 1648. Guise, nevertheless, who displayed considerable military talent at this conjuncture, continued to maintain himself at Naples; the Spanish government, despairing of retaining that Kingdom, recalled their fleet; till the remissness of France inspired them with fresh hopes, and determined them to resort to intrigue and stratagem. The Duke of Arcos was recalled and replaced by the Count of Oñate, at that time Spanish ambassador at Rome, a man of supple, insinuating manners; Annese and other popular leaders were secretly gained; during the temporary absence of Guise from Naples, who had lost his popularity, a report was spread that he was treating with the Spaniards; Annese and his confederates opened the gates to Don John and Oñate, who entered with cries of "Peace! Peace! no more taxes!" and the people being thus thrown into confusion, and knowing not what to believe, the Spanish restoration was accomplished almost without a blow, April 1st. Guise, being afterwards captured at Capua, was kept four years a prisoner in Spain.¹

¹ An account of this attempt of Guise's will be found in his own *Mémoires*, and in those of Montglat and Mad. de Motteville.

Mazarin's views and the policy of France are fully described in the fifth volume of Ranke's *Französis. Gesch.* S. 172 ff.

The breaking out of this rebellion, as well as the other embarrassments of Spain, to which we have adverted, naturally induced the Spanish Court to press on to a definite conclusion the treaty with the United Provinces, the preliminary conventions of which had been signed at Münster, in January, 1647. The success of Spain in detaching the Dutch from their allies has been attributed, and no doubt with justice, to her able diplomacy, conducted chiefly by Antoine Brun, a native of Dôle, in Franche-Comté; but it must also, perhaps, be partly ascribed to a false step on the part of Mazarin. The Dutch had been alienated from the French alliance by a proposition made to the Spanish Court by Cardinal Mazarin in the course of the negotiations, to exchange Catalonia and Rousillon for the Catholic Netherlands and Franche-Comté.¹ They were naturally alarmed at the prospect of having a powerful nation like France for their immediate neighbours, between whom and themselves Belgium, in the possession of a remote and exhausted country like Spain, formed a very desirable barrier; and, though the project appears to have been withdrawn, Antoine Brun very skilfully kept alive the jealousy of the Dutch. On the 30th January, 1648, they signed, at Münster, a definitive treaty with Spain, which conceded all that they desired. The United Provinces were recognized as free and sovereign States, to which Philip IV. renounced all pretensions for himself and for his successors. The conquests made by each party were to be retained as they stood; an arrangement which made over to the Dutch, Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, Herzogenbusch, Grave, and Maestricht, in Brabant; Hulst, Axel, and Sluis, in Flanders; together with part of Limburg. In like manner, Spain ceded to the Dutch all the conquests they had made in Asia, Africa and America; no great sacrifice, however, on her part, as these conquests had been achieved at the expense of the revolted Portuguese, and Spain's chance of recovering them was very slight indeed. The basest feature of this peace was the abandonment by Spain of the commercial interests of the Belgians, who had so loyally stood by her, by sanctioning in favour of the Dutch the closing of the Scheld, as well as of the Sas of Ghent, the Zwyn, and other channels of communication with the great river, thereby ruining the trade of Brabant and Flanders.² Thus, after a terrible and bloody struggle of eighty years' duration, the establishment and recogni-

¹ *Mémoire* of Mazarin in the *Négociations secrètes touchant la paix de Munster et Osnabrug* (by John Le Clerc), ap. Gardien, vol. i. p. 165, note.

² Dumont. t. vi. pt. i. p. 560.

tion of the United Provinces were at last effected under more favourable conditions than the most sanguine of their leaders might have anticipated—a struggle in which we know not whether most to admire the stubborn perseverance of Spain in the midst of all her disasters and defeats, or the fortitude, valour, and good fortune of the Dutch, who made the war itself a source of strength and profit, and contended with their enemies with the very resources which they ravished from them. The records of history might be searched in vain to find a similar struggle between Powers to all appearance so unequally matched, or in which such wonders were achieved by the indomitable spirit of liberty.

After this peace the Spaniards and Dutch took no further part in the congress, and the war between France and Spain of course continued. During the year 1647 it had not gone very favourably for France. Mazarin, in order to find employment for Enghien, whose demands had become troublesome, had made him Viceroy of Catalonia. By the death of his father, in December, 1646, he was now become Prince of Condé, by which title we shall hereafter mention him. His operations in Catalonia were not calculated to add to his reputation. He renewed the siege of Lerida, and, with an unbecoming fanfaronade, opened the trenches to the music of violins. But Lerida seemed destined to be fatal to French generals. It was gallantly defended by the commandant, Don Gregorio Britto, who, after every assault or skirmish, sent ices and lemonade for the refreshment of Condé. The French army suffered from desertion as well as from the sallies of the garrison, and, on the approach of the Spaniards, Condé found himself compelled to raise the siege. He afterwards achieved some trifling successes, but, on the whole, the campaign was a failure. In 1648, Condé was sent into Flanders, and was followed in the government of Catalonia by Mazarin's brother, Cardinal Michael Mazarin, Archbishop of Aix, a bizarre personage, without any capacity, who in a few months grew weary of the employment, and was succeeded by Marshal Schomberg. Neglecting Tarragona and Lerida, Schomberg carried Tortosa by assault, July 12th. The Archbishop, at the head of his clergy, was killed in the breach.

During this period the French were not more successful in the Netherlands. After the treaty with Bavaria, Turenne was marching into Luxembourg, when nearly all the cavalry of the Weimarian army refused to follow him across the Rhine, unless their pay, then several months in arrear, was forthcoming. Turenne

followed the mutinous troops into the valley of the Tauber, and killed several hundreds; of the remainder, some surrendered, but the greater part took service under the Swedish General Königsmark, in Westphalia. This affair prevented Turenne from entering Luxembourg till September; and as Marshals Gassion and Ranzau, who commanded the French forces in Flanders, could not agree, the advantage in this campaign lay with the Spaniards.

After the dispersion of the Weimarian army, and the withdrawal of Turenne beyond the Rhine, Maximilian, the now aged Elector of Bavaria, and his brother, the Elector of Cologne, again took up arms, in order to support the Emperor against the Swedes in Bohemia (October, 1647); though he endeavoured to reconcile this step with the treaty of Ulm, and declared that he had no wish to break with France, but only with Sweden and Hesse. The French, however, would not recognize this distinction, and Turenne was directed to support Marshal Wrangel. This commander, who had taken Eger, in Bohemia, finding himself no match for the united Imperial and Bavarian forces, made a masterly retreat into Westphalia. In April, 1648, he was joined by Turenne in Franconia, when the allied army advanced towards the Danube, the Imperialists retreating before them. These were overtaken and defeated at Zusmarshausen, near Augsburg (May 17th), where Melander, or Holzapfel, the former general of Amelia Elizabeth of Hesse, was killed; the Bavarian army retreated beyond the Inn, leaving garrisons in Munich and one or two other places; the Elector took refuge at Salzburg; and, in spite of the efforts of the Imperialists to succour it, Bavaria lay at the mercy of the Franco-Swedish army. A harrying war followed, marked by murder, burning, and devastation, but without any signal victories. While these things were going on in Bavaria, the fortune of war was equally adverse to the Imperialists in the Netherlands and Bohemia. In the former country, after some nearly balanced successes, Condé gained one of his most splendid victories over the Archduke Leopold, near Lens, August 20th, 1648, and completely dispersed his army. The plan of the German campaign this year had been a double attack on Austria, through Bavaria and Bohemia. This latter part of it was conducted by General Königsmark, who penetrated to Prague, and took that part of the city called the *Kleinseite* (Little Town) lying on the left bank of the Moldau, where an enormous booty was captured (July 31st). Charles Gustavus, now appointed gene-

ralissimo, arrived soon after with reinforcements from Sweden; but the remaining portions of Prague resisted all the efforts of the Swedes to master them. These disasters, however, had determined the Emperor to conclude peace; and thus, singularly enough, the Thirty Years' War was finished at the same place where it had broken out. The labours of the men of the sword were now superseded by those of the diplomatists; the Wrangels, the Turennes, and the Königsmarks, gave place to the Oxenstierns, the Avaux, and the Trautmandorfs; and the fruits of many a bloody campaign were disposed of with a little ink and a few strokes of the pen.

Towards the end of September the conferences at Osnabrück were transferred to Münster, where, after negotiations which had lasted between four and five years, were signed the two TREATIES OF WESTPHALIA (October 24th 1648). Of these treaties we can only give the principal conditions. The objects of the peace may be divided into two heads: the settlement of the affairs of the Empire, and the satisfaction of the two Crowns of France and Sweden. With regard to Germany, a general amnesty was granted; and all Princes and persons were, with some exceptions as to the immediate subjects of the House of Austria, restored to their rights, possessions, and dignities. The question of the Palatinate, one of the chief objects of the war, was settled by a compromise. The Duke of Bavaria was allowed to keep the Upper Palatinate, with the Electoral dignity and rights; while the Lower or Rhenish Palatinate was restored to the eldest son of the unfortunate Frederick V., and an eighth Electorate erected in his favour. On the extinction either of the Bavarian or the Palatine line, however, both Electorates were again to be merged into one. With regard to the political constitution of the Empire, it was determined that laws could be made and interpreted only in general Diets of all the States; which were also to have the power of declaring war, levying taxes, raising troops, making treaties, &c. The French and Swedes did not succeed in their attempt to procure the abolition of the custom of choosing a King of the Romans during the lifetime of the Emperor, which might have endangered the hereditary succession of the House of Austria. The demand of the German States that no Prince should be put under the Imperial ban without the approbation of a Diet was referred to a future assembly, and was finally established by the capitulation of the Emperor Charles VI. Several reforms were made in the constitution of the Imperial Chamber

and other tribunals, tending to give the Protestants a larger share of power. The authority of the Aulic Council was recognized by this treaty, but nothing was determined respecting its constitution, and it was not till 1654 that the Emperor, of his own authority, fixed the number of Aulic Councillors (besides a President and Vice-president) at eighteen, of whom six were to be Protestants. But the most important article of this part of the treaty was that by which the various Princes and States of Germany were permitted to contract defensive alliances among themselves, or with foreigners, provided they were not against the Emperor, or the public peace of the Empire—conditions easily evaded.

Respecting the affairs of religion in the Empire, as the Catholics sometimes pretended that the Religious Peace of 1555 had been only temporary, and ceased to have force of law after the dissolution of the Council of Trent, it was now formally renewed, subject to certain interpretations; and it was agreed that members of the Reformed Church, or Calvinists, were comprehended under it, and put on the same footing as those belonging to the Confession of Augsburg, or Lutherans. This concession was opposed by the latter sect, but readily agreed to by the Emperor. And in general everything concerning religion was referred to the footing on which it stood on New-Year's day, 1624, hence called the decretory, or normal, year.

With regard to the satisfaction of France, the Bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which, indeed, she had held for nearly a century, were ceded to her in full sovereignty, as well as Pinerolo in Piedmont. The Emperor and the House of Austria also ceded to France all their right to Breisach, Upper and Lower Alsace, the Sundgau, and the prefecture of the ten Imperial cities of Hagenau, Rosheim, Oberehnheim, Landau, Weissenburg, Schlettstadt, Colmar, Münster im Gregorienthal, Kaisersberg, and Türkheim, on condition that the Catholic religion should be upheld in these lands and towns. France was empowered to maintain a garrison in Phillipsburg. The Breisgau and the Rhenish Forest towns were to be restored to the House of Austria. It had been debated whether France should hold Alsace as a fief of the Empire, with a seat in the Diet, or in full sovereignty. Avaux had inclined to the former plan, which was also supported by the Elector of Bavaria, and several of the Catholic States of Germany; while, on the other hand, it was opposed by the Protestant States assembled at Osnabrück, and by the Emperor, who was unwilling to see his most dangerous enemy admitted, as it were, into his very house-

hold. Servien too, the colleague of Avaux, disapproved of a plan that would lower the dignity of France, by rendering its King a vassal of the Emperor; and this view of the matter prevailed at the French Court.

For the satisfaction of Sweden were ceded to her, as perpetual and hereditary fiefs, all Western Pomerania, together with the towns of Stettin, Garz, Damm, and Gollnow at the mouth of the Oder, the islands of Wollin, Usedom, and Rügen, the city and port of Wismar in Mecklenburg, and the secularized Bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, the former as a Duchy, the latter as a Principality; with seat and triple vote in the Diets of the Empire. Sweden was allowed to erect a University, which was afterwards established at Greifswald.

Other articles regulated the compensation to be made to German Princes; by which the Houses that chiefly profited were those of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, Brunswick, and Hesse. Brandenburg, which was soon to assume a foremost rank among German States, for the part of Pomerania which she abandoned to Sweden, received the Bishopric (henceforth Principality) of Halberstadt with the Lordships of Lohra and Klettenberg, the Bishoprics of Minden and Camin, the former secularized as a Principality, and, after the death of Prince Augustus of Saxony, the reversion of the Archbishopric of Magdeburg secularized as a Duchy.

By the Peace of Westphalia the independence of the Swiss League was recognized, and the Empire acknowledged also the independence of the Northern Netherlands, nor made any provision for the free navigation of the Rhine. The question respecting the succession to the inheritance of Jülich was referred to future adjustment. There were many other articles respecting the surety and guarantee of the peace, its execution, the pay of the soldiery, evacuation of fortresses, &c., which it is not necessary here to detail.¹

As the Pope seemed to be included in the peace as an ally of the Emperor, under the expression "the Princes and Republics of Italy," the Nuncio Chigi, immediately after the completion of the treaty, entered a protest against it; not indeed against the peace itself, but against the articles which it contained detrimental to the Church of Rome; and Pope Innocent X. soon after

¹ The chief work on the Peace of Westphalia is that of Mejern, *Acta Pacis Westphalica publica*, Hanover, 1734, 6 vols. fol. The treaties are in Bougeant, liv. x. t. vi., and Dumont, t. vi. pt. i. p. 450 sqq. Wolt-

mann's *Gesch. des Westphälischen Friedens* may also be consulted. The general reader will find all that he can require in the summary of the Count de Garden, *Hist des Traités de Paix*, t. i. § 4.

published a bull (November 26th) declaring the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück null and void. Such weapons, however, were now mere *bruta fulmina*. Even the Catholic Princes, who were glad to see the war ended, gave little heed to the Pope's proceedings; and Ferdinand III. himself, notwithstanding his devotion to the Holy See, did not hesitate to forbid the circulation of the bull.¹

Thus the policy of France and Sweden was entirely successful. These countries, besides raising up a counterpoise to the power of the Emperor in Germany itself, had succeeded in aggrandizing themselves at the expense of the Empire. Sweden, indeed, in the course of the next century was to lose most of her acquisitions; but France had at last seated herself, for more than two coming centuries, on the Rhine; the House of Austria lost the preponderance it had enjoyed since the time of Charles V., which was now to be transferred to her rival; and, during the ensuing period, we shall have to contemplate France as the leading European Power; a post which she mainly owed to the genius and policy of Cardinal Richelieu. Thus the peace of Westphalia marks a new era in the policy and public law of Europe.

¹ The protest and bull are in Dumont, t. vi. pt. i. p. 462.

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE Peace of Westphalia, as we have seen, had not included France and Spain. Both these countries had their motives for continuing the war. France was still animated with the ancient spirit of rivalry, nor had yet forgotten the painful sacrifices imposed upon her by the peace of Madrid in 1526; wounds only partially healed by the treaties of Cambrai, of Câteau Cambrésis, and of Vervins. The national animosity was kept alive by the counsels of Mazarin, who had his private reasons for desiring the prolongation of a war which provided employment abroad for those restless spirits which threatened his domination at home. Spain, on the other hand, though terribly exhausted, found in the aspect of affairs, some hopeful and encouraging circumstances. The state of her foreign relations was favourable. The peace which she had concluded with the United Netherlands had diminished the number of her enemies; on the side of England, now approaching the catastrophe of her long civil wars, there was nothing to be dreaded; and though the German branch of the House of Austria was precluded by the peace from lending her any open assistance, yet she might reckon on the good wishes, and even the secret aid, of the Emperor Ferdinand III. Above all, the Cabinet of Madrid was encouraged by the domestic troubles which then agitated France.

The sedition of the FRONDE,¹ though it nearly caused a revolution in France, is important in the general affairs of Europe only as crippling for some years the power of that country, and ranging the military talents of Condé on the side of Spain; and we shall therefore enter but very briefly into its history.

Although the victories of Condé and Turenne had gratified the national vanity and thrown a lustre on the administration of Anne of Austria and Mazarin, they had not been purchased without many sacrifices and privations. As a financier Mazarin had

¹ This ridiculous name, which, however, is sufficiently characteristic of this half-tragic, half-comic disturbance, is said to

have been derived from the slings used by the Parisian *gamins* in their sports.

neither skill nor conscience, and Eméri, his agent, was entirely unscrupulous. The taxes had been everywhere increased, and in some places, as Languedoc, it had been necessary to levy them by force. But it was the Parisians, and especially the sovereign courts, that had been chiefly incensed by the tyrannical proceedings of the cabinet, of which we can select only a few examples. In 1644 Eméri had thought proper to revive an obsolete edict, passed in 1548, soon after the invasion of Charles V., and inspired by the fear that the capital might be besieged, by which it was forbidden to erect any buildings outside the walls of Paris. Its operation, however, had subsided with the alarm which gave it birth, and the vacant space had been covered with the dwellings of the poorer classes of the population. The proprietors were now called upon to pay a tax in proportion to the space occupied; and, in case of non-compliance, they were threatened with the demolition of their houses. The president Barillon and several others, who pleaded in favour of these poor people, were snatched from their homes and incarcerated. Barillon was carried to Pinerolo in Piedmont, where he soon after died. Among other odious ways of raising money, Mazarin resorted to a forced loan, and put a duty on all articles of consumption entering Paris. This last measure, as it touched the pockets of all, may be regarded as the principal cause of the disturbances which followed. Having thus disgusted the citizens, his next step was to alienate the magistrates. The guaranty of hereditary succession to offices that had been purchased, renewable every nine years, expired on January 1st, 1648; and Mazarin, to insure the submission of the Parliament, and compel them to register his edicts, refused to renew it. As there were between 40,000 and 50,000 families in France dependent on these places, the discontent thus occasioned may be imagined. New magistrates were created, and the old ones were only continued in their places at a sacrifice of four years' income. In order, however, not to offend the whole Parliament, the edict was confined to such chambers as were not strictly courts of justice; as the *Chambre des Comptes*, the *Cour des Aides*, and the *Grand Conseil*. But these chambers called upon the Parliament to defend their rights; and by an *Arrêt d'Union*, deputies from all the chambers were summoned to meet together in the *Chambre de St. Louis*, and consult for the common good. The *Arrêt* was annulled by the Royal Council, yet the self-constituted chamber continued its sittings, and instead of confining itself to questions concerning the interest and jurisdiction of the

Parliament, it now announced its object to be nothing less than the reformation of the State.

France seemed to be on the eve of a revolution, and the scenes then passing in England might well inspire the Queen and her minister with dread. After a little attempt at violence, Mazarin yielded, and allowed the Chamber of St. Louis to proceed. Nothing seemed wanting to the success of the movement but sincere and resolute leaders. But these were not forthcoming. The two chiefs of the Parliament, the advocate-general Omer Talon and the president Molé, were honest, well-intentioned men, but not of the stuff which makes revolutionists. How could a thorough reform proceed from the Parliament?—men with bought places which they regarded as an estate with succession to their heirs; bred up in all the forms of legal etiquette, and imbued with an unbounded reverence for the royal prerogative.¹ Many, indeed, among the French nobles were willing to promote any disturbance that might overthrow Mazarin; for, if the people hated the Cardinal for his financial measures, the nobles both detested and despised him for his personal character. Mazarin had not that firmness which had at least made Richelieu respected. He could be worked upon only by fear or importunity; and even the promises extorted from him by these means were often broken. As a foreigner, both ignorant and neglectful of the ancient laws and customs of the country, he was naturally an object of suspicion and dislike. At the head of the malcontent nobles was the King's uncle, Gaston d'Orleans. But the Catiline of the *Fronde* was the young and profligate abbé Francis Paul de Gondi, afterwards the celebrated Cardinal de Retz. Gondi, Count of Retz, of Italian origin, had come into France with Catharine de' Medici, and had, as we have seen,² been one of the principal advisers of the St. Bartholomew. Since that period the family had been in almost hereditary possession of the archbishopric of Paris, and at the time of which we write the uncle of the Abbé Gondi was in the enjoyment of that dignity. The nephew had attached himself to the Duke of Orleans, and Mazarin had endeavoured to gain him by making him coadjutor to his uncle, and consequently successor to the archbishopric; an unlucky step for Mazarin, since this post

¹ When Anne of Austria, in an overbearing tone, demanded whether the Parliament pretended to control the King's will, the awe-stricken lawyers replied: "qu'ils ne peuvent, ils ne doivent décider une telle question, pour laquelle il faudrait

ouvrir les sceaux et les coffres de la royauté, pénétrer dans le secret du mystère de l'Empire."—Michelet. *Richelieu et la Fronde*, p. 315.

² Vol. II. p. 328 sq.

gave the abbé great influence with the Parisian clergy, and enabled him to excite, through the pulpits, the fanaticism of the populace.¹ The Coadjutor and the nobles with whom he acted had, however, no real sympathy either with the people or the Parliament; they were actuated only by vanity and self-interest, and the desire to wring as much as possible from the fears of the Court. Perhaps the only sincere leader of the movement was Broussel, an aged counsellor of the Parliament; a man of small means, who occupied a humble dwelling in the heart of the city, but whose firmness and resolution made him the idol of the populace. We cannot, however, detail at any length the intrigues of the Coadjutor and the events of the *Fronde*; how the Court, supported by the *état* of Condé's victory at Lens, caused some of the noisiest orators of the Parliament, and among them Broussel, to be arrested; how the people rose, barricaded the streets, and compelled his release. Seeing that the populace were no longer under the control even of the Parliament, the pride of Anne of Austria began to yield to the influence of fear, and to the advice of the unfortunate Henrietta of England, who since 1644 had been living in France. By the declaration of October 24th, 1648, one of the crises of the *Fronde*, the Queen conceded all the demands of the Parliament. Thus, on the very same day when the French policy was completely successful abroad by the conclusion of the peace of Westphalia, the government at home was in a state of dissolution; and that triumph of diplomacy—so much were the minds of the people engrossed with their domestic affairs—passed almost unheeded.

The support of Condé, who had returned to Paris in September crowned with the prestige of victory, and had helped to bring about the arrangement with the Parliament, was contested by Mazarin and the Coadjutor. Condé was, however, a dangerous confederate. His character, except on the field of battle, did not show to much advantage; his judgment was unsteady, his temper violent and overbearing. As he had a great contempt for the Parisians, and detested the lawyers, the Court found little difficulty in buying him by the alienation of some of the royal domains. His conduct towards the Parliament soon brought matters to a crisis. That body having been convened for December 16th, to consider how the Court performed its engagements, some of the

¹ We learn from his own *Mémoires* the part which De Retz played in the *Fronde*, which, he perhaps exaggerated.

See Ranke, *Französische Gesch.* B. v. S. 194, ff.

members complained of the quartering of troops in the neighbourhood of Paris. Condé, who attended the meeting as one of the guarantors of the Declaration of October, replied with threatening words and gestures, which were resented with a storm of groans and hisses. Condé, in great irritation, now went to the Queen, and pressed her to allow him to attack Paris; and after some deliberation it was resolved that, while the Spanish war was interrupted by the winter, Paris should be reduced to obedience by military force. On January 6th, 1649, Anne of Austria gave the signal by retiring with the Court to St. Germain. A civil war was now begun. Condé blockaded Paris, and the Parliament on their side, after treating with contempt a royal order to transfer themselves to Montargis, declared Mazarin an enemy of France, and ordered him to quit the Court in twenty-four hours, and the kingdom in a week. They allied themselves with the other Parliaments of the kingdom, and took into their service many nobles with their retainers; among whom may be named Condé's brother, the Prince of Conti, the Dukes of Longueville, Elbœuf, Brissac, Bouillon, Beaufort, and the Marquis de la Boulaye. The Parisians chose Conti for their generalissimo; but they were no match for regular troops under a general like Condé. They were defeated in every skirmish; by February they began to feel the effects of famine; and on March 11th, they were glad to conclude a peace with the Queen, through the mediation of the Duke of Orleans, which, from its being negotiated at the former seat of Richelieu, has been called the *Peace of Rueil*.

This peace, though ultimately abortive, arrested France on the brink of destruction. Turenne, who had been directed to remain with his army in Suabia till the spring; in order to insure the execution of the Peace of Westphalia, had signified to the Court his disapproval of the siege of Paris; had told Mazarin to rely no longer on his friendship, and had ended by placing himself and his army at the service of the Parliament and the public. Such a step on the part of the sedate Turenne seems almost inexplicable, except, perhaps, from some personal resentment against Mazarin, and the desire to recover Sedan for his family, confiscated by Richelieu in 1642.¹ The Archduke Leopold, Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, emboldened by these troubles, had advanced with his forces as far as the Aisne between Laon and Rheims; but on learning the peace of Rueil, he recrossed the frontier, and he and his lieutenants subsequently took Ypres and St. Venant. To

¹ See above, p. 250.

wash out this disgrace, Mazarin directed against Cambrai the troops which had blockaded Paris, united with the ancient army of the Rhine; but Harcourt, who commanded (Condé had refused the post), though he gained some small successes, failed in the main enterprise. Meanwhile all was anarchy in France. In the provinces order and authority were shaken to their foundations; the taxes could not be regularly levied, and it was difficult to find money even for the expenses of the King's household. Provence and Guienne were in a state of revolt; Paris and its Parliament were still restive. It cannot be doubted that the consummation of the English rebellion had some influence on these troubles. At Paris it was the universal topic. Nothing was talked of but liberty and a republic; the monarchy, it was said, had grown decrepit, and must be abolished.¹

As the best method of quelling these disturbances and procuring a little money, the Queen, with the young King, returned to Paris; August 18th, accompanied by Mazarin and Condé, and were well received by the Parisians. But Condé, by his pride and insolence, soon rendered himself insupportable, not only to the Queen and Mazarin but also to the *Fronde*.² The Cardinal availed himself of this latter circumstance to ruin the Prince. He persuaded Condé that the Coadjutor and the Duke of Beaufort, now one of the chief demagogues of Paris, intended to assassinate him. Condé's carriage was actually fired at while passing over the Pont Neuf, and a valet killed. Mazarin has been suspected of having concerted this affair; however that may be, he at least knew how to avail himself of it. Condé denounced the outrage to the Parliament, and involved himself in an implacable quarrel with the heads of the *Fronde*. Thus deprived of supporters, Condé became an easy victim to the arts of Mazarin. It was determined to arrest him, together with his brother Conti, and his brother-in-law Longueville. The promise of a cardinal's hat for Gondi procured for the Court the assistance of the *Fronde*; the Duke of Orleans consented to the measure, and the three princes, when on the point of leaving a council that had been held at the *Palais Royal*, were arrested, and quietly conducted to Vincennes (January 18th, 1650). It is said that the order for this arrest had been obtained from Condé himself, on pretence that it was to be used against some other person.³

¹ *Mémoires de Montglat*, p. 217; Martin, t. xii. p. 338.

² Condé treated Mazarin with personal insult. On his insensibility to such treat-

ment, see Mad. de Motteville, *Mém.* p. 288, and Michelet, *La Fronde*, p. 291.

³ Michelet, *La Fronde*, p. 333.

This was the second crisis of the sedition. The old *Fronde* had expired; its leaders had sold themselves to the Court; but in its place sprang up the new *Fronde*, called also, from the affected airs of its leaders, the *Petits Maîtres*. The beautiful Duchess of Longueville was the soul of it, aided by her admirer, Marsillac, afterwards Duke de la Rochefoucauld, and by the Duke of Bouillon. On the arrest of her husband and her brother, the duchess had fled to Holland, and afterwards to Stenai; where she and Bouillon's brother, Turenne, who styled himself the "King's Lieutenant-General for the liberation of the Princes," entered into negotiations with the Archduke Leopold. Bouillon himself had retired into Guienne, which province was alienated from the Court because Mazarin maintained as its governor the detested Epernon. In July, Bouillon and his allies publicly received a Spanish envoy at Bordeaux. Condé's wife and infant son had been received in that city with enthusiasm. But on the approach of Mazarin with the royal army, the inhabitants of Guienne, alarmed for their vintage, now approaching maturity, showed signs of submission; after a short siege, Bordeaux surrendered, on condition of an amnesty, in which Bouillon and La Rochefoucauld were included; and the Princess of Condé was permitted to retire (October 1st).

In the north, the *Frondeurs*, with their Spanish allies, seemed at first more successful. In the summer Leopold had entered Champagne, penetrated to Ferté Milon, and some of his marauding parties had even reached Dammartin. Turenne tried to persuade the Archduke to march to Vincennes and liberate the princes; but while he was hesitating, Gaston transferred the captives to Marcoussis, whence they were soon after conveyed to Havre. Leopold and Turenne, after a vain attempt to rouse the Parisians, retreated to the Meuse, and laid siege to Mouzon. The Cardinal himself, like his patron Richelieu, now assumed the character of a general. Uniting with his troops in the north the army of Guienne, he took up his quarters at Rethel, which had been captured by Du Plessis Praslin. Hence he ordered an attack to be made on the Spaniards, who were entirely defeated; many of their principal officers were captured, and even Turenne himself narrowly escaped the same fate (December 15th)*. The Cardinal's elation was unbounded. It was a great thing to have defeated Turenne, and though the victory was Du Plessis', Mazarin assumed all the credit of it. His head began to turn. He forgot that he owed his success to the leaders of the old *Fronde*, and especially

to the Coadjutor; he neglected his promises to that intriguing prelate, though Gondi plainly declared that he must either be a prince of the Church or the head of a faction. Mazarin was also imprudent enough to offend the Parliament; and he compared them with that sitting at London, which, indeed, was doing them too much honour. The Coadjutor went over to the party of the princes, dragging with him the feeble-minded Orleans, who had himself been insulted by the Queen. Thus was produced a third phase of this singular sedition—the union of the old *Fronde* with the new. The Parliament now clamoured for the liberation of the princes. As the Queen hesitated, Gaston bluntly declared that the dismissal of Mazarin was necessary to the restoration of peace; while the Parliament added to their former demand another for the Cardinal's banishment. Mazarin saw his mistake, and endeavoured to rectify it. He hastened to Havre in order to liberate the princes in person, and claim the merit of a spontaneous act. But it was too late; it was plain that he was acting only by constraint. The princes were conducted back in triumph to Paris by a large retinue sent to escort them. On February 25th, 1651, their innocence was established by a royal declaration, and they were restored to all their dignities and charges.

Mazarin, meanwhile, who saw that for the present the game was lost, retired into exile: first into Bouillon, and afterwards to Brühl on the Rhine, where the Elector of Cologne offered him an asylum. From this place he corresponded with the Queen, and continued to direct her counsels.¹ The anarchy and confusion which ensued in France were such as promised him a speedy return. Châteauneuf had ostensibly succeeded to his place; but Orleans and Condé ruled supreme, and ministers were dismissed and appointed at their pleasure. The Parliament in its turn wanted to establish a republic of the *robe*, and passed the most violent resolutions, which the Queen, who was a sort of prisoner at the Palais Royal, was obliged to confirm. Anne's situation—who was subjected on the one side to the dictation of the princes, on the other to the threats of the Parliament—became intolerable and the Coadjutor availed himself of her distress to push his own interests. He promised to procure the recall of Mazarin on condition of receiving a cardinal's hat: a fact which can scarcely be doubted, though he pretends in his *Memoirs* that he made no such engagement.² To relieve herself from her embarrassments,

Their correspondence has been published by the *Société de l'Histoire de France*.

² Martin, t. xii. p. 377.

the Queen Regent resolved to declare her son of age when he should have completed his thirteenth year, on September 6th. This step would release her from the obtrusion of the Duke of Orleans; and at the same time her son would be able to confirm all that Mazarin had done in his name. Already in address, figure, and bearing, the youthful Louis XIV. was admirably fitted to sustain the part of a king; and everybody acknowledged that he was formed to rule a people which loves to see absolute power fitly represented, and surrounded with pomp and splendour. On the day after his birthday, his majority was declared in a solemn *Lit de Justice*; but he was compelled to promise that Mazarin should never return, and thus to inaugurate his reign with a falsehood. In the same assembly was also published a *Justification* of Condé; yet that prince absented himself from the ceremony on the ground that the calumnies of his enemies prevented him from appearing before the King.¹ By his haughtiness and violence he had again completely isolated himself.² He had separated from the leaders of the *Fronde*; he had offended both the Court and the Parliament; nay, he had even alienated Turenne, who hastened to reconcile himself with the Queen and Mazarin. Anne had been advised again to arrest Condé; but he got notice of it, and fled to St. Maur. He had now no alternative but to throw himself into the arms of the enemies of his country; and all eyes were turned upon him, in anxious expectation of his movements.

At a meeting of his principal adherents held at Chantilli, Condé resolved upon war; and he proceeded at once to his government of Berri, and thence to Bordeaux (Sept. 22nd). Through his agent, Lenet, he had procured the support of the Spanish Government, which, besides promising considerable sums of money, engaged to send thirty vessels and 4,000 men to Bordeaux, while 5,000 more were to join the prince's partizans at Stenai. Eight Spanish ships actually arrived soon after in the Gironde with troops and money; but ultimately Spain, always in want of means, did nothing of importance. The defection of Turenne spoilt Condé's plans, who wanted Turenne to march on Paris from the north, while he himself advanced from the south. The majority of Louis was also unavourable to Condé: he had now to fight against the King in person, and the King's name was a tower of strength. Louis and his mother were with the royal army, which was commanded by the Count d'Harcourt. The struggle, which we need not enter into, lasted during the month of November. Condé, worsted in

¹ Martin, t. xii. p. 381.

² Montglat, t. ii. p. 287.

every rencounter, offered to treat on the basis of Mazarin's return ; but the Cardinal, who saw that that event depended not on the Prince, refused to negotiate. He had quitted Brühl, towards the end of October, for Hui, in the territory of Liége, whence he had advanced to Dinant. He was in correspondence with the governors of provinces and places in the north of France, who were for the most part his creatures. La Vieuville—the same whom Richelieu had ousted—had again obtained the direction of the finances, and forwarded money to Mazarin ; with which he levied soldiers in the electorate of Cologne and bishopric of Liége. After some anxious hesitation, Anno wrote to Mazarin, authorizing him to return “for the succour of the King” (Nov. 17th). The Parliament were furious, and unanimously opposed his return. They were now in a singular situation. On the one hand they were obliged to pronounce Condé guilty of high treason ; on the other they were drawing up the most terrible resolutions against the minister who governed both the Queen and country. They had to oppose on one side absolute power and ministerial despotism ; on the other an oligarchy of princes, united only by selfish views, and utterly regardless of the national interests.

Meanwhile Mazarin pursued his march, and penetrated by Rhetel into Champagne. At this news the Parliament issued a decree, confiscating his estates, and even the income of his prebends. They caused his palace in Paris, together with the library and furniture, to be sold ; and out of the proceeds they offered a reward of 150,000 livres to whomsoever should bring him to justice, “alive or dead.” Nevertheless, Mazarin continued his advance towards Poitiers, where the Court was then residing. His guards wore his own colours (green). The King went a league out of the town to meet him, and the very next day he assumed the ostensible direction of affairs. Fortune, however, seemed once more to turn. Condé, reinforced by the troops of the Duke of Orleans, and leaving his brother Conti and the Count de Marsin as his representatives in Guienne, marched against the royal forces under Hocquincourt, and defeated them near Bléneau (April 7th, 1652). The royal army would have been annihilated, had not Turenne arrived in time to save it. At this juncture, Charles II. of England, who had fled to France with his brother, the Duke of York, endeavoured to bring about an accommodation between the French Court and the princes ; but a conference held at St. Germain, towards the end of April, had no result.

Condé having marched upon Paris, the stream of war was

diverted towards the capital. During two or three months, Condé and Turenne displayed their generalship by counter-marches and manœuvres about Paris, while the Court went from place to place. At length on July 2nd, Turenne ventured an attack on Condé, who had entrenched himself in the faubourg St. Antoine. The young King, accompanied by Mazarin, had come to the heights of Charonne to see the issue; and Turenne, although from the strength of Condé's position, he would willingly have declined a battle, was neither willing to disappoint Louis, nor to awaken the suspicions of the mistrustful Cardinal. The Prince never displayed better generalship than on this occasion; yet he was on the point of being overcome, when he was saved by an unexpected accident. The Parliament, which had declared its neutrality, had intrusted the command of the Bastille to Mademoiselle de Montpensier, called in the Memoirs of those times *La Grande Mademoiselle*, the stout-hearted daughter of the Duke of Orléans, who had distinguished herself by the defence of that city against the Royalists. She took, with great valour but little judgment, a distinguished part in these wars; and it was said that her object was to compel the King to marry her, though he was eleven years her junior. While her father shut himself up in the Luxembourg, and would give no orders, Mademoiselle exhorted the citizens to stand by the Prince, and directed on the royal troops the guns of the neutral fortress which she commanded, the first of which she is said to have fired with her own hand.¹ Even this circumstance, however, would not have saved Condé, had she not persuaded the citizens to open the gates and admit him and his troops; when Turenne was compelled to retreat. Louis XIV. never forgave the Princess, who afterwards severely expiated her conduct.

The result of this victory was that Paris declared in favour of the princes; a provisional government was organized in that capital; the Duke of Orleans, though Louis was of age, was declared Lieutenant-General of the kingdom; and Condé, who still kept up his connection with Spain, was appointed generalissimo of the forces. The King having retired to Pontoise, summoned thither the Parliament of Paris, declaring null and void all that they should do in the metropolis. Only a few score members appeared at Pontoise, but they assumed all the functions of the legitimate Parliament. Louis had found himself compelled to announce his willingness that Mazarin should retire; but as the

Mém. de Conrart. p. 106 sq.; *Mém. de Mlle. Montpensier.* 117 sq.

Cardinal was very loth to quit his post, the Parliament of Pontoise, by concert with the Court, drew up a remonstrance beseeching the King to remove every pretext for disaffection by dismissing his minister; and Louis, after pronouncing a pompous eulogium on Mazarin, permitted him to retire (Aug. 10th). The Cardinal now fixed his residence at Bouillon, close to the frontier.

The King, who had betaken himself to Turenne's army at Compiègne, and received from all sides assurances of loyalty and devotion, offered an amnesty to Condé and the Parisians; but though all desired peace, none were inclined to trust an offer dictated by the influence of the detested Cardinal. Condé however, though the Dukes of Würtemberg and Lorraine had marched to his assistance, began to find his position untenable. All the magistrates of Paris had been changed; the Court had gained the Coadjutor, by procuring for him from the Pope a cardinal's hat; and while Condé despaired of the favour of the higher classes, De Retz caballed against him with the lower. The Parisians had sent some deputies to the King at Pontoise, who were delighted with their reception. Condé felt that it was time to fly. He quitted Paris for Flanders about the middle of October, and in the following month accepted from the Spanish general, Fuensaldaña, the bâton of generalissimo of the forces of Philip IV., with the red scarf which he had vanquished at Rocroi and Lens: thus degenerating from a rebel into a renegado. About the same time, the Queen and Louis XIV. entered Paris, escorted by the troops of Turenne. At their approach the Duke of Orleans retired to Blois, where he spent the remainder of his life in the obscurity befitting it. Mademoiselle de Montpensier was relegated to Bois le Comte; Broussel was incarcerated, and about a dozen members of the Parliament were banished to various places. An edict of amnesty was published, from which, however, the Prince of Condé, the Duke of Beaufort, and other leaders of the *Fronde*, were excepted. Subsequently, in 1654, Condé was sentenced to death by the Parliament, as a traitor.

Mazarin, however, still remained in exile. He could not yet rely on the disposition of the Parisians, especially so long as the arch intriguer, the Cardinal de Retz, remained among them. But that subtle prelate at length outwitted himself. The Queen on entering Paris had received him very graciously, and even attended one of his sermons at St. Germain l'Auxerrois. Deceived by these appearances, De Retz put too high a value on his services. In order to get rid of him, the Court offered him the

management of the affairs of France at Rome; but De Retz demanded in addition, honours, governments, and money for his friends; and when these were refused, he began to negotiate with Condé. But the time for such pretensions was past. On December 19th, after paying a visit to the Queen, he was arrested by a captain of the guard, and confined at Vincennes; whence he was afterwards removed to Nantes. This was the end of his political career; for though he contrived to escape from Nantes, whence he proceeded into Spain, and afterwards to Rome, he was not allowed to return to France during the lifetime of Mazarin.¹ De Retz has preserved a great reputation chiefly through his literary talent. As a politician he had no patriotic, nor even definite views; he loved embroilment and disturbance, partly for their own sake, partly for the advantage he derived from them. After the pacification of Paris, the malcontents in the provinces were soon reduced. Bordeaux, where the *Fronde* had taken a singular turn under the name of *L'Ormée*, was one of the last places to submit.

While these things were going on, Mazarin had joined Turénne and his army near Bar; and towards the end of January, 1653, he set out for Paris, which he entered February 3rd. Louis XIV. went out in state to meet him, and gave him a place in his own carriage. It is said that the Cardinal had distributed money among the leaders of the mob to cheer him on his entrance; it is certain that he was not only received with acclamation by the populace, but also feasted by the magistrates. The jurists of the Parliament displayed a grovelling servility, and he received the humble visits of some of those very counsellors who had set a price upon his head. Such was the end of the *Fronde*; a movement without grandeur or possible result, whose sterility only confirmed the power of the King and of the minister. From this time till the end of his life Mazarin reigned with absolute power; for he maintained the same influence over the young King as he had previously exerted over Louis's mother. His avarice and despotism grew worse than before. The management of the finances was intrusted to the most unworthy persons, among whom Fouquet astonished Europe by his magnificence. Mazarin made the interests of France subordinate to his own avaricious views, and his plans for the advancement of his family. Fortune

¹ After the death of Mazarin, however, de Retz obtained the archbishopric of Paris. His uncle, the old Archbishop Gondi, died in 1654. The *Mémoires* of

De Retz terminate in 1655. They have been completed by Champollion-Figeac. (See *Coll. Michaud*, sér. iii. t. 1.)

seemed to favour all his enterprises. His nieces, the Mancini, celebrated for their beauty and vivacity, were all married into princely houses; and Louis XIV. himself was with difficulty dissuaded from giving his hand to one of the six.

The *Fronde* is the last occasion on which we find the French nobles arrayed in open war against the Crown. Henceforth they became the mere satellites of the Court, whose power was supported, and whose splendour was increased, by their presence. How different from the great revolution which took place about the same time in England! The English reader hardly needs to be reminded that King Charles I., after a solemn trial, was publicly executed on the scaffold, January 20th, 1649; that the House of Peers, as well as the monarchy, was abolished, and the government of the kingdom conducted by the Commons; that Cromwell gradually assumed the supreme power, both military and civil, and after reducing the Royalists by his victories in Ireland, Scotland, and England, and reviving by his vigorous foreign policy the lustre of the English name, he finally, in December, 1653, caused himself to be named "Lord Protector."

Meanwhile the Spanish war had been going on, with disastrous consequences to the French. The Spaniards had good leaders in the Archduke Leopold William and Don John of Austria, to whom was now added the great Condé. They also received material assistance from the Emperor Ferdinand III. In spite of the Peace of Westphalia, Ferdinand sent thousands of men into Flanders under the flag of Charles IV., Duke of Lorraine, who, since his quarrels with France, had become a sort of partisan chief. Don John, whose exploit in saving Naples from the French we have already related,¹ and who subsequently recovered from them the Tuscan ports, had, in 1651, laid siege to Barcelona; which city, after a blockade of thirteen months, both by sea and land, at length surrendered (October 12th, 1652). Girona, Palamos, Balaguer, and other places next fell; and all Catalonia was ultimately reunited to the Spanish Crown, from which it had been separated during a period of thirteen years. In the same year the Spaniards wrested back from the French Gravelines and Dunkirk. Their conquest of Dunkirk had been facilitated by the conduct of the English Government. The Parliament which then ruled in England had offered D'Estrades, the French commandant of Dunkirk, a large sum to put that place in their hands. D'Estrades honourably refused to accept the bribe, but referred

* ¹ Above, p. 269.

the English agent to his own Court. Mazarin was inclined to cede Dunkirk to the English on condition of receiving 15,000 men and fifty vessels to act against the French rebels and the Spaniards; but Anne of Austria would not consent. In consequence of this refusal, the English fleet under Blake defeated a French fleet which was proceeding to the relief of Dunkirk (September 14th, 1652); and four days after D'Estrades was compelled to surrender to the Spaniards. Yet so fearful were the French Government of bringing upon them another enemy, that even this gross outrage failed to produce a war with England.

It would be tedious to detail all the campaigns between the French and Spaniards, in which nothing decisive was achieved till, in the year 1657, Cromwell threw the weight of England into the scale. The most prominent figures on the scene during this struggle were Condé and Turenne, who, like two Homeric heroes, seemed to hold in their hands the fortune of war. Their skill was conspicuously displayed in 1654, when Turenne compelled the Spaniards to raise the siege of Arras; but was prevented by the manœuvres of Condé from pursuing his advantage. It was in this school that the youthful Louis XIV. served his apprenticeship in arms. The campaign of 1655 was almost wholly unimportant; but the reverses of the French in the following year, as well as the failure of some negotiations with Spain, which would not consent to abandon Condé, induced Mazarin to enter into a close alliance with the Protector Cromwell.

France had not been so forward as Spain in recognizing the new order of things in England. The French Court, connected with Charles I. by his marriage with Henrietta, had viewed the rebellion with displeasure; and had exhibited this feeling by prohibiting the importation of certain articles of English manufacture. The English Parliament had naturally resented this conduct, and the establishment of the Republic had not been announced to France, as to other countries. Subsequently, in 1650, Mazarin had even listened to the proposals of the Dutch Stadholder, William II., to co-operate with him for the restoration of the Stuarts. The Spanish Cabinet, on the other hand, being desirous of the English alliance, had, immediately after the execution of Charles, acknowledged the Republic; and when Cromwell seized the supreme power, he was not only congratulated by the Spanish ambassador, but even informed that if he should assume the crown, the King of Spain would venture his

own to defend him in it.¹ At a later period, however, Mazarin, seeing the necessity for the English alliance, became a rival suitor for Cromwell's friendship. But the Protector, though well aware of the advantages of his position, was for some time prevented by a war with the Dutch from declaring for either nation.

Instead of that sympathy and support which the English Republicans might naturally have expected from the Dutch Commonwealth, which English blood and treasure had contributed to establish, the States-General had interposed to save the life of Charles I.; had acknowledged his son as lawful King of England, condoled with him on the "murder," as they styled it, of his royal father, and given him an asylum in their dominions.² This conduct was influenced by the youthful Stadholder, William II., who, having married Mary, the eldest daughter of Charles I., was naturally in favour of the Stuarts; and he had at various times supplied Queen Henrietta with arms, ammunition, and soldiers in aid of her husband's cause. In this policy William was supported by the Dutch clergy and the populace; which, incited by its ministers, was so furious against the English Parliament, or "rebels," that Strickland, the Parliamentary envoy, durst not leave his lodgings; and on May 2nd, 1649, Dr. Dorislaus, his colleague, was murdered. The higher classes of the Dutch alone, and especially in the province of Holland, where the principles of an aristocratic republic prevailed, as well as with a view to commercial interests, were for the English Parliament, and advocated at least a strict neutrality. These principles had even threatened to bring the province of Holland into a dangerous collision with the Stadholder. After the peace with Spain, the question had arisen as to the reduction of the army, and what regiments were to be dismissed; and on these points the States of Holland were at complete variance with the Stadholder. They had shown a disposition to assert the right of self-government on these and other subjects, so that it even became a question whether the supreme power was to be vested in the States-General, or whether each province was to form an independent State. William attempted to decide this question by force, and despatched some of his troops against Amsterdam, while the citizens prepared to defend themselves by cutting the dykes; when the young prince was fortunately saved from this foolish enterprise by the advice of his relative, Van Beverweert, and the mediation of the States-General. William's negotiations, before mentioned, with the

¹ Thurloe, *State Papers*, vol. i. p. 759.

² Harris, *Life of Cromwell*, p. 249.

French Court for the restoration of the Stuarts,¹ which he had entered into without consulting the States, were cut short by death. He was carried off by the small-pox, November 6th, 1650, in the twenty-fifth year of his age. A week after his death his wife gave birth to a son, William Henry, the future King of England.

The death of William was followed by a change in the constitution of the United Netherlands. In a great assembly of the States, held at the Hague in January, 1651, Holland had succeeded in establishing the principle that, though the union should be maintained, there should be no Stadholder of the United Netherlands; that each province should conduct its own affairs; and that the army should be under the direction of the States-General. In conformity with this decision, the office of Stadholder remained vacant till 1672. These events, however, not having produced any sensible alteration in the general conduct of the Dutch towards England, the Parliament, with a view to change this disposition, sent St. John, Lord Chief Justice, and Mr. Walter Strickland as ambassadors extraordinary to the Hague; and, to prevent a repetition of the former violence, forty gentlemen were appointed to accompany them. The ambassadors were instructed to propose a complete union and coalition between the two republics, and to insist that no enemy of the English Commonwealth should be sheltered in the Dutch provinces. But they could not succeed in bringing the States into their views, and were even again publicly insulted in the streets.² It must not be concealed that a good deal of commercial jealousy lay at the bottom of all these proceedings. The Dutch were now at the height of their commercial prosperity, and besides their large colonial trade, which often clashed with that of England, they almost monopolized the carrying trade of Europe. Sir Henry Vane, who was the chief director of all the transactions with the Dutch, declared it to be his fixed opinion that the commercial interests of Holland and England were irreconcilable, and that, in order to a permanent peace, the two republics must either form a coalition or else that the English must subjugate the Dutch Republic and reduce it to the condition of a province.³ Soon after the return of the English ambassadors from their fruitless errand, the House of Commons passed the celebrated Navigation Act, by which it was ordained

¹ On this subject see D'Estrades, *Lettres et Négociations*.

² Thurloe, *State Papers*, vol. i. p. 182; Ludlow, vol. i. p. 344.

³ Stubbe, *Further Justification of the War with the United Netherlands*, p. 118, sqq. 4to. London, 1673.

that goods from Asia, Africa, and America should be imported only in English bottoms, as also goods from any part of Europe, unless they were the produce or manufacture of the country to which the vessels belonged. The States-General sent ambassadors to London to endeavour to mitigate this law; but the Parliament, on its side, met their demands with others concerning the massacre that had been committed at Amboyna,¹ the fisheries, the right of the flag, &c.

It was during these negotiations that an apparently accidental collision between the English and Dutch fleets produced a war between the countries. The renowned Dutch admiral Tromp, being compelled, as he alleged, by stress of weather to take refuge at Dover with a fleet of more than forty sail, there met with Admiral Blake, who commanded a far inferior force; a battle, by whomsoever provoked, ensued, and was fought with obstinacy till night parted the combatants, when the Dutch retired, with some loss, to their own coast (May 19th, 1652). At the news of this affair the Parliament ordered all Dutch ships to be seized, and made preparations for a vigorous war. The Dutch sent the Pensionary Pauw to London to attempt a reconciliation; but the Parliament would listen to no explanations, demanded reparation, and, on its being refused, declared war (July).² We shall not detail the naval war which followed. Suffice it to say that in 1652 and the following year several sanguinary battles were fought, in which Blake, Ayscue, Monk, and Penn distinguished themselves on the side of the English, and Tromp, De Ruyter, and De Witt on that of the Dutch.³ Victory sometimes favoured one side, sometimes the other; but, on the whole, the Dutch suffered most, and especially in their commerce. They are said to have lost more during these two years than in the whole eighty years of their struggle with Spain. At length they were so crippled by the great action fought in July, 1653, in which the gallant Tromp lost his life, that they were glad to accept of a peace on the terms dictated by England.

Cromwell's foreign policy was as vigorous as his domestic.

It was his hope, he used to say, to make the name of *Englishman*

¹ The Dutch had, in 1623, massacred the English settlers in Amboyna.

² Dumont, t. vi. pt. ii. p. 28, 31; also, *Ordinance of the States-General*, *ib.* p. 35.

³ The principal actions were, in 1652, between Sir G. Ayscue and De Ruyter, off Plymouth. August 16th (undecided); Bourne and Penn's victory over De Witt and De Ruyter, off the Kentish coast,

September 28th; Tromp's victory over Blake in the Downs, November 28th, after which the Dutch admiral fixed a broom to his mainmast. In 1653 Blake and Monk defeated Tromp and De Ruyter off Portland, February 18th; the English⁴ also gained several smaller victories this year, besides the decisive one mentioned in the text.

as much respected as ever that of *Roman* had been. He sought to obtain a footing on the Continent, both as a means of extending English trade and of supporting the Protestant interest in Europe. Hence when Beverningk came as ambassador from the States to treat for peace, the Protector, as the Parliament had done before, insisted on a union of the two republics; but this the Dutch immediately rejected as impracticable, nor would they listen to another proposition that there should be three Englishmen either in the Dutch Council of State or in the States-General, and three Dutchmen in the English Council.¹ The English demands were also in other respects so high, that the Dutch prepared to strengthen themselves with alliances in order to continue the war; and especially they entered into a treaty with Denmark, whose royal family was connected with the Stuarts, and that Power engaged to shut the Sound against the English. De Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland and President of the States-General, now almost directed the counsels of the United Netherlands. At the time of his election, in 1653, he was only twenty-five years of age; but he had already displayed all the best qualities of a statesman, besides a love of literature and a philosophical talent which had been developed by the teaching of Descartes. Although public feeling in the Netherlands was very much inflamed against England, De Witt was so convinced of the necessity for a peace, that he did not hesitate to stem the popular current, and, as Cromwell also lowered his demands, and abandoned the idea of a coalition, a treaty was at length concluded, April 15th, 1654. A chief point of contention was the sovereignty of the seas.² The Dutch yielded the honour of the flag, and agreed to salute English men-of-war by striking the flag and lowering the topsail; but the Protector, on his side, abated some of his former pretensions, as, for instance, that whole fleets should render these honours to a single man-of-war, and that the Dutch should not send more than a certain number of ships of war into the British seas without the express permission of England. The Dutch agreed not to help the Stuarts, and to make atonement and compensation for the massacre at Amboyna and the injury done to English trade in the East Indies and other places. The province of Holland alone, in a separate article, engaged that no prince of the House of Orange should ever be invested with the dignity of Stadholder;

¹ Van Beverningk ap. Van Kampen, *Gesch. der Niederlande*, B. ii. S. 151.

² The English demands on this head

were founded on Selden's *Mare Clausum*. Harris, *Life of Cromwell*, p. 264.

or even be appointed Captain-General.¹ The King of Denmark was included in the treaty, the States-General engaging to make good any losses the English merchants had sustained by the seizure of their ships at Copenhagen.

After the conclusion of this peace Cromwell was at liberty to take a part in the great debate between France and Spain, both of which Powers were soliciting his friendship. The Protector himself, as well as most of his Council, preferred a war with Spain. An attack upon the Spanish trade and colonies afforded a tempting prospect, whilst a war with France offered no such advantages. Cromwell's religious views had also great influence in determining him against Spain, which, with Austria, was the chief supporter in Europe of that Popery which the Puritans so much abhorred. The same feeling had imbued the Protector with a great fondness and admiration of Sweden, distinguished among the northern nations as the champion of Protestantism, and therefore made him averse to a war with France, the close ally of Sweden. Thus during this period the foreign policy of the two maritime republics took an exactly opposite direction. After the Peace of Westphalia, it was no longer Spain, but France, as an ambitious and powerful neighbour, that became the object of apprehension in the United Netherlands; whilst in the great northern war entered into by Sweden about this time against Poland, Denmark and their allies, the Dutch, in the interests of their Baltic commerce, opposed the Swedes and supported the Danes.

In the course of 1654 Cromwell made some advantageous commercial treaties with Sweden, Portugal, and Denmark; Portugal especially granted the English an exclusive right of commerce with herself and her colonies.² The negotiations were continued with the Spanish Cabinet, which made the Protector the most dazzling offers. Besides the personal bait of assisting him to the Crown of England, Spain offered to aid him in taking Calais, provided he would help Condé in a descent upon Guyenne. But, while Cromwell pretended to listen to these offers, his resolution had been already taken. His demands upon Spain were such as it was impossible for that Power to grant—free trade with the Spanish Indies, and complete exemption for British subjects from the jurisdiction of the Inquisition.³ The

¹ Dumont, t. vi. pt. ii. p. 74.

² *Ibid.* p. 80 sqq.

³ For the negotiations with France and

Spain, see Thurloe, vol. i. p. 706, and p. 759 sqq.

Spanish ambassador said that "to ask a liberty from the Inquisition and free sailing to the West Indies was to ask his master's two eyes." In the winter of 1654-5 two fleets left the shores of England, whose destination was unknown. One, commanded by Penn, with a body of troops under Venables, sailed to the West Indies, with the design of seizing the Spanish colony of Hispaniola. It failed in that enterprise; and, though it took Jamaica, both commanders were on their return incarcerated in the Tower. The other fleet, under Blake, which entered the Mediterranean, had a sort of roving commission. It employed itself in taking some French ships, in exacting reparation from the Grand Duke of Tuscany for some alleged former losses, while the Pope trembled at its neighbourhood; it then sailed to the coast of Africa, to chastize the Deys of Algiers and Tunis for their piracies. But its principal object was the seizure of the Spanish American galleons. The Spaniards, on receiving the news of the unwarrantable attack upon their West Indian possessions, immediately declared war against England, and Blake received fresh instructions to lie in wait for their American fleet. For want of water he was compelled to abandon the enterprise to one of his captains, who succeeded in capturing two galleons and destroying others; and Blake himself soon after met his death in another and more honourable enterprise against the Spaniards in the Canaries.

Although Cromwell had broken with Spain, he had not yet made any alliance with France. The two countries were for some time kept apart by a religious question. Early in 1655 the Duke of Savoy had commenced a bloody persecution against the Vaudois who dwelt in the High Alps of Piedmont. The numbers of these poor people had increased so much that there was no longer room for them in the three upper valleys, in which alone their religious liberties were guaranteed, and they had consequently descended lower down the mountains. In the middle of winter appeared an edict ordering them, under pain of death, to quit their new abodes in three days, unless they could make it appear that they were become Roman Catholics. Exasperated at this cruel proceeding, their brethren in the High Alps flew to arms, and solicited the assistance of the Vaudois of Dauphiné and of the Protestants of Geneva and Switzerland; but before help could arrive, they were attacked, and many of them massacred, by the Piedmontese troops, in conjunction with some French troops of the army of Lombardy. How the news of this act was received by the Protestants of

Europe may be imagined ; the feeling excited in England is shown by Milton's sonnet on the subject.¹ Cromwell immediately ordered a general fast, and set on foot a subscription for the sufferers, which produced nearly 40,000*l.* He also desired Mazarin to put an end to the persecution. He told the Cardinal that he well knew that the Duke of Savoy was in the power of the French Court, and that if they did not restrain that sovereign, he must presently break with them. Mazarin, though he promised to use his good offices, at first demurred to this demand as unreasonable ; but dreading the vigorous steps which Cromwell was preparing to take, and being apprehensive of the effect of his applications to the Kings of Sweden and Denmark, the States-General, and the Swiss Protestant cantons, the Cardinal obtained from the Duke of Savoy an amnesty for the insurgents, and an indemnity for the families which had been expelled.

Soon after the settlement of this affair, a treaty of peace and commerce was concluded between England and France (November 3rd).² The most important provision of it, with regard to political matters, was that the Stuarts and their adherents were not to be harboured in France. Although England was now at war with Spain, no military alliance was concluded between England and France. Mazarin was not yet prepared to pay Cromwell's price for it—the surrender of Dunkirk, when captured, to England. Hence probably an attempt of the Cardinal's to negotiate with Spain in 1656 ; on the failure of which he again resorted to Cromwell, prepared to submit to his conditions. On the 23rd of March, 1657, a treaty was accordingly signed at Paris, by which it was agreed that 6,000 English foot, half to be paid by France and half by England, should join the French army in Flanders. Gravelines, Mardyck, and Dunkirk were to be attacked with the aid of an English fleet ; Dunkirk, when taken, was to be delivered to the English ; and the other two towns, if captured previously, were to be placed in the hands of England, as security till the condition respecting Dunkirk should be fulfilled.³

The help of the English troops under General Reynolds, and of the English fleet, turned the war in Flanders to the advantage of the French. In the campaign of 1657, Montmédy, St.

¹ *Sonnet xviii.* Milton also wrote, as Latin secretary, several State letters on the occasion. See also Sir Samuel Morland's *Hist. of the Evangelical Churches of the Valleys of Piedmont*; and *Articles accordés par Charles Emmanuel à ses sujets habitans des vallées de Piedmont*,

in Dumont, i. vi. pt. ii. p. 114.

² Dumont, t. vi. pt. ii. p. 121. It is a singular feature of this treaty that mutual guarantees are given against piracy. The police of the seas was not even yet properly established.

³ Dumont, t. vi. pt. ii. p. 224.

Venant, and Mardyck were taken; when Mardyck, in the capture of which an English fleet had assisted, was, according to treaty, put into the hands of the English. Early in the following spring Cromwell compelled Mazarin reluctantly to fulfil his engagements by ordering the siege of Dunkirk. It was a common opinion that Mazarin would have directed the allied forces against Cambray, in order to make himself bishop and prince of that city, and the attention of the Spaniards had been chiefly turned towards the defence of that place. Don John of Austria was now Governor of the Spanish Netherlands. In 1656, the Emperor Ferdinand, with the view of pleasing the cabinet of Madrid, and in the hope of marrying his son to the heiress of the Spanish Crown, had made room for Don John by recalling the Archduke Leopold William from Flanders, and at the same time Fuensaldána, Leopold's lieutenant, was replaced by Caracena. A jealousy between Condé and Leopold had prevented them from acting cordially together; but the haughty and impracticable Bourbon did not co-operate much better with the new governor. The Spaniards were astonished to find that Dunkirk, instead of Cambray, was the point of attack. Turenne, after a long and difficult march, had invested that place (May 25th, 1658). Don John, aware, too late, of his mistake, flew to its relief in such haste that he left his baggage and artillery a day's march in the rear, and encamped in presence of the enemy without the means of fortifying his position. In vain had Condé remonstrated; his sure and experienced eye foresaw the inevitable result. Next day, when Turenne marched out from his lines to engage the Spaniards, Condé inquired of the Duke of Gloucester, the younger brother of Charles II., who was by his side, "Have you ever seen a battle?" "Not yet." "Then in half an hour you will see us lose one."¹ His prediction was speedily verified. The artillery of Turenne, aided by that of some English frigates on the coast, to which the Spaniards had not the means of replying, had already thrown them into disorder before the engagement became general. The charge of three or four thousand of Cromwell's veterans, composing the left wing under Lockhart, decided the fortune of the day. The Spaniards attempted to rally, but were dispersed by the French cavalry. On the right the French infantry were equally successful, in spite of all the efforts of Condé. The rout was complete: 1,000 Spaniards and Germans were killed or wounded, 3,000 or 4,000 more were made prisoners, including many general officers; Condé himself

¹ *Mém. du duc d'York.*

escaped with difficulty. This battle, fought on the 14th of June, 1668, called the "Battle of the Dunes," from its being fought on the *dunes* or sand hills which line the coast in that neighbourhood, decided the fate of Dunkirk. That place capitulated on the 23rd, and on the 25th, Louis XIV. in person surrendered it to Lockhart. Lord Fauconberg, Cromwell's son-in-law, who was sent to compliment Louis, was received with princely honours; and in return, the Duke of Créqui and Mazarin's nephew, Mancini, were despatched to the Protector with the present of a magnificent sword, and an apology from the Cardinal for not coming in person to pay his respects to so great a man! The remainder of the campaign of 1658 was equally fortunate for Turenne. In a short time he took Bergues, Furnes, Gravelines, and other places, and overran all Flanders to within a few leagues of Brussels. These reverses, coupled with others in Italy and in the war with the Portuguese, induced the Spanish Cabinet to think of a pacification; especially as Spain had now become in a manner isolated through the death of the Emperor Ferdinand III. and the policy of France with regard to the Rhenish League. But to explain this, we must cast a retrospective glance on the affairs of the Empire.

The state of Germany after the Peace of Westphalia was eminently favourable to French interests. Sweden, the close ally of France, held large possessions in the Empire, which gave her a voice in the Imperial diet. The German princes had become even more independent of the Emperor, and several of them looked up to France for support and protection. In 1651, two leagues had been formed in Germany, with the professed object of carrying out the Peace of Westphalia. The first of these leagues was occasioned by the disorders committed by the troops of the Duke of Lorraine; through whom, as we have seen, the Emperor assisted Spain in her struggle with France. To avert this scourge, the German princes most exposed to it, namely, the Electors of Mentz, Treves, and Cologne, the Count Palatine of the Rhine, and the Bishop of Münster, formed a League at Frankfort (March, 1651), which they subsequently induced the Circles of Suabia, Franconia, and Lower Saxony to join. This union, from the religion of those who formed it, was called the *Catholic League*. About the same time, in North Germany, the Queen of Sweden, as Duchess of Bremen, the Dukes of Brunswick and Luneburg, and the Landgravine of Hesse also entered into a treaty, called the *Protestant League*, on the pretext of maintaining their territories and upholding the Peace of Westphalia. These leagues afforded Mazarin

an opportunity to meddle in the affairs of Germany. He demanded that France should be admitted into them as guarantor of the treaties of Westphalia, and he subsequently made them the basis of the *Rhenish League*, in which French influence was predominant. These leagues were naturally regarded with suspicion and dislike by the Emperor; who, alarmed by the prospect of further coalitions, caused the provisions of the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück to be confirmed by the Diet of Ratisbon in 1654.¹ This was called the *Complement of the Peace of Westphalia*, and served as the groundwork of the capitulation subsequently extorted from Ferdinand's son and successor, Leopold. Treaties in 1656 with the Elector of Brandenburg and the Elector Palatine served further to strengthen French influence in Germany. The Palatine had, in fact, sold himself for three years to France, in consideration of an annual pension.

Such being the state of things at the time of the somewhat sudden death of the Emperor Ferdinand III.² (April 2nd, 1657), Mazarin formed the plan of wresting the imperial crown from the House of Austria, and even of obtaining it for Louis XIV. The opportunity was rendered more promising by the circumstances of the Imperial House. Ferdinand's eldest son, whom he had procured to be elected King of the Romans, with the title of Ferdinand IV., had died in 1654; and the Emperor had not since succeeded in procuring that dignity, a necessary passport to the imperial crown, for his second son, Leopold Ignatius, who was now only seventeen years of age, and consequently still a minor. The situation was further embarrassed by the circumstance that the Emperor, only two days before his death, had signed an alliance with John Casimir, King of Poland, and had pledged himself to assist that Sovereign in the war then going on between him and Charles X., King of Sweden; a policy which was adopted by the Archduke Leopold William, the uncle and guardian of the youthful heir of the House of Austria.

When the news of Ferdinand III.'s death reached Paris, Mazarin despatched the Marquis de Lionne and Marshal Gramont into Germany, to canvass for the imperial crown, under the ostensible pretext of demanding reparation for some violations of the Peace of Westphalia. Lionne was a dexterous and practised diplomatist; but the real weight of the embassy rested with

¹ This is the last Diet presided over by an Emperor in person, and its recess the last ever drawn up.—Menzel, *Neuere Gesch. der Deutschen*, B. iv. S. 303.

² Caused by a shock, when ill, at the danger of an infant son, from the effects of a fire. Hormayr, *Oestr. Plutarch*, ap. Menzel, *Ibid.* S. 305.

Gramont, a man of wit and of the world, who, with manners at once agreeable and dignified, united all the qualities of a jovial companion. His task it was to gain by his social qualities the goodwill of the German Electors and Princes in those interminable banquets and drinking bouts which sometimes lasted from midday almost to midnight.¹ It is probable that Mazarin never seriously thought that he should be able to obtain the imperial crown for Louis. His real design seems to have been to transfer it to the Elector of Bavaria, or, at all events, to wrest it in any other manner from the House of Austria; and the canvassing for Louis would serve at least to create division and to gain time. The French ambassadors, on their way through Heidelberg, renewed the alliance with the Elector Palatine, who, for a further sum of 140,000 crowns, and a yearly payment of 40,000 more for three years, placed himself entirely at their disposal. France might also reckon on the three spiritual Electors; among whom the Elector of Mentz alone was actuated by honest, and what he deemed patriotic, motives. Thus, half the Electoral College had been gained, but not the most influential half. Of the other four Electors, John George II. of Saxony was for the House of Austria, out of love for precedent and custom, and also, it is said, from the hope, which everybody but himself saw to be chimerical, of marrying his daughter to the youthful Leopold. Frederick William of Brandenburg was also in favour of Leopold. Political motives connected with the invasion of Poland by Charles X. of Sweden, and his own views on the duchy of Prussia had now induced the far-seeing Elector of Brandenburg to renounce the Swedish alliance, and consequently that of France, for a league with the House of Austria and the Poles, as will be explained in the following chapter. Leopold himself, as hereditary King of Bohemia, the crown of which country, as well as that of Hungary, he had received during his father's lifetime, possessed the Bohemian Electorate; but being a minor, his vote was not yet valid. The eighth and last Elector, Ferdinand Maria of Bavaria, was hesitating and undecided.

It was not without great opposition that the French ambassadors were admitted into the Electoral Diet, and they soon per-

¹ Gramont, in his *Mémoires*, thus describes a dinner at Count Fürstenberg's: "Le dîner dura depuis midi jusqu'à neuf heures de soir, au bruit des trompettes et des timbales, qu'on eut toujours dans les oreilles: on y but bien 2,000 ou 3,000

santés; la table fut étayée, tous les électeurs dansèrent dessus; le maréchal (Gramont) qui étoit boiteux, y menoit le branle; tous les convives s'enivrèrent." — Petitot, t. lvi. p. 463. (2nde sér.)

ceived that Louis's chance was hopeless. The Elector of Mentz, however, was as desirous as the French Court itself to break the Austrian succession. At his suggestion, Gramont proceeded to Munich, urged the young Elector to become a candidate for the imperial crown, and offered him a yearly pension of a million crowns from France in support of that dignity.* Ferdinand Maria was timid, quiet, and devout; and though urged by his consort, a princess of the ever-aspiring House of Savoy, to seize the glittering prize, he listened in preference to his confessor and to his mother, an Austrian archduchess, who dissuaded him from the attempt. The Elector of Mentz now made another effort to separate the empire from the Austrian monarchy, by proposing that Leopold's uncle, the Archduke Leopold William, the former governor of the Spanish Netherlands, should assume the imperial crown; but this also was declined, and Leopold requested that the votes destined for himself should be transferred to his nephew.

As it was now plain that the Empire must fall into the hands of Ferdinand's son, the French Court directed all its endeavours to cripple his power, by imposing on him a rigorous capitulation through the German Princes, who were indeed themselves desirous to restrain the imperial authority. At his election he engaged, among many other articles which regarded Germany, not to furnish the enemies of France with arms, money, troops, provisions, or other commodities; not to afford lodgings, winter quarters, or passage to any troops intended to act against any Power comprised in the treaties of Osnabrück and Münster; nor to interfere in any way in the war then going on in Italy and the Circle of Burgundy.¹ Leopold I. received the Roman Crown July 31st, 1658, after an interregnum of about sixteen months. He had now completed his eighteenth year, and was therefore, according to the Golden Bull, no longer a minor. As a younger son, he had been destined for the Church, and his education had been intrusted to the Jesuits; so that when his destination was changed by the death of his brother, there was not perhaps a more learned sovereign in Europe. He had displayed from his youth a remarkable piety, and his only amusements, as a boy, were to build altars, keep church, and dress out images of saints. He appears to have been a well-meaning prince, but of narrow mind and little spirit, the slave of forms and ceremonies, which he

¹ The capitulation is in Dumont, t. vi. pt. ii. p. 226 sq.

willingly adopted to avoid contact with the outer world, and he was glad to let his Lord Chamberlain rule in his stead.

The Imperial Capitulation would have been of little service to France without some material guarantees for its observance; and these Mazarin provided by converting the two German Leagues already mentioned into one, styled the RHENISH LEAGUE. Within a month of Leopold's coronation, this union, purporting to be for the maintenance of the Peace of Westphalia, was signed by the three Spiritual Electors, the Bishop of Münster, the Count Palatine of Neuburg, the Dukes of Brunswick, the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, and the King of Sweden on the one part, and by the King of France on the other. The Confederates pledged themselves, without regard to difference of religion, to stand truly by one another, and to unite in case of an attack; and with this view to keep continually on foot an army of 2,300 horse and 4,900 foot. Louis XIV. on his side engaged to hold in readiness 800 horse and 1,600 foot, and five guns, whenever they should be required. These forces were styled "the Army of his Most Christian Majesty and of the allied Electors and Princes."¹ A Directory of the League was established at Frankfort, under the presidency of the Elector of Mentz, to watch over the common interests. The Rhenish League was the culminating point of French policy with regard to Germany. Its immediate object was to prevent the Emperor from interfering in the war in Flanders and Italy; and hence the French ambassadors regarded it as a complete compensation for their failure with regard to the imperial crown—indeed, as a triumph. The accession to it of so many Catholic prelates and princes, much to the vexation of Pope Alexander VII. and the Court of Rome, showed that the old spirit of intolerance was dying out, and that the traces of the religious war of Germany were obliterated, never more to be revived. The League was renewed for three years in August, 1660, and flourished long, but at the expense of France, which not only paid the princes belonging to it, but also their ministers and mistresses. Leopold returned no answer to the ambassadors of the Confederates sent to acquaint him with the establishment of the League; yet he subsequently gave it a sort of tacit recognition, by demanding from Louis XIV., as a member of it, a contingent of troops to act against the Turks. Louis sent double the number demanded, and it was indeed the French who, in the Turkish campaign of 1664, carried away the chief honour.

¹ Londorp, *Acta. Publ.* Th. vii. p. 417 sq. ap. Menzel, B. iv. S. 309.

The interregnum in the Empire, the subsequent capitulation of the new Emperor, the Rhenish League, the alliance of the House of Austria with John Casimir of Poland, and its consequent share in the war against the Swedes, were all circumstances which precluded the Spaniards from the hope of any further assistance from Germany; and this circumstance, coupled with the losses and reverses already mentioned, made them anxious for peace. On the other hand, these events were encouraging to France, and might well have induced her to prolong the war and complete the conquest of Flanders. But France herself was exhausted, and her finances in disorder; Mazarin, with increasing years, was become more desirous of peace; and Anne of Austria, who wished not to see her native country too much abased, was incessant in her entreaties that he should put an end to the war. The Queen-Mother had also another motive: she wished to marry Louis to the Spanish Infanta. An obstacle which had stood in the way of this union during the negotiations of 1656 was now removed. At that time Maria Theresa was sole heiress of the Spanish crown; and for this reason a marriage between her and the King of France was of course distasteful to the Spaniards. But in 1657 Philip IV. had had a son born to him, afterwards Charles II., and the objection mentioned had consequently in a great measure disappeared, though the chances of the Spanish succession were still strong enough to be alluring to the French Cabinet. Such a succession would be far more than equivalent to any advantages which might be expected from continuing the war, especially as it was held that in any event the Spanish Netherlands would, according to the customs of those countries, fall to the Infanta, as Philip's child by his first consort.

Under these circumstances, negotiations were renewed between the French and Spanish Courts in 1658. The dilatoriness of Philip IV. was hastened by a stratagem. Mazarin entered into negotiations with the Duke of Savoy for a marriage between Margaret, daughter of that prince, and Louis XIV.; and the Courts of France and Turin met at Lyon. The fear that this union would be accomplished, and that France would then carry on the war to extremities, induced Philip to send an ambassador to Lyon, to offer the Infanta's hand to the French King. The Piedmontese princess, whose feelings had thus been trifled with, was now dismissed with a promise of marriage in case the negotiations should fail;¹ the preliminaries of a peace were discussed at

¹ *Mém. de Gramont*, t. ii. p. 184.

Lyon, and subsequently arranged at Paris, and in May, 1659, a suspension of arms was concluded. But now another obstacle arose where it might have been least expected. Louis XIV. had fallen desperately in love with Mazarin's niece, Mary Mancini, a young lady of no great beauty, but clever, forward, ardent, fond of poetry and literature. Louis flatly proposed a marriage—a severe trial to the Cardinal! It was no doubt the Queen-Mother who put an end to this unsuitable amour; yet, whatever may have been Mazarin's real feelings, his letters to the young King on this subject display the soundest sense, conveyed in the noblest language.¹ He sent off Mary Mancini to La Rochelle,² and on the following day he himself left Paris for the frontier, to negotiate the peace. He and the Spanish minister, Don Louis de Haro, held their conferences in the Isle of Pheasants in the Bidasoa, near Hendaye, which was neutral ground; for Haro would not yield precedence by going to the Cardinal at St. John de Luz. Mazarin displayed at these conferences a regal splendour which quite threw the Spanish minister into the shade. At the first interview the Cardinal appeared with twenty-seven court carriages, each drawn by six horses, and filled with French nobles, and attended by a splendid retinue of pages, guards, and livery servants.

The question respecting the Prince of Condé formed a difficult point in the negotiations. Spain, in her treaty with that prince, had engaged to effect his restoration to all his honours and governments. After Condé's treasons, this was a hard morsel for the French Court to digest; Mazarin, moreover, owed the Prince a grudge for his personal insults. The Cardinal, however, receded so far from the preliminaries as to promise that Condé should have the Government of Burgundy, and his son the place of Lord High Chamberlain; but in return for these concessions he exacted the towns of Avesnes, Philippeville, and Marienburg in the Netherlands, and the county of Conflans in the Pyrenees. When the negotiations had made some progress, Gramont went in state to Madrid to demand the hand of the Infanta for his royal master. Louis had a rival in the young Emperor Leopold, who, in spite of his capitulation, had offered to declare war against France in return for the Infanta's hand. But peace had now become a necessity for Spain, and the offer of Louis was accepted.

¹ See particularly his letter of August 28th, 1659. *Lettres de Mazarin*, t. i. p. 303 sqq. (ed. Amst. 1745).

² It was on this occasion that she ad-

dressed to Louis the well-known words: "Vous êtes Roi, vous pleurez, et je pars!" —*Mém. de Montglat*, p. 351.

The TREATY OF THE PYRENEES, which restored peace to France and Spain, was signed November 7th, 1659. The conditions were almost entirely in favour of France. Spain ceded in the north all Artois (except St. Omer and Aire), and several towns in Flanders, Hainault and Luxembourg, together with Marienburg, Philippeville, and Avesnes between the Sambre and Meuse; in the south she abandoned Rousillon and Conflans, except the places on the Spanish side of the Pyrenees, and that part of Cerdagne lying on the French side of the same mountains. On the other hand, Spain recovered what she had lost in Italy. Louis engaged not to assist the Portuguese; and this had been a great allurements to the Spaniards to conclude the treaty, who were in hope to subdue Portugal after the peace. Spain in a great degree abandoned her ally, the Duke of Lorraine; for though Charles IV. was restored to his dominions, a considerable part of them, namely, Moyenvic, the Duchy of Bar, and the county of Clermont, was incorporated with France.¹ The Duke had attended the conferences in the vain hope of procuring better terms. Charles II. of England had also appeared on the Bidasoa. Cromwell was now dead; his son Richard had resigned the Protectorate, and the English Government was again in the hands of the Parliament. Don Louis de Haro wished to draw Mazarin into an alliance for Charles's restoration; but though the Cardinal dreaded the permanent establishment of the English Republic, he was not prepared to oppose it by entering into war.

The Treaty of the Pyrenees was followed by a marriage contract between Louis and the Infanta. In this instrument, Maria Theresa made that famous renunciation of all her prospective rights to the Spanish Crown, which afterwards led to the war of the Spanish Succession. It is probable that even the Spanish Court itself was not sincere in thinking that this renunciation would be observed. The wording of the very clause in which it was contained was calculated to raise questions likely to produce a war. The renunciation was made to depend on the payment of the dowry, and to extend to all inheritances and successions, whatever were their title, known or unknown.²

The marriage could not be immediately celebrated, as, on account of the relationship of the parties, it was first necessary to procure a dispensation from Rome. Philip IV., too, who was then in bad health, wished to accompany his daughter to the frontier.

¹ Dumont, t. vi. pt. ii. p. 264.

² Garden, t. ii. p. 29; Dumont, t. vi. pt. ii. p. 283.

The French Court therefore lingered during the winter in Provence; for which it had another motive in a wish to display its authority in those parts, which had been in a state of fermentation ever since the *Fronde*. Condé, who had written to the Cardinal in the most obsequious terms to desire a reconciliation, visited the Court at Aix, in January, 1660. In the spring the French Court proceeded slowly through Perpignan to St. Jean de Luz, where it arrived May 8th; and three days afterwards Philip IV. came to St. Sebastian. The French and Spanish ministers, however, were delayed more than three weeks in settling some points with regard to the treaty; and it was not till June 3rd that Don Louis de Haro, being provided with the procuration of the French King, espoused the Infanta in his name at Fuenterrabia. On the following day Philip IV. met his sister, Anne of Austria, in the Isle of Pheasants. They had not seen each other during forty-five years. On this occasion the Infanta accompanied her father, and Louis XIV., concealed *incognito* among the young lords in his mother's suite, obtained the first view of his bride. Next day the Kings of Spain and France met upon the island and swore to the observance of the treaties. On June 7th the Infanta was delivered to her husband, and on the 9th the marriage was consummated at St. Jean de Luz. The Court then proceeded by easy journeys to Paris, which they entered in state August 26th.

The Peace of the Pyrenees was the last important act of Mazarin, whose life was now drawing to a close. By this treaty he completed the policy of Richelieu, and put the finishing hand to the diplomatic triumphs of Münster and Osnabrück. It has been objected that this policy was not ultimately advantageous to France, and that the Spanish match even became a source of misfortune to her.¹ But to require that Mazarin should have foreseen these results seems too great a demand on human wisdom; and it is sufficient for his fame that he successfully achieved what at the time appeared to most men a very desirable object of ambition.² It cannot be doubted that the Peace of Westphalia and that of the Pyrenees secured for some time the supremacy of France. The credit of both these measures is due to Mazarin; and some of the chief advantages of the latter were secured by the personal exercise of his extraordinary diplomatic talents.³ That he made France pay dearly for these triumphs must be allowed. He

¹ See Michelet, *Richelieu et La Fronde*, p. 407.

² The Parliament of Paris, complimented the Cardinal on his services.

³ See the account of his negotiations at the Isle of Pheasants, in Gardon, *Hist. des Traités de Paix*, t. ii.

enriched himself unscrupulously at her expense, and amassed so large a fortune that, in order to avert the envy of it, he made it over in his last days to the King ; though doubtless in the confident anticipation of Louis's generosity and munificence in restoring it. Yet what could have been expected from a political adventurer and professed gambler,¹ raised to the absolute control of a great kingdom in which he was by birth an alien ? To Louis, at least, he appears to have discharged his duties with fidelity. Some of his last days were spent in advising the young King as to his future course, and rendering him fit to assume the sole control of his kingdom ; and he recommended to Louis Le Tellier, Colbert, Pomponne, and other ministers who achieved so much for the greatness of France. The young monarch was already impatient to seize the administration. The control of Mazarin was becoming irksome to him ; and the very next day after the Cardinal's death he announced to his Council, " For the future I shall be my own prime minister."

Cardinal Mazarin died March 8th, 1661, at the age of fifty-nine. Like Richelieu, he had conducted the affairs of France during a period of eighteen years.

¹ He is described by Mme. de Motteville as gambling even on his death-bed, and weighing pistoles in order to stake

the light ones again at play. *Mémoires*, p. 504.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

HAVING thus described the manner in which France pursued the advantages which she had obtained at the Peace of Westphalia, we will now turn to Sweden, the companion of her policy, and partaker of the spoils.

We have already recorded the accession of Christina, daughter of Gustavus Adolphus, to the Swedish throne in December, 1644.¹ Christina, in the first years of her reign, displayed great industry and application to business, as well as extraordinary ability. She regularly attended the meetings of her Council, over which she acquired an astonishing influence; she made herself mistress of the questions to be discussed by perusing the state papers, whatever might be their length; and she had the faculty of stating the conclusions at which she arrived with great clearness and discrimination. She was resolved to govern by herself, and to discharge worthily the high functions to which she was called. She gave audience to all foreign ambassadors, and she is said to have taken a large personal share in effecting the Peace of Westphalia.² She also possessed uncommon literary talent. To some acquaintance with the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew tongues she added a knowledge of German, French, Italian, and Spanish; which she assures us she acquired without the aid of masters.³ Her patronage of literature attracted to Stockholm a crowd of learned men, among whom may be named Grotius, Isaac Vossius, Meibomius, Gerdesius, and others, including René Descartes, the most original thinker of the age, who visited Stockholm in 1649, and died there in the following year. But unfortunately these pursuits disqualified Christina for her more serious duties. The foreigners by whom she was surrounded, by their descriptions of southern climates and southern art, created in her an aversion for her wintry realm, and the rustic simplicity of her subjects; whilst their more philosophical discussions bred in her, if not positive

¹ Above, p. 257.

² See a character of Christina in Ranke's *Pop. v.* B. 8, § ix.

³ *Vie de Christine, faite par elle-même*, p. 53. (In Arckenholtz, *Mém. de Christine*, t. iii.).

atheism, at least an indifference for all religion, unless it were that of the Roman Catholic Church, as most indulgent to sins like hers. Hence she began gradually to entertain the idea of renouncing the crown, the duties of which seemed to debar her from scenes and studies more congenial to her temper. Other motives led her in the same direction. Besides her literary pursuits, Christina had also a taste for show and splendour. She was fond of masques and mythological ballets, in which she sometimes took a part herself, in costumes not remarkable for decorum. Her extravagance was so great that she was often in want of money for her daily expenses. She bestowed with a lavish hand the royal domains on her courtiers and favourites, in order that they might appear at her feasts and revels with princely splendour, and thus deprived the kingdom of resources which were afterwards employed by the nobles to establish their own power at the expense of the crown. The necessities in which she thus became involved strengthened her wish to quit a land whose climate, customs, and religion were alike distasteful to her. Already in 1651 she had proposed to abdicate, but had been diverted from the project by the advice of her counsellors. Three years later her embarrassments became so great that she determined to throw the burden from her shoulders, and to transfer the crown to her cousin, Charles Gustavus.

We have already had occasion to mention this prince in the narrative of the Thirty Years' War.¹ He was son of the Count Palatine, John Casimir, by Catharine, sister of Gustavus Adolphus; and was born at the castle of Nyköping, November 8th, 1622. All Sweden had desired a marriage between their Queen and the nephew of their great monarch, and in 1647 the States had earnestly pressed Christina to marry; when she declared that if ever she did so, she would give the preference to her cousin, who had already proposed for her hand and been refused. In 1649, when the States renewed their request, Christina signified her resolution to remain single, but at the same time named her cousin as her successor on the throne. In the following year she was crowned with a splendour hitherto unseen in Sweden. But the nomination of Charles Gustavus did not give general satisfaction. It was much opposed by the nobles, and especially by the now aged Oxenstiern, who could never be brought to give his consent. Nevertheless the States recognized Charles Gustavus, who, however, was obliged to promise Christina's privy counsellors that he would protect and maintain them in all the gifts they had received

¹ Above, p. 260.

from her, and to come under all sorts of engagements, both towards the Queen and the States. In June, 1654, Christina abdicated, stipulating that she should not be considered as a subject, nor be made responsible for the debts of the crown; and reserving as the source of her revenues several towns, provinces, and islands. Nobody then certainly knew that she had renounced the religion of her fathers; but her conversion to the Roman Catholic faith was suspected, nor was it long before she openly declared it.¹ The manner of her abdication resembled rather the flight of a criminal than the departure of a queen. Instead of proceeding to Germany in the fleet appointed to convey her with becoming state, she hastened through Denmark into the Netherlands, as if she were flying from shame.²

Charles X., for such was the title of the new monarch, found Sweden in a terrible state of exhaustion; which had arisen not only from Christina's expensive habits, but also from the position taken by Sweden as a conquering nation, and by efforts in the Thirty Years' War more than commensurate with its strength. The difficulty of the situation was enhanced by the peculiar constitution of the Assembly of the States, and by the great difference prevailing among the provinces composing the kingdom, which rendered it difficult to levy any general taxes, while it was almost impossible to make the nobles and clergy contribute their shares. Christina, by her lavish expenditure, had not only exhausted the ready money and credit of the State, but also, by the alienation of the crown lands, had sapped the very foundation of the public property. Thus Charles found the kingdom in a state in which he must either declare a bankruptcy, or else endeavour to free himself from his burdens by a war which should maintain itself; for no small part of his expenses was occasioned by the maintenance of a numerous army of Swedes and German mercenaries, which had been kept on foot since the Thirty Years' War. Nor was he averse to the latter alternative. Naturally of a warlike disposition, his service under Torstenson had fitted him to become an able commander; he was now in the flower of his age, and was filled with the ambition of executing the plans of his uncle, and extending the Swedish dominion over all the countries contiguous to the Baltic.

¹ She was solemnly received into the Romish Church at Innsbruck, in November, 1655.

² Christina, after wandering over great part of the Continent, died at Rome in

1689. In the interval she twice revisited Sweden; in 1660 and 1667. To describe her way of life after her abdication belongs not to a general history, and would reflect but little credit on her character.

Charles never doubted that he must begin a war, the only point for deliberation was against what country he should first direct his arms. Denmark seemed to offer an easy prey. Ruled by a turbulent and powerful oligarchy, who applied to their own purposes the resources of the State, and opposed even the wisest and most useful measures of the King, that country seemed fast drifting to ruin. It was, moreover, totally destitute of any permanent and well-organized military force that could be opposed to the Swedish veterans, trained in the Thirty Years' War by the greatest captains of the age. But an attack upon Denmark was feasible at any time, and a more important project seemed first to claim the attention of Charles. He contemplated seizing those provinces on the Baltic, held by the Elector of Brandenburg and the King of Poland, which interrupted the communication between Livonia and Pomerania, provinces of which he was already in possession. The Dukes of Courland and Prussia, who were vassals of Poland, were to be compelled to acknowledge the sovereignty of Sweden; the mouths of the Vistula were to be seized, as well as Polish Prussia and Dantzic; and the House of Brandenburg was to be offered in Poland a compensation for ceding Eastern Pomerania, which would connect together all these conquests. When these plans had been accomplished, the subjugation of Denmark would complete Charles's empire in the Baltic, and render that sea a Swedish lake.¹

While Charles was still in suspense, he was decided by a step taken by John Casimir II. of Poland. That monarch, annoyed at seeing the Swedish Crown, formerly worn by his father, pass into a foreign house, yet without the power to assert his claim to it by arms, was foolish enough to afford Charles a pretext for war by protesting against his accession. Under the circumstances of Poland at that time, nothing could have been more imprudent than such a step. Since the accession of John Casimir, in 1648, Poland, which under the rule of his brother and predecessor, Ladislaus IV., had still enjoyed some reputation, had fallen into a state of decay and almost of dissolution. It was with difficulty that John Casimir could defend his frontier against the Cossacks his subjects, and the Tartars his neighbours; while the internal factions with which Poland was rent scarcely allowed him to maintain himself upon the throne.

The kingdom, or as the Poles themselves called it, the Republic of Poland, required, from its peculiar constitution, the

¹ Puffendorf, *De Rebus a Carolo Gust. gestis*, t. i. p. 39 sqq.

greatest vigour and ability in the prince who governed it. The only class of Poles which enjoyed any political rights was the nobles, comprising some 100,000 families. The rest of the population was composed either of serfs who were entirely at the disposal of their masters, or the inhabitants of towns, who, though free, could neither hold public office nor exercise any legislative power. Hence the nobles alone composed the State; but these were themselves divided into four very different classes. The first class, consisting of a few princely families, who possessed whole provinces, enjoyed large revenues, and had the privilege of maintaining troops, were often at deadly feud with one another, and carried on their quarrels with the aid of foreign mercenaries and foreign gold. Under them were the Voyvodes, Starosts and Bishops, who administered the higher temporal and spiritual offices. These two classes alone were properly the rulers of the State. The third class consisted of holders of prebends and castellanies. The nobles of the fourth and last class, by far the most numerous, were poor, and for the most part depended on those above them for employment and subsistence. The Diet, chosen only by the nobles, possessed the whole power of the Government; it elected the King, made the laws, and even took a part in the executive administration. For although the King was nominally the head of the State, yet he had so little real power that the three greatest officers, namely, the Grand Chancellor, who administered the law, the Grand Treasurer, who presided over the finances, and the Grand Marshal, who directed the political affairs of the kingdom, were not responsible to him for the discharge of their functions. Notwithstanding, however, that the Diet possessed such extensive powers, it lay at the mercy of any single member who, by virtue of what was called the *Librum Veto*, might annul its proceedings. The nobles had also the right of forming *Confederations*, which raised troops and decided by arms contested political questions. When the anarchy thus created became too intolerable to be endured, recourse was had to a *General Confederation*; a sort of military dictatorship, whose leader usurped all the functions of government. Enrolment in such a confederation was compulsory on every noble, on pain of forfeiting his privileges. Poland was also exposed to anarchy through the religious parties into which it was divided; for though most of the nobles were Roman Catholics, a considerable number belonged to the Protestant, and some to the Greek confession. These were called *Dissidents*, or dissenters. They

enjoyed the same political privileges as the other nobles; of which, however, the priests and Jesuits were continually seeking to deprive them; an object in which, in the following century, they succeeded.

Bred as a monk and imbued with all the bigotry of the cloister, John Casimir was wholly unfitted to rule a kingdom like Poland. He was himself governed by his Queen, Louisa Maria di Gonzaga; which circumstance, together with the preference which he showed for French manners, caused a large party to regard him as unworthy to reign over a warlike nobility. In the year 1652 the opposition to his government had been displayed in the strongest manner. The *Liberum Veto* was then first used, and whole provinces seemed inclined to place themselves under foreign protection. In the same year, Jerome Radzejowski, Vice-Chancellor of Poland, and one of the principal leaders of the malcontents, fled his country and took refuge at the Court of Sweden: where he incited Charles, by the promise of his assistance, to deliver the Poles from the domination of a pusillanimous king and an imperious woman. Charles might also expect to find a strong party in the Protestant malcontents, among whom was Prince Radzivil, Grand General of Lithuania. All these circumstances seemed to favour an attack on Poland, and more than all these, the war in which that country was then engaged with Russia. The Czar Michael, the founder of the House of Romanoff,¹ had died in July, 1645, and was succeeded by his son Alexis, then sixteen years of age. Russia had now recovered from her domestic troubles, and began to feel her strength. Alexis commenced those plans for civilizing the Russians, and enabling them to play a part in the affairs of Europe, which were afterwards carried out by his son, Peter the Great; he partly organized his army on the European model, and introduced foreign artisans to instruct his people in handicrafts and manufactures. To this ambitious and enterprising prince, the disputes between the Poles and the Cossacks of the Ukraine seemed to offer a favourable opportunity for extending his dominions.

These Cossacks,² who must be distinguished from those of the Don, inhabited a country lying on the Dnieper, about forty leagues broad; and situated between the 50th and 53rd degrees of N. latitude. The Slavonic name of *Ukraine* is identical with the German *Mark* and the French *Marche*, and signifies a *boundary*

¹ See above, p. 155.

² For the history of this people see

Engel, *Gesch. der Ukraine und der Cossacken.*

or *frontier*; for anciently the Ukraine formed a boundary between four states: Russia, Poland, Turkey and Little Tartary. From its being governed by the Grand Dukes of Lithuania, it also obtained the name of *Little Russia*, in contradistinction to the Russia governed by the Muscovite Sovereigns; and hence when Jagellon, Grand Duke of Lithuania, was elected to the throne of Poland, in 1386, the Ukraine became united under the same prince with Poland. In 1569, when Lithuania was incorporated with Poland, the Palatine and Castellan of Kiev, in the Ukraine, took their places among the senators of the Republic. A few years afterwards, Stephen Bathori gave the Cossacks a more regular organization. He divided them into regiments of 1,000 men, distributed under *Sotnas* (*banners*) or companies, each of which had a permanent chief. All the regiments were under a sole commander, called *Hetman*, whom the King invested in his command with a flag, a horsetail, a bâton, and a mirror. But Sigismund III. Augustus, who succeeded Bathori on the Polish throne, quite alienated the Cossacks by his inpolitic measures. He reduced their military force from 40,000 men to 6,000; forbade their marauding expeditions, and made their Hetman subordinate to the general of the Crown. Sigismund was also imprudent enough to shock their religious prejudices; and being governed by the priests, did all that lay in his power to bring the Cossacks, who belonged to the Greek communion, into that of the Pope. These innovations excited a discontent which broke out more than once into open rebellion, and produced a series of wars, which were prolonged with varying success through the reigns of Sigismund and his successor Ladislaus. At length an imprudent step on the part of Ladislaus prepared the events which for ever separated the Ukraine from Poland.

The Diet having refused Ladislaus a corps of foreign troops for the war which he meditated against the Turks, that Sovereign resolved to gain the affection and assistance of the Cossacks by restoring to them their ancient privileges. But this he endeavoured to effect by engaging their leader, Chmelnicki, in a sort of sham conspiracy against his own kingdom. The Tartars were to be secretly induced to attack Poland in conjunction with the Cossacks; and when the Diet should have provided Ladislaus with troops and money to repel the invasion, the Cossacks were to make common cause with him, and, after driving out the enemy, to establish the King's authority on a solid basis. The plan was carried out. In 1647 the Cossacks rose; in May, 1648,

with the assistance of the Khan of the Tartars, they defeated a Polish army; and Chmelnicki, as had been arranged, addressed a letter to the Polish King, demanding for the Cossacks a redress of grievances and the re-establishment of their ancient constitution.

Unfortunately, however, for the success of this project Ladislaus had expired before the letter was delivered; and the Diet which assembled in July, after some stormy debates, resolved to use force against the Cossacks; but the Polish army disbanded itself on their approach. John Casimir, therefore, when elected to the Polish crown, had no alternative but to conclude an armistice with them, and in the following year, he restored to them most of their privileges. This agreement, however, was not observed; the Cossacks again rose, but with their allies the Tartars, were defeated by the Poles, July, 1651; when they were compelled to accept a convention much less favourable than the former one. The strength of their army was reduced to 20,000 men, and they were obliged to admit, as collectors and agents of the King, the Jews who had been formerly banished. Such a state of things was in the highest degree unpalatable to a warlike people accustomed to treat with arms in their hands. Their leader, Chmelnicki, who had three or four years before sought the aid of the Russians, with whom the Cossacks were connected by a common origin, and a conformity of language and religion, persuaded them, in 1654, to place themselves by a formal treaty under the protection of the Czar Alexis;¹ who eagerly seized the occasion to reunite to his empire provinces which had been separated from it since the fourteenth century. This step involved Alexis in a war with Poland; which he strove to justify with foreign Powers by the most childish complaints of errors committed by the Poles in the titles given by them to himself and his father; the authors of which errors, he said, he had in vain required to be capitally punished.² The Czar in person laid siege to, and captured Smolensko, September 10th, 1654, and soon after Vitepsk and other towns; another Russian army entered Lithuania, and took several places, while a third occupied Kiev and all the Ukraine. The Poles, who did not take the field till late in the year, being reinforced by 18,000 Tartars, blockaded Chmelnicki in his fortified camp at Ochmatoff till February, 1655; when that intrepid chieftain cut his way through their ranks sword in hand, and rejoined the Russians.

¹ Engel, S. 191.

² "Ipsum Czarem missis Legatis scipius postulasse, ut qui tales errores admiserint

capite plecterentur." — Puffendorf, *De Rebus Suec.* lib. xxvi. § 8.

Such was the state of Poland at the time of Charles X.'s contemplated expedition against that kingdom. In vain had John Casimir despatched ambassadors to Stockholm to avert it; who, in excuse for their master's having assumed the title of King of Sweden, alleged the example of the English sovereigns, who bore the title of Kings of France; of the King of Denmark, who called himself King of the Goths and Vandals; and of Henry III. of France, who had continued till the end of his life to use the title of King of Poland. Charles remained inexorable. He wanted a pretext for war, and this was the best that he could find. There was nothing in the state of Europe to deter him from his project. The Emperor was occupied with the internal affairs of the Empire; Denmark, as we have said, was weakened by internal discord; Holland, the State most likely to oppose the designs of Charles, had just terminated an expensive war with England, and was also crippled by dissensions at home; France and Spain were entirely occupied with the war then raging between them; and the Protector Cromwell had no wish to arrest the progress of Sweden; a State which, besides being energetically Protestant, was also the decided opponent of Holland. A treaty was even concluded between England and Sweden, by which Charles X. promised to favour the Baltic commerce of the English rather than that of the Dutch; while Cromwell engaged, so long as it should be necessary, to put twenty ships of war at the service of Sweden, and to allow recruits for that country to be levied in England and Scotland.¹

Charles X.'s plan was to break in two directions through Pomerania and Livonia into Poland, already weakened by the attacks of the Russians and Cossacks; and also, by means of its internal dissensions, to induce some of its provinces to come under a voluntary subjection. Dantzic, which enjoyed an independent government, was to be blockaded by the Swedish fleet, which, as in the time of Gustavus Adolphus, was to levy dues, and thus in time compel that city to submit to Sweden. In July, 1655, Field-marshal Count Wittenberg, governor of Swedish Pomerania, received instructions to enter Great Poland with 17,000 men. A Polish army, under the Palatines of Posen and Kalisch, offered to dispute the passage of the Netze, when Radzejowski, who accompanied Wittenberg, persuaded the Polish commanders to place their Palatinates under the protection of Sweden. Charles X.

¹ A considerable number of British troops and officers fought under the Swedish banners in this war, as they had done in the time of Gustavus Adolphus.

himself, with an army of 15,000 veterans, landed near Wolgast towards the end of July, and proceeded to Stettin. The fleet which had conveyed him, consisting of forty vessels of war under Charles Gustavus Wrangel, was then despatched to blockade the road of Dantzic. The King entered Poland early in August, passed the Netze at Czarnikow, and formed a junction with Wittenberg at Conin-on-the-Warta. His march resembled rather a triumphal procession than a hostile inroad. The nobles flocked from all sides to claim his protection, and compared him to "their good king Ladislaus." The many enemies by which John Casimir was attacked had compelled him to divide his forces. One division under Potocki opposed the Cossacks; Radzivil, with a second, was defending Lithuania against the Russians; whilst the King himself, with a third, marched against the Swedes, whom he met at Sobota, August 23rd. Here John Casimir was entirely defeated, and Charles, leaving Wittenberg to pursue him, marched directly on Warsaw, which surrendered unconditionally, August 30th. He had only just anticipated an attempt on the same city by the Russians, who had despatched some troops thither from Grodno. John Casimir after his defeat had retreated towards Cracow, and attempted to surprise Wittenberg's camp; but that general having been rejoined by the King, the Poles were again defeated at Zarnowa. After these events, the greater part of the Polish cavalry dispersed; the Swedes pursued John Casimir with forced marches, and again defeated him on the river Donajek, near Cracow, September 21st. The Polish King now lost all hope, and fled to Oppeln in Silesia, to behold from a distance the misfortunes of his country. Cracow, which had been bravely defended by Stephen Czarnecki, opened its gates to the Swedes, October 8th. Soon after the Polish standing army, called *Quartians*,¹ took the oath of fidelity to Charles X. Poland seemed now in a state of utter dissolution. Most of the Polish nobles made their submission to Charles in person at Cracow, or to his representatives at Warsaw; though twenty-two of the senators offered the Polish crown to the Emperor. The army of Potocki, which had been beaten by the Cossacks, submitted to the Swedes. Horn, landing at Stettin with reinforcements, had occupied Pomerelia, and secured the King of Sweden's rear. Field-marshal Stenbock, crossing the Bug at its confluence with the Vistula, had defeated the army of

¹ So called because a fourth part of the Crown lands was set apart for their maintenance. Among their colonels who took

the oath to Charles was John Sobieski, afterwards King of Poland.

Vasovia, and secured that province. In Lithuania, Minsk, Grodno, and Wilna having been taken by the Russians, Radzivil submitted to De la Gardie, the Swedish governor of Livonia. Charles was recognized as Grand Duke of Lithuania, and the States of that province, as well as of Samogitia, made their formal submission in October.

Conquests so rapid and extensive seemed almost to place this expedition of Charles X. on a par with that of his great predecessor Gustavus Adolphus to the Rhine. Yet the Swedish King did not feel himself altogether secure. The Tartars were reported to be in motion. The Russians, who now held the greater part of Lithuania, were dangerous neighbours; and the Czar announced, by the assumption of the titles of "Grand Prince of Lithuania, White Russia, Volhynia, and Podolia,"¹ that he did not intend to resign his conquests. The Poles themselves could not be confidently relied on, and Prussia, one of the chief objects of the war, had not yet been reduced. Above all, Charles was anxious about the conduct of the Elector of Brandenburg, who had been negotiating with his enemies, John Casimir and the Dutch, and had finally entered West Prussia with 8,000 men; where, calling the States together, he made a treaty with them to resist any attempt on the part of the Swedes to obtain possession of Prussia. As the events of this Swedish invasion, and the policy adopted by the Elector of Brandenburg with regard to it, are among the chief causes which finally led to the establishment of the Prussian monarchy, it will be useful to examine with some attention the character, motives, and actions of that prince.

We have already recorded² the accession of Frederick William, commonly called the "Great Elector," to the electorate of Brandenburg in 1640. His dominions were then exposed to all the risks and dangers of the Thirty Years' War; but the first steps of the young Elector—for he was only twenty years of age at the time of his accession—were marked by the greatest prudence and circumspection. He hastened to conclude an armistice with Sweden, which he the more readily obtained as a marriage was at that time in contemplation between him and Christina, the heiress of the Swedish throne. The conduct of the Elector during the remainder of the war was such as to procure him, as we have already seen, very favourable terms at the Peace of Westphalia. One of the most remarkable features of Frederick William's character was his piety. He had adopted the Calvinistic faith, the religion of his

¹ Hermann, *Gesch. Russlands*, B. iii. S. 629 Anm.

² Above, p. 247.

grandfather, John Sigismund; but he rejected its most characteristic feature, that of election and predestination, and he required that the doctrine of universal grace should be preached in all the churches of the Mark. Every morning and evening he had prayers in his apartments; on Sundays he twice attended church; he often took the Sacrament with the congregation; he strictly observed the four yearly fasts; and he forbade any mythological images to be used upon his coins. His chief study was the Bible, which he always carried with him on his journeys; and even his motto was selected from the holy volume: "Cause me to know the way wherein I should walk." (Psalm, cxliii.)

Frederick William had paid particular attention to his finances, which were in a flourishing condition. He was very sparing in his personal expenses; but the political exigencies of the time compelled him to maintain a standing army, which had been gradually increased from 8,000 men, till at the time of the Swedish invasion it numbered 26,000, with 72 guns. As his States were opposed to so heavy a charge, he had been sometimes obliged to resort to compulsion, and act against the law and the mediæval rights which stood in his way; for his political conscience was somewhat broad, and allowed him, in spite of his motto, to choose the path which seemed most advantageous—to join the stronger party and loose himself from the weaker, as interest dictated. One of the chief objects of his ambition was to shake off the feudal bonds by which he held his Duchy of Prussia under the elective kings of Poland, whose weakness he despised. He had at first wished to arrange the differences between Sweden and Poland in an amicable manner; but seeing war inevitable, he consulted how he might best turn it to his advantage. His military strength made him a desirable ally for either party, and he had also fortified himself by an alliance with the Dutch. The Rhenish possessions which had fallen to him by the succession of Jülich rendered the friendship of that people important to him; but the negotiations had been so long protracted, that the Swedish invasion of Poland gave a new object to them, and induced the States-General to league themselves with the Elector. On the 27th of July, 1655, a treaty was concluded at the Hague for mutual defence, to include the Elector's possessions on the Baltic; and Frederick William engaged to protect the Dutch commerce in that sea.

While these negotiations were going on with the States, Charles X. had also been endeavouring to bring over the Elector to his side. Conferences had taken place at Stettin, in which the

Brandenburg plenipotentiaries had tried to dissuade the Swedish King from his projects; but finding him resolved, had offered to unite the Electoral forces with his, if Charles would engage to free Prussia from Polish vassalage. But this agreed not at that time with Charles's plans, and the success of his arms rendered him every day less conciliating. Frederick William, on his side, reckoning that the Poles might be able to hold out till the spring, when aid might be expected from all sides, had been induced, as already related, to enter West Prussia with his forces, and in November, 1655, he concluded with the Prussian nobles an agreement for the defence of the duchy; but the towns of Dantzic, Elbing, and Thorn kept aloof.¹

This step of the Elector's gave great offence to the King of Sweden, and afforded another motive for marching into Prussia. He himself, having recruited his army with 7,000 Poles, set out from Warsaw; Stenbock with his division preceding him down the Vistula, while De la Gardie marched in the same direction from Lithuania. Thorn and Elbing soon opened their gates to the Swedish forces. Charles then marched against the Elector, and having taken Welau on the Pregel (Dec. 15th), compelled him to shut himself up in Königsberg, the capital of his duchy. Frederick William, finding that he could expect no assistance from the Dutch, was now compelled to yield; and he authorized his ministers to sign with the Swedish Chancellor, Eric Oxenstiern, a treaty by which he recognized himself as the vassal of Sweden instead of Poland; bound himself to assist the Swedes in their wars, and to allow them free passage through the Duchy of Prussia, with the use of the ports, &c. After its execution the Elector visited the King at Bartenstein, where they spent some days together in great apparent friendship.

All Charles's plans seemed now to be crowned with complete success, and nothing appeared necessary to his recognition as King of Poland except a coronation. But his conquests were too rapid to be lasting, and had, indeed, been conducted in a manner which entailed their loss. The Polish nobles had been offended by Charles's haughtiness; the people were incited by the priests to defend their religion against the heretic Swedes; and they were naturally anxious to preserve their property, which, in many instances, had been seized by Charles for the support of his troops. The embers of lurking discontent were busily stirred by John Casimir, and during the absence of Charles in Prussia

¹ Puffendorf, *De Rebus Gest. Frid. Wilhelmi*, p. 252 sqq.

they burst into an open flame. The Swedes were massacred wherever they were the smaller number. Potocki's troops, who had submitted with reluctance to the Swedes, suddenly broke up from Lublin, and marched towards Red Russia (Gallicia), calling on the Poles to arm. A confederacy had been formed at Tyrcowitz, which was confirmed by John Casimir, Jan. 5th, 1656. That King had recrossed the Polish borders with a small body of cavalry towards the end of the year, and having joined a force under Lubomirski, had marched to join Potocki and the Tartars who were announced to be hastening to his assistance.

Although it was mid winter, the King of Sweden, when he heard of these movements, quitted Prussia to suppress them. Crossing the Vistula on the ice, he defeated with great loss, near Golumbo, a Polish force of 12,000 men under Stephen Czarnecki (Feb. 8th). He then overran the Palatinates of Lublin, Belz, and Sandomier. But he soon discovered that his resources were unequal to the enterprise he had undertaken. As fast as he left a conquered province the inhabitants again rose against him; large numbers of the *Quartians* deserted his standards; while many of his Swedish troops perished of hunger and cold, or at the hands of the peasantry. Under these circumstances, Charles was compelled, towards the middle of March, to commence a retreat to Warsaw, during which he experienced the greatest difficulties and dangers from the state of the roads, and especially from having to cross the river Sau in the face of the enemy. His brother-in-law, the Margrave Frederick of Baden, who was bringing some reinforcements to his aid, was defeated by the Poles near Warka on the Pilsa, March 28th. Charles reached Warsaw April 5th; and leaving that city under the command of Wittenberg, he returned into Prussia with the view of taking Dantzic, which city, however, baffled all his attempts.

The ill-success of the Swedish King determined him to draw closer his alliance with the Elector of Brandenburg, with the view of reducing Poland by their joint arms. Charles now contemplated a partition of that country something similar to that which took place about a century later. By the treaty of Marienburg, June 15th, 1656, the two sovereigns entered into an offensive and defensive alliance, by which Frederick William agreed to assist Charles then with all his forces, and at other times with 4,000 men; while Charles undertook to defend the Elector's territories with 6,000 men. By another secret treaty, signed on the same day, the King ceded to Frederick William in full sovereignty the four

Palatinates of Posen, Kalisch, Siradia, and Lenezca. The rest of Poland was abandoned to the Russians, the Cossacks, and George Rakoczi, Prince of Transylvania; Charles reserving for himself only Prussia, the real object of the war.

After this treaty had been signed, the King, the Elector, and the Margrave of Baden, who had arrived from Pomerania with fresh troops, marched to the relief of Warsaw, where Wittenberg had been six weeks besieged by a large Polish and Tartar force, animated by the presence of John Casimir; but before the allies could reach that city, Wittenberg had been compelled to capitulate (June 21st). So weak was the authority of John Casimir over these barbarous hordes, that he could not prevent the capitulation from being violated; and though the garrison had stipulated for an unmolested retreat to Thorn, Wittenberg and several other Swedish generals were made prisoners, and numbers of their soldiers were killed or maltreated. It was not till towards the end of July that the King of Sweden and the Elector had formed a junction at Nowydwor, near the confluence of the Bug and Vistula. Hence they marched on Praga—a suburb of Warsaw on the right bank of the Vistula—where John Casimir, with his Poles and Tartars, offered them battle. A desperate struggle ensued, which lasted three days; when at length the Polish troops, though twice as numerous as their opponents, were compelled to yield to the superior science and bravery of the Swedes and Germans. Warsaw was now again recovered and occupied by the Swedes, while John Casimir retired to Lublin. But Charles was prevented from pursuing the enemy and reaping all the fruits of his victory by the politic remissness of Frederick William; who pleaded the incursions of the Poles into Prussia as an excuse for leading back his army thither, leaving only 4,000 men with the King of Sweden, as he was bound to do by treaty; and, after his return, he began to negotiate in a very suspicious manner with the Poles, the Danes, and the Emperor. He seems to have perceived that Charles had entered on an enterprise too vast for his strength, and to have resolved to turn his indiscretion to advantage. It was at first thought that John Casimir would have come to some terms after his defeat; but the invasion by the Russians of the Swedish province of Livonia, and the hope held out to him of some support from the Emperor, caused him to alter his mind.

The peace of Stolbova¹ between the Swedes and Russians, in 1617, had been so disadvantageous to the latter, that it was not

¹ See above, p. 155.

unnatural they should wish to break it. By this treaty, Ingria and part of Carelia were ceded to Sweden; and as this Power had previously obtained Livonia by the treaty of Teusin, in 1595, the Russians were thus entirely excluded from the Baltic, sequestered as it were from European commerce, and reduced almost to the condition of an Asiatic Power. It was a conviction that the Czar would endeavour to escape from such a state of things and regain a footing on the Baltic,¹ which had induced Charles X., before he invaded Poland, and with the view of conciliating the Russian sovereign, to despatch to him an embassy. But the vanity and presumption which characterized the Russian Court before it had been civilized by European intercourse, rendered this embassy one of the causes of the war which it was intended to avert. Alexis, after his conquests in Poland, had not only added the names of the subdued provinces to his titles, but had also assumed that of "Lord of many lands to the North, East, and West, and heir of his Ancestors and Predecessors." As it was plain that by this oriental bombast he indicated his pretensions to Livonia, Ingria, and Carelia, Charles refused to acknowledge these titles, which implied a claim on his own dominions; a want of condescension which gave great offence to the Czar, who seized and imprisoned the Swedish ambassadors. Alexis, though himself at war with Poland, was also displeased at the invasion of that country by the Swedes, which seemed to rob him of part of his destined booty; and several acts of hostility had occurred between the Russian and Swedish troops, intent on occupying the same places in Lithuania.

If Alexis could have agreed with the King of Sweden and the Elector of Brandenburg, the partition of Poland might perhaps then have been effected, instead of being postponed till the following century. But the Czar was jealous of the occupation of Lithuania by the Swedes, and his ministers urged him to seize the pretext of Charles's refusal to acknowledge his titles to declare war against Sweden, and to recover the provinces which had formerly been lost. Their representations were seconded by the Dutch merchants; while the Court of Vienna offered its mediation to procure for the Czar a truce with Poland, so that he might direct all his efforts against the Swedes. Without awaiting the result of these negotiations, Alexis, in June, 1656, ordered his troops to enter Ingria and Carelia; whence, after ravaging those provinces, they penetrated to the extremity of Finland. Alexis

¹ Puffendorf, *De Rebus Carol. Gust.* lib. i. § 53.

himself, at the head of 100,000 men, invaded Livonia, seized Dunaburg and Kokenhausen, the garrisons of which places were put to the sword, and invested Riga. From this last place, defended by De la Gardie, he was repulsed with great loss; but Dorpat having capitulated October 26th, the Russians were enabled to penetrate into the country and devastate everything with fire and sword.

The Emperor Ferdinand III. had viewed with uneasiness the progress of the Swedes, which threatened the Roman Catholic religion in Poland, and endangered his own hereditary dominions. The desire to divert their arms had led him to incite the Czar to enter Livonia. He was not himself prepared to declare war against Charles; but he accorded to John Casimir an asylum, where he might prepare the means of re-entering his kingdom. He even made an alliance with that prince, and engaged to use his good offices with the Elector, as well as with the Cossacks, in his favour. A truce was also concluded through Ferdinand's mediation between the Poles and Russians at Wilna, November 3rd, 1656. The Czar, jealous of the victories of the Swedes, readily listened to the proposals of John Casimir, especially as hopes were held out to him of succeeding to the Polish throne.¹ The Elector of Brandenburg skilfully availed himself of the embarrassment occasioned to Charles by the Russian war to obtain the secret object of his policy, the sovereignty of Prussia. Charles was very averse to accede to an arrangement which broke the contiguity of his provinces on the Baltic; but at length (November 20th) he signed the TREATY OF LABIAU, which may be said to have laid the first stone of the Prussian monarchy. By this treaty, Frederick William and his heirs male were recognized as legitimate and independent sovereigns of Prussia and Ermeland. In any future peace, the Elector was to use his endeavours that West, or Royal Prussia, Pomerelia, and part of Cassubia, together with Semigallia, Samogitia, Livonia, and Courland, should be assigned to Sweden. The Elector renounced his pretensions to the four Polish Palatinates, and agreed to afford to the King of Sweden the same aid as stipulated by the treaty of Marienburg.²

Charles had also turned to other quarters for assistance, and among them to England, almost the only Power which viewed his progress without displeasure or alarm. But though Cromwell had said that the Swedes, for aught he cared, might extend their conquests to the Caspian Sea, he was not disposed to give them

¹ Hermann, *Gesch. Russlands*, B. iii. S. 636.

² Dumont, t. vi. pt. ii. p. 148.

any active assistance; and all that they obtained by a treaty concluded at London in July, 1656, was permission to recruit in Great Britain. With George Ragozi, Prince of Transylvania, Charles was more successful. Ragozi, who wished to obtain a share of the Polish provinces, if not the crown of Poland itself, which had been offered to him by a party of the malcontents, had sent an embassy to Charles, with the view of making an alliance. The ill turn which Charles's affairs subsequently took, and especially the Russian war, having rendered such an ally very desirable, a treaty was concluded in December, in which nearly all the terms demanded by Ragozi were granted. He was to have Red Russia, Podolia, Volhynia, and all the southern provinces of Poland as far as the Narew and the Bug, with the titles of King of Little Poland, or Eastern Poland, and Grand Duke of Lithuania. His allies the Cossacks were to be maintained in possession of the Ukraine. Such was the eagerness of Ragozi to secure these acquisitions, that before the treaty had been ratified he began his march with 18,000 horse and 5,000 foot; to which were added 20,000 Cossacks and 6,000 Moldavians and Wallachians. Charles set out from Prussia to meet his new ally. The junction was effected near Sandomierz, April 2nd, 1657, and the united forces proceeded to lay siege to Brzesc in Lithuania, which surrendered May 13th. But during the siege Charles received intelligence that the Danes were preparing to make war upon him; an event which entirely altered his plans.

Frederick III. of Denmark was well aware that chance alone had prevented his dominions, instead of Poland, being attacked by the Swedes. He knew that he was destined to be the next prey of their rapacity; he had therefore fortified himself with alliances, and awaited a favourable opportunity to strike the first blow. He was continually complaining of the toll established by the Swedes at the mouth of the Vistula, as annoying the navigation of the Baltic and prejudicial to Danish interests in the Sound dues. The toll was still more hurtful to the Dutch, on account of their valuable commerce with Prussia; and in June, 1656, a Dutch fleet had appeared in Dantzic roads, and compelled the raising of the blockade. Frederick III. sent ten vessels to join this fleet, and concluded a treaty with the States-General for the defence of the Baltic navigation. Charles, however, soon afterwards found means to pacify the Dutch by a treaty in which he granted them very favourable terms. At this epoch the Danish finances were in a terrible state; the fortresses were dilapidated,

and there was scarcely any regular army. Such had been the sad result of the Danish oligarchical constitution. The nobles diverted to their own use the money that should have been applied to maintain the defences of the kingdom, and refused to keep on foot any large force, lest it should be employed to annul the capitulation which they had imposed upon the King. Nevertheless the aspect of affairs in the spring of 1657, and especially the accession of a new sovereign of the House of Habsburg (*supra*, p. 301), who seemed disposed to take a more active part against the Swedes, induced the Danish monarch to declare war against Charles. The invasion of Poland by Ragoczi had determined the Emperor Leopold to enter into the Polish war. In May he confirmed his father's alliance with John Casimir and the Republic of Poland, and undertook to send 12,000 men into the field.¹ The King of Denmark also concluded, two months later, an alliance with John Casimir, but he commenced his attack upon the Swedes before the treaty was signed. He was no doubt further confirmed in this resolution by the prospect of assistance from the Elector of Brandenburg.

When Charles received at Brzesc the news of these events, he immediately resolved to hasten back with the greater part of his troops to the succour of his German possessions, before the Danes, supported by the Austrians, should cut off his retreat. His apprehensions were also excited by the conduct of the Elector of Brandenburg, who had withdrawn his contingent from the Swedish army. Ragoczi, in spite of Charles's repeated warnings to him to keep nearer to his own dominions, had persisted in marching to Warsaw. A part of the Swedish troops were already on their way to the North; and Charles, leaving the command in Poland to his brother, John Adolphus, now withdrew the rest of his army from that of his Transylvanian ally (June 13th). Enraged at this desertion, Ragoczi loaded Charles with reproaches, and hastened to regain his frontier; but being overtaken by Czarnecki, was compelled to sign a disgraceful capitulation, by which he engaged to send ambassadors to apologize to the Republic of Poland, the King of Hungary (Leopold), and the Ottoman Porte, and to pay 400,000 ducats for the damage he had done. The Swedes, on their side, hastened northwards, burning all on their road to Thorn, to prevent the Poles from following them. They arrived at Stettin early in July, reduced to about 6,000 ragged men, but full of ardour and burning to revenge

¹ Dumont, t. vi. pt. ii, p. 179.

themselves on the Danes. After their retreat, the Protestants in Poland were subjected to the most cruel persecution. They were accused of having enticed the Swedes into Poland; their estates were plundered, and their churches desecrated; they were excluded from the Diet, and many of them were even put to death.

After Charles's failure in Poland, the Elector of Brandenburg began to throw off the mask. He had, indeed, never sincerely embraced the Swedish cause. He foresaw that he should ultimately lose his share of Pomerania, as well as his Prussian Duchy, if Charles succeeded in his gigantic projects; those provinces being indispensable to the completion of the Swedish dominion on the Baltic. Leopold was aware of the Elector's views on this subject, and he was encouraged by them to mediate a peace between him and Poland. Frederick William stipulated that, in return for his active support, the independent sovereignty of Prussia, granted to him by Sweden, should be confirmed; and the Poles were at length induced, by the success of Charles in Denmark, which we shall presently relate, to accede to this condition. Thus by the TREATY OF WELAU, signed September 19th, 1657, Frederick William became Sovereign Duke of Prussia. On his side he engaged to restore all that he occupied in Poland, Lithuania, and Warmia, either by force of arms or by treaty with Sweden.¹

The war referred to between Denmark and Sweden commenced at sea. A Danish fleet of forty sail took its station at Bornholm; another squadron blockaded Gothenburg. The plan was to shut up all the Swedish harbours. Frederick III. was impressed with the idea that Charles would hasten to return to Sweden with his shattered army. Hoping to intercept him, Frederick himself secretly went on board the Danish fleet; but when he arrived off Dantzic, he was surprised with the news that the Swedish King had entered Pomerania; on hearing which he hastened back to his dominions. The Danes had crossed the Elbe early in July at Glückstadt and Harburg, and another division had entered Mecklenburg and penetrated as far as Wismar. Many rencounters subsequently took place in those parts, mostly to the advantage of the Swedes, but which we forbear to relate, as the issue of the war depended on Charles's invasion of Denmark. That king had mustered his army at Demmin, July 10th; and on the 18th, to the astonishment of all Europe, he stood on the frontiers of Holstein. This rapid march was not accomplished without the loss

¹ Dumont, t. vi. pt. i. p. 191.

of many hundred horses. The Danes retreated before him, and did not even attempt to defend the pass of Möln, the entrance into Holstein. At Ottensen, near Altona, he made a short halt, and compelled the Hamburgers to equip his army. So rapid and unexpected had been his march that he still found the Danish forces separated by the Elbe. Wrangel was despatched into the duchy of Bremen, and in a fortnight drove the Danes from every place except Bremervörde. Charles himself began his march northwards, August 3rd. He had accompanied Torstenson during the campaign in Holstein and Jutland in 1644; he had thus become acquainted with the scene of his future exploits, and had discussed with Torstenson those plans which now gave him the victory. His progress was rapid. The raw Danish levies, commanded by inexperienced officers, were unable to withstand the Swedish veterans. Charles traversed Holstein and Sleswick almost without resistance. On the 23rd of August he stood before Fridericksodde in Jutland, a strongly fortified place which commands the Lesser Belt. The greater part of Jutland was now in his power; but as he foresaw that Fridericksodde would require a long siege, he resigned the command to Wrangel, and retired to Wismar, in order to watch the movements of the Poles and Austrians. In spite of his success, his position had become extremely critical. He was at open war with Poland, Russia, Denmark, and Austria, while Holland and Brandenburg were covert enemies. The Austrian army had begun to move northwards. The Swedish general Würtz had surrendered Cracow to them on condition of an unmolested retreat; a place, indeed, which from its distance from the other Swedish possessions was not worth retaining. An Austrian corps was marching towards Prussia; and Czarnecki, with 4,000 Poles, had entered Swedish Pomerania, and devastated everything as far as Uckermünde. Another motive with Charles for going to Wismar was that he might superintend the operations of his fleet. This was not ready till the beginning of September; and on the 12th of that month it engaged the Danish fleet off the Isle of Möen, in a battle which lasted two days and left the victory undecided. The Swedish ships then entered the harbour of Wismar.

The siege of Fridericksodde lasted till the 24th of October, when Wrangel became master of it by a bold and successful manœuvre. The town lies on a tongue of land, but one of its sides is protected hardly by the sea; and on this side some palisades

were its chief defence. Wrangel, taking advantage of a periodical recess of the sea, and the shades of night, ordered some of his cavalry to destroy the palisades and enter the town on that side, whilst he himself stormed it with all his forces on the other. This plan proved entirely successful; most of the garrison were killed or made prisoners, and in the morning the Swedish flag floated upon the walls. The possession of Fridericksodde was indispensable to the Swedish army, in order to pass over to Funen. The passage, however, could not be effected without the fleet; and that of the Danes, though terribly maltreated in the late engagement, having been reinforced with eighteen Dutch ships, was still the mistress of the seas. Charles had been disappointed of the aid of an English fleet. He had proposed to Cromwell a plan for the partition of Denmark, by which that kingdom would have been entirely extinguished; but though the Protector was desirous of obtaining some German State, in order that he might have a voice in the affairs of the Empire, he did not wish to see Denmark completely crushed; and he had observed to the Dutch ambassador that the times were past when it was permitted to destroy whole kingdoms.¹ Cromwell would have preferred a triple alliance, with Sweden and Denmark, against the House of Austria; and he declared himself ready to join Sweden and the German Protestant States against Leopold. Both England and France had offered to mediate between Denmark and Sweden; but both these Powers were then disinclined to a peace, and Charles X. especially did all that lay in his power to defeat the negotiations.

Under these circumstances, the capture of Fridericksodde would have been of no avail to Charles, had not the powers of nature stepped in to his assistance. After he had suffered some months of anxiety, a severe frost covered the Baltic with ice, and suggested to him an idea by which he might excel the exploits of any former conqueror. He resolved to cross the sea on the ice, although the persons whom he consulted denounced the enterprise as impracticable. The strength of the current near Middlefahrt, where the Little Belt is narrowest, rendered it unadvisable to cross at that point; the passage to Funen was therefore effected some miles lower down towards Hadersleben; where, though the Belt is six or seven miles broad, the ice was more secure, while the little island of Brandsö in the middle of the channel materially assisted the operation. On the night of

¹ Puffendorf, *De Reb. Carol. Gust. Lib. iv. § 84.*

the 30th January, 1658, the King himself and Wrangel led the cavalry and artillery, while the Count De la Gardie, at the head of the infantry, crossed between Stenderup and Tybring. After passing the island of Brandsö, the cavalry advanced in order of battle towards the headland of Ivernäs, now Wedelsborg, on the coast of Funen. In this operation several squadrons of cavalry sunk beneath the ice; but the main body arrived in safety and defeated a Danish corps which attempted to arrest their progress. The Swedes occupied Funen without further resistance, and Charles next day entered Odense, the chief town. The more hazardous enterprise of crossing the Great Belt into Zealand still remained to be achieved. The shortest route was from Nyborg to Corsöer; but it was determined to adopt the safer, though more circuitous one, across the islands which lie between the southern extremities of Funen and Zealand. The channel between Funen and Langeland was passed on the night of February 5th, and on the following one the still broader channel between Langeland and Laaland. On the 8th, Guldborg Sound was crossed, which separates Laaland from Falster. In Falster it was necessary to wait for the infantry and artillery, which arrived at Stubkiöping on the 10th; and in two days the whole army passed over into Zealand.¹

Nothing could equal the consternation of the Danes at the news of this successful and unexpected invasion. Copenhagen was in so wretched a state of defence as to be entirely at the mercy of the conqueror. Charles, flushed with the triumph of one of the most extraordinary military enterprises ever achieved, debated whether he should put an end to the Danish kingdom by incorporating it with Sweden, or whether he should content himself with seizing some of its finest provinces. The first of these projects he is said to have relinquished only through fear that the more agreeable climate of Zealand might induce some of his successors to make it their residence, and that Denmark might thus become the seat of empire, whilst Sweden sank down into a mere Danish province. But whatever the exultation of Charles, and however brilliant his situation, he could not be insensible to its danger. Czarnecki and his Poles, after wasting Pomerania and threatening to penetrate into Holstein, had indeed returned home to secure their booty, instead of marching to the assistance of the King of Denmark; but, on the other hand, a

¹ See for this expedition, besides Puffendorf, the *Mémoires* of the Chev. de Terlon, the French ambassador.

more dangerous enemy had been added to those who had declared against Charles. The Elector of Brandenburg had concluded an offensive alliance with Denmark, November 10th, 1657. That Prince might soon come to the aid of the Danish King; besides which, it was known that the Dutch were preparing to come to the relief of Copenhagen, as soon as the ice broke up, with a fleet of twenty-five ships and 7,000 men. The apprehension of these events led Charles to refuse any suspension of arms for the purpose of negotiation, and to hasten his march towards the Danish capital. He did not, however, reject the mediation pressed upon him by England and France. The Danish plenipotentiaries had been instructed to agree to the best terms they could obtain, and the preliminaries of a peace were signed at Tostrup, towards the end of February, which led to the definitive TREATY OF ROSKILD, March 8th, 1658. By this treaty Denmark was isolated from her allies, as each party agreed to renounce all alliances contracted to the prejudice of the other, and the Baltic was to be closed to the fleets of the enemies of either Power. This last article was particularly offensive to the Dutch, and caused Van Beuningen, the Dutch minister, to strain every nerve to upset the treaty. Denmark ceded to Sweden Halland, Schonon, Blekingon, and the Isle of Bornholm with their dependencies, the cities of Bahus and Drontheim, together with some rights in the Isle of Rügen. Conquests made during the war were mutually restored.¹

In spite of this treaty, it soon became evident that the war was not at an end. Charles X. still felt the cravings of a conqueror. It was a saying of his, that a great prince should be always at war, both to occupy his subjects and to render himself formidable to his neighbours. His plans were on the most gigantic scale. After rendering himself master of the Scandinavian kingdoms and of the Baltic, he proposed to maintain a fleet of 100 ships and an army of 100,000 men; and it is said that he entertained the idea of then marching to Italy and founding there, like another Alaric, a new kingdom of the Goths. These schemes are characteristic of a sovereign who has obtained the name of the "Pyrrhus of the North;" but they were singularly out of proportion to his means. Authorities differ as to the precise period at which he had determined to renew the war with Denmark. His historian, Puffendorf, says that he did not come to that resolution till the middle of June; but Dalberg, a favourite officer of Charles, and one of the chief agents in some of his most daring and important

¹ Dumont, t. vi. pt. ii. p. 208.

achievements, says in his "Journal" that the King had already determined on a renewal of hostilities by the middle of April.¹ All Charles's actions show, indeed, that in his secret heart he had never meant to observe the peace. The maintenance of his army rendered war necessary to him. It was for the most part composed of foreign mercenaries, who, if once disbanded, could never be reassembled; yet his means did not permit him to maintain them except in an enemy's country. Thus, after the conclusion of the treaty of Roskild, his troops were still kept in the Danish provinces; and though in May Wrangel was ordered to withdraw the divisions in Zealand, those which occupied Funen, Jutland, and Holstein were not recalled. It was alleged in excuse for this occupation that several points in the treaty had not been finally arranged. One of the most important of these regarded Charles's father-in-law, the Duke of Holstein Gottorp. The Duchies of Sleswick and Holstein were held by a younger branch of the House of Holstein, but under the suzerainty of the regal branch, or kings of Denmark; and disputes had frequently arisen as to the extent of the royal jurisdiction in Sleswick, for Holstein was a fief of the German Empire. Frederick, the reigning Duke, had taken advantage of his son-in-law's invasion of Denmark to assert his independence of that kingdom. The matter had not been settled by the Treaty of Roskild; but a commission had been appointed to consider the Duke's claims, and in May, 1658, he was recognized as independent sovereign of Sleswick and the Isle of Fehmern. There were still, however, some other unsettled points with regard to the treaty of Roskild, which afforded Charles a pretext for keeping his army in Denmark, and especially a question respecting the little Isle of Hveen, the possession of which was important to Sweden, as it commanded the approach to the port of Landskrona. Meanwhile Charles, who was at Gothenburg, kept the Swedish States assembled in readiness for any emergency. He was persuaded, as well from his own recent success as from the facility with which Frederick III. had yielded to all his demands, that Denmark was too weak to resist his arms; and he had already, in imagination, disposed of his future conquest. Denmark was to be annihilated as an independent kingdom, and to be reduced to the condition of a Swedish province. Nay, he even debated with his Council how homage should be done to him, and what titles he should assume when his conquest was completed; and it was arranged that he should be called "King

¹ Apud Carlson, *Gesch. Schwedens*, B. iv. S. 307.

of Sweden and the Goths, of Denmark, Norway, and the Vandals.”¹

Early in August Charles was ready to take the field. He coloured his breach of the peace by charging the King of Denmark with not having fulfilled all the conditions of the treaty of Roskild; with being the direct or indirect cause of the oppression of the Protestants in Livonia by the Russians, and the taking of Thorn by the Poles; and with having promoted the election of Leopold, the enemy of Sweden, as Emperor. He embarked with his army at Kiel, August 5th. He had at first proposed to go directly to Copenhagen, which he might then probably have taken, as everything depended on promptness; but, instead of this, he was advised to land at Corsoer, several days' march from the capital, which had thus an opportunity to prepare for its defence. Frederick III., who, with his son, afterwards Christian V., was in Copenhagen at this juncture, displayed a firmness which excited the admiration of all Europe. When advised to escape into Norway, he replied that he would die, like the bird, in his nest. He inspired the inhabitants with the same courage as animated himself. The citizens and students armed; the magistrates declared their readiness to die with him; the suburbs were burnt, and the outworks abandoned. Nevertheless, so small was the regular garrison, and so dilapidated were the fortifications of Copenhagen, that had Charles, when he appeared before it, ordered an immediate assault, as advised by Dalberg, the city would most probably have been taken; but the King listened in preference to the advice of Wrangel, to attack Kronenborg first. The siege of this place lasted from August 16th till September 6th, when it surrendered; a delay most valuable to the Danes, as it enabled them to repair the defences, and to augment and train the garrison of Copenhagen. After the surrender of Kronenborg, Copenhagen was regularly invested by the Swedes, and the guns taken at the former place were employed against it. But Frederick and his loyal citizens made a vigorous defence, and repulsed every assault, till at length a Dutch fleet of thirty-five vessels, under Opdam, arrived to their relief. Opdam had appeared at the entrance of the Sound October 20th, but was prevented by contrary winds from entering it till the 29th, when he engaged and defeated the Swedish fleet, and compelled it to retire to Landskröna. The Dutch revictualled Copenhagen, landed a reinforcement of 2,000 men, and supplied Frederick with a loan

¹ Carlson, *Gesch. Schwedens*, p. 309.

of 3,000,000 guilders. The Swedes now withdrew to a height within a few miles of Copenhagen, and converted the siege into a blockade.

Meanwhile, in September, the Elector of Brandenburg, with an army of 30,000 men, half of which were his own troops, and the rest Austrians under Montecuculi, and Polish cavalry under Czarniecki, had marched to the assistance of Frederick. They reached the Isle of Alsen, but the rigour of the season having prevented them from embarking on the fleet which Frederick had sent to convey them into Zealand, they penetrated into Jutland, took Kolding by storm on Christmas Day, and proceeded to drive the Swedes from other parts of that province. Thus, while Charles X. was blockading Copenhagen, he was, in fact, himself blockaded; at sea by the Dutch and Danish fleet, on land by the army of the allies. Towards the close of the year he had been tantalized by the appearance of an English fleet, which, however, was obliged to return home by unfavourable weather. On the night of the 10th February, 1659, Charles endeavoured to make himself master of Copenhagen by a desperate assault, which was repulsed with great loss, including several generals, among whom was Count Erin Stenbock; and the Swedes were compelled to retire to their fortified camp.

The only favourable circumstance in Charles's situation was that he had succeeded in effecting a three years' truce with the Russians, December 20th, 1658. Little of importance had occurred in the war between the Swedes and Russians since the taking of Dorpat, before-mentioned, except the battle of Walk, June 19th, 1657, in which a corps of 10,000 Russians was entirely defeated. The successes of the Swedes in Denmark disposed the Czar to peace; a suspension of arms had been agreed upon in April, 1658, and subsequently the truce just mentioned. The events of the war with the Poles, Austrians, and Brandenburgers had been unfavourable. Thorn had surrendered, December 21st, 1658, after a siege of eighteen months by 40,000 Poles. At the time of its capitulation the garrison only numbered 300 men. The Elector of Brandenburg, though victorious in Jutland, could not find means to transport his army into Funen. Leaving 4,000 men in Jutland, he marched with the remainder of his troops into Swedish Pomerania, where, in the course of 1659, most of the principal towns yielded to his arms and those of the Austrians. In Prussia also, at the end of the same year, the only places remaining in possession of the Swedes were Elbing and Marien-

burg. Meanwhile the Maritime Powers had interfered to put an end to the war in Denmark. Early in April an English fleet of forty-three vessels, under Admiral Montague, appeared in the Sound; and as some negotiations had been going on between Sweden and England, then governed by Richard Cromwell, respecting the cession of certain countries for a loan, Charles at first thought that the English fleet was come to his assistance. But Admiral Montague, and Meadows, the English minister, declared both to the Kings of Sweden and Denmark that their instructions were to negotiate the re-establishment of the Peace of Roskild, with the exception of the article which forbade the entrance of any foreign fleet into the Baltic; and that they were authorized to declare war against either monarch that refused to treat. Neither Frederick III. nor Charles X. was, however, disposed to listen to these proposals; the negotiations were protracted; and meanwhile a revolution in England compelled Richard Cromwell to resign the Protectorate, and the new Parliament subsequently resolved to take no part in the Northern War.

In May, 1659, an agreement was entered into at the Hague between England, France, and the Dutch States, to enforce the Peace of Roskild. This agreement, known as the FIRST CONVENTION OF THE HAGUE, was succeeded in July by a second, to which France was no party, and on August 14th by a third, the conditions of which were essentially the same as in the first. If the belligerent monarchs did not agree to a peace within a fortnight after the receipt of the demands of this new convention, the fleets were to be employed against the party or parties refusing.¹ This was the first attempt in European policy to coerce a conquering nation by forcing upon it a treaty; and it was afterwards repeated against France by the Triple Alliance. Both the Danish and Swedish King were at first indignant at this coercion. Frederick III., however, soon accepted the proffered terms; but Charles obstinately rejected them, and insisted that all negotiations should be carried on only between the two belligerent Powers. The English admiral, who had been instructed not to interfere, then sailed home, while De Ruyter, the commander of the Dutch fleet, commenced hostilities against the Swedes. He carried over to Funen about 4,000 men of the allied army, who, having joined a Danish corps at Odense, completely defeated the Swedes near Nyboerg to whom; indeed, they were much superior

¹ Dugont, t. vi. pt. ii. p. 252 seq.

in number (Nov. 14th, 1659). Next day De Ruyter bombarded Nyeborg, where the routed Swedes had taken refuge, and compelled it to surrender.

Negotiations had been commenced between Sweden and Denmark in some tents pitched between Copenhagen and the Swedish camp; but Charles X. did not live to see their conclusion. He had retired to Gothenburg, where he was seized with a malignant fever, the result, probably, of anxiety and disappointment, of which he died February 13th, 1660. In his short reign of about five years he had performed many extraordinary exploits, which, however, redounded more to his own military reputation than to the solid advantage of his people. He left a son only four years of age, during whose minority he appointed by his will a regency consisting of his wife, his brother, and four senators. The provisions of the will were, however, modified by the States, who ultimately appointed a regency consisting of the Queen-Mother, with two votes; the Lord High Steward, Peter Brahe; the Lord High Admiral, Charles Gustavus Wrangel; the Lord High Chancellor, Count Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie; and the Lord High Treasurer, Gustavus Bonde.

Before the negotiations between Sweden and Denmark were concluded, a peace had been effected between Poland and Sweden. The Poles were suspicious of their allies, the Emperor Leopold and the Elector of Brandenburg; for about this time a project was talked of for a partition of Poland between those Powers and Russia; while on the side of Sweden, the distress of the Swedish garrisons in Prussia was a pressing motive for peace. Austria and Brandenburg used every endeavour to thwart the negotiations, which were conducted under French mediation in the convent of Oliva, near Dantzic. The TREATY OF OLIVA, which is as celebrated in the North of Europe as those of Münster and Osnabrück in the South, was signed May 3rd, 1660. John Casimir renounced his claim to the Swedish crown, but was allowed to retain the title of King of Sweden, which, however, was not to be borne by his successors. Thus an end was put to the pretensions of the Polish Vassals. All Livonia beyond the Dwina was ceded to Sweden, but Poland retained the southern and western districts. The Duke of Courland, whom Charles had carried off, was to be liberated and restored to his dominions, and Sweden gave up all the places which she had seized in Prussia.¹ The Treaty of Oliva also established peace

¹ Dumont, t. vi. pt. ii. p. 303.

between the Emperor Leopold, the Elector of Brandenburg and Sweden. The Emperor restored to Sweden all the places in Mecklenburg and Pomerania occupied by his troops. Sweden abandoned to the Elector her claim of suzerainty for the Duchy of Prussia; and thus the ambitious scheme of Charles X. for uniting his German possessions with those on the Gulf of Finland was finally frustrated.

The TREATY OF COPENHAGEN between Sweden and Denmark, after being long adjourned, not only by the disputes of the principals, but also of the three mediators, France, England, and Holland, was at length signed, June 6th, 1660. It was essentially a confirmation of the Treaty of Roskild, but with the omission of the clause which shut the Baltic to foreign fleets, as well as of that which gave Sweden an immunity from the Sound dues. Sweden restored all her Danish conquests.¹

The war still continued between Russia and Poland, nor had any definitive treaty of peace yet been made between Sweden and Russia. In 1658 the Poles, being no longer in danger from the Swedes, had renewed the war with Russia: they seemed to forget the promise of their throne to the son of Alexis, and assisted the revolted Cossacks against him. The campaign of 1660 was very disastrous to the Russians, who were defeated in several battles. The Czar now became desirous of a definitive arrangement with Sweden. Negotiations were opened at Kardis on the frontier of Esthonia, but it was not till July 1st, 1661, that the PEACE OF KARDIS was signed.² By this treaty the Russians restored all that they had taken in Livonia, and the treaty of Stolbova was confirmed, except in a few points. The war between the Poles and Russians lingered on some years without any very remarkable events; till at length, in January, 1667, both parties being equally weary of the struggle, a truce of thirteen years was concluded at Andrusoff, to terminate in June, 1680.³ The Cossacks were now divided into two tribes, one under Polish government, the other under that of Russia; with two distinct *Hetmans* to be named respectively by the King of Poland and the Czar. The thirteen years' war with Poland (1654—1667) first stamped Russia as a European Power.

¹ *Theatrum Europ.* t. viii. p. 1269; Dumont, t. vi. pt. ii. p. 319.

² There is an extract of the Treaty of Kardis, or Pleyssesmond, in Dumont, *Ibid.*

p. 363. It has never been printed entire. Cf. Koch and Schoell, *Hist. des Traités*, t. xiii. p. 25.

³ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 4.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

WE must now revert to the affairs of the South. One of the principal motives with the Spanish Court for concluding the Treaty of the Pyrenees (*supra* p. 307) was the desire to prosecute with vigour the war with Portugal, and again to reduce that kingdom under the crown of Spain. The Portuguese throne was now occupied by a new sovereign. John IV., the founder of the House of Bragança, had died in 1656; and as his eldest son Theodosio had gone before him to the tomb, he was succeeded by his second son, Alfonso VI., then only thirteen years of age. In the Queen-Mother, Doña Luisa de Gusman, who now assumed the reins of government for her minor son, Portugal acquired both a spirited and a prudent Regent. Of such a ruler she stood much in need. Besides the Spanish war, she now became involved in a war with the Dutch. The relations between Portugal and the United Netherlands had been for many years of the most singular kind. The Dutch, as already related,¹ had supported the Portuguese revolution and declaration of independence, events which were highly favourable to them in their war with Spain; in June, 1641, a truce of ten years had been concluded between the two nations, and they mutually agreed to assist each other against the common enemy with a fleet of twenty ships.² But this truce did not extend to America and the East Indies. Although the Portuguese colonies had, like the mother country, thrown off the Spanish yoke, and declared for the House of Bragança, yet the Dutch continued to attack them; and this colonial warfare was carried on many years with varying success, without any breach of the peace between the two nations in Europe. At the time when John IV. ascended the throne of Portugal, the Dutch had succeeded in wresting half Brazil from the Spaniards; but the Portuguese colonists, without any aid from the mother country, gradually recovered it, and in 1654 had entirely expelled the Dutch from that colony: a success which they owed in no small degree to the threatening attitude assumed by England towards the United Netherlands,

¹ Above, p. 243.² Dumont, t. vi. pt. i. p. 215.

and the naval war which subsequently broke out between these two countries. The Portuguese had also recovered Angola and St. Thomas, whilst, on the other hand, the Dutch had made themselves masters of the Cape of Good Hope and of Colombo in Ceylon.

In this state of things, the death of John IV. of Portugal, and the accession of a minor King under the guardianship of his mother, inspired the States-General with the hope of extorting favourable conditions by means of a formidable demonstration. A fleet of fourteen Dutch ships of war, under Wassenaar, appeared in the Tagus to demand from the Regent the restoration of the Portuguese conquests in Africa and Brazil, together with an indemnification for losses suffered; and when these terms were refused, the Dutch ambassadors quitted Lisbon, after making a formal declaration of war. De Ruyter, who had been cruising in the Mediterranean, now came to the assistance of Wassenaar; the combined fleets cruised on the coasts of Portugal, molested her Brazilian commerce, and blockaded her harbours, so that in 1658 the trade of Lisbon was almost annihilated.¹

Meanwhile the war between Spain and Portugal still continued, but without any memorable or decisive events. It was expected that the Peace of the Pyrenees would enable Spain to crush her adversary; but the Portuguese Regent averted such a catastrophe by forming alliances with France and England. Louis XIV. still dreaded that Spain, with whose utter exhaustion he was unacquainted, might again become formidable if she succeeded in reuniting Portugal under her sceptre; and he resolved, in spite of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, secretly to assist the Portuguese Regent. Doña Luisa formed a still closer alliance with England, where Charles II.; with the assistance of General Monk, had remounted the throne of his ancestors, May 29th, 1660. The Portuguese Regent induced Charles to conclude a marriage contract with her eldest daughter, Catharine, by which he was to receive, besides a dowry of half a million sterling, the settlements of Tangiers in Africa and Bombay in the East Indies; whilst he in turn engaged to succour Portugal with 3,000 men and ten ships of war.² The marriage was celebrated in May, 1662. So far was Louis from feeling any jealousy of this connection, and the introduction of the English into the Mediterranean,

¹ Southey, *Hist. of Brazil*, vol. ii. p. 243 sqq. Van Kampen, *Gesch. der Niederlande*, B. ii. S. 162 f.

² The treaty is in La Clède, *Hist. Généralè de Portugal*, t. viii. p. 307.

that he promoted the marriage, as favourable to his policy with regard to Spain, and agreeable to the alliance which he had formed with the House of Stuart. In March, 1661, his brother Philip had married Henrietta, sister of Charles II., and had been invested on the occasion with the Duchy of Orleans.

These alliances enabled Portugal to withstand all the assaults of her enemies. Through the mediation of England she concluded a peace with the Dutch in August, 1661. This treaty, however, only freed her from immediate annoyance in Europe. Disputes arose about its ratification; the Dutch availed themselves of the delay to make conquests in the Portuguese colonies; and it was not till July, 1669, that a definitive treaty of peace was signed at the Hague.¹ Portugal derived more assistance from her allies against the Spaniards. In 1661 Louis despatched Marshal Schönberg, a German, to Lisbon with 4,000 men; and when Philip IV. complained of this proceeding, as an infringement of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, he was answered that the French Government had no concern in it; that Schönberg and most of his men were foreigners over whom they had no control; and though decrees were issued against enlistment and volunteering, care was taken that they should not take effect till the men had reached Portugal. The French and English troops under Schönberg proved the salvation of Portugal. Philip IV.'s natural son, Don John of Austria, who commanded the Spanish army, was at first successful, and took Evora; but being defeated at Estrenoz in 1663, he retired from the command. His successor, the Marquis de Caracena, sustained a complete defeat at Villa Viciosa in 1665. This was the last remarkable event during the reign of Alfonso VI., a prince who had disgraced himself by a life of the lowest profligacy, and who was hurled from the throne by a plot so atrocious in its nature and circumstances that nothing but his own infamous conduct could have ensured its success. Alfonso's consort, a princess of the House of Nemours, had fixed her affections on his younger brother, Don Pedro, and in the autumn of 1667 she retired to a convent, declaring that, in consequence of her husband's impotence, her marriage with him had never been consummated, and was consequently void. Don Pedro, who had secured a considerable party, now induced Alfonso, by threats and remonstrances, to sign an act of abdication, upon which he was banished to Terceira, and subsequently removed to

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 114. The Dutch retained all their conquests, and Portugal engaged to give salt to the value of a million florins for Brazil.

the castle of Cintra, where he died in 1683. After his brother's abdication Don Pedro was proclaimed Regent; and he soon afterwards married his sister-in-law, she having procured from the Pope a divorce, on the ground already mentioned.

Meanwhile Louis XIV. was beginning to display that overbearing pride and ambition which during so many years disturbed the peace of Europe. Agreeably to his maxim, *l'état c'est moi*, he seemed to regard himself as the vicegerent of the Almighty upon earth, and responsible to Him alone; in accordance with which principle he required from his subjects a blind and unlimited obedience.¹ The tone which he adopted towards foreign Powers was equally haughty and uncompromising. Thus he dismissed M. de Pomponne, an able negotiator, because he had not sufficient force and grandeur for the representative of so great a monarch; and, in spite of the remonstrances of Colbert, he sacrificed the commercial interests of France in the treaty of Nimeguen for the sake of some clauses which only flattered his pride.² His lofty pretensions were manifested in his very bearing. He affected a peculiar gait, and even when playing at billiards retained the air of the master of the world. His bigotry was almost as remarkable as his pride. His religious education had been conducted by his mother, who had inspired him with all the prejudices of a Spanish devotee.³ Yet he did not suffer even these to stand in the way of his absolute authority. He required as implicit a submission from his clergy as from his other subjects; and we shall have to record several instances in which he disputed and opposed the authority of the Pope.

These are the darker shades in Louis's character. He possessed, on the other hand, many solid as well as brilliant qualities, which gained him the admiration, if not the love, of his subjects, and entitled him, in their view at least, to the appellation of "Louis le Grand." He was one of the handsomest men in his kingdom, and excelled in all bodily exercises, especially dancing. With a grave and dignified deportment he united affability and politeness towards his own sex, and a refined gallantry in his

¹ In his own words: "Celui qui a donné des rois aux hommes, a voulu qu'on les respectât comme ses lieutenants, se réservant à lui seul le droit d'examiner leur conduite. Sa Volonté est que quiconque est né sujet obéisse sans discernement."—*Instructions pour le Dauphin*, *Œuvres*, t. ii. p. 336.

² Lémontey, *Œuvres*, t. v. p. 82, 120. Versailles was decorated with the apo-

theosis of Louis; and it is said that the family of La Feuillade burned incense before his statue, till pious scruples urged him to abolish the practice. *Ibid.* p. 122.

³ He counselled his grandson, Philip V., to maintain the Inquisition; advice which Philip followed so well that he burned between two and three thousand heretics. Llorente, t. iv. p. 29.

intercourse with ladies. His apprehension was quick, his judgment sound; and to these qualities were added great strength of will and an indefatigable industry and application.¹ He entered his cabinet at ten o'clock every morning, and remained in it with his ministers till twelve. He also gave them separate audiences in the evening. By his patronage of literature and art he procured the reputation of a connoisseur; while the victories of his generals, often ascribed by popular flattery to himself, throw a military lustre over his reign.

Louis had very early given some specimens of his haughtiness. He had instructed his ambassadors always to assert their precedence over those of Spain; and the Spanish ambassador at London having, by the aid of an English mob, carried off this privilege, Louis compelled Philip IV., by threatening him with hostilities, solemnly to renounce all such pretensions in future, a concession which Louis recorded in presence of the assembled diplomatic body. Soon afterwards a somewhat similar occurrence took place at Rome. The Duke of Créqui, the French ambassador in that city, had offended the Papal government by his haughtiness; an affray took place in consequence between the Pope's Corsican guard and Créqui's people, in which the latter were worsted, and the ambassador himself was insulted and fired upon. But Louis took up the cause of his representative with so much vigour, that Pope Alexander VII. was obliged to dismiss his Corsicans, and to erect before their former guardhouse a pyramid, with an inscription recording the decree for their expulsion. Alexander also consented to send his nephew, Cardinal Chigi, into France to make excuses, the first legate of the Court of Rome who had ever been employed on such a mission.² These acts showed the vigour which might be expected in the foreign policy of the young King of France. Ever since his marriage his views had been directed towards reaping the eventual succession of the Spanish crown. He had never regarded the Treaty of the Pyrenees but as a step towards further acquisitions, and all his measures had been calculated to assert his claims when the proper opportunity should arrive. The death of the young brother of his consort, the heir of the Spanish crowns, in June, 1661, seemed to clear the way to this succession, but in the following November it was again barred by the birth of another sickly infant, the future Charles II.

¹ See the Report of the Nuncio Chigi, in the *Archives Curieuses de l'Hist. de France*, t. xi.

² Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV.* ch. 7.

The death of Philip IV. of Spain, in September, 1665, supposed to have been accelerated by the battle gained by the Portuguese at Villa Viciosa, opened out to Louis the prospect of realizing at least part of his plans. Franche-Comté and the Spanish Netherlands, transferred by Philip II. to his daughter Clara Eugenia,¹ had, on the death of that princess without heirs, in 1638, reverted to Philip IV. Philip's first consort was then alive, and the only surviving issue by this marriage at the time of Philip's death was Maria Theresa, the Queen of France. Now by a law of the countries in question, called the *Jus Devolutionis*, the children of the first bed, whether male or female, were entitled, on the death of their father, to inherit his real estate; and on this law Louis founded the claim of his consort to the provinces of Brabant, Mechlin, Antwerp, Upper Gelderland, Namur, Limburg, Hainault, Artois, the Cambrésis, a fourth part of Luxembourg, and a third of Franche-Comté, to the exclusion of Charles II., who, though Philip's male heir, was the offspring of a second bed. The Spaniards, on the other hand, pleaded that the *Jus Devolutionis* concerned only private persons, and could not abrogate the fundamental laws of Spain, which established the indivisibility of the monarchy; and they further urged the renunciation made by Maria Theresa of all her claims at the time of her marriage. To this it was replied that the French Queen was not then of age, and consequently not capable of renouncing her legitimate rights, and, moreover, that the renunciatory clause had been rendered null by the non-payment of the dowry of 500,000 gold crowns, in consideration of which the renunciation had been made. On this point some discussions had taken place between the French and Spanish Cabinets in 1661, when Louis declared that if the dowry was not paid he should regard his consort's renunciation as cancelled.

It was with a view to secure the Flemish provinces of Spain that Louis had concluded with the Dutch, in April, 1662, a treaty of commerce and alliance. Towards the close of the same year, the recovery of Dunkirk, disgracefully sold to him by the English King, Charles II., gave France additional strength in that quarter. Louis had also placed his army on a most effective footing, both by reforming its constitution and discipline, and by gradually raising its numbers through secret levies which attracted no attention. In addition to these circumstances, the long minority of Charles II., an infant of three years, seemed to favour the

¹ Above, p. 10.

projects which Louis had formed against Spain. The government of that country had been assumed by the Queen-Mother, Maria Anna, daughter of the Emperor Ferdinand III.; but she in turn was ruled by her German confessor, the Jesuit Niethard. Louis, however, did not feel himself in a position to prosecute his claims immediately and by force. The chief obstacle arose out of that very alliance with the Dutch which he had entered into with the view of facilitating his operations. A war had broken out between England and the United Netherlands, and the Pensionary De Witt claimed the assistance of France by virtue of the treaty of 1662.

We shall not relate at any length the naval struggle between England and Holland, which lasted from 1665 to 1667, and must be familiar to most English readers. Few wars have been commenced so lightly, or have produced such memorable events in so short a period. It was entered into both by the English Court and people from interested motives, though of a different kind. The King encouraged it as a pretence to get subsidies from his Parliament, and also as a means to place his nephew, the Prince of Orange, at the head of the Dutch Republic. Charles showed that he would accept very moderate conditions, provided he could attain this last object. De Witt, as well from hatred of England, which after the Restoration knew no bounds, as from his extreme republican opinions, opposed the nomination of the Prince, even as Captain-General; though in order to please the friends of the House of Orange, he had caused William to be adopted as "Child of the State," and had taken upon himself the care of his education. Both Charles II. and De Witt resorted to unworthy means to gratify their enmity. Charles is said to have incited a Jesuit to murder De Witt; while the Pensionary, on his side, sought to revive the civil war in England through Ludlow and Algernon Sydney.¹ While such were the motives of the King, his brother, the Duke of York, was led to encourage the war by the prospect of employment and the hope of distinguishing himself as an admiral. Lastly, the nation was envious of the commercial prosperity of the Dutch. In April, 1664, the Commons had passed a resolution that the vexations and indignities offered by the Dutch to English subjects in the Indies, Africa, and elsewhere, were intolerable; and they promised to assist the King with their lives and fortunes in suppressing them. A fleet was soon after despatched under Admiral Holmes to Africa, who seized the Dutch

¹ De Witt's *Letters*, ap. Van Kampen, *Gesch. der Niederlande*, B. ii. S. 195.

forts in Guinea, and the Isle of Goree, besides a number of ships. Holmes then proceeded to America, and reduced the Dutch possessions there, which were re-named New York. These aggressions however, did not pass unavenged. De Ruyter succeeded in recapturing the places on the Guinea coast, and, though he was not successful in America, he molested the English East India commerce. Meanwhile, in Europe, upwards of one hundred and thirty Dutch vessels were seized, and that without any declaration of war, which was not formally made till March 4th, 1665. On June 13th following, was fought the battle of Lowestoffe, in which, after a brave and obstinate resistance, the Dutch, under Admiral Opdam, were totally defeated with great loss.

It was under these circumstances that the Dutch called upon Louis to assist them, agreeably to treaty. Such an application was very unwelcome to the French King, especially when the situation of affairs became complicated by the death of Philip IV. He endeavoured, but in vain, to extort from the Dutch a recognition of his claims on the Spanish Netherlands; and in order to gain time, he sent an embassy to London to attempt a mediation between the belligerents. This having failed, he could find no further excuses for postponing the assistance which he had bound himself to afford to the Dutch, and he accordingly declared war against England, January 26th, 1666. Louis took this step with the greatest reluctance, and he assured Charles that nothing should have constrained him to it but the necessity of keeping his word. In this profession he was doubtless sincere. Throughout the war the French fleet kept at a distance from the scene of action, and the only loss which it suffered was that of a frigate taken by the English while endeavouring to run into Brest. Louis, however, was compelled by this state of affairs to postpone his designs upon the Spanish Netherlands; for a war at once with Great Britain and Spain, and probably also with the Emperor, was not to be lightly ventured.

Besides the aid of the French, the Dutch had also procured that of the King of Denmark, with whom a treaty was concluded, February, 1666; and this alliance was extended and confirmed by another treaty at the Hague in the following October, to which the Duke of Brunswick Lüneburg acceded. The States had also formed an alliance with the Elector of Brandenburg at Cleves, in February of the same year. But these Powers were of more use to the Dutch in the war which they were then waging with the Bishop of Münster than in their contest with England. Louis XIV.

also had rendered the Dutch a more loyal assistance in that war, and in April, 1666, the warlike Prelate, who was in the pay of England, and had cruelly ravaged some of the Dutch provinces, was compelled to lay down his arms. The naval war of that year went, on the whole, in favour of England. The memorable battle of the North Foreland, which commenced on the 1st of June and lasted four days, was indeed left undecided; but the Dutch were defeated in a subsequent action, July 25th, and the English appeared to be masters of the seas. These advantages, however, had not been purchased without severe losses, which were aggravated by the hand of fortune or Providence. London, after being ravaged by a dreadful pestilence, had been almost destroyed by the Great Fire. Under these circumstances, the English Cabinet was disposed to peace. In February, 1667, an envoy was despatched to Paris to discuss preliminaries; and in the following April a secret agreement was concluded between the French and English Courts, by which Louis engaged to withdraw his assistance from the Dutch. This agreement, in itself a breach of faith towards the Dutch Republic, was, however, accompanied with a perfidiously highly disastrous to England. Whilst Louis assured the English Cabinet that the Dutch would have no fleet at sea that summer, he pressed the latter to fit out their ships, and encouraged them by promising to join them with his own,¹ though he had not the smallest intention of executing that promise. The fatal effects to England are well known. Relying on Louis's word, as well as on the negotiations for a peace already begun at Breda, under the mediation of the King of Sweden, no preparations were made for defence; in June, 1667, the Dutch sailed up the Thames without opposition, took Sheerness, destroyed our ships in the Medway, infested our coasts, and threatened the safety of the capital itself.

While these disasters moved the English to accelerate the conclusion of the PEACE OF BREDA, the unexpected march of Louis XIV. into the Spanish Netherlands, in May, had the same effect on the Dutch. On the 31st of July three treaties of peace were signed between England on the one side, and Holland, France, and Denmark on the other. The basis adopted in the Dutch treaty was the *status quo* from the 10th to the 20th May, 1667. Hence the English retained New York and New Jersey, while Surinam, and the Isle of Polorone in the Moluccas, remained

¹ Mignet, *Succession d'Espagne*, in the *Documents inédits sur l'Hist. de France*, t. ii. p. 40 sqq.; Harris, *Life of Charles II.* vol. ii. p. 195.

to the Dutch. The Navigation Act was so far modified that all merchandise coming down the Rhine was allowed to be imported into England in Dutch vessels; a measure which rendered the Dutch masters of great part of the commerce of Germany. In the treaty with France, this Power restored to England the Isle of St. Christopher's, which she had seized, and ceded Antigua and Montserrat, while she recovered Acadia and Cayenne. The chief difficulty with Denmark was the Sound dues. By a clause in the treaty, Denmark reserved her right to the Orkney Isles, anciently pledged by the Kings of Norway to the Kings of Scotland.¹

By the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands, Louis took all parties by surprise. He had fortified himself for that step by a new offensive alliance with Portugal (March 31st, 1667), by which he engaged to pay to that Power a subsidy of 1,800,000 livres annually, till he should himself declare war against Spain.² The death of Louis's mother, Anne of Austria, who expired January 20th, 1666, had removed one obstacle to his enterprise. Anne's political influence in her later years was not very great: but she had exerted what she had to prevent a war between her son and the house from which she sprang. Louis had succeeded in blinding the Regent of Spain and her incompetent minister and confessor. Up to the 1st of May he had given them the most pacific assurances; on the 8th he announced to the Regent his intention of marching in person into the Netherlands to possess himself of what belonged to him in right of his consort. The Dutch were equally taken by surprise. As late as the 27th of April Louis had assured De Witt that nothing should be undertaken without his knowledge. It was indeed a question of vital importance to the United Netherlands, which might next be swallowed up if the barrier between them and Franco were removed. Long and anxious negotiations on the subject had been going on between the two countries, but without result. At first a plan had been discussed to erect the Spanish Netherlands into a republic under the joint protection of France and the States, and this had been succeeded by another, to divide them between these two Powers, which, however, could not agree, either as to the method or the time of the division.

Louis XIV. had accompanied his announcement to the Spanish Regent with a little treatise, in which were set forth his pretensions not only to the Burgundian provinces, but also eventually to the whole Spanish monarchy. This treatise, which was in fact a

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 40 sqq.

² *Ibid.* p. 17.

sort of manifesto, was also forwarded to all the European Governments. The claim to the Spanish Netherlands was not rested on the law of devolution alone. By confounding the Kingdom of France with that of the Franks, it was asserted that the people of the Netherlands were Louis's natural subjects.¹ This was only another form of those claims which France has so often urged, sometimes on the ground of natural boundaries, sometimes of nationalities. It was plain that she meant to seize the Spanish provinces, and would always be able to find a justification.

Louis placed himself at the head of his army May 20th. He had announced his invasion of the Netherlands to the European Powers simply as a "journey," as if he were going to occupy his own undisputed possessions. Armentières, Binch, Charleroi, Ath, Bergues, Furnes, Tournai, Douai, Courtrai, Oudenarde, Alost were occupied without resistance, or capitulated after a short siege; Lille made a better defence, but surrendered on August 28th. The French army now appeared before Ghent. But a rainy season had set in; it was doubtful whether the Flemish towns would surrender so readily as the Walloon, which were better inclined to the French, and spoke their language; Louis, too, was desirous of avoiding a breach with the Dutch; and for all these reasons he determined to do no more this year. He had accompanied Turenne's division of the army, had taken a personal share in some of the sieges, and had displayed no lack of courage.

Louis had also determined to strike a blow in another direction. Franche-Comté, nominally a Spanish province, was in fact almost an independent state. Being completely isolated from the Spanish possessions, the Government of Spain found it necessary to accord great privileges to the inhabitants, lest they should transfer their allegiance elsewhere. Although ostensibly subject to the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, the real authority lay with the Governor of the province, elected from among its nobles, and with the Parliament of Dôle, which enjoyed the chief share in the administration. Franche-Comté yielded but a trifling revenue to Spain, and little care had consequently been taken for its defence. Its reduction was intrusted to the Prince of Condé, who, as Governor of Burgundy, was advantageously situated for that purpose. A considerable body of troops was secretly assembled; the attention of the Swiss was diverted, who, like the Dutch, did not wish to have the French for their neighbours; and in

¹ See Mignet, *Succession d'Espagne*, t. ii. p. 58 sqq.

February, 1688, Condé's forces invaded Franche-Comté. Louis hastened from Paris to the scene of action, and joined Condé before Dôle. That capital surrendered February 13th, and in a fortnight the whole province was reduced. Louis now placed both Burgundies under the government of Condé.

These rapid conquests inspired not only Spain, but all Europe also, with alarm. To give any efficient aid to the Netherlands was totally out of the power of the Spanish Government. It was impossible to raise fresh taxes in Spain; the galleons which brought the American tribute were not due till the end of the year; a national subscription was tried, but failed;¹ and to add to these embarrassments, the Portuguese, at the instigation of the French King, invaded Estremadura. Spain had declared war against France, July 14th, 1667, but without the means to carry it on. She appealed to all Europe for help, but nobody was inclined to give her any active succour. She had recently concluded a commercial treaty with England, on terms favourable to this country; but she was not permitted to levy soldiers in Great Britain. The Elector of Brandenburg resolved to maintain a neutral position. The Emperor Leopold, to whom Spain might have looked with more confidence, was actually negotiating with France, as will be explained further on. The Marquis of Castel Rodrigo, the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, in vain invoked the aid of the Dutch States, and offered to give up the tolls on the Meas and Scheld for a loan of two million guilders. The Spanish ambassador, Gamarra, proposed still more tempting conditions, and engaged to place Bruges, Ostend, Damme, and the forts of St. Isabella and St. Donas in the hands of the Dutch, in return for a loan of one million guilders, and the aid of 12,000 men. These negotiations form a turning point in the career of De Witt. They affect not only his fame as a statesman, but may even be said to have been the cause of his death. His situation, no doubt, was one of extreme difficulty. He knew that a league with Spain would be considered by France as a declaration of war; nor did the weakness of Spain, and the lukewarmness of her Belgian subjects, offer much encouragement to embark with her in such a contest. On the other hand, it should be considered that a war with France would have been popular with the Dutch, who for the most part detested the French; and that to allow the latter to fix themselves in the Spanish Netherlands was only to facilitate a future attack on the United Provinces themselves. In

¹ Mignet, *Succession d'Espagne*, t. ii. p. 121 sqq.

these circumstances De Witt adopted the dangerous expedient of a compromise. He resolved to avoid an immediate breach with France, and yet to force her to set a bound to her conquests, though he could not but have been aware how offensive such a course would be to a young and ambitious monarch like Louis XIV. Such was the policy he followed in the alliance with England and Sweden, which we have now to relate.

After the Peace of Broda, Louis had endeavoured to conciliate England by enticing offers. He held out the baits of a treaty of commerce, subsidies, the cession of a Netherland port, and the abandonment of Spanish America to the English arms, provided he might be allowed to occupy the Spanish Netherlands without opposition. Charles himself was lured with the offer of aid in case of need against his rebellious subjects.¹ But, though Clarendon had been disgraced, the time was not yet ripe for so intimate a connection between the French and English Crowns. The English Cabinet listened in preference to the envoys of the United Provinces, who were continually pressing Charles to join them in interposing between France and Spain. In December, 1667, Sir William Temple, the British resident at Brussels, received instructions to proceed to the Hague and negotiate a treaty with the States. In his conferences with De Witt, Temple urged him to conclude an offensive alliance, by which France should be compelled to relinquish all her recent conquests. But the policy of De Witt was, as already said, more temporizing. He dreaded an open breach with France, and wished to have Louis for a friend, though not for a neighbour. Temple yielded to his arguments, and, after a few days' negotiation, an alliance was concluded at the Hague, January 23rd, 1668, which, from the accession to it of Sweden, has been called the TRIPLE ALLIANCE. There were two treaties:² one established a defensive alliance between Great Britain and the States; the other, with a reservation for the accession of Sweden, erected those two Powers into mediators between the belligerent Crowns. France was to be persuaded to an armistice; Spain was to be forced to accept one of the alternatives already offered by Louis: namely, that he should be left in possession of all the places he had conquered in 1667; or that he should have instead of them either the Duchy of Luxembourg or Franche-Comté; and together with either of these provinces, the Cambrésis, Douai, Aire, St. Omer and Furnes. There were also three secret Articles: 1. That no

¹ Mignet, t. ii. p. 599.

² Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 66 sqq.

question should be raised about the renunciation of Maria Theresa; 2. That if the war should continue between Spain and Portugal, France should respect the neutrality of the States; 3. That if France rejected a peace on these conditions, England and the States should assist Spain till matters were restored to the footing established by the Peace of the Pyrenees. This last clause, which came to the knowledge of Louis, gave him very great offence. Dohna, the Swedish envoy, acceded to the treaty on the day of its execution; but the object of it was attained before it was formally ratified by Sweden. The key to this change of policy on the part of the Swedish Court, after an alliance of nearly half a century with France, lies in the circumstance that the latter Power had withdrawn the subsidies which she formerly paid to Sweden, and that the Dutch had undertaken to furnish them.

About the same time a peace was concluded between Spain and Portugal. After the War of Devolution had broken out, Spain became inclined to listen to English offers of mediation, and the negotiations for a peace were conducted during the revolution in Portugal already described. Don Pedro, the new Regent of Portugal, though secretly inclined to France, whose interest it was that the war should be prolonged, was compelled by the Cortes to sign the Treaty of Lisbon, February 13th, 1668. The independence of Portugal was acknowledged, and all conquests were restored on both sides, except Ceuta, which was ceded to the Spaniards.¹ Thus was at length concluded a war which had lasted more than a quarter of a century.

The peace between Spain and Portugal had the effect of facilitating in some degree the negotiations between France and the allies. Louis did not learn the conclusion of the Triple Alliance till he had completed the conquest of Franche-Comté. The question of pushing the war with vigour, or submitting to the arbitration of the allies, was discussed with great warmth and much difference of opinion among Louis's generals and ministers; but the King himself was inclined to abide by the alternatives which he had offered. Louis consented to a fresh truce till the end of May, and a Congress was opened at Aix-la-Chapelle; but the negotiations were really conducted at St. Germain. The Marquis of Castel Rodrigo accepted, as Spanish plenipotentiary, the first of the two alternatives just specified, and a preliminary treaty was

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 70. Cf. *Mémoires d'Ablancourt*, the French envoy in Portugal, p. 253.

signed at St. Germain, April 15th, 1668.¹ This injudicious choice, which placed in the hands of France the keys of the Netherlands, is said to have been made by Spain, in order to compel the allies, from the desperate nature of her situation, and the danger with which it threatened the Dutch provinces, to aid her in case of further attack.² After the Treaty of St. Germain, the definitive treaty, signed at Aix-la-Chapelle, May 2nd, was little more than a form. France retained all her conquests in the North, and restored Franche-Comté to Spain,³ the integrity of whose other possessions was guaranteed. England proposed to make the Triple Alliance permanent, and to obtain the accession of Spain; but De Witt either feared to offend France too far, or distrusted the sincerity of the British Cabinet.

The conduct of the Dutch had inflicted on the pride of Louis a wound too deep to be easily healed. His heart was bent on revenge, and his whole policy was directed to obtain it. His anger was further inflamed by the boasting of the Dutch. That little republic had now reached the summit of her good fortune, and had begun to grow somewhat dizzy with her eminence. She had not only achieved her own independence against the colossal power of Spain, but had also vindicated the rights of other nations, including those of Spain herself. She had saved Denmark from the grasp of Sweden; she had fought at least a drawn battle with England for the dominion of the seas; and now she had prescribed bounds to the haughty and powerful sovereign of France. There was nothing, therefore, but what was strictly true in the inscription on the medal which the Council of State caused to be struck in commemoration of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in which credit was taken for having asserted the laws, purified religion, aided, defended, and conciliated kings, vindicated the liberty of the seas, conquered by arms an advantageous peace, and established the tranquillity of Europe.⁴ The assertion of having done all this was, however, far from being the less offensive because it was true. Matters were rendered worse by the loud and offensive boasting of the Dutch journals, and by the personal bearing of Van Beuningen, the ambassador of the States at the French Court,

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 88.

² See, for these negotiations, Sir William Temple's *Letters*.

³ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 89.

⁴ The medal represented the Maid of the Netherlands, the image of the Dutch Republic, treading chains under her feet, having the cap of liberty on a spear, and

resting on a trophy, with ships in the distance. On the reverse was the following inscription: "Assertis legibus, emendatis sacris, adjutis, defensis, conciliatis regibus, vindicata marium libertate, pace egregia virtute armorum parata, stabilita Orbis Europæi quiete." See Van Loon, *Hist. métallique des Pays Bas*, t. iii. p. 22.

whose republican frankness, not to say rudeness, was offensive to Louis and his ministers.

It was not, however, merely from personal feeling that Louis wished to humble or destroy the Dutch Republic. He had political motives also. He hated the United Netherlands because they were the asylum of civil and religious liberty, and the centre of those ideas which were directly opposed to his own principles and institutions. Another cause of complaint was that the importation of French goods and manufactures, except wine, into the United Provinces had been prohibited, or at all events allowed only under very exorbitant duties; though this, indeed, was only a retaliation for the policy of Colbert. Add that the Dutch were the chief obstacle which prevented Louis from seizing the whole of the Spanish provinces, and we need not be surprised at his determination to ruin them. As a preliminary step, however, the Triple Alliance must be dissolved. Louis first attempted to effect this by means of the Dutch themselves; but De Witt resisted all Pomponne's endeavours for that purpose.¹ After this failure, which embittered Louis all the more against the Dutch, he turned his views to England and Sweden. De Witt, who saw the danger to which he had exposed his country, endeavoured, when it was too late, to disarm the French King by advances and propositions of various kinds; but Louis had made up his mind, though he kept up an appearance of negotiation, in order to amuse the Dutch. His kingly pride was deeply offended by the idea that a few republican traders should attempt to arbitrate between two of the greatest monarchs of Europe.²

The chief aim of Louis was to cement a firm alliance with England, in which Charles II. was disposed to meet him half-way. After the disgrace of Clarendon, Charles fell more and more into the hands of Buckingham, Arlington, and the other members of the Cabal Cabinet. The few religious ideas entertained by Charles were in favour of the Roman Catholic faith. He harboured, as is well known, a sort of waking dream of re-establishing, some day or other, with the aid of the French King, that worship in his dominions; a project which, however chimerical, contributed to form a bond of union between the two sovereigns. Want of money, however, was the chief motive with Charles to form the French

¹ D'Estrades, *Lettres, Mémoires, et Négociations*, t. vi. p. 444.

² Thus, in a despatch to the French ambassador in Holland, Lionne writes: "Il n'appartient pas à des marchands, qui

sont eux-mêmes des usurpateurs, de décider souverainement des intérêts des deux plus grands monarques de la Chrétienté."—Mignet, t. iii. p. 583 sq.

alliance. While his exchequer was always empty, that of Louis was always overflowing, and the surplus at the disposal of such princes or ministers as were willing to be bought. In December, 1669, Charles offered his services to Louis on terms which shew that if he and his advisers were ready to barter away the civil and religious liberties of England, they were at the same time anxious to promote her foreign interests, at least as they were then understood. They claimed, besides large money payments, a considerable eventual share in the Spanish succession;¹ and from the spoils of the Dutch Republic, Sluys and the Isles of Walcheren and Cad-sand. These claims were afterwards modified. Charles consented to postpone the question of the Spanish succession, and to reduce his pecuniary demands; and on May 22nd, 1670, a secret treaty was arranged at Dover between Charles and his sister, Henrietta of Orleans, who went thither on pretence of a friendly visit. Charles engaged to declare himself a Roman Catholic, on condition of Louis giving him two million livres, and supporting him with 6,000 foot against the consequences which might ensue. Charles was to declare his conversion at what time he pleased, and after his declaration had been made, to join Louis in a war against the Dutch whenever Louis should think proper. He was to assist him with 6,000 foot and the English fleet, to which were to be added thirty French ships of, at least, forty guns; and Charles was to receive a subsidy of three million livres a year during the war. The treaty was signed by Colbert de Croissi, the French ambassador, and on the part of Charles by four commissioners, all Catholics.² Louis ratified it by an autograph letter to Charles, June 10th. Charles gave his sister to understand that he would permit the French King to attack Holland before he had declared his own conversion, notwithstanding the article to the contrary in the treaty. The goodwill of Charles had been conciliated by ministering to one of his foibles. Henrietta had brought in her suite a beautiful young lady, Mademoiselle de Kerhouël, with whom Charles was immediately captivated. She departed with the Duchess of Orleans, but was persuaded without much difficulty to return to England, where she became the noted Duchess of Ports-

¹ Minorca, Ostend, and Spanish America. *Ibid.* p. 120.

² The Lords Arlington and Arundel, Sir Thomas Clifford, and R. Bellings. This secret treaty, which was in the possession of the Clifford family, was first published by Dr. Lingard, by permission

of Lord Clifford, in 1830. It will be found in his *Hist. of England*, vol. ix. App. note B. By later agreements the English share of the Dutch conquests was to be augmented by the Isles of Voorne and Goree, thus giving England the command of the Scheld and the Maes.

mouth; and, as Charles's mistress, contributed to keep alive the good understanding between him and the French Court.

Charles was probably never sincere in the design of publicly changing his religion, or rather, perhaps, of assuming any at all; but the treaty seems to have encouraged his brother, the Duke of York, openly to profess his adherence to the Catholic faith, and may thus be considered as having prepared the fall of the Stuart dynasty. A second treaty, intended to be made public when the war should break out, and relating, therefore, only to the affairs of Holland, was signed on the 31st of the following December by Colbert de Croissi and those of Charles's ministers who were not in the secret of his contemplated apostacy.¹ Louis was in hopes to have begun the war in the spring of 1671, but the state of his negotiations in Germany and elsewhere induced him to put it off till the following year. In order to facilitate his attack on the United Netherlands, he had seized the Duchy of Lorraine (September, 1670). The restless Duke Charles IV. had afforded the French King a pretext for this aggression, by having, in contravention of the treaty of the Pyrenees, revoked his engagement that his dominions should fall to France after his death; as well as by levying troops, fortifying several places, and contracting alliances without the knowledge of the King.² The occupation of Lorraine caused a great sensation in Europe, and especially among the Dutch, to whom it presaged the coming storm. The acquisition was of great importance to France, not only from its magnitude, but also strategically, as the communication between the Netherlands and Franche-Comté was thus intercepted. Charles IV., who was closely connected with the Imperial family, fled to Vienna, and afterwards served against Louis in the Dutch war. Leopold addressed to the French Court some remonstrances in his favour; but though this occurrence produced for some time a coldness between the Emperor and Louis, it did not eventually put an end to the good understanding which we have already mentioned as subsisting between them at this period, the origin of which we must now relate.

Louis had, early in 1667, made proposals to the Emperor for dividing between them the dominions of Spain in the event of the death, without issue, of the sickly young king, Don Carlos II.

¹ By this treaty Charles was to receive five million livres instead of three; but in a secret article, unknown to Buckingham, it was acknowledged that two of these

were the price of his conversion. Lingard, vol. ix. p. 185.

² *Theatrum Europ.* t. x. pt. ii. p. 347.

The present object of Louis in these negotiations was to prevent the Emperor from interfering in his designs upon the Spanish Netherlands. Leopold and the House of Austria had, perhaps, equal pretensions to the Spanish succession with Louis and his heirs. Neither Leopold's mother, Maria Anna, daughter of Philip III., nor his wife, Margaret, daughter of Philip IV., had renounced her claims to the Spanish throne, as both Anne of Austria, the mother, and Maria Theresa, the wife of Louis XIV., also daughters respectively of Philip III. and Philip IV., had done. But as neither Leopold nor Louis could hope to reap the entire succession, and as Leopold was at that time governed by his minister, Auersberg, who was in the pay of Louis, he was easily induced to enter into the views of the French King. In January, 1668, a secret treaty was accordingly concluded at Vienna with Gremonville, the French ambassador; by which it was agreed that in the event just specified, the Emperor should have Spain, except Navarre and Rosas, the Milanese, certain places in Tuscany, the Balearic Isles, Sardinia, the Canaries, and the Spanish West India possessions; while Louis's share was to be the Catholic Netherlands, Franche-Comté, Navarre, Rosas, Oran, Melilla, Ceuta, &c., in Africa, the two Sicilies, and the Philippine Isles.¹ Soon after this treaty, Auersberg was dismissed from Leopold's service, his subserviency to France having become only too manifest by the attempt of Louis to procure for him a cardinal's hat from Pope Clement X. His successor, Lobkowitz, was, however, equally sold to Louis; and down to that King's actual invasion of Holland, and, in fact, till 1674, no step was taken by Leopold to oppose the progress of the French. The leagues of the Emperor in January and June, 1672, with the Electors and Princes of Mentz, Trèves, Saxony, Brandenburg, Brunswick Lüneburg, Hesse Cassel, and other German Powers, as well as Denmark, were purely defensive, and to prevent the Empire from being attacked; and though an Austrian force under Montecuculi was sent to the Rhine in June, Gremonville was assured that it would not act offensively. Indeed, the true politics of Lobkowitz and the Imperial Court at this juncture are shown by another treaty with France, November 1st, 1671; by which it was agreed that neither the Emperor nor the French King should support the other's enemies; and that Leopold should not inter-

¹ Mignet, t. ii. p. 441 sqq. This treaty is not in the usual collections; but it is avowed by Louis himself in a *Mém. d'In-*

struction to the Marquis d'Harcourt. See Gardien, *Hist. des Traités*, t. ii. p. 190.

tere in any war arising out of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, and waged outside the boundaries of the Empire.¹

It was manifest from this treaty that Louis had nothing to apprehend from the Emperor in any enterprise against the Dutch. The position of most of the other German Powers was equally encouraging to him. The Elector of Bavaria was entirely in the interests of France. The ill state of health of the Emperor Leopold had caused Louis to imagine that the Imperial Crown would soon be vacant; the Elector had promised the French King his vote, and in 1670 a secret treaty had been concluded between them, the main feature of which was a marriage between the Dauphin and the Elector's daughter. The Elector Palatine followed this example, and was recompensed for his adherence to France by the marriage of his daughter to the King's brother, the Duke of Orleans, whose consort, Henrietta, had expired soon after her visit to Dover. The Duke of Hanover and the Bishop of Osnaburg espoused Louis's cause so warmly that they granted him the exclusive right to levy troops in their dominions. The Elector of Cologne and the Bishop of Münster, with a view to self-interest, were still more ardent in his cause. They drew closer their former relations with France by a new treaty in January, 1672; by which the Elector engaged to aid the King against the Dutch with an army of 18,000 men for a subsidy of 8,000 crowns a month, and in consideration of a sum of 400,000 livres to admit a French garrison into Neuss. The Bishop promised to unite his forces with those of the Elector, and both were to receive a share of the future conquests. Among the German Princes the politic Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg seemed long doubtful as to which side he should favour. In December, 1669, he had concluded a treaty with Louis, by which he agreed not to join the Triple Alliance, and to support the King's claims to the Spanish Netherlands; but he would make no promise with regard to Holland. The ruin of that Republic appeared to him to be too great a peril both for Protestantism and for Germany to be ventured on. Yet he had not much reason to be satisfied with the Dutch, who withheld from him Wesel, Rees, Emmerich, and two or three other places in the Duchy of Cleves, which they had taken from the Spaniards during the Thirty Years' War; while Louis endeavoured to entice him to their ruin by the most tempting offers. The French King proposed that the Dutch Republic should be dissolved; that France should take the provinces to the west of the Meuse; that the

¹ *Theatrum Europ.* t. xi. p. 37.

Elector of Brandenburg should have Gelderland and Zutphen; the Elector of Cologne, Utrecht, Münster, and Overysse; the Duke of Lüneburg, Friesland; the Duke of Neuburg, Gröningen; while Holland and Zealand were to fall to the House of Orange; and all these provinces were to form a Confederate State.¹ But Frederick William was not to be dazzled; and eventually he threw in his lot with the Dutch, by concluding with them; in April, 1672, a treaty by which he engaged to assist them with 20,000 men.

Among the few German potentates adverse to France, the Elector of Mentz took the leading part. This Prince had formerly been a warm friend of France, and the principal agent in establishing the Rhenish League; but when the War of Devolution made him better acquainted with the views of Louis, he altered his politics; and it was through his influence that the League had been dissolved in January, 1668.² He succeeded in negotiating an alliance in 1672 with the Electors of Trèves and Saxony and the Margrave of Baireuth, which was also joined by the Emperor. This league, however, was a purely defensive one; the whole force which it proposed to raise did not much exceed 10,000 men, to guard the Empire from attack; and thus even the Bishop of Münster, though leagued with the French against the Dutch, conceived himself at liberty to join it.

Secure on the side of England and Germany, Sweden was the only other Power which Louis was desirous of gaining. As Denmark was the firm ally of the States-General, and as the posture of the Elector of Brandenburg became every day more hostile to France, it became highly important to Louis to secure the friendship of Sweden. With that needy but ambitious Power, money was the grand instrument of negotiation. When, in 1667, France ceased to pay Sweden the subsidies stipulated under the treaty of January, 1663, she abandoned, as we have seen, her ancient ally, and attached herself to England and the Dutch. The offer of 400,000 rix-dollars in ready money, and a yearly subsidy of 600,000 during the war, sufficed to gain her back to France. The Treaty of Stockhølm, concluded April 14th, 1672,³ purported to

¹ Puffendorf. *De Reb. Gest. Frid. Will.* lib. xi. § 5.

² It was the Elector of Mentz who attempted to divert Louis from his enterprise against the United Netherlands, by a counter-project for the conquest of Egypt; a scheme which had originated in the fertile brain of the celebrated philosopher Leibnitz, then a young man

of five-and-twenty. The Elector sent Leibnitz to Paris to persuade Louis to engage in it; but the French King could not be induced to leave his destined prey for so distant and doubtful an undertaking. See Menzel, *Neuere Gesch. der Deutschen*, B. iv. S. 427 f.

³ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 166. The treaty was for three years, and was re-

be for the maintenance of the Peace of Westphalia, of which the two contracting Powers were guarantors; but the secret articles showed that it was directed against the Dutch, as Sweden engaged to assist Louis in case he should be attacked by the Emperor or any German Power, during his war with the United Netherlands.

While thus abandoned by almost all the world, the Dutch fixed their chief hopes of support on an alliance with the Spaniards, their ancient masters and oppressors. A revolution had now taken place in the Spanish Government. The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle and the acknowledgment of Portuguese independence had excited great indignation against the Regent and her Jesuit minister; and Don John of Austria availed himself of this feeling to drive Niethard from power. Don John had been appointed Governor of the Spanish Netherlands during the French aggression, and was on the point of embarking at Coruña when the news of the arrest and execution of one of his adherents led him to return towards Madrid. The Queen, however, forbade him to approach that capital, and directed him to retire to his seat at Consuegra. Niethard, on pretence that Don John had formed a conspiracy against his life, sent a party of cavalry to arrest the Prince in his retirement; but he succeeded in escaping into Aragon, where, having collected a body of 700 determined followers, he advanced to Torrejo, within a few leagues of Madrid, and dictated to the Queen the dismissal of her Confessor. Such was Niethard's unpopularity, that even this small force enabled Don John to effect his object, especially as he was supported by several members of the Council; and, in spite of the tears and entreaties of the Queen, her minister was compelled to retire to Rome (February, 1669). Don John, however, was not admitted to a share of the government. Niethard was succeeded by another favourite, Don Fernando de Valenzuelo, a gentleman of Granada; but the ambition of Don John was appeased with the viceroalties of Aragon and Catalonia. It was this new government which, in December, 1671, concluded at the Hague a treaty of alliance with the States.¹

Louis, besides the formidable combination which he had organized against the Dutch, endeavoured also to promote the success of his enterprise by fomenting their intestine dissensions,

newed in April, 1675. *Ibid.* p. 291. Sweden engaged to act in Pomerania with 16,000 men against those who should assist the Dutch, that is against Denmark and Bran-

denburg. The secret articles are in Puffendorf, *De Reb. Frid. Willh.* lib. xi. § 35.

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 155.

and exciting the Orange party against De Witt. Six of the United Provinces were for appointing William III., who had now attained the age of twenty-one, Captain-General for life; a step which they thought might conciliate his uncle, Charles II., and avert a war with England. But the inflexible De Witt would not consent. He would only agree that the Prince should be named Captain-General for the ensuing campaign, and that with very limited power. The province of Holland would not even go so far, and delayed the Prince's nomination till November, 1672, when he would complete his twenty-second year. It cannot be denied that the subsequent misfortunes of the Republic must, in great measure, be attributed to De Witt. The Dutch army was in a sad condition. Officers had been forbidden to enter foreign service, and thus, from the long peace by land, were entirely without experience. Promotion was obtained not through service but favour. Most of the soldiers were foreigners, discipline was neglected, and the fortresses and magazines were ill supplied and suffered to go to decay. The blame of these things must attach to De Witt.¹ The navy, on the other hand, owing to the care of De Ruyter, was in excellent condition. De Witt could not persuade himself till the last moment that Louis was in earnest in his preparations. On December 10th, 1671, the States-General addressed to the French King a most submissive letter, in which they told him they could not believe he meant to turn his arms against his ancient and most faithful allies; they protested that they had not voluntarily infringed the treaty of 1662; they offered to redress any inadvertent breaches of it, and to give his Majesty all the satisfaction he could reasonably require. They even instructed their ambassador, Van Groot, son of the illustrious Grotius, to tell the King that he had only to say the word, and the United Provinces would disarm; an action which would display the King's grandeur in a fairer light than the most complete success of his arms. Louis's reply was haughty and threatening. He contested the epithet which the States had given themselves of his "faithful" allies; he reproached them with their diplomatic intrigues against France, as well as with their hostile tariffs. He even seemed to affect a great condescension in replying to their letter; "which," he added, "seems not so much written for us, as to excite against our interests those princes in whose courts it has been made public before we could receive it."²

On the 6th of April following, Louis published his declaration

¹ Van Kampen, B. ii. S. 228.

² Mignet, t. iii. p. 657 sqq.

of war. He alleged no specific cause for hostilities, which, indeed, was out of his power. He spoke only in general terms of the ingratitude of the Dutch for the benefits they had received from his forefathers, and asserted that his "glory" would not permit him any longer to dissemble the indignation which their conduct had raised in him.¹ The English declaration of war had preceded by a few days that of Louis (March 29th). There was an attempt in it to specify some grievances, but their flimsiness was as transparent as that of the French manifesto. It alleged some oppressions of Charles's subjects in India, the detention of some Englishmen in Surinam; the refusal of the Dutch fleet to strike their colours to an English yacht which had on board the wife of Temple, the ambassador; and certain abusive pictures, which turned out to be a portrait of De Witt's brother, the Admiral Cornelius, with a view of the burning of Chatham in the background. A public treaty had been signed between France and England, February 12th, which was merely a repetition of the secret treaty of December 31st, 1670; except that Charles was released, during the year 1672, from his obligation to furnish the French army with a corps of infantry. A few days before the declaration of war, Admiral Sir Robert Holmes had attacked the Dutch Smyrna fleet at the back of the Isle of Wight, but with such small success as was a poor compensation for this shameful breach of international law.

Early in May, 1672, the French marched against the United Netherlands in three divisions. Louis himself accompanied the main division, which, under the command of Turenne and Condé, advanced to Viset on the Meuse, a place between Liège and Maestricht. The King was accompanied by Louvois, his minister of war, and Vauban, the celebrated engineer. The Dutch had only about 20,000 ill-disciplined men to oppose to ten times that number of French, under generals like Condé and Turenne. It is not our intention to detail at any length the campaigns of Louis XIV. They have now lost much of their interest through the grander and more important ones of recent times; and we shall content ourselves with indicating some of the chief results. The French army, neglecting Maestricht, into which the Dutch had thrown a strong garrison, advanced into the duchy of Cleves, occupied with little or no resistance Orsoy, Rheinberg, Buderich, and Wesel, and penetrated into the province of Gelderland. The passage of the Rhine, or Lech, at Tolhuys, June 12th,

¹ Mignet, t. iii. p. 710.

which the flatterers of Louis magnified into a grand exploit, and celebrated in poetry, painting, and sculpture, has since been estimated at its true value.¹ The river, with the exception of a few yards in the middle, was fordable by cavalry, and the passage of the French was disputed only by some 1,200 men under Würz; the Prince of Orange with the main body of the Dutch army, having retired to Utrecht. The passage cost the French only a score or two of troopers. The operation was, however, important in its consequences, since the French, with the assistance of their allies from Cologne and Münster, occupied in a few weeks the provinces of Gelderland, Utrecht, Overysse, and part of Holland. Amsterdam itself might probably have been surprised, had Condé's bold advice been followed to direct against it a body of 6,000 cavalry.

So sudden and overwhelming an invasion, which might be compared to the bursting of their dykes and an irruption of the sea, filled the Dutch with consternation. Every man, says a Dutch writer, seemed to have received sentence of death.² Manufactures and trade were suspended; all the shops were closed, as well as the schools, universities, and courts of law; the churches alone remained open, and sufficed not to contain the anxious crowds which thronged to them. Many sent their wives and children to England, Brabant, Denmark, and even to France, together with their treasures, which others buried. In this low ebb of their fortunes, the dejection of the Dutch prompted them to make the most submissive proposals to the conqueror, in order to secure what remained to them. They offered to surrender to Louis Maestricht and its dependencies, together with Dutch Brabant and Flanders, and to pay him six millions for the expenses of the war. Pomponne pressed the King to accept these offers, but Louis listened in preference to the violent counsels of Louvois. By the advice of this minister, counter-proposals were made of the most extravagant nature. The cession of Dutch Brabant and Flanders was accepted; only, as the King was bound by treaty to make over Sluys and Cadsand to the English, Delfzyl and its dependencies, near the mouth of the Ems, was demanded in their stead. In like manner, instead of Maestricht, Louvois required Nimeguen and the Isles of Batavia and Bommel; that is, the Lech for a frontier instead of the Meuse; a proposition which, while it was more injurious to the Dutch, was in reality less ad-

¹ Napoleon characterized it as an operation of the fourth order. *Mémoires*, t. v. p. 129.

² Valkenier, *ap. Van Kampen*, ii. 235.

vantageous to the French. He also demanded Grave on the Meuse and the county of Meurs; and he doubled the indemnity to be paid for the expenses of the war. But more offensive to the Dutch than all these demands were others which injured their commerce, shocked their religious prejudices, and wounded their pride. The prohibitions and new customs duties on French goods were to be revoked, without any reciprocity; the public exercise of the Roman Catholic religion was to be restored throughout the United Provinces, and, in all places which had more than one church, one was to be consecrated to the Popish worship; while, in acknowledgment of the King's goodness in granting them a peace, the Dutch were to present him every year with a gold medal, bearing an inscription that they owed to him the preservation of that liberty which his predecessors had helped them to acquire.¹

The injustice and arrogance of these demands inspired the Dutch with a resolution to defend themselves to the last extremity. They determined to pierce the dykes, and lay the country under water; a heavy sacrifice, but which would at least secure them till the frosts of winter. They even resolved, if these measures should prove useless, to abandon their homes, and seek in their possessions beyond the seas that civil and religious freedom which was denied to them in Europe. An account was taken of the shipping in the harbours, and it was found that they had the means of transporting 50,000 families to the East Indies.

These events were accompanied with a revolution which proved fatal to the Pensionary and his brother Cornelius. The advance of the French had roused the popular resentment against the De Witts to the highest pitch. They were denounced from the pulpits as the enemies and betrayers of their country; the Pensionary was even suspected by many to be in the pay of France. On the night of the 12th of June he was attacked by four assassins and wounded, but not mortally, though he was obliged for some weeks to keep his bed. Among his assailants were two sons of Van der Graaf, a member of the Council, the younger of whom was captured. Great interest was made to save his life, and it was thought that De Witt would have interceded with the judges in his favour. But it lay not in his nature. "The pardoning of such a crime," he observed, "would be followed by the worst consequences for the administration of justice. The law must take its course. *Fiat justitia et pereat mundus.*" Young

¹ Basnage, *Annales des Prov. Unies*, t. ii. p. 246 sqq.; Mignet, t. iv. p. 31 sqq.

Van der Graaf was condemned and beheaded, June 29th. This last spark lighted up the train. A cry was raised in the little town of Vere in Zealand, and ran through the other provinces, that the Perpetual Edict must be abolished, and the Prince of Orange appointed Stadholder. Cornelius de Witt, who was confined to his bed by sickness, was compelled by the people to sign the abolition of the Edict. It was abrogated by the States of Holland, July 3rd, and on the 8th of the same month, the States-General recognized William Prince of Orange as Stadholder, Captain-General, and Admiral for life.

This revolution was soon followed by the murder of the two De Witts. On the 24th of July, Cornelius was arrested on a charge of having plotted against the life of the Prince of Orange. The charge rested on the testimony of one Tichelaar, a barber or surgeon, a man of infamous character, who deposed that Cornelius had attempted to bribe him to murder the Prince. Cornelius was cited before the Court of Holland, of which the father of Van der Graaf was a member, and by order of the judges was put to the rack. He endured the torture with the greatest fortitude, and displayed the unshaken constancy of his mind by reciting an ode of Horace in praise of the just and resolute man who can alike defy the frowns of a tyrant and the iniquitous decrees of a turbulent faction ("Justum et tenacem propositi virum," &c. *Od. Lib. iii. 3*). The evidence sufficed not to condemn the Admiral, and he should therefore have been discharged, for there is no middle term between guilt and innocence; but the judges being resolved to make him a victim, deprived him of all his offices and dignities, and sentenced him to perpetual banishment. As he lay in prison he was surprised by a visit from his brother, the Pensionary. "What! you here, brother?" "Did you not send for me?" "No." "Then we are both undone." The augury was only too true. The party in power, unable to murder the De Witts judicially, had resolved to sacrifice them to the fury of the populace, and had enticed the Pensionary, by a false message, to share his brother's fate. The States of Holland, indeed, made a show of protecting the De Witts by a guard of cavalry; but this was soon withdrawn, and the infuriated mob broke into the prison. The two brothers were dragged into the streets and murdered; their bodies, after being mutilated in the most frightful and disgusting manner, were hung upon the public gibbet; their hearts were torn out and put up to sale. A Gomarist preacher, Simon Simonides, presided, like a priest of Moloch, at

these bloody orgies (August 20th). Thus miserably perished John De Witt, who had directed the counsels of the Dutch Republic during a period of twenty years with honest and single-minded patriotism, if not, in the last eventful crisis, with a wise and successful policy; whilst his brother Cornelius had sustained her honour upon the seas with valour and reputation. Their murder may not be directly imputable to the Prince of Orange; but he at least accepted it, and made himself an accessory after the fact by protecting and rewarding the assassins. The Stadholder proclaimed an amnesty; the principal leader of the riot was made Mayor, or Bailiff, of the Hague; and Tichelaar obtained a place and a yearly pension of 400 guilders, which was paid to him during the life of William.¹

The Dutch entertained a hope that the appointment of the Prince of Orange as Stadholder would disarm the anger of Charles II.; and this feeling was strengthened by the arrival of his two principal ministers, Buckingham and Arlington, at the Hague, early in July. The English ambassadors were received by the people with enthusiasm and shouts of "Long live the King of England and the Prince of Orange!" But their expectations were doomed to disappointment. After an interview with William, Buckingham and Arlington repaired to the camp of Louis, near Utrecht; and on the 16th of July, they signed a new treaty with the French King. The demands of England were as intolerable as before. Whole fleets were to strike to a single man-of-war; England was to receive an indemnity of a million sterling, and a yearly payment of 10,000*l.* for the herring fishery on the British coast; Sluys, with the Isles of Walcheren, Cadsand, Gorree, and Voorne, were to be made over to England as security for these conditions; and no separate peace was to be made by either Power. The Prince of Orange, whom the allies persisted in protecting in spite of himself, was to have the sovereignty, or at least the hereditary Stadholdership, of the United Netherlands. Nor did France abate a single article of her former demands.² When Buckingham and Arlington again went to the Prince of Orange with these conditions, and urged him to throw himself into the arms of their King, William answered, "My country confides in me, and I will never betray it for any unworthy objects of personal ambition. If I cannot

¹ Basnage, *Ann. des Prov. Unies*, t. ii. p. 317; Mignet, *Succ. d'Espagne*, t. iv. p. 71; *Mém. de Gourville* (*Collect. Michaud*, 3^e série, t. v. p. 576); Van Kam-

pen, *Gesch. der Nederlande*, B. ii. S. 246 sq.

² Dumont. t. vii. pt. i. p. 203.

avert its ruin, I can at least defend every ditch; and I will die in the last."

The confidence of the Prince in his valour and his cause was justified by the sequel. The Republic had already passed the most alarming crisis of its fortunes. At sea, the Dutch, if not absolutely victorious, had maintained a resistance which inspired good hopes for the future. In a great action fought off Solebay, on the coast of Suffolk, May 28th, De Ruyter had engaged the combined English and French fleets a whole day, and the losses on both sides were so equally balanced that neither could claim the victory. The French, indeed, had taken but little part in the action, by the secret orders, it is supposed, of Louis, who was not displeased to let the two Maritime Powers destroy each other's forces. The landing of the English at the Texel had been subsequently hindered by an extraordinary ebb tide of twelve hours, and then by a great storm. On land, the inundations had arrested the progress of the French. On July 26th Louis had taken his departure for St. Germain, leaving Turenne in command of the army, but with instructions to attempt nothing more that year.

The successes of the French had at length awakened the Emperor from his lethargy. Leopold entered into a defensive treaty with the Elector of Brandenburg June 23rd, by which each engaged to despatch 12,000 men to the Rhine.¹ Intelligence of this treaty, and the encouragements of the Elector, had contributed to make the Prince of Orange reject the demands of England and France. Leopold, in a treaty signed by his minister l'Isola at the Hague, July 25th, 1672, in spite of his former engagement of neutrality with France, agreed to assist the Republic, on condition of receiving a large subsidy.² But the Emperor was still playing a double game; and though Montecuculi was despatched with 12,000 men to join the Elector of Brandenburg, he received secret orders not to engage the French; and Leopold even assured Louis that he wished him success.³ The advance of the Elector and the Austrians, who formed a junction at Halberstadt, September 12th, was nevertheless favourable to the Dutch by the diversion which it caused. Turenne received orders to proceed to the Rhine, and arrest the progress of the allies; and he prevented them from forming a junction with the Prince of Orange, who had advanced for that purpose to the neighbour-

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 201.

² *Ibid.* p. 208.

³ Puffendorf, *Frid. Will.* lib. xi. § 51.

hood of Liège. Montecuculi, in pursuance of his secret orders,¹ declined to fight, and the Elector of Brandenburg was consequently compelled to retreat beyond the Weser, abandoning to the enemy some of his Westphalian dominions. The Elector now made proposals of peace to France, and on June 16th, 1673, a treaty was concluded at Vossem, near Louvain, by which Louis engaged to pay him 800,000 livres, and restored to him all his dominions, including those in the Duchy of Cleves captured from the Dutch, except Wesel, and the forts of Lippe and Rees; which were also to revert to him at the end of the war. The Elector on his side engaged not to assist the Dutch, but reserved to himself the right of taking up arms if war should be declared by the Empire.² Sweden had not fulfilled her engagements to France, but she offered her mediation; which led to the assembly of a Congress at Cologne in the spring of 1673.

Meanwhile the Stadholder, after failing to form a junction with the Austrian and Electoral troops on the Meuse, made a bold but unsuccessful attempt on Charleroi, and then hastened back to the defence of Holland. Marshal Luxembourg had taken advantage of the frosts of winter to invade that country; but the elements again favoured the Dutch; a sudden thaw compelled the French to retreat. The campaign of 1673 presents little of importance except the taking of Maestricht by Louis in person, with the assistance of Vauban, June 30th; and the surrender of Trèves to the same eminent engineer and Rochefort, September 8th. Meanwhile Louis had marched into Alsace, where he occupied the ten imperial cities, and compelled them to renounce the rights guaranteed to them by the Peace of Westphalia.

A great coalition was now organized against France. On August 30th, 1673, two treaties were signed at the Hague by the States, the King of Spain, and the Emperor. By the first of these treaties, Spain promised to declare war against France, and the States engaged to make no peace with that Power till she had restored to Spain all that she had seized since the Peace of the Pyrenees; failing which, the States were to cede to Spain Maestricht and the county of Vroonhove. They were likewise to endeavour at a peace with England on equitable terms; and if they

¹ Montecuculi was so disgusted with the orders sent by Lobkowitz, that he wrote to the court to request that, as the shortest way, he might receive his instructions direct from Paris! Puffendorf, lib. xii. § 51. Montecuculi was soon recalled

at his own desire. Lobkowitz was dismissed in October, 1674; after which Leopold became his own prime minister.

² Puffendorf, lib. xi. § 95; Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 234.

did not succeed, Spain engaged to declare war against England. The Dutch were also to recover their lost possessions. By the second treaty, the Emperor was to assemble near Egra a force of 30,000 men, and march them to the Rhine; the States paying a subsidy of 45,000 rix-dollars per month, and providing on their part 20,000 men. The three confederate Powers also concluded in October a treaty with the Duke of Lorraine, by which they bound themselves to place him at the head of 18,000 men, and to restore him to his dominions.¹ From this period the cause of the Dutch Republic began daily to look more promising. The naval war this year was decidedly in her favour. On land, the Stadholder, after taking Naerden, September 12th, effected a junction near Bonn with the Imperialists, who, in spite of all the efforts of Turenne, had succeeded in passing the Rhine near Mentz, and taking Bonn, after a short resistance, November 12th. This was a signal advantage. The States of Cologne and Münster lay at their mercy; they established themselves along the Rhine, and thus secured the free communication of the Imperialists with the Netherlands; whilst Turenne was compelled to fall back on the Sarre. The French were now obliged to evacuate Holland, which was effected in the winter and spring, 1673-74. Of all their conquests they retained only Grave and Maestricht.

The Prince of Orange on his return was received in triumph by the Dutch. Early in February, 1674, he was proclaimed hereditary Stadholder and Captain-General of Holland and Zealand, with succession to his male heirs; an example which was soon followed by Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overysse. These honours were conferred on William in order to smooth the way to a peace with England, which was effected the same month. The war was very unpopular in England. The King could obtain no grants from the Parliament, whose suspicions had been further excited by the recent marriage of the Duke of York with a princess of Modena, a niece of Mazarin's. Louis XIV. had been the chief author of this marriage, and had bestowed a large dowry upon the bride. Charles II. made the best excuses he could to his patron Louis for his defection; but he had, in fact, no alternative, and was compelled to accept the Treaty of Westminster, February 19th, 1674. By this treaty the States engaged to salute the British flag between the limits of Cape Finisterre in Spain and Van Staten in Norway, and to pay 800,000 crowns for the expenses of the war. Conquests were to be restored on both sides, and the disputes that

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 244 sq.

had arisen in the East Indies were to be adjudicated by a Commission.¹ The example of England was soon after followed by the Bishops of Münster and Cologne.

While Louis was thus deserted one by one by his allies, the Empire was rousing itself to vigorous action against him. The immediate occasion of this was an occurrence which took place at Cologne. The harsh proceedings of the French King towards the Alsatian cities, as well as other parts of his conduct, were ascribed to the advice of his pensioner, William von Fürstenberg, who attended the congress of Cologne as plenipotentiary of the Elector. Although the congress rendered that city neutral ground, the Emperor caused Fürstenberg to be arrested by some Austrian troops as he was returning from a visit on the evening of February 4th, 1674, and he was carried off to Wiener-Neustadt. France and Sweden loudly exclaimed against this proceeding as a violation of the rights of nations; whereupon their envoys were directed to leave the town, and the congress was dissolved without any result. This event put an end to any good understanding which still subsisted between the Emperor and the King of France. Leopold complained to the Diet of Ratisbon of the conduct of the French, and though Gravel, the French envoy there, used every endeavour to bring the German States back to their former dependence on France, yet so much was the position of affairs altered by the late occurrences, that the Emperor was able to dismiss Gravel from the Assembly, and in spite of the opposition of the Elector of Bavaria, several German princes gave in their adhesion to the Emperor and joined the coalition of the Hague. In June, Leopold formally declared war against France, and thus enabled the Elector of Brandenburg to join the league (July 1st), according to his special reservation in the Treaty of Vossem.

Louis, supported by Sweden alone, now found himself opposed to almost all Europe. The campaign of 1674, however, went in favour of the French. Louis in person entered Franche-Comté, and in the months of May and June again reduced that province. It was never afterwards separated from France, and the Jura henceforward formed the French frontier on the east. Meanwhile Turenne was holding the Imperialists in check by a series of brilliant manoeuvres on the Rhine. By his victory at Sinzheim, June 16th, he compelled them to retreat beyond the Neckar. He then entered and ravaged the dominions of the Elector Palatine,

who had joined the Imperial League; when his troops, enraged at the murder and mutilation of some of their comrades by the peasants, burnt seven-and-twenty towns and villages in the Palatinate.¹ The Elector, who, from his palace at Heidelberg, was a spectator of this calamity, wrote to Turenne upbraiding him with his barbarity and challenging him to single combat; from which Turenne was deterred by the commands of his sovereign. His subsequent campaign in Alsace has been reckoned his masterpiece. By his victory at Enzheim, October 4th, he saved that province from the grasp of the Imperialists; and subsequently, by a combination of the most skilful operations executed in mid-winter, and concluded by the battle of Türkheim, January 5th, 1675, he compelled them totally to evacuate it. The Elector of Brandenburg was forced to separate himself from the allies and march to the relief of his own dominions, which, as will be related in the next chapter, had been occupied by the Swedes. Churchill, afterwards the renowned Duke of Marlborough, served in this campaign under Turenne, as colonel in one of the English regiments in the French service, and learnt some useful lessons in the school of so consummate a master. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, the war had been carried on between the Stadholder and Condé with nearly balanced success. At the bloody battle of Senef, fought on August 11th, neither commander could claim the victory, and nothing of much importance was done during the remainder of the campaign.

In the spring of 1675 the struggle was again resumed on the Rhine between Turenne and Montecuculi, where both generals displayed all the resources of their skill. But the career of Turenne was brought to a close before he could fight any decisive action. He had made all his arrangements for a battle near the pass of Sassbach, in the Duchy of Baden, and was reconnoitring the enemy's position, when he was killed by a cannon-ball, July 27th.² The dejection and despair of the French at the loss of their great commander was uncontrollable. It was followed by their immediate retreat, and Montecuculi was enabled to cross the Rhine and enter Alsace. Condé was now ordered to assume the command in Alsace, as being the only general worthy to

¹ M. Martin asserts, after Du Buisson, *Vie de Turenne*, p. 364 sq. (ed. Cologne, 1687), that these excesses were committed by the *English* companies in the service of France (*Hist. de France*, t. xiii. p. 447). But Turenne himself, in his answer to the Palatine, ascribes them to *his* soldiers.

The memory of that great commander must not, however, be loaded with a crime which he was unable to prevent.

² The shot is said to have been directed by Prince Hermann of Baden, who had recognized Turenne. Basnage, t. ii. p. 616.

succeed Turenne. He contented himself, however, with remaining on the defensive, and succeeded, without fighting a single battle, in holding Montecuculi in check till November, when the Imperialists retired into winter quarters beyond the Rhine. This was the last campaign both of Montecuculi and Condé, who were compelled to retire from service by a more obstinate and irresistible enemy than they had hitherto encountered—the gout.

The fifth year of the war, 1676, was more remarkable for its naval engagements than for those on land. After the peace between England and the United Netherlands, the French, despairing of encountering the Dutch upon the seas on anything like equal terms, had withdrawn into their harbours, and contented themselves with remaining on the defensive. They were induced by a revolution in Sicily to alter this policy. The inhabitants of Messina, exasperated by the oppressions of the Spanish Government, had revolted in the summer of 1674, and invoked the aid of France, which was accorded by Louis. The French made great efforts to retain so important a position as the Straits of Messina; they defeated all the attempts of the Spaniards to regain possession of that city; and even extended their occupation in its neighbourhood. At length, towards the end of December, 1675, a Dutch fleet under De Ruyter, arrived to the assistance of their allies, the Spaniards, and a desperate but indecisive action took place, January 8th, off the Lipari Isles, between the combined fleets and the French under Duquesne. On the 22nd of April, 1676, another engagement was fought near Catania with the same result, except that the death of the gallant De Ruyter might be considered equivalent to a victory. A cannon-ball carried away the left foot and shattered the right leg of the veteran admiral, as he was giving his orders on the quarter-deck. He died of his wounds a few days after at Syracuse.¹ In a third naval action off Palermo, June 2nd, the French gained a complete victory; they now remained masters of the seas, and the allied fleet was compelled to take refuge at Naples.

The campaigns of 1676 and the following year present but little that is remarkable. They were conducted on the part of the French by the Duke of Luxembourg, Marshals Créqui, Schomberg, and D'Estrades, besides Louis XIV. himself, and were, on the whole, in favour of the French. Valenciennes, Cambrai, St. Omer, and Freiburg in the Breisgau were taken. The Stadholder, while hastening to the relief of St. Omer, sustained a

¹ Brandt, *De Ruyter*, p. 688 sqq.

complete defeat at the hands of the Duke of Orleans and Luxembourg, April 11th, 1677. By these conquests the Spanish Netherlands were deprived of nearly all their frontier fortresses. Only Mons and Namur, on the land side, and Ostend and Nieuport on the sea, remained to them; the rest of the towns were incapable of defence. These events could not but have a considerable influence on the negotiations at Nimcguen, where a congress had been assembled under the mediation of the English King. Charles was again become the pensioner of France. Unable to procure any money from his Parliament, he listened to the temptations of Ruvigni, the French ambassador; and in February, 1676, signed a secret treaty, by which, as the price of his neutrality, he consented to accept from Louis a yearly subsidy.¹ This bargain presented a serious obstacle to the scheme of the Prince of Orange to draw Charles into an offensive alliance against France. Although the Dutch, alarmed by the conquests of the French, were very desirous of peace, the fall of Cambrai, the defeat of the Stadholder, and the surrender of St. Omer had a precisely reverse effect in England, and roused a cry for war which Charles had some difficulty to resist. Spain and the Emperor on one side, France on the other, competed with one another to buy the votes of members of Parliament.² The Commons were capricious as well as venal. They pressed the King to declare war against France, yet withheld the means to carry it on. Charles, on his side, got rid of their importunities by repeated adjournments, in consideration of which he obtained from Louis an addition of 200,000*l.* to his pension. Meanwhile the French King was endeavouring to detach the Dutch from their allies, and to effect with them a separate peace; but though the States-General and the Dutch people were inclined to such a course, William was for carrying on the war and adhering to his engagements with the Emperor and Spain; and with this view he resolved to make a closer alliance with England, and, if possible, to draw that Power into the war. He now made proposals for the hand of the Princess Mary, eldest daughter of the Duke of York, which he had declined three years before. His advances were at first received with coldness, but were ultimately accepted, and he was invited into England, though on condition that he should leave the country before the Parliament met. The marriage was arranged

¹ Dalrymple, *Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland*, vol. i. p. 57 and p. 140 sqq.

² See Lingard's *Hist. of England*, vol. ix. ch. 5. The price of a patriot seems then to have been from 300*l.* to 500*l.*

at Newmarket and solemnized in November, 1677. The careless Charles let slip the opportunity of compelling the Prince to accede to his views respecting a peace; but in the conferences which ensued the basis of a treaty was agreed upon. France was to remain *in statu quo* with regard to Spain, and she would thus retain possession of Franche-Comté, besides the places which she had conquered in the Spanish Netherlands, with the exception of Ath, Charleroi, Oudenarde, Courtrai, Tournai, Condé, and Valenciennes; which places were to be restored to Spain in order that they might form a barrier between France and the Dutch Republic. The Duke of Lorraine was to be reinstated in his dominions, and the Dutch and French were mutually to restore their conquests. Thus Holland was to be saved at the expense of Spain.

Charles II. had thus exchanged the character of a mediator for that of an arbiter, and taken upon himself to dictate terms to the monarch whose pay he was receiving. Louis endeavoured to soften these demands, but meanwhile prepared for a winter campaign, and took St. Ghislain. The pride of Charles was offended by these proceedings, and he resorted to some vigorous steps, which surprised the Prince of Orange as well as Louis. He broke his secret compact with France by summoning the Parliament to meet in January, though he had agreed to adjourn it till April; and he followed up this measure by proposing to his nephew an offensive alliance against France. The Stadholder joyfully accepted so unlooked-for a proposal, and on January 10th, 1678, a treaty was signed at the Hague between England and the States-General, with a view to compel France to a peace nearly on the conditions already mentioned.¹ Louis, in alarm, immediately recalled his ships and troops from Sicily, which were now exposed to the risk of being cut off by the English and Dutch fleets; abandoning without remorse the Messinese, whose rebellion he had encouraged, to the fate they might expect at the hands of their Spanish tyrants. He also suspended Charles's pension, though he endeavoured to bribe the English monarch, but without effect, to abandon the demand for Condé, Valenciennes, and Tournai. Encouraged by the exhortations of his brother and his minister Danby, who were for war, Charles displayed for some time an unwonted firmness. He recalled the English regiments in the service of France, made vigorous preparations for war, and, with the permission of the Spaniards,

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 341.

occupied Ostend with a garrison of 3,000 men. The French King was on his side not idle. In the midst of winter he threatened the whole frontier of the Netherlands, from Luxembourg to Ypres; then, suddenly concentrating his forces, he appeared unexpectedly before Ghent, and compelled that town to surrender (March 11th); thus opening up a road into the Dutch territories. Ypres soon after also surrendered. Louis had tampered with the opposition party in the English Parliament; supplies were refused, and Charles found himself drifting into a war with France without the means to carry it on. In these circumstances he again threw himself into the arms of Louis, and concluded with that monarch, May 27th, another secret treaty, by which, in consideration of receiving six million livres, he agreed to withdraw his forces from the Continent, except the garrison in Ostend, unless the States-General accepted within two months the *ultimatum* which Louis had recently offered at Nimeguen as the basis of a general peace. The terms were: the satisfaction of Sweden and her ally the Duke of Holstein Gottorp; the release of Prince Fürstenberg, and his restoration to his estates and dignities; the entire re-establishment of the Peace of Westphalia, the Emperor either restoring Phillipsburg, which he had taken, or ceding Freiburg; the restitution to Spain of Charleroi, Limburg, Binch, Ath, Oudenarde, Courtrai, Ghent, and St. Ghislain, in order to form the barrier desired by the Dutch; Spain, in her turn, ceding Franche-Comté, Valenciennes, Bouchain, Condé, Cambrai, Aire, St. Omer, Ypres, Cassel, and other places in what was afterwards called French Flanders; Maastricht and its dependencies to be restored to the Dutch, who were, however, to make it over to Spain; and lastly, the restoration of the Duchy of Lorraine.¹

A peace was on the point of being concluded on these conditions, when the negotiations were again interrupted, by Louis signifying that he should not restore to Spain the towns in the Netherlands till his ally the King of Sweden had been reinstated in his possessions in Germany which he had lost during the war. This demand produced an immediate reaction in England and Holland. Charles again prepared for war; the English army in Flanders was reinforced, and on the 26th of July a *fresh* treaty was signed between England and the States, by which they engaged to declare war against France, unless Louis should agree to restore to Spain the towns in question, without any reference

¹ Mignet. *Succ. d'Espagne*, t. iv. p. 550.

to the affairs of Sweden, before the 11th of August, on which day the truce between France and the Republic would expire. Louis was extricated from this embarrassment by the Swedes themselves, who declared they should be satisfied if the States-General engaged no longer to assist their enemies; and on the night of August 10th the PEACE OF NIMEGUEN was signed.¹ All that Holland lost in a war which had threatened to annihilate her, were her settlements in Senegal and Guiana, which had been taken by the French. The delay of the French ministers in signing the treaty produced a collision between the Stadholder and the Duke of Luxembourg, by which much blood was needlessly spilt. The Prince of Orange had advanced with his army and his English reinforcements to the relief of Mons, which place had been blockaded by the French since the winter, and was in a state of great distress. On the 14th of August he attacked Luxembourg's army, when a furious and sanguinary battle ensued, which was put an end to only by the night. William protested that he had received no intelligence of the signature of the treaty till the following day; but though it may be true that it was not *officially* notified to him till the 15th, he could hardly have been ignorant of it; and, at all events, he was bound to wait for certain intelligence that the treaty had not been concluded. It may be suspected that he was not unwilling to frustrate the peace; but as the treaty was favourable to France, no notice was taken of the occurrence.²

Spain acceded to the peace, September 17th, by a treaty signed at Nimeguen, on the conditions, with little variation, proposed by Louis in the *ultimatum* already specified.³ The Cabinet of Madrid wished to delay the ratification till the Emperor should also have made his peace; but were compelled by the threats and movements of Louis to ratify the treaty, December 15th. Louis was now in a condition to dictate to the Emperor and his allies almost what terms he pleased, especially as the campaign of 1678 had been unfavourable to the Austrian arms. On the 5th of February, 1679, a treaty was signed between France and the Emperor on the basis of that of Münster. The Duke of Lorraine, now Charles V., was restored to his dominions, but on the most

¹ The treaty is in Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 350. It was in French, which language was now almost generally substituted for Latin in diplomatic transactions. See Garden, *Hist. des Traités*, t. ii.

² On this affair see Basnage, t. ii. p. 941; Temple's *Memoirs (Works)*, vol. ii. p. 456; *Mémoires de Gourville (Coll. Michaud)*, 3^e sér. t. v. p. 575).

³ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 365.

onerous conditions. He was obliged to exchange Nanci and Longwi against Toul, and Louis reserved four military roads through his dominions. The Duke of Lorraine protested against the articles, and rather than accept them became a voluntary exile. The Emperor consented that the King of France should compel the princes of North Germany to make satisfaction to Sweden, and should retain for that purpose a chain of posts in the Rhenish provinces to assure the march of his armies. But to the pacification of Northern Europe we shall return in the next chapter.

The Peace of Nimeguen is the culminating point of Louis XIV.'s glory. But France now became the object of a jealousy excited by the pride of Louis, the pernicious counsels of Louvois, and the natural restlessness of the French people, which, after some time, produced misfortunes that embittered the last days of the French monarch with repentance and regret.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

WE shall now advert to the affairs of the Austrian dominions and of the eastern nations of Europe.

The comparative feebleness into which the Turkish Empire was sunk, as well as its war with Venice, which had been going on since 1645,¹ had for many years relieved Austria from all apprehension of attack from that quarter; but in 1656 the appointment of Mahomet Köprili as Grand Vizier infused more vigour into the counsels of the Porte. The youthful Sultan, Mahomet IV., and the Sultana Valide, allowed Köprili an almost unlimited power; and though that remarkable man was more than seventy years old, and had not performed during his long life any memorable action, yet he discharged his high office during the five years which he held it with distinguished ability and success, and at his death transmitted his power to his son. Under the administration of Mahomet Köprili, the Turks began again to interfere in the affairs of Transylvania (1658). The Voyvode, George Ragotski II., their tributary, having shown symptoms of insubordination, the Porte resolved to set up Barcsai, a creature of its own, in his place, and to increase the yearly tribute from 15,000 ducats to 40,000. Ragotski, after resisting a year or two, was defeated by the Turks in a battle near Klausenburg, in May, 1660, and received a wound of which he died. In the following August the Turks captured Grosswardein, one of the strongest fortresses on the borders of Hungary and Transylvania.

The Cabinet of Vienna, though alarmed by the progress of the Turkish arms, was unwilling to break with the Porte, and had even commanded the Hungarian Count Zrinyi to desist from the attempts at resistance which he had made on his own account. But the progress of events at length compelled the Emperor Leopold to take a direct part in the war. Peter Kemeni having been elected Voyvode of Transylvania under the imperial auspices, and having murdered Barcsai, the Porte caused Michael Apafy to

¹ See above, p. 259.

be elected in place of their nominee. The Viennese Cabinet, after some vain attempts at negotiation, despatched some forces under Montecuculi and Count Stahrenberg into Hungary (1661), but with strict orders not to attack the Turks; and all that Montecuculi effected was to supply Kemeni, who had shut himself up in Klausenburg, with troops and provisions. In the ensuing winter Kemeni made an attempt to seize Apafy at Mediasch; but the Turks having come to Apafy's aid, defeated Kemeni and killed him in his flight.¹

Mahomet Köprili died November 1st, 1661, and was succeeded in his high office by his son Achmet, then thirty years of age. This transmission of power from father to son was a thing unheard of in the Turkish annals, and seemed to recall the reign of the Mayors of the Palace in France during the Merovingian dynasty. The administration of Mahomet Köprili had revived in a remarkable degree the strength of the Ottoman Empire; he had firmly established his power in the Seraglio, and by measures of great severity had reduced the rebellious Spahis and Janissaries to order and obedience. From his first accession to office, Achmet Köprili was resolved on a war with the Emperor; but in order to make the requisite preparations, he encouraged the Imperial Cabinet to negotiate. Leopold refused to recognize Apafy as Voivode of Transylvania, who had abandoned great part of that province to the Turks, and had promised to assist them against the Emperor; but at the same time the Imperial Cabinet, in the vain hope of solving the question by diplomacy, refused all active assistance to Kemeni's brother Peter. Even in the spring of 1663, when Achmet Köprili was pressing forward with a vast army to Buda, the imperial plenipotentiaries were seeking to arrest his march by new negotiations; but the terms he proposed were too arrogant and insulting to be entertained. He demanded an indemnity of 2,000,000 florins for the expense of arming, the evacuation of several fortresses, the renewal of the ancient tribute abolished by the Peace of Sitvatorok, and free passage for the Turkish troops into Dalmatia and other places belonging to the Venetians.

The Cabinet of Vienna began at last to perceive the fatal error it had committed in not providing the means of resistance. To the Turkish army of 200,000 men Montecuculi could oppose but a very small force. The Hungarians themselves could not agree

¹ The chief sources for these affairs are Katona, *Hist. Hungariæ Ducum*; Mém. Engel, *Gesch. des ungarischen Reichs*; de Montecuculi; Wagner, *Hist. Leopoldi*.

as to the means of defence. The Protestant part of that people were even in favour of the Turks, who treated them with politic consideration; while the Imperial Court, under the influence of the Jesuits, displayed towards them nothing but intolerance. Count Forgacz, commandant of Neuhäusel, who had marched out to oppose the Turks, was defeated by them at Parkany; and though he contrived to defend Neuhäusel for six weeks, he was at length compelled to surrender it by capitulation (September 24th, 1663). The fall of Neuhäusel was followed by that of several other fortresses, and it was the common opinion that in the following spring Köprili would appear before Vienna. In spite of all Montecuculi's exertions, a body of 25,000 Turks and Tartars crossed the Waag into Moravia, threatened Nikolsburg, Brünn, and Rabensburg, and penetrated almost to Olmütz, committing in their progress the most horrible barbarities. It was even with some difficulty that Montecuculi succeeded in defending Presburg. Meanwhile a Diet had assembled at Ratisbon; and in December the Emperor went thither in person, to reanimate their deliberations, and urge them to provide an adequate defence against so urgent a danger. The Diet voted on the part of the Empire an army of 42,000 foot and 14,000 horse, to be commanded by the Margrav Leopoldo William of Baden; which, added to the troops of the Austrian hereditary dominions, constituted a force of more than 80,000 men. Louis XIV. supplied from the army of Italy 6,000 men under Count Saligni, as the contingent for Alsace; and Sweden sent 3,500 men, besides the *quota* for the states it held in Germany. The Pope, and the Italian princes and republics, also furnished the Emperor with liberal contributions in money.

Montecuculi was thus enabled to take the field in 1664 with more prospect of success; and though the first operations of the campaign were in favour of the Turks, he at length arrested their progress by the memorable battle at St. Gotthardt (August 1st), a place on the Raab, near the borders of Styria. Montecuculi having given the word "Death or victory," the Christians, contrary to their usual practice, charged without waiting to be attacked; the Turks were routed and thrown into a disorderly flight, in which more than 10,000 of them were slain or drowned in the Raab.¹ But instead of pursuing this advantage, which seemed to open the road to the most extensive conquests, the Imperial Cabinet surprised all Europe by seizing the occasion to

¹ Katona, t. xxxiii. p. 518 sqq.; Montecuculi, *Mémoires*, liv. iii. p. 445 sqq.

make peace with the Porte. On August 10th, only a few days after the victory, a treaty was concluded at Vasvar for a twenty years' truce. The Emperor abandoned to the Turks all their conquests, which included the fortresses of Grosswardein and Neuhäusel; he withdrew his support from the party of Ragotski and Kemeni, thus abandoning Transylvania to Apafy, the nominee of the Porte; and he made the Sultan *a present*—in other words, paid him a tribute—of 200,000 florins.¹ This treaty caused universal dissatisfaction. The Germans complained of the Turks being established at Neuhäusel; a place, they said, which might be seen from the walls of Vienna. The Hungarians exclaimed that their privileges had been violated by the conclusion of the treaty without their knowledge and participation. The Transylvanians said that by the abandonment of Grosswardein, the Turks would be enabled to overrun the whole of their country. Apafy alone was content, who remained in possession of Transylvania on condition of paying the ancient tribute. Yet disgraceful and disadvantageous as this treaty undoubtedly was, Leopold seems to have had some cogent reasons for concluding it. Montecuculi's army was still far inferior to that of the Turks; the Austrian exchequer was empty, nor could the continuance of the services of the contingents voted by the Diet be reckoned upon. Deep jealousies existed between the German and Hungarian commanders, and the latter, who suspected the House of Austria of a project for the entire subjection of Hungary, impeded rather than assisted the operations against the Turks. It may be, too, that Leopold wished to rid himself of the services of the French troops, who had awakened his jealousy by carrying off much of the glory of the battle of St. Gotthardt.

The war which they had been waging so many years with Venice was, on the side of the Turks, a motive for concluding the truce of Vasvar; but its details are uninteresting, and we therefore forbear to relate them. The siege of Candia, the capital of the island of that name, is, however, one of the most remarkable in history, having lasted from May, 1667, till September, 1669. After an attempt to relieve it with a large French force, under the Duke of Navailles, had failed, the garrison was compelled to capitulate, September 6th, and was allowed to march out with all the honours of war, followed by nearly the whole population, two priests, a woman, and three Jews alone remaining behind. A peace was now concluded between Venice and the Porte, and

¹ The treaty is in Katona, t. xxxiii. p. 565 sqq. and Dumont, t. vi. pt. iii. p. 23.

terminated a war in which the Venetians are said to have lost 30,000 men, and the Turks upwards of 118,000.¹

Meanwhile, in Hungary, the discontent caused by the oppressive government and the religious persecutions of the Austrian Cabinet had gone on increasing; but it was not till 1678, when the young Count Emmerich Tekeli placed himself at the head of the malcontents, that these disturbances assumed any formidable importance. Tekeli, who possessed much military talent, and was an uncompromising enemy of the House of Austria, having entered Upper Hungary with 12,000 men, defeated the imperial forces, captured several towns, occupied the whole district of the Carpathian mountains, and compelled the Austrian generals, Counts Wurmb and Leslie, to accept the truce which he offered. The insurgents were encouraged by the Porte, and after the conclusion of the Turkish and Russian war, in 1681, Kara Mustapha, who was now Grand Vizier, determined to assist them openly. In spite of the liberal offers made to Tekeli by the Emperor, that leader entered into a formal treaty with the Porte, and, in conjunction with the Turks, effected several conquests. Leopold now despatched a splendid embassy to Constantinople, in the hope of renewing the treaty of Vasvar, but without avail; the Turks only increased their demands.² In the spring of 1683 Sultan Mahomet marched forth from his capital with a large army, which at Belgrade he transferred to the command of Kara Mustapha. Tekeli formed a junction with the Turks at Essek, and the united armies began their march to Vienna. In vain did Ibrahim, the experienced Pasha of Buda, endeavour to persuade Kara Mustapha first of all to subdue the surrounding country, and to postpone till the following year the attack upon Vienna; his advice was scornfully rejected, and, indeed, the audacity of the Grand Vizier seemed justified by the little resistance he had met with.

At the approach of the Turks the Viennese were seized with a terror amounting almost to despair. Little preparation had been made for defence; 70,000 men was all the force that could be opposed to the Turkish army of 200,000, and a great part even of that number was required to defend the frontier fortresses. On July 7th, when news arrived of the defeat of the Austrian forces at Petronell, Leopold and his court quitted Vienna for Linz and Passau. His departure was the signal for an almost universal flight;

¹ A chief authority for this war is Valiero, *Storia della Guerra di Candia*.

² See for these occurrences Katona, t. xxxiv.

60,000 persons are said to have hurried from Vienna in a single day. Leopold intrusted the defence of his capital, which he thus disgracefully abandoned, to Count Stahremberg, in whom it found an able and valiant defender. It was fortunate for the Emperor, who could get but little aid from the German States, that he had concluded in the preceding March, with John Sobieski, King of Poland, an offensive and defensive alliance against the Turks, with special reference to their besieging either Cracow or Vienna. Under King Michael, who had been elected to the Polish crown in 1669, after the death of John Casimir II., the Poles had been reduced to become tributary to the Porte; but John Sobieski, who occupied the post of general of that crown, defeated the Turks in a battle near Choczim, and in 1673, after the decease of Michael, he was elected King of Poland. Sobieski had not been able to remedy the internal evils of that country arising from the Swedish war and the defection of the Cossacks of the Ukraine, as well as from the vicious constitution of the kingdom; but his personal qualities and warlike renown had enhanced the reputation of Poland. The Emperor Leopold and Louis XIV. contended for his alliance. Sobieski persuaded the senate to choose the former, and the treaty alluded to was concluded, March 31st, 1683.¹ In the peace which he had made with the Turks in 1676, Sobieski had been compelled to leave them in possession of Podolia and a great part of the Ukraine, provinces which he would willingly recover; nor could he behold without concern their attempts upon Hungary and Austria. At one time Vienna seemed beyond the reach of human aid. The Turks sat down before it on July 14th, and such were their numbers that their encampment is said to have contained more than 100,000 tents. It was the middle of August before John Sobieski could leave Cracow with 25,000 men, and by the end of that month the situation of Vienna had become extremely critical. Provisions and ammunition began to fail; the garrison had lost 6,000 men, and numbers died every day by pestilence or at the hands of the enemy. It was not till September 9th that Sobieski and his Poles formed a junction, on the plain of Tulln, with the Austrian forces under the Duke of Lorraine, and the other German contingents under the Electors John George of Saxony, Max Emanuel of Bavaria, and the Prince of Waldeck, when the united army was found to amount to upwards of 83,000 men, with 186 pieces of artillery. On September 11th, the allies

¹ The treaty is in Katona, t. xxxv. p. 15 sqq.

reached the heights of Kahlenberg, within sight of Vienna, and announced their arrival to the beleaguered citizens by means of rockets. On the following day the Turks were attacked, and after a few hours' resistance completely routed. Kara Mustapha, who in vain attempted to rally them, was himself carried off in the stream of fugitives, whose disorderly flight was only arrested by the Raab. The Turkish camp, with vast treasures in money, jewels, horses, arms, and ammunition, became the spoil of the victors.

Count Stahrenberg received John Sobieski in the magnificent tent of the Grand Vizier, and greeted him as a deliverer. The different commanders then entered Vienna, and in St. Stephen's Church gave thanks for their deliverance, when the preacher chose for his text, "There was a man sent by God whose name was John." The Emperor Leopold, who returned to Vienna on September 14th, instead of showing any gratitude to the commanders who had rescued his capital, received them with the haughty and repulsive coldness prescribed by the etiquette of the Imperial Court. Sobieski nevertheless continued his services by pursuing the retreating Turks. Worsted by them at Parkany on October 7th, he inflicted on them on the 9th, with the aid of the Duke of Lorraine, a signal defeat, in which 15,000 of them are said to have been slaughtered or drowned; and he terminated the campaign with the capture of Gran (October 27th), which place had been almost a century and a half in the hands of the Turks. The Sultan, enraged at these misfortunes, caused Kara Mustapha to be beheaded at Belgrade.¹

In the following year, 1684, the King of Poland, having returned to his dominions, the war against the Turks was pursued by the Duke of Lorraine, who, after capturing Wissegrad, Waitzen, and Pesth, sat down before Buda, July 14th. This place, however, was defended with the greatest obstinacy, and as the Imperial army was decimated by disease, the Duke of Lorraine was desirous of raising the siege at the beginning of October; but it was fruitlessly prolonged, by orders from Vienna, till the 29th of that month. It had cost the assailants 23,000 men. It was this year that a league against the Turks, under the protection of the Pope, and therefore called the HOLY LEAGUE, was formed by the Emperor, the King of Poland, and the Republic of Venice. The Venetians were induced to join it by the hope of recovering their former

¹ His head was found at the capture of 1698, and is still preserved in the city arsenal of Vienna.

possessions, and declared war against the Sultan, Mahomet IV., July 15th. The war which ensued, called the *Holy War*, lasted till the Peace of Carlowitz, in 1699. Venice in this war put forth a strength little expected from that declining State. Many thousand Germans were enrolled in her army, commanded by Morosini, and by Count Königsmark, a Swede.

The Austrians pursued the campaign in Hungary with success, in 1685. The Ottoman army was defeated at Gran, and Neu-häusel was shortly after recovered (August 19th), the northernmost place held by the Turks. In Upper Hungary, Eperies, Tokay, Kaschau, and several other places were also retaken. The Grand Vizier Ibrahim was so enraged at these reverses that he caused Tekeli, whom he regarded as the cause of them, to be carried in chains to Adrianople. But Ibrahim being dismissed from office the same year, Tekeli recovered his liberty. The following year (1686) was signalized by the taking of Buda by the Duke of Lorraine, which was carried by assault, September 2nd, after a siege of more than three months. Buda, the capital of Hungary, had been during 145 years in the hands of the Turks. Another campaign sufficed to wrest almost all Hungary from the Porte. The Austrians under the Duke of Lorraine having been joined by the Elector of Bavaria with a large force from the German States, completely defeated the Turks in the battle of Mohács, the scene of the former triumph of the Ottoman arms (August 12th). The Duke of Lorraine followed up this success by reducing all Transylvania, while Sclavonia was reconquered by General Dünewald, one of his officers. The chief places in Upper Hungary, including Erlau and Munkacz, were also taken, and Tekeli's wife and her two children captured and sent prisoners to Vienna. Thus, before the end of 1687, the whole of Hungary, except a few scattered places, was recovered by Austria. Michael Apafy, however, was left in possession of Transylvania, but on condition of admitting Austrian garrisons into the principal towns, and paying a contribution of 700,000 florins.¹ In October, Leopold summoned an assembly of the Hungarian States at Pressburg, and proposed to them to incorporate in the kingdom of Hungary all his recent conquests over the Turks, to confirm the ancient privileges of the nation, and to grant to the Protestants the free exercise of their religion, on the following conditions: 1. The abrogation of the law passed in the reign of King Andrew II. (1222), by which a clause was inserted in the oath

¹ Katona, t. xxxv. p. 393 sqq.

of fidelity taken to the King, enabling any nobleman to take up arms against him, in case he should be of opinion that the King had violated his coronation oath; 2. That as a reward for delivering Hungary from the Turks, the crown should be made hereditary in the heirs male of the House of Austria; 3. That imperial garrisons should be admitted into all the fortresses of the kingdom. The Hungarian Diet having consented to these conditions, which were in fact an abolition of their ancient constitution, the Archduke Joseph, the Emperor's eldest son, was crowned King of Hungary by the archbishop of Gran, December 9th, 1687.

While the war in Hungary had been conducted by the Emperor with such eminent success, the King of Poland had made only some fruitless attempts upon Moldavia. The Czar of Muscovy, Ivan Alexiowitsch who, after settling some disputes about boundaries with the King of Poland, had joined the Holy League in 1686, did not fare much better. All the attempts of the Russians to penetrate into the Crimea were frustrated by the Tartars. The Venetians, on the other hand, had made some splendid conquests. St. Maura, Koron, the mountain tract of Maina, Navarino, Modon, Argos, Napoli di Romania, fell successively into their hands. The year 1687 especially was almost as fatal to the Turks in their war with Venice, as in that with Hungary.* In this year the Venetians took Patras, Lepanto, all the northern coast of the Morea, Corinth, and Athens. Athens had been abandoned with the exception of the acropolis, or citadel; and it was in this siege that one of the Venetian bombs fell into the Parthenon, which had been converted by the Turks into a powder magazine, and destroyed the greater part of that magnificent relic of classical antiquity.¹ The acropolis surrendered September 29th. The fall of Athens, added to the disastrous news from Hungary, filled Constantinople with consternation. After the defeat of Mohács, the Turkish army had retired in a state of mutiny to Belgrade. The Grand Vizier Solyman was unpopular with the Janissaries and Spahis on account of the stricter discipline, which he had endeavoured to introduce among that licentious soldiery; and his disastrous defeat at Mohács afforded them a pretext to get rid of him. They elected in his stead Siawusch* Pasha, governor of Aleppo, and sent envoys to Constantinople to demand the dismissal of Solyman, who had fled to that capital. The Sultan was weak enough even to outstrip

¹ An account of this siege will be found in Dyer's *Athens*, chap. xi.

these demands, by sending to the mutineers the head of the obnoxious Vizier, and the seal of the empire for Siawusch. Not content, however, with these concessions, the army marched to Adrianople, and demanded the deposition of the Sultan himself, in favour of his brother, Solyman. Their demands were seconded by a large party in the metropolis; the *Utema* assembled in the mosque of St. Sophia, at Constantinople (November 8th, 1687), and having sanctioned the demands of the troops, Solyman II. was saluted as Padischah in place of his brother. Mahomet, IV. was thrown into prison, where he died disregarded five years afterwards.

This revolution had scarcely been completed, when Siawusch entered Constantinople at the head of the rebellious troops. The Janissaries and Spahis now became more turbulent than before. They demanded that the usual donation on the accession of a new Sultan should be increased, and that all such ministers and placemen as they disapproved of should be banished. Some of the viziers having attempted to resist their demands, a dreadful riot ensued; the palaces of all the ministers were stormed, plundered, and burnt; and even the Grand Vizier Siawusch himself fell by the hands of those who had elected him. The Janissaries and Spahis were only at last controlled by the people rising against them (February, 1688), and peace was gradually restored. The aged Ismael Pasha was now intrusted with the seal of the empire, and with the conduct of a war which seemed to threaten the Osmanli Empire in Europe with destruction. For the campaign of 1688 was still more disastrous to the Turks than the preceding one. The Imperialists, under the Elector of Bavaria, took Belgrade, while another division under the Margrave Louis of Baden overran great part of Bosnia.

Humbled by these reverses, the Porte, for the first time, began to make proposals for a peace, and was disposed to make very ample concessions. The Duke of Lorraine, who was now appointed to the command of the Imperial army against the French, pressed the Cabinet of Vienna to listen to these offers, and to put an end to the war in Hungary, in order to concentrate all the forces of the empire upon the Rhine. The Margrave of Baden, on the contrary, who succeeded the Duke of Lorraine in the command of the Austrian army in Hungary, pressed for the continuance of the war against the Turks, and represented that all the advantages to be expected from it would be enjoyed by the House of Austria, which, on the other hand, was but little interested in the war with

France. The advice of these two princes was not, perhaps, uninfluenced by motives of self-interest. The Margrave was gathering easy laurels in the Turkish war; and the Duke of Lorraine, in pressing that with France, had probably a view to the recovery of his patrimonial dominions. The Emperor himself, elated by his successes against the Turks, was inclined to listen to the Margrave; he dreamt of nothing less than putting an end to the Turkish empire in Europe, and effecting the union of the Greek and Latin Churches. The war, therefore, went on, and the result of the campaign of 1689 seemed to justify the advice of the Margrave Louis. That commander, carrying the war from Bosnia into Servia, inflicted several severe defeats upon the Turks, occupied the passes of the Balkan from the borders of Roumelia to the Herzegovina, and captured all the fortresses on the Danube from Widdin to Nicopolis, so that he was enabled to take up his winter quarters in Wallachia. The Turks, however, after the rejection of their proposals, prepared to recover their losses. Mustapha Köprili, who had now been appointed Grand Vizier, infused more vigour into the government; and with the assistance of Tekeli, who, after the death of Michael Apafy in April, 1690, had been made Prince of Transylvania, the Turks this year recovered almost all that they had previously lost. Belgrade was retaken, to the great alarm of the Viennese; and even in the winter time Turkish divisions pushed on to Temesvar, Grosswardein, and even into Transylvania. But in 1691, the Margrave Louis, though he had only about 45,000 men to oppose to more than double that number of Turks, completely defeated them at Salankemen, August 19th; in which battle Mustapha Köprili was slain. The victory, however, had not the important consequences which might have been anticipated, and the next four or five years are barren of great events. They were, however, marked by a frequent change of Sultans. Solyman II. died in June, 1691, and was succeeded by his brother, Achmet II., who in February, 1695, in turn gave place to Mustapha II. Mustapha was an energetic prince, and having determined to put himself at the head of his armies, he crossed the Danube, captured several places, and in 1696 defeated the Imperialists at Bega.

The death of John Sobieski, King of Poland, in that year had indirectly an important effect on the war in Hungary. In order to withdraw Poland from Austrian influence, Louis XIV. strained every nerve to obtain the crown of that kingdom for his cousin, the Prince of Conti. The Emperor Leopold, on the other hand,

unwilling to have a French prince for his neighbour, incited Augustus of Saxony, surnamed the Strong, to become a candidate for the vacant dignity ; and his cause was espoused by the Pope, the Jesuits, the Czar of Russia, and the Elector of Brandenburg. The last-named prince, always subservient to Austrian policy, had an additional motive in the promise of Augustus to recognize the royal title which he contemplated assuming. As a candidate for the Polish crown, to which none but a Roman Catholic was eligible, Augustus was obliged to change his religion ; with him, however, a matter of no great difficulty ; for though the hereditary head of the Lutheran Confession, Augustus had, in fact, little religion of any kind. He made his confession of the Roman Catholic faith, and purchased his election with his own money and that of the Emperor. The Prince of Conti was indeed chosen by a majority at Warsaw, June 27th, 1697 ; but the minority proclaimed Augustus, who, hastening into the kingdom with his Saxon troops, was crowned at Cracow, September 15th.¹

The acceptance of the Polish crown obliged Augustus to resign the command of the Imperial army, which he had conducted without much ability or success. His retirement made room for one of the greatest generals of the age. Prince Eugene of Savoy, descended from a younger branch of the House of Savoy, was by his mother, Olimpia Mancini, a great nephew of Cardinal Mazarin. Noted during the early years of Louis XIV. for her intriguing and lively temper, Olimpia had in 1680 become implicated in some suspicion of poisoning, and Louis, as an act of grace, permitted her to leave France. Her disgrace fell upon her family. Eugene, her youngest son, who from being first destined for the Church, was called the Abbé of Savoy, having demanded a commission in the army, was refused by the King. This refusal was afterwards to cost Louis dear. Eugene offered his sword to the Emperor, and in the battle of Zenta on the Theiss, September 11th, 1697, he inflicted on the Turks a signal defeat.² The Grand Vizier Mustapha Köprili was slain in this battle. Eugene could not follow up his victory, except by a short incursion into Bosnia ; but it may be said to have been one of the principal causes of the peace which soon afterwards ensued. To this, however, the successes of the Venetians and Russians also contributed, to which we must briefly advert.

By the capture of Malvasia in 1690, the Venetians completed

¹ As King of Poland he was Augustus II. ; as Elector of Saxony, Augustus I.

² See D'Artanville, *Mém. du prince Eugène*, t. ii. p. 98 sqq.

the conquest of the Morea. The Isle of Chios, taken in 1694, was again lost the following year; but in Dalmatia and Albania the Venetian Republic made many permanent conquests, from the mountains of Montenegro to the borders of Croatia and the banks of the Unna. The operations of the Poles in the Turkish war were insignificant; but in July, 1696, the Russians, under the Czar Peter,¹ after many long and fruitless attempts, at length succeeded in taking Azov, at the mouth of the Don; a most important conquest as securing for them the entry into the Black Sea. It was the fall of this place, combined with the defeat at Zenta, that chiefly induced the Porte to enter into negotiations for a peace; which England and Holland had been long endeavouring to bring about, but which France, on the other hand, did everything in her power to prevent. Conferences were at length opened at Carlowitz, near Peterwardein, in October, 1698; and on January 26th, 1699, treaties were signed between the Porte on one side and the Emperor, the King of Poland, and the Republic of Venice on the other. By the treaty with the Emperor the Porte ceded all Hungary (except the Banat of Tamesvar), Transylvania, the greater part of Slavonia, and Croatia as far as the Unna. The armistice was to last twenty-five years—for the Turks never made what was called a perpetual peace—subject to prolongation.² Poland obtained by her treaty, Kameniek, Podolia, and the Ukraine. To Venice were ceded the Morea, the Isles of St. Maura and Egina, and several fortresses in Dalmatia. Count Tokeli was totally disregarded in these treaties. He had lived since 1695 in a remote quarter of Constantinople on a small pension allowed him by the Sultan. He was afterwards banished to Nicomedia, where he died in 1704. The negotiations between Russia and the Porte were long protracted, as the latter was very loth to part with Azov. A Russian ship of war of thirty-six guns, built at that port and commanded by a Dutch captain, which arrived at Constantinople in the summer of 1699, opened the eyes of the Turks to the consequences of their loss, and made them fear a less civil visit if hostilities should again break out. Nevertheless; in July, 1702, a treaty was at length concluded, by which Azov, with about eighty miles of territory, was ceded to the Czar, who converted it into a most formidable fortress.

Such was the end of the Holy War. We now pass on to the

¹ Peter had assumed the government in 1689, while his brother Ivan was still living. We shall return to this subject in Chapter XLII.

² Katona, t. xxxvi. p. 106 sqq.

affairs of Sweden and the North, after mentioning the only occurrence of any moment at this period in the affairs of Germany as a confederate body. This was the erection by the Emperor of a ninth electorate, that of Hanover in 1692, in favour of Duke Ernest Augustus of Hanover. The terms, however, on which it was granted were such as made the new Elector a mere satellite of the Imperial House. In return for the electoral hat and the office of archbanneret of the Holy Roman Empire, the new elector was to place 6,000 men, over and above his ordinary contingent, at the service of the Emperor so long as the war in Hungary and Germany should last, and to pay during the same time a subsidy of 500,000 crowns; if the King of Spain should die without issue, he was to employ all his forces to procure the throne of that kingdom for an Austrian archduke; he was to use all his credit and influence to re-establish the King of Bohemia in the exercise of all the rights, privileges, and prerogatives enjoyed by the other electors;¹ he was to engage for himself, his heirs, and successors in perpetuity, that they should never give their electoral suffrage in the election of future Emperors and Kings of the Romans except in favour of the eldest archdukes of the House of Austria; that he should act in concert with the Imperial Court in all the assemblies of the Empire; and that he should accord to the Catholics the public exercise of their religion in Hanover and Zell.² The new elector, however, did not obtain his title without great opposition. The electors of Trèves, Cologne, and the Palatine protested against it, as well as many princes of the Duke of Hanover's own religious persuasion, and among them his cousin, Anthony Ulrich, of Wolfenbüttel, the head of the House of Brunswick, out of jealousy at seeing his kinsman thus preferred before him. In the following year the Dukes of Saxe Gotha, Saxe Coburg, Brunswick, Wolfenbüttel, and Mecklenburg, the King of Denmark as Duke of Holstein-Glückstadt, the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, the Margraves of Brandenburg Culmbach (or Baireuth), and Baden Baden, the Bishops of Münster, Bamberg, and Eichstädt,

¹ The Kings of Bohemia had lost, by disuse, their electoral privileges, especially those of sitting in the assemblies of the Electoral College, and of assenting to the imperial capitulations drawn up in the electoral diets. This had arisen either through their neglecting privileges which seemed to fortify their dependence on the empire; or through their being deprived

of them by a wrongful interpretation of the letters patent of the Emperor Frederick II., granting to the kings of Bohemia, as matter of grace and favour, a dispensation from attending all diets except those held at Bamberg or Nuremberg. Pfeffel, t. ii. p. 473.

² Lünig, *Reichs Archiv*. Pars spec. t. v. p. 167 sqq. Menzel, B. iv. S. 495.

formed a League at Ratisbon, under the name of the *Correspondent Princes*, to oppose the designs of the Imperial Court, and declared the investiture of the new Elector to be null and void. This did not prevent Duke Ernest from making use of his new title, though the full and recognized possession of the electoral dignity was only at length obtained by Ernest Augustus's son, George Louis. The most important part of this transaction with regard to the general affairs of Europe was, that it afforded Louis XIV. an opportunity of again intervening in the affairs of the empire, and forming a French party in Germany. The protesting princes required the diplomatic intervention of France, as guarantee of the Treaty of Westphalia, of which they represented the Emperor's proceedings to be a breach; and Louis entered a protest against them at the Diet of Ratisbon.

We now revert to the history of the Scandinavian kingdoms since the Peace of Copenhagen in 1660, which we have recorded in Chapter XXXVI. The events of the war with Sweden, and the exhausted state in which Denmark had been left by the struggle, showed the indispensable necessity for some alteration in the Danish constitution. Her misfortunes might be traced chiefly to the oligarchy of nobles, who administered the finances and diverted them to their own purposes. The freedom of that order from taxes, and the other privileges and immunities which they enjoyed, were also highly detrimental to the State. The jealousy and hatred of this privileged class had been enhanced by its conduct in the war. During the siege of Copenhagen the nobles had displayed the greatest indifference, and had sheltered themselves under their privileges from taking any part in its defence; which the King had been obliged to conduct with the assistance of the citizens, the students, and the mercenary troops. It was natural enough, therefore, at the end of the war, to think of using this army in order to compel the nobles to relinquish their pernicious immunities. Already in 1658, after the rupture of the Peace of Roskild, Frederick had gained the affections of the burgher class by granting them some extraordinary privileges. Every citizen who distinguished himself by his courage was to be ennobled; every serf who enrolled himself as a soldier was to earn the freedom of himself and his children. The right of staple was conferred on Copenhagen; it was made a free city and one of the States of the kingdom, with a voice in public affairs; the citizens were empowered to buy the lands of nobles, and were placed on a like

footing with them with regard to tolls and taxes, the quartering of troops, the accession to public offices, and the like.

The Queen of Denmark,¹ who had distinguished herself by her intrepidity during the war, and who was as enterprising and intriguing as Frederick was mild and gentle, took a more active part than the King in bringing about the revolution which was to overthrow the oligarchical party. It was necessary that so fundamental a change should be effected by the body of the nation; and in spite of the opposition of the Council and the nobles, a general assembly of the States was opened at Copenhagen, September 10th, 1660. It consisted of three Chambers: the first composed of the members of the Council and landed proprietors of noble birth; the second of bishops and delegates from the clergy; the third of deputies from the commercial towns. A proposal for raising a tax to meet the debts and burdens of the nation was the signal for contention. The nobles wished to preserve their ancient immunity from taxation; but the two other Chambers declared that they would consent to the tax proposed, only on condition that it should be paid by every Dane without distinction. Conferences now followed between the Chambers, in which the nobles, and especially the High Chamberlain, Otto Krag, made matters worse by their pride and insolence. The clergy and citizens, instead of appealing to the Council, as they had hitherto done, now applied directly to the King, and made propositions wholly incompatible with the existence of the nobility: and especially they required that the domains and revenues of the crown, hitherto entirely at the disposal of that order, should henceforth be leased to the highest bidders. The nobles denounced this proposition as an attack upon their property, and a violation of the 46th article of the Capitulation; signed by the King on his election, which secured to them the exclusive possession of the royal fiefs. As the King naturally felt reluctant to annul the Capitulation to which he had sworn, a plan was adopted to obviate this difficulty. Suane, Bishop of Zealand, Nansen, Burgomaster of Copenhagen, together with Marshal Schack, the commandant of the city, Hannibal Sehestädt, formerly Viceroy of Norway, and other creatures of the Queen, placed a guard at the gates of the city, which nobody was permitted to leave without a passport from the Burgomaster. The nobles thus shut up, and having no means of resistance, found themselves compelled, after much delay and reluctance, to agree to a resolution passed by the other two

¹ Sophia Amelia, a Hanoverian princess. •

estates, declaring the crown hereditary both in the King's male and female issue.

By this change from an elective into an hereditary monarchy, the Capitulation fell of itself to the ground, and it therefore became necessary to found a new constitution; a task which was intrusted to eight members of the Council and Upper Chamber, and twelve members of the clergy and commons. It was agreed that the Capitulation should be given back into the King's hands; and on the 18th October it was solemnly destroyed with great pomp and ceremony, and on the same day an oath of homage was taken to Frederick, containing only the usual general and empty promises. On the following day the Council was dissolved; a new ministry was installed, and the administration was intrusted to certain colleges, or *bureaux*, the members of which could be appointed or dismissed at the King's pleasure. The establishment of this autocracy, as absolute as that of the Sultan, rested ostensibly on the consent of the people. The new constitution was submitted for signature to the clergy, to all landed proprietors and municipal magistrates, but its maintenance was secured by a standing army of 24,000 men. The despotic power thus intrusted to the King was, however, seldom abused, and proved much more advantageous to the kingdom than the previous irresponsible oligarchy. The new constitution was embodied by Peter Schuhmacher, a German jurist, in the celebrated *Kongelov* (*Lex Regia* or Royal Law); which established the unlimited power of the King, and the order of succession to the crown. Schuhmacher also made several changes regarding the nobles, which finally resulted in the extinction of the ancient houses. He introduced the German distinction of a higher and lower nobility, and created by royal letters patent Barons, Counts, &c., titles never before heard of in Denmark.

In Sweden, on the contrary, the consequences of the war increased the power of the nobles. By calling a national assembly (1660) that order found means to overthrow the Regency which Charles X. had appointed by his will during the minority of his son Charles XI., and to establish a government consisting of the Queen-Mother, Peter Brahe, the Lord High Constable, Charles Gustavus Wrangel, High Admiral, Count Magnus de la Gardie, High Chancellor, and Gustavus Bonde, Treasurer. As the Queen had no political influence, this oligarchy, with their relatives and dependents, administered, or rather abused for their own purposes, during the minority of Charles XI., the royal domains and national

revenues; a state of things, however, which ultimately produced that counter-revolution in favour of the kingly power which we shall have to relate in the sequel.

For several years after the Peace of Copenhagen the annals of the Scandinavian kingdoms present little worth relating. In the war which broke out between England and the United Netherlands in 1665, Sweden concluded an alliance with England, but afforded her no substantial assistance; whilst Denmark made a treaty with the Dutch, and engaged to exclude British ships from the Baltic, so long as the war should continue. During the War of Devolution, Sweden, as we have seen, abandoned France, her ancient ally, and joined the Maritime Powers in the Triple Alliance which produced the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. But this deviation from her usual policy was only temporary, and in 1672 she entered into a treaty with Louis XIV. to support him in his war against the Dutch, as we have before related.¹ It was this treaty that disturbed the peace of Northern Europe by lighting up a war between Sweden and the Elector of Brandenburg, in which Denmark also ultimately took part; the origin of which we shall now proceed to relate.

The Elector of Brandenburg, after forming in July, 1674, the alliance with the Emperor, the Dutch States, and Spain, recorded in the preceding chapter,² had proceeded in October to join the Imperial army on the Rhine, then commanded by the Duke of Bournonville. But the dilatory proceedings of that commander awakened the same suspicions which Frederick William had before conceived of the sincerity of Montecuculi. As these suspicions were strengthened by Bournonville's retreat over the Rhine after his battle with Turenne at Türkheim (January 5th, 1675), in which the French had suffered more than the Germans,³ the Elector separated from his allies, and took up his winter quarters in Franconia. Meantime his own dominions had been invaded by the Swedes. After the treaty of Vossem, Frederick William being still uneasy respecting the intentions of Louis XIV., who had neglected to pay him the money stipulated in the treaty, had endeavoured to form with Sweden a third party, in order to impose a peace upon the belligerents; and with this view he had renewed for ten years his ancient alliance with that Power (December 1st, 1673). By a secret article it was agreed that if they should fail in establishing a peace, either Power should be free to

¹ Above, p. 360.

² Above, p. 371.

³ Puffendorf, *Frid. Will.* lib. xii. 48 sqq.

engage in the war, but not without first informing the other of his intentions;¹ yet the Elector had entered into the alliance against France without giving notice to the Swedish Government—a step, indeed, which he excused by pleading that, as war had been declared by the Empire, he was bound *ipso facto* to take up arms, and had provided for such a contingency in the treaty of Vossem;² nor would he arrest his march towards the Rhine in the autumn of 1674, although the Swedes sent a special ambassador to persuade him to maintain a neutral position, in conformity with the treaty between them. The French now declared that they would pay the Swedes no more subsidies unless they compelled the Elector to withdraw his troops from the allies. The young King Charles XI. having in vain endeavoured to divert Frederick William from his purpose,³ the Swedes, under Field-Marshal Charles Gustavus Wrangel, prepared to enter the March of Brandenburg; and even as this step did not induce the Elector to return, Wrangel gave notice that he should be obliged to take up his winter quarters in the March, which was accordingly done. The Swedes behaved at first in a quiet, orderly manner, but by degrees they began to levy contributions, to raise troops, and to fortify themselves in defensive positions. At length, incited by the French, they proceeded to acts of open violence and hostility. They forcibly seized several small towns, and allowed their troops every licence of plunder and outrage. The Elector bore all this very quietly; nay, he probably rejoiced that the conduct of the Swedes might offer him an opportunity to regain that part of Pomerania which he had been formerly compelled to relinquish. Dissembling the injury he had received, he sounded the disposition of his allies, but found small hopes of succour. The Emperor and the princes of the Empire, jealous of the Elector and of one another, stood aloof. The King of Denmark, though by the Treaty of the Hague, July 10th, 1674, he had engaged to employ an army of 16,000 men against those who should take part with the enemies of the allies,⁴ yet, being desirous, it is said, of marrying his sister to Charles XI., excused himself from not declaring openly against that monarch. The States-General alone, after much persuasion, and when the Elector's troops were already in motion, declared war against Charles XI., unless he evacuated the March.⁵ •

¹ *Ibid.* §§ 13-19.

² Above, p. 309.

³ Stenzel. *Gesch. des preuss. Staats*, Th. ii. S. 338. On the whole matter, see

Temple's *Memoirs (Works)*, vol. ii. p. 283 sqq. ed. 1757).

⁴ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 269.

⁵ Puffendorf, lib. xiii. § 23 sqq.

Frederick William was thus reduced to rely upon his own efforts. Early in June, 1675, he led his army, increased by new levies to 15,000 men, through the Thuringian forest towards Magdeburg, which he reached on the 21st. By a rapid march, the Swedes cantoned on the right bank of the Havel, carelessly secure and ignorant of the approach of an enemy, were surprised and beaten at Rathenow (June 25th). A few days after (28th), the Elector gained a decisive victory at FEHRBELLIN over the main body of the Swedish army. This affair, which gave the Elector a place among the great captains of the age, was the more honourable to the Brandenburgers as the first general engagement which they had ever fought and won *proprio Marte*, and that too with smaller numbers, over some of the best troops of the North. The Swedes were in consequence compelled hastily to evacuate the electoral dominions.

The victory of Fehrbellin induced the King of Denmark to declare himself. Frederick III. had died in 1670, and the throne was now filled by his son Christian V. Christian, like his father, was at first guided by the counsels of Schuhmacher, who had been elevated to the new nobility which he had created, with the title of Count Greifencfeld. The first act of the Danish King was directed against his relative and neighbour, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, who was suspected of having formed an alliance with Charles XI. Questions respecting the division of the revenues of Sleswick, the bishopric of Lübeck, and, more recently, the succession of the last Count of Oldenburg, to whom both the Duke of Holstein and the King of Denmark were related, supplied materials for dissension. If Christian should be involved in a war with the Swedes, the Duke of Holstein, who was connected with Charles XI. both by treaties and kinship, might prove a very troublesome neighbour, and Christian therefore resolved to secure him. This was effected in the most treacherous manner. The Queen Dowager of Denmark enticed her daughter, the Duchess of Holstein, to Copenhagen, while the King invited the Duke Christian Albert to an interview at Rendsborg. Here he was arrested, and, after five days' confinement, compelled to sign the Convention of Rendsborg (July 10th, 1675), by which, among other things, he consented to receive a Danish garrison in Gottorp, Tonningen, and Stapelholm, to transfer the troops of Holstein to the Danish service, to restore everything to the footing on which it stood before the year 1658; and to renounce the sovereignty of Sleswick and the Isle of Fehmern, with which he

had been invested by Frederick III.¹ The Duke, after signing this convention, escaped to Hamburg, where he signed a protest against its stipulations.

The King of Denmark now put himself at the head of his army; and in September he had an interview with the Elector of Brandenburg at Gadebusch, which led to the secret Treaty of Dobran (October 5th).² The contracting parties agreed to carry on the war against the King of Sweden till he should be compelled either to pay its expenses or to restore to Denmark Schonen, Halland, and Blekingen, to renounce the freedom of the Sound, and to abandon what he held in Pomerania to the Elector of Brandenburg; who, on his side, engaged to give up Wismar and the Isle of Rügen to the Danish King. The war now began by land and water, on which latter element the allies were supported by a small Dutch fleet. Frederick William, entering Swedish Pomerania, surprised the Isle of Wollin and took Wolgast by capitulation (November 9th); while the King of Denmark occupied Rostock and Damgarten and laid siege to Wismar, which surrendered December 15th. At the same time a Danish corps joined the allied army, under the Bishop of Münster, in the Duchy of Bremen, and the united forces occupied several places in that district; which, as already related, had been assigned to Sweden at the Peace of Westphalia. The Bishop of Münster, the Dukes of Lüneburg, Zell, and Wolfenbüttel, the Elector of Brandenburg, and the King of Denmark had formed an alliance to eject the Swedes from Bremen and Verden, though ill agreed among themselves as to the division of the booty.

The war with Sweden had been undertaken much against the will of the Queen Dowager of Denmark, whose daughter, Ulrica Eleonora, had been united to Charles XI. in the summer of 1675. That young monarch, who was desirous of acquiring a military reputation, for which, however, he had no great talent, placed himself at the head of his army in 1676; and as he threatened to invade Zealand, Christian V. withdrew his troops from Pomerania and posted them in an intrenched camp near Kronenborg. The Danish admiral, Niels Juel, in conjunction with the Dutch fleet, seized the Island of Gothland; and Tromp, being named by Christian V. Admiral of Denmark, inflicted a terrible defeat on the Swedish fleet near Entholm on the coast of Blekingen (June

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 296.

² There is an extract of this treaty in

Puffendorf, *De Rebus Gest. Frid. Wilh.* lib. xiii. § 43, p. 1010.

11th). In the same month Christian, at the head of 15,000 men, made a descent on Scania (or Schonen); but, being defeated at Halmstadt, was prevented from penetrating further into Sweden. In December a bloody battle was fought between the two kings near Lunden, the ancient capital of Schonen. Both parties claimed the victory, but the substantial success remained with the Swedes, as the King of Denmark was for a long time disabled from attempting any further enterprise. Meanwhile the Elector of Brandenburg had taken several places in Pomerania, while in the Duchy of Bremen the allies had captured Stade, the last place which held out for the Swedes. As the Bishop of Münster and the Dukes of Lüneburg now manifested a desire to hold the Duchy of Bremen for themselves, Christian V. and Frederick William concluded a new and still closer alliance, December 23rd, 1676. By secret articles, the Elector guaranteed the Convention of Rendsborg, and engaged that the King of Denmark should obtain at least a fifth part of the territories of Bremen and Verden; while Christian, on his side, undertook that the Elector should receive satisfaction in those districts, in case he did not obtain it in Pomerania. Both pledged themselves not to surrender at a general peace the conquests which they had wrested from Sweden; and Christian promised to stand by the Elector in case he should be precipitated into a war with Poland.¹

In the campaign of 1677, the Swedes had on the whole the advantage on land, and especially in the battle of Lanscrona (July 14th) Charles XI. inflicted a severe defeat on Christian V.; but, on the other hand, the Danes were victorious at sea. In June, Admiral Juel defeated the Swedish fleet off Rostock; and in the following month he gained a still more decisive victory over Admiral Horn in the Bay of Kiøge, when he took or sunk eleven ships of the line. The King of Denmark concluded the campaign by taking possession of the Island of Rügen, which, however, was again lost and recovered. The chief exploit of the Elector of Brandenburg was the capture, after a six months' siege, of Stettin (December 26th), the constant object of his ambition.

During the year 1678 the marked superiority of the Danish fleet compelled the Swedes to keep in port, and consequently no actions took place at sea. In the autumn the Elector took Stralsund and Greifswald (November). But while he was engaged in the siege of the latter place, a body of 16,000 Swedes, under Field-Marshal Horn, Governor of Livonia, suddenly invaded the

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 325 sq. Secret articles in Puffendorf, *Ib.* p. 1074.

Duchy of Prussia, and penetrated as far as Insterburg. It was thought that the despotism which Frederick William had exercised towards the Prussians would have rendered them discontented, and anxious to throw off the yoke; and it was as much from the apprehension of such an occurrence, as with a view to defend the place against the Swedes, that the Elector despatched in all haste General Görzke with 3,000 men to Königsberg. He himself, early in 1679 and during a severe frost, proceeded by forced marches against the Swedes, with a chosen body of about 4,000 foot and 6,600 horse. The progress of the infantry was assisted with sledges, and the Frische Haff and Kurische Haff, two large bays, or friths, in the neighbourhood of Königsberg, were crossed on the ice; the army marching in this way ten or twelve leagues a day. Frederick William overtook the Swedes, who had been already worsted near Tilsit by his advanced guard, at the village of Splitter, which lies at a short distance from that town, completely defeated them, and pursued them to Bauske, about forty miles from Riga. Marshal Horn was captured, and of his 16,000 men not above 1,500 found their way back to Riga, so great had been their suffering from cold and hunger as well as from the sword.

The victories of Frederick William and Christian V. were, however, destined to be fruitless. They were deserted by their allies, and Louis XIV., who now gave law to Europe, made it a point of honour to secure the Swedes in the possession of those territories which had been assigned to them by the Peace of Westphalia. Already in August, 1678, the Peace of Nimeguen had been concluded between France and the United Netherlands; and in the following February the Emperor Leopold, who viewed with a jealous eye the successes of the Elector of Brandenburg, acceded to the treaty without waiting for the consent of the States of the Empire. The conditions offered by Louis were not indeed disadvantageous to the Empire; only he insisted that the northern allies should restore to Sweden all their conquests; and Leopold, by a particular treaty with Charles XI., engaged that this should be done, as well as that the Duke of Holstein Gottorp should be maintained in all his rights of sovereignty against the Crown of Denmark. Nothing now remained for the Elector of Brandenburg but to obtain the best terms he could from the all-potent Louis, the patron of the beaten Swedes; especially as his allies, the Dukes of Lüneburg, had acceded to the general pacification shortly after the Emperor, by the Treaty of Zell, February 5th,

1679, by which they engaged to restore to Sweden all that portion of the Duchy of Bremen which they had occupied, and to take no further part in the war. This example was soon after followed by the Bishop of Münster.¹ All Frederick William's proposals to the French Court for retaining Pomerania were treated with brutal contempt, and Louvois even threatened that a French army should march to Berlin: The great Elector condescended to address a humble letter to the French Monarch, and offered to place the greater part of his conquests in Louis's hands on condition of retaining the rest;² but without effect. The French division, under Marshal Créqui, cantoned in the Duchy of Cleves, having entered Westphalia, and threatening an invasion of Brandenburg, Frederick William found himself compelled to sign the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye (June 29th, 1679), by which he agreed to restore to the Swedes all his conquests, retaining, however, the district which they had possessed beyond the Oder, except the towns of Damm and Golnow; the latter to be redeemed by the Swedes for 50,000 rix-dollars. By a secret article, Louis XIV. promised to give the Elector 300,000 crowns, as compensation for the damage he had suffered from the occupation of the French troops, if the Elector consented to renew their ancient alliance.³

Christian V., relying on an article in the treaty between the Dukes of Lüneburg and France, by which the Dukes had stipulated that no troops were to march through their dominions, had at first thought of continuing the war; but a French division under the Duke of Joyeuse having, in spite of this engagement, entered the Danish counties of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, Christian hastened to make his peace, by signing the Treaty of Fontainebleau, September 2nd, 1679. Christian engaged to restore all his conquests to Sweden, and to reinstate the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp in his sovereignty, according to the Treaties of Roskild and Copenhagen.⁴ But an obscurity in the wording of this last article subsequently gave occasion to new disputes. This Peace was soon followed by that of Lunden, between Denmark and Sweden (Sept. 26th). Sweden recovered all that she had lost; and, on the 7th of October, the two Powers signed a defensive alliance for a term of ten years.⁵ Thus Sweden, through

Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 391 and p. 399.

May 16th, 1679. See *Hist. des Négoc. de Nimègue*, t. ii. p. 208. (Paris, 1680.)

³ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 408; Puffen-

dorf. *De Rebus gestis Friderici Willh.* lib. xvii. § 77 sqq. and p. 1093. Cf. Mignet, *Succ. d'Espagne*, t. iv. p. 699 sqq.

⁴ Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 419.

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 425, 431.

the aid of France, concluded, without any loss of territory, a war which had threatened her with dismemberment. Her losses, nevertheless, both moral and material, were very considerable. Her military glory, acquired by the victories of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles X., had been entirely eclipsed; her finances were exhausted, her navy almost ruined; and it had been demonstrated that, without the help of France, she was scarcely a match for the other Northern Powers.

The peace was immediately followed by a revolution in the Swedish Government. The exhausted state of the finances required a reform in the administration, which was loudly demanded by all classes of the nation, the nobility alone excepted, who enriched themselves out of the public revenue. Charles XI., moreover, was desirous of relieving himself from dependence on French subsidies; and in these views he was encouraged by Benedict Oxenstiern, who had had some violent altercations with the French minister, Colbert de Croissy, and had conceived in consequence a strong hatred of France. Charles now dismissed the Chancellor, Count Magnus de la Gardie, the head of the French party, and gave his office to Oxenstiern. At the same time he removed other ministers whom he suspected of being more devoted to the Council of State than to himself. A Diet having been assembled in Stockholm (1680), the chamber of the nobles was surrounded by soldiers, under pretence of a guard of honour, and the three lower estates—the clergy, the peasants, and the burgher-class—passed a resolution investing the King with absolute power. It was declared that he was bound by no form of government; that he was responsible to nobody for the measures he might adopt; and he was even empowered to direct and regulate the constitution and form of government by his Testament. As the army was entirely devoted to Charles, the nobles found themselves compelled to accept this constitution. In another Diet assembled in October, 1682, a decree was issued that all ministers of finance during the King's minority should make good the losses which the kingdom had suffered in that period. The five high offices of state were no longer filled up; the Council of State was converted into a Royal Council, nominated by and dependent on the King. A Commission was appointed to inquire into the administration of the Crown lands since the year 1632; and all donations, as well as all Crown leases, were revoked, the holders of the latter being reimbursed the sums which they had actually paid. This measure was called

the "Reduction." The province of Livonia was the chief sufferer by it, where nearly five-sixths of the whole landed estates of the province were adjudged to the Crown.¹ This unjust and violent measure, which deprived a great number of families of their patrimony, was further aggravated by the imposition of a tax amounting to a fourth part of the revenues of the nobles. A deputation from Livonia having warmly protested at Stockholm against these proceedings, and having resorted to steps offensive to the Court, were criminally indicted and condemned to death as rebels (1694). This penalty was commuted as regards three of the deputies, for perpetual imprisonment; the fourth, John Reinhold Patkul, having escaped into Poland, entered the service of Augustus II., and became the principal instigator of that league against Sweden which we shall have to relate in a subsequent chapter.

During the latter part of his reign, which lasted till 1697, Charles XI. remained at peace, and employed himself in restoring the army and navy, in improving the finances, and accumulating a treasure; which enabled his son and successor, Charles XII., again to assert for a short period the supremacy of the Swedish arms. Although the measures of Charles XI. were often tyrannical, it must be confessed that they were designed for the public good: he and his family lived in a simple and sparing manner, and the large sums which he wrung from the people were applied for their benefit. The regulations which he adopted concerning the army rendered it a national institution. Every nobleman who had an income of from 500 to 580 marks, was bound to provide a soldier; if his income was double that sum, two soldiers, and so on, in the same ratio. The peasant, or several peasants together, were in like manner bound to provide a man, whom they employed and kept, the King only finding his horse. The soldiers thus provided were exercised twice a year; and in this manner was formed, from the pith of the nation, the army which performed such wonders under Charles XII.

Christian V. of Denmark reigned till 1699, when he was succeeded by his son, Frederick IV. Christian's reign, subsequently to the peace of Lunden, like that of his rival, Charles X., presents little worthy of notice.

¹ De Bray, *Essai Crit. sur l'Hist. de la Livonie*, ap. Koch and Schoell, *Hist. des Traités*, t. xiii. p. 156.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE ambition of Louis was not satisfied with the Peace of Nimeguen. He contemplated it, like those of Westphalia and the Pyrenees, only as a stepping-stone to further acquisitions, which were to be made by means of the very treaties themselves. Disputes had been going on the last twenty years between France and the Empire as to the extent of the cessions made by the Treaty of Westphalia. Louis XIV. contended that the cession of the three bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, with their dependencies, included the sovereignty of the German fiefs which held under them; thus identifying vassalage with the sovereignty of the feudal lord—a principle at variance with the public law of Germany. The Imperial plenipotentiaries had neglected to discuss the principle at Nimeguen, and Louis now proceeded to reopen the whole question; not only with regard to the bishoprics, but also his more recent acquisitions of Alsace and Franche-Comté. In 1680 were established in the Parliaments of Metz, of Besançon, in Franche-Comté, and in the Sovereign Council of Alsace, then sitting at Breisach, certain Chambers called *Chambres Royales de Réunion*, in order to examine the nature and extent of the cessions made to France by the Treaties of Westphalia, the Pyrenees, and Nimeguen. The researches of these Chambers were carried back to the times of the Frankish kings. The Alsatian Chamber, whose decisions seem to have been justified by the text of the Treaty of Westphalia,¹ adjudicated to France the bishopric of Strasburg, the abbeys of Murbach, Lure, Andlau, and Weissemburg, a great part of the bishopric of Spire, and the counties of Horburg, Lichtenberg, and other places. The Chamber of Metz, though with less appearance of equity, went still further, and reunited to the French Crown all the Hundsrück, the Duchy of Zwey-brücken, or Deux-Ponts, the counties of Saarbück, Veldenz, and Salm, the Lordships of Bitsche, Sarreburg, Homburg, part of the states of the Rhinegraves and Counts of Linange, and a number of immediate territories and lordships.

¹ Pfeffel, *Hist. d'Allemagne*, t. ii. p. 400.

Nay, this Chamber eventually adjudged to Louis the dependencies of the county of Chiny, comprising a full third of the Duchy of Luxembourg, besides the sovereignty of the Duchy of Bouillon, of the territory between the Sambre and the Meuse, and of some other districts in the Bishopric of Liège. The Chamber of Besançon, although Franche-Comté had been but so recently annexed to the French Crown, was as zealous for its interests as the others, and adjudged to it the county of Montbéliard, and four lordships holding of the county of Burgundy. These assignments affected the domains of several considerable potentates; as the Elector of Trèves, the Elector Palatine, the Duke of Würtemberg, the King of Sweden for the Duchy of Deux-Ponts, and others of less name. The King of Sweden remonstrated, but without effect. The Chamber of Metz decreed that if homage were not rendered within a certain time, the Duchy of Deux-Ponts would be reunited to the Crown; and as Charles XI. refused thus to abase his royal dignity, the duchy was confiscated, and Louis XIV. invested with it as a fief the Prince Palatine of Birkenfeld.

The possession of the Imperial city of Strasburg was a principal object with Louis. Till that city was in his hands, Alsace could never be considered in safety, and the passage of the Rhine might at any time be secured to the Imperial armies. In the late war Strasburg had retained a neutral posture, which was regarded by the French as a want of loyalty, and it was resolved to seize the city on the first opportunity, under the decree of the Chamber of Breisach. The municipal government was gained by bribes, and on July 28th, 1681, an army of 35,000 men, concentrated from various quarters with great celerity, appeared before its walls. Resistance was useless; the Imperial Resident attempted to raise the people, but the magistrates had taken care to deprive the city of all means of defence, and no alternative remained but to accept the favourable capitulation offered by the French. Strasburg, by recognizing Louis as its sovereign lord, obtained the confirmation of all its civil and religious rights and liberties, and continued to form a sort of republic under the authority of France down to the time of the French Revolution. Louis XIV. entered Strasburg in person, October 23rd. It was then consigned to the skill of Vauban, who rendered it a fortress of the first order, and the bulwark of France on the east.

Louis also sought to make acquisitions in the Spanish Netherlands. By forced interpretations of the Treaty of Nimeguen, he pretended a right to all the towns and districts which had been

occupied by his troops during the late war, although these had been withdrawn either at or before the peace, on the ground that the restitution of such places had not been expressly stipulated. On this pretext he claimed the Burgraviate, or ancient borough of Ghent, Beveren, Alost, Gramont, Ninove, and Lessines. The real object of these claims, however, the granting of which, as Louis himself admitted, would have entirely compromised the safety of the Spanish Netherlands, was to obtain concessions on the side of Luxembourg; and therefore to the indignant remonstrances of the Spanish Cabinet, he coolly replied that he should be ready to listen to any proposals of exchange. To keep the French out of Flanders, Spain ceded the county of Chiny, adjudged, as we have said, to the crown of France by the Parliament of Metz. But it was then discovered, or pretended, that this inconsiderable domain, whose capital was a mere village, possessed dependencies which extended to the very gates of Luxembourg; and the King of Spain was called on to do homage for a multitude of arrière fiefs. At the same time Louis was seeking to extend his dominions on the side of Italy. He entertained the project of obtaining Savoy, by procuring the marriage of the young duke, Victor Amadeus II., who had succeeded to his father, Charles Emmanuel II., in 1675, with the heiress of Portugal. Victor, it was expected, would cede his duchy to France on obtaining the Portuguese crown; he had already been betrothed (March 1681), and was on the point of setting off for Lisbon, when he was deterred by the remonstrances and threats of the Piedmontese from completing the marriage. Louis, however, was in some degree consoled for this disappointment by the occupation of Casale in September, 1681, which he had purchased from the profligate and needy Duke of Montferriat.

These pretensions and acquisitions alarmed all Europe. Louis, it was said, was aiming at a universal monarchy, and the suspicion was encouraged by his attempts on the Empire itself. A pretended Imperial capitulation was circulated in Germany in July, 1681, by which the Dauphin was to be elected King of the Romans, and consequently the presumptive successor of the Emperor Leopold.¹ Symptoms of resistance began to appear. In October, 1681, the King of Sweden concluded a treaty with the United Netherlands to guarantee the Treaties of Münster and Nimeguen against violation. The Emperor acceded to this treaty in February, 1682, and Spain in the following May. It was probably these move-

¹ Dumont, *Mémoires politiques*, ap. Martin, t. xiii. p. 587.

ments that caused Louis to withdraw the troops which were blockading Luxembourg, and to offer to refer his claims to the mediation of the King of England. This appears from a treaty which he concluded about this time (January 22nd), with the Elector, Frederick William of Brandenburg. Although many of the German States were joining the league against French ambition, that politic Prince, from the hope apparently of regaining Pomerania by the aid of Louis, not only refused to participate in such an alliance, but also undertook to use his endeavours for a peaceful solution of the points in question between France and the Empire : in other words, to induce the Emperor to give up to the French the places which they had occupied. Louis promised in return to put a stop to further reunions, and not to resort to arms so long as any hope remained of a friendly settlement.¹ He claimed for his motives the praise of a disinterested generosity, and he gave out that he had no wish to disturb the peace of Europe at a moment when it was menaced by the Turks, or to prevent Spain from succouring the Emperor against the common enemy of Christendom.² His plans, therefore, were for the present postponed, though not abandoned. But Europe knew how to appreciate his moderation. The alliances of the German States against France were pushed more vigorously than ever, and were even joined by the young Elector of Bavaria, Louis's son-in-law ; and in the spring of 1682, the Emperor, Spain, Sweden and Holland renewed their conventions for mutual succour.³ Louis, however, who, in spite of his pretended generosity, was secretly encouraging the Turks to attack the Emperor, gave an ostensible colouring to his assertions by bombarding Algiers (June, 1682), in punishment of the many piracies committed by the Algerines on French subjects. The bombardment was renewed in the following year ; but it was not till April, 1684, that the Dey was reduced to submission.

The pretended forbearance of Louis had come to an end while the motive alleged for it was not only still in existence but had even become more powerful than ever. In the summer of 1683, while the Turks were in full march upon Vienna, Louis was preparing to assert by arms his claims on the Spanish Netherlands. During the two months, indeed, that the Turks were encamped before Vienna, he suspended the blow which he was prepared to

¹ Puffendorf, *De Rebus g. Frid. Wilhelmi*, lib. xviii. § 44. Cf. Stenzel, *Gesch. des preussischen Staates*, B. ii. S. 414, Anm. 1.

² The Austrian and Turkish war will be related in another chapter.

³ Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 22 sqq.

strike. A certain respect for the public opinion of Europe, his previous magnanimous declarations, as well, perhaps, as his treaty with the Elector of Brandenburg, arrested his hand; nay, he even made a show of offering his forces to the Emperor, who at once declined the aid of so dangerous an ally. Louis probably expected, as he certainly hoped,¹ that the Turks would take Vienna, after which blow the States of the Empire would be compelled to seek his aid. Amid the rejoicings of Europe for the deliverance of that city, the French Court was remarkable by its sadness. Immediately after the retreat of the Turks, the French troops entered Flanders and Brabant. The mediation of Charles II. had been without result. Louis had fixed the end of August as the term for Spain's reply to his demands; she would yield nothing except Chiny, and on the 28th of October she declared war against France, though she was without the means of prosecuting it. Courtrai and Dixmuyde were taken by the French early in November. Louis proposed to exchange these places against Luxembourg, and granted to the Spaniards a suspension of hostilities till the end of January, 1684, to consider the proposal. Meanwhile the French laid the districts they had occupied under contribution; and when the garrison of Luxembourg, by way of reprisal, made some incursions into the French territory, Marshal Créqui punished that city by a terrible bombardment.

The Spanish Cabinet in vain looked around for aid. Neither the King of Sweden, nor the Emperor, the latter of whom was still embarrassed with the Turkish war, was in a condition to interfere. The King of England at first showed some disposition to assist the Spaniards. After the Peace of Nimeguen a coolness had arisen between Charles and Louis, who would not continue his subsidies except on terms too onerous to be endured; and in June, 1680, the English King formed an alliance with Spain to guarantee the treaty.² In the following year, however, the venal Charles promised to abandon his new allies in consideration of his pension being renewed. Louis, by a verbal agreement, promised him two million livres for the present year, and 500,000 crowns for the two following years;³ and Charles now advised the Spaniards to submit to the demands of France. Even the Dutch Republic, on which Spain most relied, did nothing. The Stadholder, indeed, strained every nerve to bring an army into

¹ It is said that, among the papers of the Grand Vizier captured by the Austrians, was found a letter of Louis XIV. recommending the siege of Vienna. Puf-

endorf, *ibid.* lib. xviii. § 96, p. 1187.

² Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 2.

³ Dalrymple, *Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland*, vol. i. p. 370.

the field, but he could not persuade the States-General to second his views. The field was thus left open to the operations of the French. In March, 1684, Marshal d'Humières bombarded Oudenarde; in April, Louis in person took the command of the army in Hainault; while Marshal Créqui, with another division of 32,000 men, proceeded to invest Luxembourg, and after a short siege compelled that city to capitulate (June 4th). Shortly after, Trèves was taken and dismantled, though not occupied, by the French, and a truce of twenty years was concluded between France and the States-General. Louis XIV., at the commencement of the siege of Luxembourg, had given the Dutch to understand that he should be content with that place, together with Beaumont in Hainault, Bovines and Chimai, which would not compromise their boundary; and that he would restore Courtrai and Dixmuyde to Spain. These conditions were accepted by the States, who promised to abandon the Spanish alliance if they were not acceded to, and the truce was accordingly signed June 29th. The Emperor acceded to the truce at Ratisbon, August 15th, both in his own name and that of the King of Spain, by whom he had been furnished with plenipotentiary powers for that purpose. It was agreed, in addition to the articles already mentioned in the Dutch treaty, that, during the truce, France should remain in possession of all the places adjudged to her by the *Chambres de Réunion* up to August 1st, 1681, including Strasburg, but should, during the same period, make no further claims on territories belonging to the Empire.¹

As these proceedings display Louis XIV.'s unjust and insatiable ambition, so, about the same time, he gave equally striking examples of his pride and bigotry. The little Republic of Genoa was to become a victim to the "glory" of the great King. The alliance of the Genoese with Spain was too intimate to please Louis; he proposed that they should accept his protectorate instead of that of the Catholic King, and when this was declined, he sought a pretext for war. The Genoese were charged with having supplied the Spaniards with four galleys, contrary to his prohibition; with having furnished the Algerines with ammunitions of war; with having stopped the passage of French salt through Savona, &c.; above all, like their brother republicans the Dutch, they had ventured to talk of the French King with disrespect. Louis treated them like rebellious vassals instead of an independent people. He imprisoned their envoy in the Bastille, and sent a fleet

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. pp. 79 and 81.

to bombard their city, which reduced "Genoa the Superb," with its marble palaces, almost to a heap of ruins (May, 1684). The Genoese, having in vain besought the aid of Spain, implored the mediation of the Pope, at whose intercession Louis abated many of his demands, but only on conditions calculated to humiliate the Genoese, and gratify his own inordinate pride. The Doge of Genoa, whom the laws forbade to leave the city, was required to appear in person at Versailles, and deliver a speech prepared for him by one of Louis's flatterers, in which the King was described as "a monarch who had surpassed in valour, grandeur, and magnanimity all the kings of past ages, and who would transmit to his descendants his unassailable power." Louis, indeed, who possessed the most polished manners, affected to alleviate the feelings of the Doge by the gracious reception he accorded to him; but he could not escape the indignation of Europe at the barbarities he committed, merely for the barren satisfaction of gratifying his pride.¹

About the same time he gave an equally signal instance of his bigotry and intolerance. During the latter days of Cardinal Mazarin the liberties granted to the Protestants by the Edict of Nantes had been gradually curtailed; but when Louis himself assumed the reins of power, these retrograde acts became still more frequent and striking. The private meetings, or colloquies, of the Protestants, as well as their national triennial synods, were suppressed (1661, 1662). In April, 1663, appeared a Royal Declaration, forbidding all Protestants who had become Catholics to return to the Reformed religion, and all priests or ecclesiastics to embrace it at all. These were followed by many other decrees of the same kind; such as the forbidding any but Catholics to be admitted as masters of trades, except in certain special cases; the allowing of boys of fourteen years of age, and girls of twelve, to change their religion in spite of their parents; the prohibiting of Protestants to keep schools of a superior kind for the education of the higher classes; with others of the like description. These proceedings were viewed with great sorrow and disapprobation by Colbert, as they affected the most active and industrious portion of the population, and consequently the trade and prosperity of the kingdom; and it seems to have been from his representations, seconded by the remonstrances of the Elector of Brandenburg, that Louis was induced to put a stop for some years to these persecutions,² or, at all events, to restrain them within moderate

¹ Martin, t. xiv. p. 261,

² *Hist. de l'Edit de Nantes*, t. iv. p. 12.

bounds ; and from the year 1666 to 1674, the Hugonots enjoyed comparative tranquillity. The recommencement of persecution in the latter year must be ascribed to a change in the domestic life of Louis.

In the year 1666, Louis, at the recommendation of his mistress, Madame de Montespan, had allowed her to take as the governess of their children the widow of the burlesque writer, Scarron. Madame Scarron was descended from a distinguished Hugonot family, being the grand-daughter of D'Aubigné, the Protestant historian and friend of Henry IV. ; but her husband had left her in the greatest poverty. The house of Scarron was not a school of strict morality. His wife, who had been converted to the Romish faith, had made in it some acquaintances of more than doubtful character, and among them Ninon de l'Enclos ; yet she appears, nevertheless, to have been sincere in the character she had assumed of a prude and devotee. Madame Scarron, at the middle period of life, had preserved in a remarkable degree a beauty of no ordinary kind ; she had much wit and many accomplishments, which were enhanced by a bewitching grace and dignity of manner. These qualities made by degrees an irresistible impression on the heart of Louis ; in a few years her empire over the King was completely established, and in 1675 he created her Marquise de Maintenon. So far from this influence being the price of virtue, it was employed in conducting Louis back into the paths of morality. His youth had been engrossed by a succession of mistresses. Elizabeth Tarneaux, Madlles. La Vallière, La Motte d'Argencourt, Fontanges, and Madame de Montespan, had successively ruled his heart ; by the last he had a numerous offspring whom he had legitimated and compelled the Queen to receive. Yet Madame de Maintenon succeeded in reclaiming the affections of the King even from her haughty patroness, and restoring them to the Queen. From this period of his conversion the King renounced unlawful love. Madame de Maintenon soon found her reward. In 1683 Maria Theresa died, and in the following year, the King and Madame de Maintenon were privately married in the chapel at Versailles.

This reform in the King's life was accompanied, unhappily for France, with an increase of his bigotry. To bring back those of his subjects who had wandered from the Church of Rome appeared to him a work which might merit the redemption of past sins ; and thus his own reformation and the conversion of his heretic subjects became inseparable ideas. This new bent of his mind

was encouraged by those whom he chiefly consulted in the affairs of his conscience: the illustrious Bossuet, Harlai, Archbishop of Paris, and Father La Chaise, the King's confessor. The renewal of persecution dates, as we have said, from 1674, and the establishment of Madame de Maintenon's influence. Naturally gentle and moderate, Madame de Maintenon herself was indeed at heart averse to the severe measures adopted against her former co-religionists; yet it appears from her own confession that she was led to encourage them, lest the King, who had heard that she was born a Calvinist, should suspect her of a want of zeal.¹ These measures, therefore, were not directly owing to her; but they were the result of the King's misinterpretation of the principles with which she had inspired him; a misinterpretation, which, out of interest and self-love, she encouraged instead of repressing. Louis found in his proud and unfeeling minister, Louvois, a fitting instrument of his bigotry. It would be too long to detail all the steps adopted against the Hugonots. They were calculated to strip them, one by one, of all the privileges accorded by the Edict of Nantes, and thus to prepare the final blow, the revocation of the Edict itself. The Protestant churches were gradually demolished; the so-called *Chambres mi-parties*, before which Protestant suits were pleaded in the Parliaments of Toulouse, Bordeaux, and Grenoble, were suppressed; Roman Catholics were forbidden to apostatize under pain of penance, confiscation of goods, and perpetual banishment; mixed marriages, of Catholics and Protestants, were prohibited, and the children of such marriages were declared bastards; it was forbidden that Hugonots should be employed as clerks or otherwise, in the management of the finances; nay, these savage decrees penetrated into and divided the family household; and by a royal declaration of June 17th, 1681, it was decreed that children of the tender age of seven years should be capable of conversion in spite of their parents, as if already competent to distinguish the true path of salvation. Such are a few specimens of the numerous edicts published against the Hugonots. Louvois, who had opposed the King's moral conversion, and had caballed with Montespan against Maintenon, zealously threw himself into the cause of persecution, and effected conversions by means of his own department. Converted Protestants were exempted from military billets; while the additional charge which would thus have been thrown on Catholic

¹ Rulhière, *Eclaircissements sur les causes de la révocation de l'Édit de Nantes*, ap. Martin, *Hist. de France*, t. xiii. p. 628.

householders was diverted by billeting on the richer Hugonots twice the number of soldiers that fell legally to their share.¹

Flight was the only mode of escaping these persecutions. In spite of the surveillance exercised by the police on the frontiers and in the ports, emigration took place on a great scale. England, Holland, Denmark offered hospitality to the emigrants, and were enriched by their industry, skill, and capital. The French Government endeavoured to stop the emigration by forbidding Hugonot families to leave France under the penalty for the heads of them of perpetual relegation to the galleys (May, 1682). The stoppage of this outlet occasioned an explosion within. The Hugonots began to band together in the south of France. Their prohibited provincial synods were replaced by secret unions; they began to arm, and in some places it was necessary to suppress their movements by force and bloodshed. After the death of the wise and moderate Colbert in 1683, these persecutions assumed new vigour. The influence of Louvois, now uncontrolled, was displayed in a multitude of the most rigorous edicts (1684-1685).² Troops³ were despatched into the southern provinces, where the Hugonots were chiefly seated; and though the soldiers were publicly forbidden to use any violence, their brutalities were secretly connived at. By these means the Protestants of Béarn, estimated at 22,000, were converted, within a few hundreds. Terror harbingered the approach of the dragoons, at whose appearance whole towns hastened to announce their submission. The same method was used with success in Guienne, the Limousin, Saintonge, Poitou, Languedoc, and Dauphiné. Conversions were announced by the thousands; though the value of such a conversion is easily estimated. Louis was quite intoxicated with his success. It seemed as if he was as great a conqueror over men's souls as over their bodies and worldly possessions; that he had but to speak the word, and all those proud and obstinate heretics, who had once almost dictated the law to his ancestors, must fall down and yield to his infallible genius; a thought gratifying at once to his bigotry and his pride. And now when the Hugonots were reduced, in appearance at least, to a small fraction of their former number, Louis conceived that the time was arrived when he might strike the final blow by repealing the Edict of his grandfather Henry IV.

¹ Martin, *Hist de France*, t. xiii. p. 627.

² The particulars of them will be found in the *Anciennes Lois Françaises*, t. xix. p. 464 sqq.; and in the *Hist. de l'Édit de Nantes*, t. v. liv. 21, 22, and App.

³ Dragoons were chiefly used in this service, as being most adapted to it from their serving both on foot and horseback. Hence these military persecutions were called *Dragonnades*.

THE REVOCATION OF THE EDICT OF NANTES, drawn up by the aged Chancellor Le Tellier, father of Louvois, was signed by the King, October 17th, 1685. It went, of course, to the complete future annihilation of Calvinism in France. All Protestant churches were to be immediately demolished; the Reformed worship was forbidden on pain of confiscation and perpetual imprisonment; the ministers who refused to be converted were to quit the kingdom in a fortnight; the children of Protestant parents were to be baptized by the curé of the parish, and instructed in the Roman Catholic faith. Only by the last article some indulgence was shown to those who still remained unconverted. They were permitted, "till such time as it should please God to enlighten them like the rest," to remain in France, and to exercise their callings and professions, without let or molestation on account of their religion.¹ Such was the text; but the practice hardly corresponded with it. In fact, Louvois instructed the leaders of the *dragonnades* to disregard the last article of the Declaration, and to treat with the extremity of rigour all those who should have the absurd vanity of persisting in a religion which differed from that of His Majesty the King! Louvois gave the order to let the soldiery live "licentiously." Everything was permitted to them except murder and violation; but a good deal may be done short of these crimes; nor did the soldiery always abstain even from these. The most horrible tortures were resorted to. Those Hugonots who had the most influence with their brethren, either from their character or their social position, were sent to the Bastille or other state prisons; and some were even buried in sultry or freezing dungeons, the remains of feudal barbarism. From Dauphiné the *dragonnades* were extended to the Vaudois. At the command of Louis, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amédée II., joined in their persecution; the ministers, or *barbes*, of the Vaudois, their schoolmasters, and the French Protestants who had taken refuge among them, were ordered, under pain of death, to quit the Ducal territories in a fortnight; while their worship was prohibited, and their schools were ordered to be closed under the same penalty (February, 1686). The Vaudois attempted to defend their liberties by arms against the French troops, led by Catinat, a brave soldier and enlightened man, who performed the task with reluctance. Many thousands of the Vaudois perished in this massacre, in which neither age nor sex was spared. A remnant of them who had managed to defend themselves in the more inaccessible parts of

¹ *Hist. de l'Édit de Nantes, t. v. Preuves, p. 185; Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 117.*

the mountains, obtained, through the intervention of the Protestant Powers, and especially of the Swiss, permission to emigrate.¹

These cruelties naturally produced a reaction. Emigration became more vigorous than ever, in spite of all the endeavours of the Government to prevent it, though seamen or others assisting the emigrants were threatened with fine and corporal punishment, the galleys, and even death. It is computed that between the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the end of the century between 200,000 and 300,000 persons left France for the sake of their religion. These too, from their wealth and character, were amongst the most valuable citizens of France, and included many men of high literary reputation; as Basnage, the historian of the United Netherlands; Lenfant, historian of the Councils of Basle and Constance; Beausobre, author of the History of Manicheism; Rapin, author of the History of England, and others. It was now that whole colonies of French established themselves at London, at Berlin, in Holland, and other places, and planted there the silk manufacture and other arts and trades.

It happened singularly enough that while Louis was engaged in this crusade against the Protestants, he was also involved in a warm dispute with Pope Innocent XI. (Benedict Odescalchi) respecting the *Régale*, in some of the southern provinces. The matter belongs to the domestic history of France, and is chiefly remarkable as having produced Bossuet's celebrated *Declaration of the Clergy of France*, which forms an epoch in the Gallican Church (March, 1682). The substance of it is, that the Pope has no power in temporal affairs; that, as decreed by the Council of Constance, the Pope's spiritual authority is subordinate to that of a General Council; that the constitutions of the Gallican Church may not be subverted; and that, though the Pope has the first voice in questions of faith, his judgment is not irrevocable unless confirmed by the Church. This declaration was converted into a law by a royal edict.

The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes excited unbounded sorrow and indignation in all the Protestant States of Europe. These feelings were nowhere more conspicuously manifested than in the Electorate of Brandenburg. Frederick William, a zealous Calvinist, even overstepped the bounds of Christian moderation by publishing a retaliatory Edict against his Catholic subjects; but the steps which he took for the protection of the French

¹ *Hist. de l'Édit de Nantes*, t. 3. p. 926; *Mémoires de Catinat*, t. i. p. 20 sq.; and *Pièces Just.* p. 256 (Paris, 1819).

refugees were of a nobler character. Partly out of compassion for his fellow-religionists, partly also perhaps with the politic view of encouraging arts and manufactures in his dominions, he granted to the French emigrants more privileges than were enjoyed even by his own subjects; he gave them ground and materials for building; he supplied them with money to open manufactories, pay their clergy, and erect their own consistories, tribunals, schools, and churches.¹ Sweden, the ancient ally of France, participated in the feeling now awakened against that Kingdom, both on religious grounds and from the personal injury which Charles XI. had sustained, as already related, at the hands of the French King with regard to his Duchy of Zweibrucken. In the spring of 1686 a secret treaty was concluded between the King of Sweden and the Elector of Brandenburg, lately such bitter enemies, for mutual defence and for the protection of the Empire against the attacks of France. In the United Netherlands, Louis completely alienated, through his persecution of the Hugonots, the goodwill of the party which had supported him, and the ancient adherents of the De Witts now went over to the Prince of Orange. The anger of the commercial portion of the Dutch nation had been further excited because Louis, in his indiscriminate hatred of the Calvinists, had not spared the persons and property of Dutch merchants naturalized in France, and had thus annihilated the trade between that kingdom and Holland.² Thus by an infatuated policy, the French King, besides weakening his kingdom, and alienating a large portion of his own subjects, who subsequently fought against him under the banners of his enemies, also incurred the hostility of every Protestant country of Europe; while Spain and the Catholic States of the Empire were provoked and alarmed by his grasping ambition, and even the Pope himself was irrevocably alienated by the contempt which he displayed for the apostolic chair.

There was one prince whose keen and penetrating glance saw all these mistakes, and whose hatred of the French King and nation incited him to take advantage of them. Among the earliest remonstrances of the Dutch Stadholder, William, were the injuries which his country had received at the hands of Louis XIV. At his entrance into public life, William had found himself reduced to choose between submitting to the haughty conqueror, or half ruining his country, perhaps abandoning it.

¹ Meusel, *Neuere Gesch. der Deutschen*, B. iv. S. 482 sq.

² Van Kampen, B. ii. S. 295.

altogether, in order to escape the vassalage of France. These things had engendered him an inextinguishable hatred which recent occurrences had served still further to inflame." Although a Calvinist, William was a friend of toleration; and, like the rest of his countrymen, had beheld with disgust the religious persecutions in France. This feeling was increased by a private injury. Louis had seized his principality of Orange, properly an Imperial fief, and had annexed it to the French Crown. William had publicly declared that he would make Louis repent the outrage, and had refused to retract his words when called upon by D'Avaux, the French minister in Holland, for an explanation.¹ Thus, by all his steps at this juncture, Louis was not only embittering the enmity which the Prince of Orange entertained against him, but also preparing those events which ultimately enabled William to curb his power and humble his pride. From this time the Dutch Stadholder must be regarded as the chief opponent of French ambition, as the man on whose counsels the destiny of Europe hung. It is in this character, as Lord Macaulay justly remarks,² and not as King of England, that William's conduct as a statesman should be viewed and estimated. His plans for wresting the English sceptre from the hands of his Popish father-in-law were only part of his grand scheme for humiliating Louis. He wished to reign in England chiefly, if not solely, in order to wield her power against the French King. In this struggle the principles of Rome and those of the Reformation are still in presence, however mixed up with political events and secular ambition. The bigoted Louis XIV., though at enmity with the actual Pope, is still the representative of those ancient monarchical traditions which leaned for support on the Church of Rome; while the Calvinist William, the child and heir of the Reformation, is the champion of religious toleration and civil liberty. Nature had admirably qualified him for the part which he had assumed; in which defeat and disappointment were often to be endured without discouragement, and success at last achieved by long and complicated combinations, pursued with indomitable perseverance and unflinching courage.

It was some fresh symptoms of aggression on the part of Louis which enabled the Stadholder to unite the greater part of Europe in a league against him. The Duke of Orleans, the French King's brother, had married the sister of the Elector Palatine, the last

¹ See *Négociations du comte d'Avaux*, September to December, 1682.

² *Hist. of England*, chap. vii.

of the House of Simmern, who died in May, 1685, when his next relative, the Count Palatine Philip William, Duke of Neuburg, took possession of the Electorate. The Duchess of Orleans had by her marriage contract renounced all her feudal rights to the Palatinate, but not her claims to the allodial property and the movables of her family. In these latter, Louis, on the part of his sister-in-law, insisted on including not only the furniture of the electoral palaces but even the cannon of the fortresses; and the new Elector was forced to satisfy these claims by the payment of 100,000 livres. The claims of the Duchess on the allodial property were far more embarrassing. Under this head were demanded the principalities of Simmern and Lautern, the County of Sponheim, with numerous other territories, towns, and lordships; in short, the larger portion of the whole Electorate. Philip William resisted these demands, and Louis, who was now busy at home with the Hugonots, and who was shortly afterwards seized with a dangerous and painful malady, did not at present attempt to assert them by force. He had, however, done enough to arouse general alarm, and to show that he had not abandoned his designs of enriching himself at the expense of his neighbours. The new Elector implored the protection of the Empire, and thus redoubled the uneasiness felt in Germany, and indeed throughout the greater part of Europe, respecting the schemes of Louis. The Prince of Orange availed himself of these suspicions to forward his plans against Louis. He artfully inflamed the universal alarm, and at length succeeded in inducing the Emperor Leopold, the Kings of Spain and Sweden, as princes of the Empire, the Electors of Saxony and Bavaria, the Circles of Suabia, Franconia, Upper Saxony and Bavaria to enter into the celebrated LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG (July 9th, 1686). The object of this league was to maintain the Treaties of Munster and Nimeguen and the Truce of Ratisbon. If any member of it was attacked he was to be assisted by the whole confederacy: 60,000 men were to be raised, who were to be frequently drilled, and to form a camp during some weeks of every year, and a common fund for their support was to be established at Frankfort. The League was to be in force for three years, but might be prolonged at the expiration of that term should the public safety require it.¹

The Elector Palatine, who was in fact the party most directly interested, acceded to the League early in September, as well as the Duke of Holstein Gottorp: The Elector of Brandenburg had

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 131 sqq.

already made a separate alliance with the Emperor, by which certain exchanges of territory were made between them; and the Elector had pledged himself to defend the Empire against all assailants. He did not, therefore, join the League of Augsburg, to avoid giving any open cause of offence to the French King. Nor did the Stadholder himself become a party to it, since it ostensibly professed to be an association only of the members of the Empire. Most French writers are of opinion that William organized this league in order to assist his scheme for seizing the Crown of England; and it is certain that it eventually proved very useful to him in that undertaking. Yet, although the idea of supplanting his father-in-law may already have occurred to him, he could hardly have foreseen that two years afterwards he should be invited into England by the Whigs, and that at the same time Louis should have declared war against the Empire; and it seems, therefore, more probable that William, without any definite view of self-advantage, merely organized the League as part of his general policy against the French King.

The establishment of the League of Augsburg gave rise to some sharp correspondence between Louis and the Emperor; and by way of defiance, the French King caused a fort to be built opposite Huningen, on the right bank of the Rhine, in the territory of the Margrave of Baden. It was not, however, till two years afterwards, as we have already said, that war actually broke out between France and the Empire. The reason why it should have been so long postponed, or why it should have been entered into at that particular juncture, it is not easy to explain. Some French writers have attributed it to a quarrel between Louis and his minister Louvois respecting the size of a window in the little palace of Trianon; when Louvois, mortified by the hard words which he received from his master, resolved to divert his attention from such subjects by finding employment for him in a war.¹ This, probably, is only one of those anecdotes, more piquant than veracious, in which the French writers of memoirs delight; yet, had it been true, the pretexts for war set forth by Louis in his manifesto of September 24th, 1688, could hardly have been more flimsy. The main grounds assigned for declaring war were, that the Emperor intended to conclude a peace with the Turks in order that he might turn his arms against France; that he had supported the Elector Palatine in his unjust hesitation to do justice to the claims of the Duchess of Orleans; and

¹ *Mémoires de St. Simon*, t. xiii. p. 9; *Martin*, t. xiv. p. 80.

that he had deprived the Cardinal Von Fürstenberg, an ally of the French King, who had been elected Coadjutor by part of the Chapter of the Archbishopric of Cologne, and had procured to be chosen in his stead the Bavarian Prince, Joseph Clement.¹ Louis also called upon the Emperor to convert the truce of Ratisbon into a definitive peace; or, in other words, to cede to him in perpetuity the acquisitions which had been assigned to him only for a limited period.

With regard to the first of these charges, it is true, as we have related in another chapter, that Austria, since the siege of Vienna, had achieved some signal triumphs both over the Turks and the Hungarians, triumphs which had excited great jealousy and anger in the French Court, but which can hardly be regarded as affording Louis any legitimate cause of war against the Emperor. The affair of the Duchess of Orleans we have already explained. It had been referred, with the consent of Louis, to the arbitration of the Pope; and the delay which had taken place was, therefore, imputable to Innocent XI. and not to the Emperor. It is certain, however, that Innocent was the implacable adversary of France. No Pope since the Reformation had exercised so much political influence as he; and, strange to say, for the sake of opposing Louis, this influence was ranged on the side of the heretic William, against his orthodox uncle, James II., the Sovereign whose devotion to Rome was so blind and implicit that he hesitated not to sacrifice three kingdoms for a mass. Innocent had also thrown in his weight against Louis in the affair of the Electorate of Cologne, which requires a few words of explanation.

The Suabian family of Fürstenberg was entirely devoted to France. Egon Von Fürstenberg, Bishop of Strasburg, had been very instrumental in putting the French in possession of that city; his brother William had, as we have seen, been seized by the Emperor at the Congress of Cologne for being too warm a partisan of French interests, but had subsequently recovered his liberty at the Peace of Nimeguen. Egon having died in 1682, Louis obtained for William, who had purposely entered the Church, the Bishopric of Strasburg, and subsequently a cardinal's hat. Not did the French King's views in his favour stop here. Louis resolved to procure for him the Archbishopric and Electorate of Cologne; a step by which the electorate would

¹ See *Mémoires des Relations qui ont obligé le Roy à reprendre les armes*, in Dumas, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 176.

become almost a French province, while, at the same time, Louis would obtain through his creature and dependent a voice in the affairs of the Empire. Early in 1688, Maximilian, the Archbishop-elect of Cologne, and the Chapter being gained by French money, elected, by nineteen votes out of twenty-four, William Von Fürstenberg Coadjutor; that is, successor to the archbishopric when it should become vacant by the death of Maximilian, an event which happened a few months later (June, 1688). But the Pope, who was in the interests of the Emperor, annulled the election of the Coadjutor; the League of Augsburg brought forward the Bavarian Prince, Joseph Clement, as a rival candidate for the Archbishopric and Electorate, and though Clement was only seventeen years of age, the Pope gave him a dispensation and a brief of eligibility. As both the candidates possessed bishoprics, they could only be elected by *postulation*, for which the canon law requires a majority of two-thirds of the votes. But of the twenty-four votes, Fürstenberg obtained only fifteen, or one short of the required number. Clement had the remaining nine; and as he had been declared eligible by the Pope, while Fürstenberg had been rejected, the election fell upon Clement. Louis, however, declared that he would support Fürstenberg and the majority of the Chapter, and his troops took possession of most of the places of the electorate.

Thus the enmity between the Pope and the French King, first excited by the *Régale*, became irreconcilable. It had been recently aggravated by another dispute, which had involved the Parliament of Paris in Innocent's displeasure. The Pontiff, with a view to the better administration of police in Rome, had abrogated a privilege enjoyed by foreign ambassadors resident in that capital, by which not only the palace, but even the quarter which they inhabited, was considered inviolable, and thus afforded an asylum to malefactors of all kinds. All the other Powers submitted without a murmur to this wholesome regulation; but Louis haughtily declared "that his Crown had never been guided by the conduct of others; but, on the contrary, God had established it to be for them an example, and he was determined, so long as he reigned, never to forfeit any of its rights."¹ The Marquis of Lavardin, who proceeded to Rome as French ambassador in November, 1687, was instructed to disregard the Pope's abrogation of the ambassadorial franchise, although a bull of

¹ Martin, *Hist. de France*, t. xiv. p. 78.

excommunication had been launched against all who should neglect it. Liavardin entered Rome at the head of near a thousand armed men; but Innocent refused to receive him, and placed the French church of St. Louis, which the ambassador was accustomed to attend, under an interdict. The matter was taken up by the Parliament of Paris. Several members, and especially De Harlai, the *Procureur-général*, and Talon, the *Avocat-général*, inveighed vehemently against the Pope, and appealed to a future Council. The Parliament passed an *Arrêt* (January, 1688), that the King should be supplicated to assemble Provincial Councils, or a National Council, in order to put an end to the disorder created by the vacancy of bishoprics (through the *Régale*); and that all commerce with Rome, and the remitting of money thither, should be forbidden.

These quarrels show how much France was then before other Roman Catholic nations in the little value which she set on the Papal authority, and how near she was to an absolute separation from Rome. Nay, they were not without importance on the political events of the period, and caused Louis to feel that the Pope had not yet entirely lost his influence even in temporal matters. His rage and disappointment are shown in a violent and remarkable letter which he addressed to the Pope (September 6th), through the Cardinal d'Estrées, with orders to communicate it to Innocent and the Consistory. In this letter, which may almost be regarded as a declaration of the war he was meditating, he declared that he had lost all hope of reawakening in Innocent the feelings of the common father of Christendom, or to obtain any justice at his hands; and he intimated that the Pope's conduct would probably cause a general war in Europe. "It is a conduct," he continued, "which emboldens the Prince of Orange openly to manifest the design of attacking the King of England in his own dominions, and to hold out, on the pretext of so bold an enterprise, the maintenance of the Protestant religion, or rather the extirpation of Catholicism." He declared that he could no longer recognize Innocent as mediator in the affair of the Palatine succession, and that he should take care to obtain justice by the means which God had placed in his hands. He further announced that he should continue to assist the Cardinal Von Fürstenberg; and that if his ally, the Duke of Parma, was not immediately put in possession of the Duchies of Castro and Ronciglione, withheld from him by the Holy See since the Treaty

of Pisa, the French troops would enter Italy and Avignon would be seized.¹ This last threat was carried into execution in October.

Innocent XI. replied by proclaiming Clement of Bavaria Archbishop of Cologne, and by excommunicating the Parliament of Paris and the Advocate-General Talon. Louis, on his side, followed up his philippic against the Pope by the declaration of war against the Emperor already mentioned. For some weeks the French troops had been marching from Flanders towards the eastern frontier. One division, ostensibly commanded by the Dauphin, but in reality by Marshal de Duras and Vauban, laid siege to Philipsburg early in October; another smaller corps, under Boufflers, occupied, almost without resistance, Kaiserslautern, Neustadt, Kreutznach, Worms, Oppenheim, Bingen, Baccharach—in short, almost all the possessions of the Elector Palatine and the Elector of Mentz on the left bank of the Rhine. The latter admitted the French into his capital on condition that the neutrality of his dominions beyond the Rhine should be respected.

The joy of the Dutch Stadholder was boundless when he learnt that the French King had irrevocably committed himself to a policy which insured the success of the Stadholder's designs upon England, and would enable him at no distant period to add the might of that country to the already formidable coalition against France. Louis, unfortunately for himself, listened to the counsels of Louvois instead of those of D'Avaux. The latter had advised him to menace the Dutch frontier, and thus keep William at home. Louvois, on the other hand, represented that unless a diversion were made by an attack upon the Empire, the Turks, humiliated by their defeats; and threatened with the loss even of Belgrade, their frontier town, would be compelled to submit to whatsoever conditions the Emperor might be pleased to impose upon them, and would thus enable him to concentrate all his forces against France. This advice coincided with the policy, long pursued by Louis, of enriching himself at the expense of the Empire; whose frontiers, but slightly guarded, seemed to offer an easy conquest. Considerations of a personal nature had also, perhaps, some influence on the decision of the French King. He had to gratify his own pride, which had received a wound in the affair of Cologne; and he was, perhaps, also not unwilling to

¹ *Lettre de Louis XIV. au Cardinal d'Estresis*, in Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 167; *Essai sur l'Etat de France*, vol. i. p. 759.

mortify the pride of the King of England. The blindness and insatiation of James II. in this crisis of his fortunes almost surpasses belief. Ever since the end of May Louis had been warning James that his son-in-law was meditating a descent upon England. William had formed, near Nimeguen, a camp of 90,000 men; he was notoriously preparing large quantities of arms and warlike stores; the Dutch fleet had been put in preparation to sail at a few days' notice. James, however, refused to believe that these preparations were directed against himself, and listened to the assurances of William that they were occasioned by the state of affairs on the Continent. Another notion, that the States-General would not permit the departure of a force which was necessary for the defence of the Republic, was better founded. William himself had assured the States that such was the motive for his preparations. Nevertheless, had James had the least discernment, he must have perceived, from the state of feeling among his subjects, that it was not a moment to reject the aid of France, nay, even to insult the French King. Louis, who wished to save James in spite of himself, intrusted D'Avaux, his minister at the Hague, to signify to the States-General, early in September, that he should consider any act of hostility against his ally, the King of England, as a declaration of war against himself; at the same time preparations were made to march a force to the Dutch frontier, and Bonrepaux was despatched to England with offers of naval aid. But James, who had formerly been the pensioner of Louis, now indignantly disclaimed any alliance with him, thus giving him the lie in the face of Europe; and Skelton, the English ambassador at Paris, who had been privy to those steps on the part of the French Court, was recalled and committed to the Tower. James was seized with an unseasonable fit of pride, and exclaimed that a King of England needed not, like an Archbishop of Cologne, the patronage of any sovereign. So portentous a mixture of pride and stupidity was certainly well-calculated to disgust Louis; who, however, would himself have acted more wisely by overlooking James's folly, and listening only to the dictates of policy. Probably, however, Louis did not anticipate that the Stadholder would have achieved so speedy and triumphant a success. He might reasonably have expected that James would have been able to make a better stand; that a civil war would have ensued, which, for a year or two at least, might have found employment for all William's resources, and in which he might have been ultimately baffled by the help of a moderate French force. But when the

crisis actually came, James himself took a juster view of his position. No sooner were the French troops withdrawn from Flanders than his desolate situation at once stared him in the face; and especially when Louis, in his declaration of war against the Emperor, intimated that he meant to observe the peace with Holland, as well as the twenty years' truce with Spain: James, in his despair, now almost went the length of declaring war against France. He assured the States that he had no alliance with that nation; that he regarded the siege of Philipsburg as a breach of the Truce of Ratisbon; that he was ready to join Spain and the States in maintaining the peace of Europe. But the States listened in preference to William, who opened to them his intended expedition, and persuaded them that the safety and independence of their religion and country were involved in its success; and, in their answer to James, instead of entering into his proposal concerning the peace of Europe, they intimated their desire to restore peace and confidence in England, by securing the civil and religious rights of his subjects.¹ William hastened on his preparations, and on November 1st, 1688, he finally sailed with his fleet to seize the Crown of England. The Spanish ambassador at the Hague caused a grand mass to be performed for his success.² Such are the revolutions of state policy! In the same year of the preceding century Spain had fitted out the Armada, in order to wrest the English sceptre from the hands of a heretic sovereign and compel the nation to return to the Popish Communion. Now she was favouring and abetting the attempt of a Calvinist Prince to expel a Roman Catholic King, and thus to consolidate the civil and religious liberties of England.

It forms no part of our plan to enter into the details of William's expedition—to explain the state of parties in England, the motives which led him to undertake his enterprise, the reasons which promised him success, and the means by which it was achieved. All these things, especially since the publication of Lord Macaulay's brilliant pages, are familiar to the English reader; and we shall therefore merely refresh his memory with a summary of the principal facts, and hasten on to view the effect of this great revolution on the general affairs of Europe. William landed at Torbay on November 5th, the anniversary of the Popish plot; on December 18th he was domiciled at St. James's, his march having been interrupted only by one or two trifling skirmishes. Meanwhile

¹ Kennet, *Hist. of Engl.*, vol. iii., p. 489 sq.; Macaulay, vol. ii. ch. 9.

² D'Avaux, *ap. Lingard*, vol. x. p. 257, note.

James had fled. On December 28th the fugitive monarch arrived at St. Germain's, and found in Louis XIV., whom he had rejected as an ally, a generous protector. On February 13th, 1689, William and his consort Mary solemnly accepted the English Crown, the Parliament having previously voted (January 23rd) that James, by withdrawing himself out of the kingdom, had *abdicated* the government, and that the throne was thereby vacant. In Scotland the authority of the new King was established after a slight attempt at resistance; Ireland, from the religion and disposition of the people, was naturally more favourable to James's cause, and it was here that, with French aid, he was enabled for a year or two to dispute the ground with William. On March 12th, 1689, James, escorted by a large French fleet, and accompanied by some 1,200 of his own soldiers, paid by France, landed at Kinsale; the Irish flocked to his standards, and he soon found himself at the head of a large, but ill-armed and ill-disciplined force. This hostile act on the part of Louis caused William, as King of England, to declare war against France, May 17th, 1689.¹ The Irish campaign of that year was indecisive. James was held in check by the Irish Protestants, and particularly by the heroic defence of Londonderry; and by the landing of Marshal Schomberg, at the head of 10,000 men (August), he was compelled to retire into winter quarters. That celebrated general, who was a Protestant, had renounced the service of Louis upon the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and, after a short residence in Brandenburg, had entered that of William, along with many other French refugees. Thus the cruel and bigoted policy of Louis was not long in bearing its fruits. In the campaign of the following year (1690) William opposed his father-in-law in person, and completely defeated him at the battle of the Boyne (July 1st). Schomberg fell in this engagement, while animating his Hugonot troops to avenge themselves on their persecutors. James again escaped to France, and became a pensioner on Louis's bounty. In the same year a naval engagement took place off Beachy Head, between the French fleet, under Tourville, and the combined English and Dutch fleets, under the Earl of Torrington (June 30th). Victory remained with the French, who, however, neglected to pursue their advantage, except by the burning of Teignmouth. In 1691 William proceeded into Holland, to take part in the campaign against the French; but the Irish were reduced to obedience by his forces under General Ginkell. They obtained

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 280.

a favourable peace by the treaty called the Pacification of Limerick (October 3rd), and William was thus enabled to devote his whole attention to the affairs of the Continent, to which we must now return.

The success of the English revolution caused a great sensation throughout Europe. The ancient prejudices of religion, the theories of absolute monarchical power, of the divine and indefeasible rights of kings all vanished before the political interests of the moment, and the success of William was hailed with almost unmixed delight by the Courts of Madrid, of Vienna, and even of Rome. All nations seemed absorbed in the one thought of repressing the unconscionable ambition of Louis XIV.; while Louis, on his side, wantonly defied united Europe. One of his first steps on learning William's descent on England had been to declare war against the United Netherlands (November 26th, 1688), and thus to convert the Dutch from indirect into open and active enemies. This declaration, indeed, was not founded on William's expedition, but on the intervention of the Dutch in the affairs of Cologne, to the prejudice of Furstenberg. Yet at this moment France was not strong enough to hold the conquests which she had made. Louis now hearkened to the diabolical counsels of Louvois. From the Court of Versailles, the model of politeness, the centre of European refinement, issued a mandate which might have disgraced Attila or Zingis Khan. The French generals were ordered to burn the towns and villages they could not garrison, lest they should be occupied by the enemy! Heidelberg, the residence of the Elector Palatine, was one of the first places abandoned to the flames, and the ruins of the magnificent electoral palace still attest this act of ferocious barbarity. These orders were soon afterwards followed by others for a more wholesale destruction—nothing less than the burning of all the places near the Rhine between Mentz and Philipsburg! Spires, Worms, Oppenheim, Frankenthal, Bingen, and other places, with their beautiful cathedrals and churches and their ancient mediæval monuments, became a prey to the flames, and all that smiling region assumed the aspect of a desert. Altogether, more than forty towns and villages were burnt. A hundred thousand houseless human beings wandered about in search of some refuge for their misery, imprecating curses on the French and their cruel King, and demanding vengeance at the hands of the Emperor and of Europe. Voltaire¹ suggests, in excuse for Louis, that he

¹ *Siècle de Louis XIV.*

would not have caused this misery could he have seen it with his own eyes; a better security, perhaps, would have been that he should have felt some portion of it. The exasperation of the Germans may be better imagined than described. The Emperor Leopold, in confirming the Decree of the Diet of Ratisbon of January 24th, 1689, for war, denounced the King of France as the enemy not only of the Empire, but of all Christendom, and worthy to be regarded in the same light as the Turk.¹ The Diet decreed the expulsion of every Frenchman from Germany, and interdicted, under the penalty of high treason, all commerce with France.

It was in the midst of these horrors and disasters that Leopold extended the bounds of the coalition against Louis XIV. by entering into an offensive and defensive treaty with the Dutch Republic, May 12th, 1689, in which both parties engaged not to lay down their arms, or separate from each other, till Louis should have been deprived of all his conquests, and reduced within the limits of the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees.² William III., as King of England, acceded to the treaty, December 30th, 1689, and his example was followed by the King of Spain (June 6th, 1690).³ The greater part of Europe was thus confederated against France, and the treaty obtained the name of the GRAND ALLIANCE. Frederick III. of Brandenburg—the Great Elector, Frederick William, had died April 29th, 1688—had also joined the party of his uncle William and the Emperor, and, following the footsteps of his father as protector of the Reformed Faith, had done all that lay in his power to promote the success of William's enterprise upon England. The death of Pope Innocent XI. (August, 1689) seemed to be the only event favourable to France. But although Louis XIV. expended three million livres to procure the election of Alexander VIII. (Cardinal Ottoboni), as Innocent's successor, and though he restored Avignon to that pontiff, and yielded on the subject of the ambassadorial franchise, yet he did not succeed in gaining his friendship. Alexander confirmed the election of Clement to the Archbishopric of Cologne, and continued to refuse bulls of investiture to the French bishops who had been parties to the declaration of 1682.

Our limits will not permit us to describe at any length the war between Louis XIV. and the Grand Alliance, which lasted till the Peace of Ryswick, in 1697, but only to note some of the chief

¹ *Theatrum Europ.* t. xiii. p. 657.

² Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 229.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 241, 267

incidents of the different campaigns. The Imperialists had, in 1689, notwithstanding the efforts it was still necessary to make against the Turks, brought an army of 80,000 men into the field, which was divided into three bodies, under the command of the Duke of Lorraine, the Elector of Bavaria, and the Elector of Brandenburg; while the Prince of Waldeck, in the Netherlands, was at the head of a large Dutch and Spanish force, composed, however, in great part of German mercenaries. In this quarter Marshal d'Humières was opposed to Waldeck, while Duras commanded the French army on the Rhine. In the south the Duke of Noailles maintained a French force in Catalonia. Nothing of much importance was done this year; but on the whole the war went in favour of the Imperialists, who succeeded in recovering Mentz and Bonn.

1690.—This year Marshal d'Humières was superseded by the Duke of Luxembourg, who infused more vigour into the French operations. Luxembourg was a general of the school of Condé; that is to say, he achieved success by vigour and impetuosity rather than by cautious skill and scientific combinations. On the other hand, these last qualities, which were the characteristics of Turenne, were possessed in an eminent degree by Catinat, the first instance in France of a plebeian general. Belonging to a family of *the Robe*, or legal profession, and at first an advocate himself, Catinat had attained his military rank solely by his merit and almost in spite of the Court. Mild and simple in his manners, wary and prudent in his manœuvres, he was beloved by his soldiers, who called him "Père La Pensée." Catinat was sent this year into Dauphiné to watch the movements of the Duke of Savoy, who was suspected by the French Court, and not without reason, of favouring the Grand Alliance. The extravagant demands of Louis, who required Victor Amadeus to unite his troops with the army of Catinat, and to admit a French garrison into Vercelli, Verrua, and even the citadel of Turin itself, till a general peace should be effected, caused the Duke to enter into treaties with Spain and the Emperor, June 3rd and 4th;¹ and on October 20th, he joined the Grand Alliance by a treaty concluded at the Hague with England and the States-General.² This last step was taken by Victor Amadeus in consequence of his reverses. He had sustained from Catinat in the battle of Staffarda (August 17th) a defeat, which only the skill of a youthful general, his cousin the Prince Eugene, had saved from becoming a total rout. As the

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 265 sqq.

² *Ibid.* p. 272.

fruits of this victory, Catinat occupied Saluzzo, Susa, and all the country from the Alps to the Tanaro. During these operations another French division had reduced, without much resistance, the whole of Savoy, except the fortress of Montmélian. The only other event of importance during this campaign was the decisive victory gained by Luxembourg over Prince Waldeck at Fleurus, July 1st. The captured standards, more than a hundred in number, which Luxembourg sent to Paris on this occasion, obtained for him the name of the *Tapissier de Notre Dame*. Luxembourg was, however, prevented from following up his victory by the orders of Louvois, who forbade him to lay siege to Namur or Charleroi. Thus, in this campaign, France maintained her preponderance on land as well as at sea by the victory off Beachy Head, already mentioned. The Imperialists had this year lost one of their best leaders by the death of the Duke of Lorraine (April). He was succeeded as commander-in-chief by Maximilian Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria; but nothing of importance took place upon the Rhine.

1691.—The campaign of this year was singularly barren of events, though both the French and English Kings took a personal part in it. In March, Louis and Luxembourg laid siege to Mons, the capital of Hainault, which surrendered in less than three weeks. King William, who was in the neighbourhood, could not muster sufficient troops to venture on its relief. Nothing further of importance was done in this quarter, and the campaign in Germany was equally a blank. On the side of Piedmont, Catinat took Nice, but being confronted by superior numbers, was forced to evacuate Piedmont; though, by way of compensation, he completed the conquest of Savoy by the capture of Montmélian. Noailles gained some trifling successes in Spain; and the celebrated French corsair, Jean Bart, distinguished himself by his enterprises at sea. One of the most remarkable events of the year was a domestic occurrence, the death of Louvois. That minister had become altogether insupportable to Louis by his insolence, and by the errors and even crimes into which he had led him; and the French King could not help expressing the satisfaction he felt at his death. Nevertheless, in spite of all his faults, Louvois had great administrative abilities, and particularly a wonderful talent for military organization, the loss of which in the present embarrassing war, it was impossible to supply.

1692.—Louis had made extraordinary exertions for the campaign of this year. The French armies were estimated at nearly

450,000 men, while 100,000 were levied for the navy. So great a force had never before been raised in France. Enraged by the loss of Ireland in the preceding year, Louis had resolved to make a grand attempt for the restoration of James II. by a descent upon England. For this purpose, and for an attack upon the Spanish Netherlands, his whole power was to be concentrated, whilst in Germany, Piedmont, and Catalonia his armies were to stand on the defensive. Five hundred transports, calculated to convey 30,000 men, chiefly Irish and British emigrants, were assembled at La Hogue, Cherbourg, and Havre; and their passage was to be covered by a French fleet of fifty ships of the line under Tourville. The frustration of this attempt by Admiral Russell's victory over Tourville, May 19th, and the subsequent destruction of great part of the French ships which had taken refuge at La Hogue, are well known to the English reader. With this defeat vanished James's last chance of ever regaining the English throne. Louis's success on land afforded him some compensation for this misfortune. In May, the King and Luxembourg undertook the siege of Namur with upwards of 100,000 men. The town surrendered in less than a week, but one of the forts constructed for its protection by the celebrated Dutch engineer Cohorn, and defended by himself, held out nearly a month. William III., who was in the neighbourhood with about 70,000 men, was unable to render Namur any assistance. After the fall of that place, Louis returned to Versailles, leaving Luxembourg with a much reduced force to make head against William. On August 3rd, he was attacked, almost surprised, by William, near Steinkirk. The day was obstinately contested; both sides suffered enormous loss, and though William was at length obliged to retire, he conducted his retreat in good order and without molestation.¹ On the side of the Rhine, and on that of the Pyrenees, the war was altogether insignificant. In the Alps the French suffered some reverses. The Duke of Savoy crossed into Dauphiné, took Embrun, burnt Gap, and devastated the surrounding country, by way of reprisal for the destruction committed by the French in Piedmont and the Palatinate. Here a youthful heroine, M^{lle}. de la Tour-du-Pin, directed against the invaders a partisan warfare in a way which procured for her a military pension, and a trophy in St. Denis near that of Joan of Arc.

¹ The inconvenient match-lock was still partially used by the French infantry, but seems to have been abandoned after

this battle. The allies appear to have been in advance of the French in using the flint-lock. Martin, t. xiv, p. 184.

1693.—Early in June, for the campaign opened late, the kings of France and England found themselves almost in presence in the neighbourhood of Louvain. William III. was encamped at the Abbaye du Parck, Louis at Gemblours; William had scarcely 50,000 men, Louis had more than double that number. The defeat of William would have insured the conquest not only of Liège and Brussels, but of the whole Spanish Netherlands. The French army was impatiently awaiting the order of attack, when Louis suddenly set off for Versailles, and dismembered his army by despatching part of it into Germany, under pretence of making a diversion in favour of the Turks. In fact Louis, who was fond of besieging towns that were sure to be taken, was afraid of risking his military reputation in the open field, and in spite of the earnest intreaties of Luxembourg, flung away one of those opportunities which fortune never offers twice. This conduct, said to have been counselled by Madame de Maintenon, who had accompanied Louis to Namur, rendered him the object of derision not only to his enemies, but also to his own subjects, and deprived him of the confidence and respect of his soldiers. He never again appeared at the head of his troops. The French army was in some degree compensated for its disappointment by Luxembourg's victory over William at Neerwinden, July 29th; purchased, however, by an enormous loss on their side as well as on that of the allies.¹ William, as usual, conducted his retreat with skill and safety, so that Luxembourg, who was momentarily expected at Brussels, did not venture to follow him, and was fain to content himself with the capture of Charleroi. Meanwhile the campaign in Germany, for the sake of which, Louis had relinquished the prospect of conquering the entire Spanish Netherlands, was almost null. Here a fine army, nominally under the command of the Dauphin, but in reality of Marshal De Lorges, achieved only the re-conquest of the ruins of Heidelberg, and disgraced itself by pillaging and burning what had escaped the former devastation, and by exercising the most ruthless barbarity on the miserable inhabitants. In Piedmont, Catinat, now a marshal, gained a great victory over the Duke of Savoy at Marsaglia, October 4th, but was unable to follow it up for want of money and siege materials. Prince Eugene commanded the allied infantry

¹ This is said to have been the first battle decided by a charge with the bayonet, which was then nothing but a sword thrust into the barrel of the musket. The modern method of fixing

it was, however, invented about this time either by Vauban, or the Scotch general Mackay. Martin, t. xiv. p. 176. The Duke of Berwick was captured in this action. See his *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 120.

on this occasion. The battle of Marsaglia, like that of Neerwinden, was in a great measure decided by charges with the bayonet. In Catalonia, Marshal Noailles captured Rosas, June 9th. Thus the advantage of this campaign rested with the French, who were also successful at sea. The battle of the Hogue, though a severe blow, had not been so fatal to the French navy as represented by some historians. France had never had larger fleets at sea than in 1693; when she had 93 vessels afloat, of which 71 were ships of the line, besides 30 galleys. On June 27th, Tourville defeated, in the Bay of Lagos, Admiral Rooke, who was convoying the English and Dutch Smyrna fleet, of which a great part was captured or destroyed.

In the midst of his successes, however, Louis was desirous of peace. Several causes combined to produce this disposition. By the death of Louvois he had lost a minister who not only stimulated his warlike inclinations, but also provided him with the means of gratifying them with ease and success. The French treasury was exhausted, and the nation in general in a state of the deepest distress and misery. As Voltaire remarks, "the people were perishing to the sound of *Te Deums*." Even at the beginning of the war, in 1689, the kingdom was so exhausted by Louis's wars, by the money spent in bribing foreign princes and ministers, and by his own profusion and extravagance, that recourse had been had to the disgraceful expedient of recasting the specie, and it at an advance of ten per cent. in its nominal value;¹ while, at the same time, such was the scarcity of the precious metals, that private individuals were compelled to send their silver plate and utensils, above a certain weight, to the mint. Louis himself set the example by melting some of his finest sculptured vases and other articles. In order to meet the current expenses and the growing national debt, absurd taxes were put upon trade and agriculture, which tended to check production and augment the public misery. The cultivation of the land was rendered more difficult and expensive by the large draughts upon the peasantry to recruit the army; and these artificial causes of distress were aggravated in 1692 and 1693 by two successive deficient harvests. To these domestic motives for peace add another of foreign aggrandizement. The feeble health of Charles II. of Spain promised soon to bring him childless to the tomb, and Louis could not hope to reap his succession while

¹ Forbonnais, *Recherches sur les Finances*, ap. Martin, t. xiv. p. 120.

all Europe stood confederated and in arms against him. Denmark and Sweden, though they had at first furnished some troops to the Coalition, had afterwards assumed a neutral posture, and had recently entered into a treaty with each other to make their maritime neutrality respected (March 17th, 1693). Through these Powers, as mediators, Louis offered to make great concessions to the Empire; to evacuate almost all his recent acquisitions; to abandon his sister-in-law's claims on the Palatinate; nay, even to refer the question of the *Réunions*, with the exception of Strasburg, to the arbitration of Venice. Louis made concessions equally ample to Spain and to the Duke of Savoy. But though the two Northern Powers and the Pope zealously endeavoured to effect a peace, the Emperor and the King of England, who were encouraged by the exhaustion of France to continue the war, frustrated all their attempts for that purpose. A new Pontiff now occupied the Apostolic Chair. Alexander VIII. had died after a short reign in February, 1691, and was succeeded by Cardinal Pignatelli, who assumed the title of Innocent XII. This Pope was of a more placable temper than his predecessors, and Louis XIV. purchased his friendship by what the French call a *transaction*; that is, a compromise on the subject of the Declaration of 1682. No retractation was made of the Gallican doctrines promulgated in the Declaration; but the bishops who had signed it, made, in their individual capacity, a humble, though somewhat equivocal, apology, with which Innocent XII. professed himself satisfied, and granted the bulls which had been withheld.¹

1694.—We now return to the course of the war. Want of means compelled Louis XIV. to remain on the defensive, except in Catalonia, where, by inflicting some vigorous blows, he hoped to compel Spain to a peace. Marshal Noailles having forced the passage of the Ter (May 27th), drove the Spaniards from their entrenched position on the other side, and captured the towns of Palamos, Girona, and Ostalric: thus threatening Barcelona, which, however, the presence of the English fleet under Admiral Russell deterred him from attacking. The campaigns in Piedmont and Germany this year were wholly insignificant. Even that in the Netherlands, notwithstanding the vast preparations of William III., went off without a battle, through the skilful manœuvres of Luxembourg. The only advantage gained by the allies was the capture of Hui. This was the last campaign of Marshal Luxembourg,

¹ Bausset, *Hist. de Bossuet*, t. ii. p. 205, sqq.

the greatest general then in the French service, who had gained almost every battle he fought. He died at the age of sixty-seven, January 4th, 1695, in consequence of his gallantries and debaucheries, which he still continued to pursue, in spite of his years and his deformed person.

The naval-war this year was more fertile in incidents than that on land. An attack of the English and Dutch fleets upon Brest was repulsed with some loss, chiefly through the treachery of Marlborough, who had privately informed James II. of the intended enterprise, and had thus enabled the French to put themselves in a posture of defence. The combined fleet, in retiring, bombarded Dieppe, Havre, Dunkirk, and Calais; but, except the burning of Dieppe, without much effect. Meanwhile, the celebrated French corsairs, Jean Bart, Duguay Trouin, Petit Renau, and others, filled the narrow seas with the renown of their valour, and the hearts of the Dutch and English merchants with grief for their losses.

1695.—After the death of Marshal Luxembourg the command of the French army in the Netherlands was bestowed on Villeroi, son of Louis's tutor, and the companion of his youth; a favourite at Court, but little qualified for the important post with which he was intrusted. His only feat during the campaign was a savage and useless bombardment of Brussels, which, however, did not save Namur from falling into the hands of the allies (September 6th). This was almost the only considerable success of William since the commencement of the war; and as it was also the first of Louis's conquests retaken from him by force, it produced a great sensation in Europe. On the banks of the Rhine the French repeated without hindrance their usual summer ravages, but attempted nothing further. In Piedmont, Louis and the Duke of Savoy had already come to an understanding with each other. Victor Amadeus deceived the Imperial and Spanish generals by a collusion with France, by which it was arranged that Casale should be surrendered to him by the French commandant after a kind of mock siege, but on condition that its fortifications should be demolished, and its military importance thus annihilated. Victor Amadeus contrived, by his dilatoriness, to make this the only operation of the year.¹ In order, however, to throw dust into the eyes of the allies, he acceded to the renewal of the Grand Alliance, which was again signed this year by the Emperor, the

King of Spain, the King of England, the States-General, the Bishop of Münster, the Duke (now Elector) of Hanover, and the Electors of Bavaria and Brandenburg. The war at sea was confined to useless bombardments of a few places on the French coast by the English and Dutch fleets.

1696.—The campaign in Flanders this year was a vast and almost ridiculous display of force, without the striking of a single blow. Armies of 250,000 men, under William and Vaudemont on one side, Villeroy and Boufflers on the other, watched one another several months, without coming to an engagement. The campaign in Germany was, as usual, equally null. In Piedmont, Victor Amadeus threw off the mask, and concluded an advantageous treaty, offensive and defensive, with Louis XIV. (August 29th). The Duke, who was to be allowed a fair and reasonable period to disengage himself from the Grand Alliance, was to recover, at the general peace, Pinerolo, the key of Italy, which Richelieu had been at such pains to acquire; Savoy, Susa, and the county of Nice were also to be restored to him. The Duke of Burgundy, the eldest of the French King's grandsons, was to marry the Duke's eldest daughter. If the neutrality of Italy was not effected by that time, the Duke was to unite his forces with those of France, to take the command of the combined army, to receive a subsidy of 100,000 crowns a month, and to be invested with whatsoever conquests should be made in the Milanese.¹ The Cabinets of Vienna and Madrid, exasperated by the Duke's treachery, at first refused the neutrality of Italy, in spite of the instances of the Pope, the Venetians, and other Italian Powers; but Victor Amadeus, having united his forces with those of Catinat, laid siege to Valenza, and threatened the invasion of the Milanese; and the allied generals, finding themselves unable to oppose him, used the power with which they had been furnished in case of extreme necessity, to accept the neutrality of the Italian peninsula (October 7th).

Although the treaty with Victor Amadeus strengthened the hands of Louis by placing another army at his disposal, he nevertheless made advances to the allies for peace. William III. seemed not disinclined to listen to them. The Dutch and English, whose commerce had suffered enormously by the French privateers, had begun to perceive that they were bearing almost the whole brunt of the war for the benefit of the Emperor. Leopold alone was

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 368.

averse to a peace for the very same reason that Louis desired one—the question, namely, of the Spanish Succession. At length, however, on the intimation of Sweden, the mediating Power, that if he persisted in his refusal to negotiate, Great Britain and the States-General would conclude a separate peace with France, he consented to send plenipotentiaries to Ryswick, a village near the Hague, where a Congress was opened May 9th, 1697, in William's Château of Neuburg Hausen.

While the negotiations were going on, preparations were made by the French for conducting on a grand scale the campaign in the Netherlands. They were also pushing with vigour the war in Catalonia. The Duke of Vendôme, who succeeded Noailles in this quarter in 1695, had not hitherto been able to effect anything of importance; but this year, being assisted by the French fleet under D'Estrées, he laid siege to Barcelona, and compelled it to surrender, August 10th. The fall of this place, and the distracted and distressed condition of the Spanish monarchy, induced the Cabinet of Charles II. to accept the ultimatum offered by Louis; and on the 20th of September three separate treaties were signed between France on the one side, and Holland, England, and Spain on the other. The only article of importance in the treaty between France and the States-General was the restoration by the latter of Pondicherry, which they had captured, to the French East India Company. The Dutch also concluded on the same day a very advantageous treaty of commerce with France. By the treaty with Great Britain, Louis XIV. recognized William as the lawful king of that country, and bound himself to lend no further help to his enemies, that is, to James II.; a step which must have been most painful to Louis, both from his love of the Stuarts and his hatred of the Prince of Orange. The points in dispute between William and his father-in-law had, indeed, formed the chief difficulties in the secret preliminary discussions held this summer at Hall, between Marshal Boufflers and William's confidant, Bentinck, Earl of Portland. The only other article of much importance in this treaty was the restoration, by both parties, of the conquests they had made in America.

By the third treaty, with Spain, Louis restored to that Power Girona, Rosas, Cervera, and Barcelona in Catalonia; also, with a few exceptions, all the places in the Spanish Netherlands which had been taken by him during the war, as well as all the places in that country which had been reunited since the Peace of Nime-

guen, except certain towns and villages which Louis pretended to be dependencies of Charlemont, Maubenge, and other towns previously ceded to him.

By a separate article Leopold and the Empire were allowed all the month of October to accede to the ultimatum, and a suspension of arms was granted for the same period. The Imperial plenipotentiaries signed a treaty with France, October 30th, on the basis of those of Westphalia and Nimeguen. Louis restored all the places which had been reunited to his Crown with the exception of those in Alsace; and thus the Bishop of Strasburg, the nobles of Higher and Lower Alsace, the ten Imperial cities, and the immediate nobility of Lower Alsace, became thenceforward the vassals and subjects of France. The Duke of Lorraine¹ was restored to his dominions, with the reservation of Sarre Louis. The Bavarian Prince, Joseph Clement, remained in possession of the Electorate of Cologne; while the Elector Palatine engaged to pay the Duchess of Orleans 200,000 francs per annum till the Pope should have pronounced his arbitration.²

At the last moment before the treaty was signed, the French ministers, under threats of renewing the war, effected the insertion of the following clause into the fourth article: "That the Roman Catholic religion should remain, in the places restored, on the same footing as it then was." In the numerous Protestant towns and villages which the French had reunited, they had introduced the Roman Catholic service, and had compelled the Protestants to lend their churches for that purpose. This clause laid the foundation for new dissensions between the Catholics and Protestants of Germany.³

Thus a war which had lasted nine years, and which had been carried on with such mighty efforts on all sides, produced not consequences so important as might have been expected. For the first time since the ministry of Richelieu France had lost ground, and, with the exception of Strasburg, had abandoned the acquisitions of 1684 for the limits prescribed by the Peace of Nimeguen in 1678. For Europe in general the most important result was

¹ Leopold, who became the stem of the new House of Austria, which mounted the Imperial throne after the extinction of the male line of the House of Habsburg in 1745. We have already mentioned the death of Leopold's father, Charles V., in 1690. Charles died with a great reputation as a man of learning, an able general, and good diplomatist. Louis XIV. said

of him:—"Qu'il était le plus grand, le plus sage, et le plus généreux de ses ennemies."—His *Testament Politique*, which appeared in the midst of the negotiations for the Peace of Ryswick, produced a great sensation in Europe.

² Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 421.

³ See Menzel. *Neuere Gesch. der Deutschen*, B. iv. Kap. 50.

that the Stuarts were for ever deprived of the throne of England ; and that country, liberated from French influence, became the counterpoise of France in the European system. From this period the continental relations of England became permanent ; and she adopted, for the most part, the policy of allying herself with those countries which had reason to dread the ambition of France.

CHAPTER XL.

THE question of the Spanish Succession, the chief motive with Louis XIV. for concluding the somewhat disadvantageous Peace of Ryswick, engrossed, towards the close of the seventeenth century, the attention of European statesmen. An attack of tertian fever, in 1697, had still further shattered the feeble constitution of Charles II.; and though he survived three or four years a disorder which had threatened to be fatal, the effects of it at length brought him to the tomb. Feeble both in body and mind, his life had been nothing but a protracted malady, in which the last descendant of the Emperor Charles V. seemed to typify the declining kingdom over which he reigned.

The majority of Charles II. had been fixed at the age of fifteen, and the first act of his accession had been a kind of revolution. Maria Anna, the Queen Dowager, after the expulsion of Niethard (*supra*, p. 361 *sq.*) had created Valenzuelo a Marquis and grandee of the first class, and at length made him prime minister; while Don John of Austria was condemned to a sort of banishment in his governments of Aragon and Catalonia. But in 1677, when Charles II. attained his majority, he recalled Don John to Court; the Queen was shut up in a convent at Toledo, and Valenzuelo banished to the Philippine Islands. Don John's administration, however, did not answer to the opinion which had been formed of his abilities. He found Spain involved in a ruinous war with France, which he was forced to terminate by acceding to the humiliating Peace of Nimeguen; and he further alienated the affections of the Spaniards, who detested the French, by negotiating a marriage between Charles II. and Maria Louisa of Orleans, niece of Louis XIV. This union, which was celebrated at Quintanapulla, in October, 1679, he did not live to see. He died in the preceding month, in his fiftieth year, worn out, it is said, by chagrin at his unpopularity and by the anxiety occasioned by the machinations of the Queen's friends. The Queen Dowager was now recalled; but, having grown cautious from her late misfortunes, took but little part in the conduct of affairs.

The young King, who was himself incapable of business, successively intrusted the administration to a secretary named Eguia, to the Duke of Medina Celi, the Counts of Oropesa and Melgar, the Dukes of Sessa and Infantado, and the Count of Montéréy; but these ministers, though differing in talent, all proved unequal to the task of raising Spain from the misery into which she was sunk, which was aggravated, not only by bad fiscal measures, but also by the natural calamities of earthquakes, hurricanes, inundations, and famines. The death of Charles II.'s consort, Maria Louisa, in 1689, and his marriage the following year with Mary Anne, of Neuburg, a sister of the Empress, naturally tended to draw him under the influence of the Austrian Court; especially as Mary Anne, after the death of the Queen Dowager, in 1696, obtained more undivided sway over her husband. This circumstance favoured the Imperial claims to the Spanish succession; but in order to understand that question, and the politics of the different parties concerned in it, we must here give an account of the origin of their claims.

The three¹ principal claimants were, first, the Dauphin of France, as son of the elder sister of Charles II.; second, Joseph Ferdinand, the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, as grandson of his second sister; and third, the Emperor Leopold. The Emperor at first claimed, as male representative of the younger branch of the House of Austria, being descended from Ferdinand, second son of Philip and Joanna of Castile; and he alleged, in support of his claim, the family conventions entered into by the House of Austria; by which, if the males of one branch became extinct, the succession was to pass to the males of the next branch, to the exclusion of females, who could not succeed except in default of heirs male of all the branches. But as it was replied, that particular arrangements among members of the House of Austria could not abrogate the fundamental laws of Spain, by which direct female heirs were preferred to collateral male heirs, Leopold withdrew this argument and substituted another claim in right of his mother, Maria Anna, daughter of Philip III. of Spain, who had done no act to invalidate her succession to the Spanish Crown.

In preferring this claim, Leopold became the rival of his own

¹ There were two or three other claimants, whom it is scarcely necessary to mention, viz., Victor Amadeus of Savoy, as descended from Catharine, second daughter of Philip II.; and the Duke of

Orleans, as son of Anne of Austria, eldest daughter of Philip III. and wife of Louis XIII. The latter claim would evidently vest in Louis XIV. Also, Don Pedro II. of Portugal.

grandson, the Electoral Prince of Bavaria. Leopold had married for his first wife, Margaret, second daughter of Philip IV. of Spain, and younger sister of Maria Theresa, Queen of Louis XIV.; and as Margaret had made no renunciation of the Spanish Crown, and had been named among his heirs by Philip IV., she seemed to have a preferable title to her elder sister. Leopold had had by her an only daughter, Mary Antoinette, now dead, who had married Max Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria, and had had by him Joseph Ferdinand, the Electoral Prince in question, who, if the rights of his mother were admitted, was entitled to the Spanish throne. But Leopold, to guard against any claim which might divert the Spanish succession from the House of Austria to that of Bavaria, had caused his daughter to execute an act of renunciation at the time of her marriage, which, however, had never been ratified either by the King of Spain or by the Cortes.

It was plain, however, that a question of such vast European importance would not be decided by the strict rules of hereditary succession, but must become a subject of negotiation, and even of war. The European Powers would hardly stand quietly by and see the vast dominions of Spain annexed to the already overgrown power of the Emperor; and Leopold, to evade this objection, transferred his claim to the Archduke Charles, his second son by his marriage with Eleanor Magdalene, Princess Palatine of Neuburg: his eldest son Joseph, by the same marriage, having been elected King of the Romans, in 1690, and thus destined to succeed him on the Imperial throne. In like manner, to obviate any objection to the union of France and Spain, Louis ultimately proposed to give the crown of the latter country to Philip, Duke of Anjou, second son of the Dauphin.

The King of Spain's second consort, Mary Anne of Neuburg, being a sister of the Empress, naturally promoted the views of Leopold; in which, however, she was opposed by the Queen-Mother, Mary Anne of Austria, who was in favour of the Electoral Prince of Bavaria; while the imbecile and unfortunate Charles, incapable of forming a judgment, or maintaining an opinion of his own, was drawn to either side alternately.¹ The Austrian

¹ Louis XIV., in his *Instruction* to the Marquis d'Harcourt, gives the following description of Charles II.:—"Ce prince a passé sa vie dans une profonde ignorance; jamais ses propres intérêts ne lui ont été expliqués, et l'extrême aversion qu'on avait pris soin de lui inspirer pour la France est la seule maxime dont on ait prétendu l'instruire. Sa propre inclina-

tion l'a éloigné des affaires, sa timidité lui a fait haïr le monde; son tempérament est prompt, colère, et le porte à une extrême mélancolie," &c. Ap. Gardien, *Hist. des Traités*, t. ii. p. 187. Charles's ignorance was such that, when Louis XIV. took Mons, he thought that the place had been captured from William III. instead of himself.

influence began, indeed, to predominate after the death of the Queen-Mother in 1696; but her representations had made so lively an impression on Charles, that he is said to have made a will in favour of the Electoral Prince of Bavaria. It was to efface these impressions that Leopold sent as his ambassador to Spain Count Harrach, a veteran diplomatist, who was charged to obtain the substitution of the Archduke Charles for the Bavarian Prince. Charles II. consented to this arrangement, provided the Emperor would send that Prince into Spain, together with a force of 10,000 men, to assist in expelling the French from Catalonia; but Leopold, embarrassed at that time by the Turkish war, declined a proposal which suited neither his means nor his inclination. The negotiations lingered, and France, meanwhile, concluded the Peace of Ryswick, which put an end to the hopes which Leopold had founded on the Grand Alliance. England and Holland, in spite of their engagements with Leopold, inclined towards the Bavarian party, as best calculated to maintain the balance of power; and thus they abandoned the Emperor in the negotiations at Ryswick, in which not a word was said about the Spanish succession.

To counteract the Austrian influence, Louis XIV. despatched the Count d'Harcourt to Madrid early in 1698. The Germans were not popular in Spain; the Queen, by her maladroitness, had alienated several of the ministers and grandees, whom D'Harcourt, by his popular manners and winning address, and partly, also, it is said, by bribery, succeeded in conciliating to the French cause; and among them, in particular, the Cardinal Portocarrero, Archbishop of Toledo, one of the most influential men in Spain. The French ambassador also worked on the timid mind of Charles by threats, and plainly intimated a resort to force if the rights of the children of France should be superseded. By these means he induced the King of Spain at least to postpone any declaration in favour of the Archduke Charles, though without pressing the nomination of the Duke of Anjou, on which Louis himself had not yet determined. The French King felt the impossibility of securing the entire Spanish succession without kindling afresh a general war in Europe, for which he was but ill-prepared; and he was therefore inclined to listen to the overtures made to him by William III., through the Earl of Portland, for a partition. As the Emperor now claimed the undivided succession for his second son, it was useless to think of renewing with him the eventual treaty of 1688; the better plan, therefore, seemed to be to come

to an understanding with the King of England, and to force the Emperor to accept the settlement which they should agree upon. After long negotiations, a secret treaty was concluded at the Hague, October 11th, 1698, between France, England, and Holland. By this, which has been called the First Treaty of Partition, it was agreed that on the death of Charles II. without issue, the Dauphin should have the two Sicilies, the Tuscan ports, the marquisate of Finale in Liguria, and the province of Guipuzcoa; that the Archduke Charles should have the Milanese; and that the remainder of the Spanish possessions, including the Belgian provinces, should fall to the Electoral Prince of Bavaria.¹

Although the share thus assigned to France in the Spanish spoils was far inferior to that apportioned to her by the eventual treaty with the Emperor, and though, to conciliate England and Holland, she had renounced her pretensions to the Flemish provinces, still the share which she thus obtained of Italy was so important as to render it probable that William III. was not sincere in these negotiations, and that his sole object was to prevent Louis, who alone was prepared, from immediately resorting to force, in case of the early death of the King of Spain.² However this may be, it is certain that Charles II. was very indignant on learning—for the secret soon oozed out—this dismemberment of his monarchy; and he resented it by making a new will, in which he appointed the Electoral Prince his universal heir, and named the Queen, his wife, Regent during the minority of Ferdinand Joseph. But all these arrangements were suddenly overthrown by an unexpected catastrophe. The Bavarian Prince died at Brussels in February, 1699, at the age of six years; an event which, by its happening so soon after the Partition Treaty, threw a violent suspicion of unfair play on the Austrian Cabinet, though there is no evidence to justify it. By this event the contests of the Austrian and French parties were renewed with more vigour than ever at Madrid, the choice being now restricted between two parties, instead of three. The Spanish Queen exerted herself in favour of the Archduke Charles, while Portocarrero and the French party endeavoured to sway the mind of the King by superstitious terrors. Meanwhile Louis XIV. made overtures to William III. for another partition treaty, which was executed at the Hague in March, 1700, by the parties to the former one. Louis being aware that the Maritime Powers would never consent that Spain and the Indies should fall to the share of France,

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 442.

² See Martin, t. xiv. p. 356.

now agreed that the greater part of the Spanish succession should be assigned to the Archduke Charles, but on condition that the Crown of Spain should never be united with that of the Empire, the Dauphin retaining what had been apportioned to him in the former treaty, with the addition of Lorraine. The Duke of Lorraine, provided he should accede to the treaty, was to have the Duchy of Milan, which in the previous treaty had been given to the Archduke Charles. Three months were to be allowed to the Emperor to adhere to the treaty; and upon his definitive refusal, the share of the Archduke was to pass to a third party, not named, but who was understood to be the Duke of Savoy.¹

Thus the Spanish Succession was disposed of by two foreign Powers, one being a party interested in it, without consulting the Spanish monarch or nation, whose spoils were thus unceremoniously divided. Such a proceeding naturally irritated the Courts both of Vienna and Madrid, and their anger was principally directed against William III. for interfering in a matter in which he was not directly concerned. So loud were the complaints of the Spanish minister at London that William ordered him to quit the kingdom; a step which was retaliated by the dismissal from Spain of the British and Dutch ambassadors. The Emperor at first endeavoured to persuade Louis XIV. to enter into a direct and separate negotiation; but not succeeding, refused to accept the Treaty of Partition. The other European Powers, to whom the treaty had been officially communicated, hesitated to guarantee it, and seemed inclined to await the course of events. Only the Duke of Lorraine accepted the proposed exchange.

Meanwhile the struggle of the contending parties was redoubled at Madrid. Each seemed alternately to gain the ascendant over the wavering mind of Charles, who was inclined to listen to everybody except those to whom the decision of the question rightly belonged—the Spanish nation, through the Cortes. At length Portocarrero, availing himself of his sacred office, and representing to the King that his eternal salvation depended on the appointment of a rightful successor, prevailed on him to submit the question to the profoundest lawyers of Spain and Italy. These decided unanimously in favour of the House of Bourbon, provided means were taken to prevent the union of the French and Spanish Crowns, the sole object of the renunciation

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 477.

of Maria Theresa. Charles, not content with this decision, referred the matter to Pope Innocent XII., who confirmed it, and added a letter strongly urging the Catholic King, as he valued his salvation, to secure the undivided inheritance of the Spanish monarchy to a son of the Dauphin, the rightful heir.

It was not, however, till after he had obtained the opinions of the Council of Castile and the Council of State, which agreed with that given by the Pope, that Charles, under the renewed spiritual menaces of the Archbishop of Toledo, at last drew up a testament in favour of the House of Bourbon. But as Louis XIV. had ostensibly bound himself to a different course of policy by the Treaty of Partition, Charles appears first of all to have obtained from the French King an assurance that he would accept a bequest of the whole Spanish monarchy, instead of a dismemberment, which was highly distasteful to the nation.¹ On October 2nd, 1700, Charles signed a will in which, after many injunctions to his successor on the subject of religion, he declared his heir to be his nearest kinsman after those destined to mount the throne of France; that is to say, the Duke of Anjou, second son of the Dauphin. Should the Duke of Anjou inherit the throne of France, and prefer it to that of Spain, then his younger brother, the Duke of Berri, was named in his stead; and in his default, the Archduke Charles and the Duke of Savoy successively. Charles strictly enjoined his successors not to alienate any part of the Spanish monarchy. He died about a month after signing this will (November 1st), in the thirty-ninth year of his age and thirty-seventh of his reign.²

Had Spain consulted her real interests, she would probably have adopted another pretender, Don Pedro II. King of Portugal; whose claims, derived from Joanna, putative daughter of Henry the Impotent,³ were, however, never seriously regarded. By such a choice the union of Spain and Portugal might have been pacifically achieved; but the Spaniards, anxious to keep together a monarchy of whose extension they were proud, though they had not themselves the power to defend it, preferred the French

¹ See *Mémoires de Torci*, ap. Coxe, *Mémoires of the Bourbon Kings of Spain*, vol. i. p. 74.

² The will is in Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 485. Respecting the Spanish Succession in general, see Lamberty, *Mém. pour servir à l'Hist. du XVIII^e Siècle*, t. i.: *Mém. secrets sur l'établissement de la maison de Bourbon en Espagne*, extraits de la correspondance du Marquis de

Louville, t. i. (Paris, 1818); Mignet, *Négoc. relatives à la succ. d'Espagne* (in *Doc. inédits sur l'Hist. de France*); *Letters of Count Schomberg, the Earl of Manchester, and Harcourt*, in *Coles' Memoirs of Affairs of State*, and in the *Hardwicke Collection*; Coxe, *Memoirs of the Bourbon Kings of Spain*, *Hist. Introd.* § iii.; Lord Mahon, *War of the Succession in Spain*.

³ See Vol. I. p. 191.

Prince as more capable of maintaining an empire which was at once their glory and their ruin.

By the will, a Junta, or Council, of Regency was established, consisting of the Queen, as President, the Primate (Cardinal Portocarrero) the Inquisitor-General, the Presidents of Castile and Aragon, and two representatives of the grandees and Council of State. The Junta immediately assumed the direction of affairs, and despatched a messenger to Louis with a copy of the will. Should Louis refuse to accept the inheritance, the messenger was instructed to proceed to Vienna and offer it to the Archduke Charles. The matter had been already discussed and decided; a French courier had previously arrived with the news, when Louis summoned a council consisting of the Dauphin, and three ministers of state, the chancellor Pontchartrain, the Duke de Beauvilliers, and Torci the foreign secretary, to discuss the momentous question of acceptance or rejection. Louis had to decide between a crown for his grandson, or the aggrandizement of France according to the Treaty of Partition. A decision either way might produce a war; but in the one case it would probably be short and successful, in the other it would be impossible to predict either its length or its issue. Beauvilliers alone is said to have declared against accepting the offer. His principal arguments were: that Louis would be accused of violating his engagements with England and Holland, who would not suffer him to give the law, in the name of his grandson, to the vast monarchy of Spain; that the wounds which France had received were still bleeding, and in case of acceptance ^{an} effort be again opened in a general European war; and that it ^{is} would be a hundred times more advantageous for France to unite several fine provinces to the monarchy than to place a French Prince on a foreign throne, whose descendants would themselves shortly become strangers to the country of their ancestors. On the other side it was urged by Torci that the question lay not ^{is} between war and peace, but between one war and another—between the totality of the Spanish monarchy or nothing; that, ^{is} the will substituting the House of Austria for France, there could be no ground for claiming part of the inheritance, after rejecting the whole; that even this part would have to be conquered from the Austrians, aided by the Spaniards, who would support the integrity of their monarchy; that the English and Dutch would lend only a feeble aid, and probably abandon the contest altogether; and that thus an Austrian Prince would be again planted

on the Pyrenees.¹ The chancellor merely summed up the arguments without pronouncing any opinion; while the Dauphin, with unwonted energy, demanded the acceptance of the will, and declared that he would not renounce his claims except in favour of his son, the Duke of Anjou.

This discussion seems to have been a mere farcical ceremony for the sake of appearances, and it is probable, as we have already said, that Louis XIV. had signified his assent to the will before its execution. Louis carried out the farce by not declaring his resolution till three days after the meeting of the Council; when, in the presence of the Spanish ambassador, at Versailles, he announced it by addressing the Duke of Anjou as follows: "Sir, the King of Spain has made you a King. The *grandees* demand you, the people of Spain desire you, and I give my consent." The Spanish ambassador, on his knees, then saluted and complimented his new master as "Philip V.," the folding doors were thrown open, Louis presented his grandson to the assembled courtiers with the words, "Sirs, here is the King of Spain," and the ceremony ended by Louis exhorting Philip to be a good Spaniard, but at the same time to remember that he was born a Frenchman—exhortations which, from their contradictory nature, it might be sometimes difficult to reconcile.

By character, however, Philip V. might easily have been a lineal descendant of Philip IV., so closely did his habits resemble those of the hereditary Spanish House. Shy, hypochondriac, docile, monotonously regular, dotingly uxorious, without either great faults or striking virtues, he was fit only to be governed, as his predecessors had been before him. At the time of his accession; indeed, being then only seventeen years of age, Philip's character was as yet undeveloped, and consequently unknown to the Spaniards; with whom, however, it might perhaps have been only an additional recommendation. Immediately on receipt of Louis XIV.'s answer, the Junta caused Philip V. to be proclaimed at Madrid, and addressed a letter to the Most Christian King, in which they begged him to dispose of everything in Spain, and assured him that his orders should be as exactly obeyed as in France. Philip passed the Bidasoa January 22nd, 1701, and on February 18th entered Madrid, where he was received with the acclamations of the people. All the European provinces, all the American and Asiatic possessions, of the vast Spanish Empire immediately recognized the new Monarch; nor was his title at

¹ For the arguments, see Mignet, *Négociations*, &c.

first disputed by the greater part of the European Powers. The Elector of Bavaria, then resident at Brussels as governor of the Catholic Netherlands—a dignity which had been procured for him by William III.—was the first prince who recognized Philip V.; both from hatred of the Emperor, whom he suspected of having poisoned his son, and from the hope that Louis would convert his government in the Netherlands into an hereditary one. Louis XIV., as was indeed his interest, showed every disposition to conciliate the Courts of Europe. His minister at the Hague was instructed to insist on the sacrifices which the French King had made in not accepting the Partition Treaty, which would have aggrandized France by the addition of so many fine provinces; to declare that he had renounced these advantages rather than cause a war which would disturb the repose of Europe; and to point out that had he adhered to the Treaty, a war must have inevitably ensued both with Spain and Austria; the former nation being determined that their monarchy should not be divided, which, in the event of his refusal to accept it, would have been offered to the Archduke Charles.¹

Although this reasoning did not satisfy William III., he was compelled for a time, by the force of circumstances, to acquiesce in it. In England, William's government was not popular, owing to the Treaty of Partition; the nation was at that time averse to a war with France, and it would have been impossible for him to obtain from Parliament the necessary supplies for carrying it on. With regard to Holland, Louis clinched his reasonings by an appeal to force. By virtue of a convention with Philip II., some of the cities of the Spanish Netherlands, as Antwerp, Namur, Charleroi, and others, were garrisoned by Dutch troops, in order that they might serve as a barrier against France. But Louis, having obtained from Madrid authority to take such measures as he should deem necessary for the public good, the Elector of Bavaria, as governor of the Netherlands, was instructed to pay the same deference to his orders as to those of Philip V.; and the Elector, who, as we have said, was well inclined to France, readily permitted French troops to enter the towns garrisoned by the Dutch. On the pretence that the States-General were preparing a league, in conjunction with England, against Philip V. and France, the Dutch were now required to evacuate these towns; and they were not even allowed a free retreat till the States, alarmed at the force which menaced their frontier, consented to acknowledge Philip

¹ *Mémoires de Lamberty*. t. i. p. 221; Coxe, *Memoirs of the Bourbon Kings of Spain*, ch. ii.

V. as King of Spain.¹ William, having at present no means of resistance, found it expedient to follow this example. In April, 1701, he addressed a letter to Philip V., in which he congratulated "his very dear brother" on his happy accession.²

The situation of the rest of Europe was also, on the whole, at first favourable to Philip V. The Northern and Eastern Powers were occupied with the great war that had broken out among them, as related in a preceding chapter. The greater part of the German princes, struck with astonishment that the Treaty of Partition, to which they had been so earnestly pressed to accede, should have been so suddenly abandoned, remained silent and inactive. The Emperor Leopold was threatened in his hereditary States by a Hungarian insurrection, while the Empire was in the throes of a crisis occasioned by the erection of the Hanoverian Electorate; the States confederated against this innovation were arming, and the Diet had been compelled to suspend its deliberations. Some of the German princes, as the Electors of Bavaria, and Cologne, the Dukes of Brunswick Wolfenbüttel, and Saxe-Gotha, and the Bishop of Münster, declared for France; and in March, 1701, Bavaria concluded a formal treaty of alliance with Louis. The Duke of Savoy, already connected with France by the marriage of his daughter Adelaide to the Duke of Burgundy, and now further gained by the union of his younger daughter, Louisa Gabriella, with Philip V., as well as by the post of generalissimo of the Crowns of France and Spain in Italy, was among the first to recognize the now King of Spain; and he also engaged to allow the French troops at all times free passage into Italy. The marriage of Philip and the Piedmontese Princess was celebrated at Figueras in September, 1701. The bride was only in her fourteenth year, and as her extreme youth naturally gave rise to the expectation that she would be governed by some adviser, the Court of Versailles selected as her *Camerera Mayor*, or chief lady of her household, the celebrated Princess Orsini (or Des Ursins), who had gained the friendship and confidence of Madame de Maintenon, and who was deemed well fitted to promote French interests at the Spanish Court. The example of Victor Amadeus was followed by the Duke of Mantua (February, 1701). Portugal also pronounced itself in favour of the new Spanish dynasty, and ultimately a treaty was concluded at Lisbon between that Power and Spain (June, 1701); by which Portugal engaged to support the succession of

¹ Thucelii, *Des heiligen Röm. Reichs Staats Acta*, t. i. p. 366.

² La Torre, ap. Martin, t. xiv. p. 372.

Philip V., and to shut its ports against every nation that should attempt to hinder it by arms.¹

Under these circumstances, it is possible that if Louis had acted with moderation and judgment he might have prevented or frustrated the great coalition which was at length formed against him. But his measures were such as to excite suspicion and mistrust, while they offended by their arrogance. One of his first steps after the departure of the Duke of Anjou for Spain was to send him letters patent² reserving his rights to the French crown in default of the Duke of Burgundy and his male heirs, and without any stipulation that he must choose between the crowns of France and Spain; thus renewing the fears respecting the union of those crowns on the same head. These letters were all the more impolitic from being superfluous, since the Duke of Anjou's accession to the Spanish throne did not invalidate his rights to that of France; as appears in the instance of Henry III., who, though he had been King of Poland, succeeded his brother, Charles IX. Besides this measure, which concerned all Europe, he adopted others which irritated and alarmed particular States. The Dutch were injured in their commerce by Louis supplanting them in the Spanish *Asiento*, or monopoly of the slave trade; while at the same time the new works which he constructed within sight of their fortresses, and the increase of his army, excited their apprehensions that he contemplated renewing his former hostilities.³ The English, besides their commerce being injured, like that of the Dutch, by the exclusion of the ships of both those nations from Spanish ports, were further insulted by an open and flagrant violation of the Peace of Ryswick. James II. having died at St. Germain, September, 1701, Louis, in contravention of that treaty, openly gave James's son the title of King of England.⁴ The indignation which this act excited in England at length enabled William III. to bring to a practical issue the negotiations which he had been long conducting with the Emperor.

When the testament of Charles II. was declared, Count Harrach, the Imperial ambassador, quitted Madrid, after entering a formal protest against it. The protest was renewed at Vienna, and early in 1701 the Emperor entered into secret negotiations with William III. with a view to overthrow the will. England and Holland also concluded an alliance with Denmark (January 20th,

¹ Dumont, t. viii pt. i. p. 31.

² Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 494; Lambert, *Mémoires*, t. i. p. 388.

³ Lord Mahon, *War of the Succession*

in Spain, p. 42.

⁴ St. Pierre, *Ann. Politiques*, t. ii. p. 21; Lord Mahon, *ibid.* p. 43.

1701), by which, in case of hostilities breaking out, that Power engaged to shut all her ports against ships of war, and in consideration of a subsidy, to place a certain number of troops at the disposal of the allies.¹ After the occupation of the Flemish fortresses by the French troops, William even obtained some supplies from the English Parliament; but the nation was not yet prepared to enter into a general war, and William had been compelled to content himself with some fruitless negotiations with Louis XIV.; for, though very equitable conditions were offered, the French King would not listen to them. Leopold, however, drew the sword without waiting for the alliance of the Maritime Powers. That Upper Italy and Belgium should be in the hands of the French, appeared to Prince Eugene, Leopold's counsellor as well as general, so pregnant with danger to Germany that he pressed the Emperor to assert his right to the Spanish inheritance, and undertook himself to open the war in Italy with 30,000 men. Leopold determined to follow Eugene's advice, although all his other counsellors dissuaded him from it, and represented Austria as so overloaded with debt that she could not maintain an army of 15,000 men in the field. Austria, indeed, was not in a condition to oppose alone the united power of France and Spain; but Leopold was encouraged by the hope of the ultimate aid of England and Holland, as well as of the Empire. And although some of the minor Princes of the Empire, offended by the affair of the Hanoverian Electorate, had combined against the Emperor, and even appealed to France and Sweden, as guarantors of the Peace of Westphalia, yet all the Electors, except Bavaria and Cologne, were devoted to Leopold. George Lewis of Hanover, as we have already seen, was bound to him by a former treaty; and Leopold now enticed the much more powerful prince, Frederick III., Elector of Brandenburg, into a similar engagement, by conferring upon him the title of King.

Frederick's temper led him to attach much weight to the outward symbols of greatness. It was not without some feelings of envy that he had seen the Prince of Orange raised to the English throne, and Augustus of Saxony to that of Poland; and in an interview with William III., at the Hague, his pride had been not a little hurt that he had been forced to content himself with a common chair, while an arm-chair had been set for the King! He had been several years negotiating with the Emperor on this subject; but his elevation to the royal dignity had been warmly

¹ Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 1.

opposed as well by politicians as by religious zealots, who did not wish to see the number of Protestant Sovereigns increased. The affair of the Spanish succession, however, determined the Emperor to secure a powerful ally by a concession which cost him nothing. By a treaty between the Emperor and the Elector, commonly called the TREATY OF THE CROWN, executed at Vienna Nov. 16th, 1700, Leopold engaged to recognize the title which Frederick proposed to assume of King of Prussia, while Frederick bound himself to place 10,000 men in the field, to side in the Diet always with Austria, to give his electoral vote in favour of the descendants of the Emperor's son Joseph, King of the Romans, &c. &c.¹ No sooner did the Elector hear of the signing of this treaty than, in the middle of winter, he hastened with his family and Court to Königsberg, and, with great pomp and ceremony, placed the crown upon his own head, January 18th, 1701. The Emperor sent an envoy extraordinary to Berlin to congratulate him, and this example was followed by most of the European Powers, except France and Spain. The assumption of the Prussian crown was opposed only by the Teutonic Order, a body now of no importance, and by Pope Clement XI., who had ascended the chair of Peter, November, 23rd, 1700. In an allocution in the Consistory, Clement lamented that the Emperor should have sanctioned an act so detrimental to the Church, without reflecting that the Holy Chair alone has the power of appointing kings!²

Eugeno, who had massed his army in the environs of Trent and Roveredo, descended into the plains of Verona towards the end of May, 1701, with 25,000 men; Catinat, who commanded the French auxiliary army in Lombardy, retreating before him. Early in July the Imperialists defeated the French at Carpi, in the Duchy of Modena, and proceeded to occupy the whole district between the Adige and the Adda. The disappointment of Louis XIV. was extreme: he recalled Catinat, though the reverses of the French seem to have been owing more to the Duke of Savoy, their generalissimo, who, in fact, did not wish for their success. Catinat was succeeded by Marshal Villeroi, who soon gave another proof of the incapacity which he had displayed in 1695, by incurring a signal defeat at Chiari, near Brescia. This was the last action this year in Lombardy, where alone the war had as yet broken out.

¹ Rousset, *Suppl. au Corps Dipl.* t. iii. pt. i. p. 461.

Menzel, *Neuere Gesch. der Deutschen*, t. iv. kap. 55.

² Lamberty, *Mémoires*, t. i. p. 383;

The successes of Prince Eugene encouraged William III. to league himself with the Emperor; who, on September 7th, concluded, at the Hague, with England and the States-General, the treaty which must be regarded as the basis of the second GRAND ALLIANCE. The object of it was stated to be to procure his Imperial Majesty a just and reasonable satisfaction for his claims, and the King of Great Britain and the States-General a sufficient security for their territories, navigation, and commerce. The Spanish Netherlands were to be conquered in order to serve as a barrier to the United Provinces; also the Milanese, the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the Mediterranean islands, and the Spanish possessions on the coast of Tuscany. No peace was to be made without measures having been first adopted to prevent France and Spain from being ever united under the same king, to hinder the French from becoming masters of the Spanish Indies, and to insure to the English and Dutch the same commercial privileges in all the Spanish dominions which they had enjoyed under the late King of Spain. The Empire was to be particularly invited to accede to this treaty, as interested in the recovery of certain fiefs which had been detached from it.¹

War, however, was not yet declared against France, and might, perhaps, have been long deferred had not Louis committed the mistake already mentioned of recognizing as King of England the son of James II. In consequence of this step an article was added to the treaty (March, 1702), by which the Emperor engaged not to make peace with France till Great Britain had received satisfaction for this injury.² William III., availing himself of the feeling excited in England by Louis's act, summoned a new Parliament, which approved his now openly-avowed negotiations and policy, and granted liberal supplies of men and money to carry them out; attainted the pretended Prince of Wales, and by the Act of Abjuration for ever excluded the Stuarts from the throne of Great Britain. But at the moment when he had thus matured and organized the great league for resisting the ambition of France, he was prevented by death from directing, as he had purposed, the operations of the war (March 19th, 1702). His successor, Queen Anne, however, pursued the same line of policy which he had chalked out; and the military affairs of the Grand Alliance probably suffered no detriment from being conducted, instead of the King, by the Earl of Marlborough, whom William had already despatched with 10,000 men to Holland. In the

¹ Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 89.

² *Ibid.* p. 91.

United Netherlands also the death of William occasioned no change of foreign policy, although it was followed by a species of domestic revolution. A little before his death William had endeavoured to procure the nomination of his cousin Friso of Nassau, who was already hereditary Stadholder of Friesland and Groningen, as his successor in the Stadholdership of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overijssel; but that dignity was now abolished in these five provinces, which resumed the republican form of government established in the time of De Witt. The chief share in the direction of the affairs of the United Netherlands now fell to Daniel Heinsius, Grand Pensionary of Holland. Heinsius, Marlborough, and Eugene formed the soul of the Grand Alliance, and obtained the name of the Triumvirate of the Coalition. Louis XIV. had endeavoured to take advantage of the death of William to seduce the Dutch from their allies; but Heinsius was a devoted adherent to the system of that politic Prince, and the States-General indignantly repulsed the advances of France.¹ The three allied Powers declared war against France and Spain in May, 1702.²

Leopold used every endeavour to engage the confederated body of the Empire in the war; and in the preceding March he had succeeded in obtaining the accession of the five Circles of Suabia, Franconia, the Upper and Lower Rhine, and Austria, to the Grand Alliance.³ This example was soon afterwards followed by the Elector of Trèves and the Circle of Westphalia. Suabia, Franconia, and the Rhenish Circles had previously belonged to a union, formed by the Elector of Bavaria at the instigation of Louis XIV., in the summer of 1701, for the purpose of maintaining their neutrality in the quarrel between the Emperor and Louis.⁴ The Elector of Bavaria engaged in the cause of France and Spain his brother, the Elector of Cologne, that very Joseph Clement whose investiture had been so strenuously resisted by Louis, and had been the immediate cause of the war of 1688. Joseph Clement admitted French garrisons into the fortresses of his Electorate and into the citadel of Liège, while the Elector of Bavaria continued to affect neutrality, and to negotiate with the Emperor; but in June, 1702, he concluded a secret treaty with Louis XIV. and Philip V., who promised him the hereditary government of

¹ Martin, t. xiv. p. 385.

² See their Manifestoes in Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. pp. 112, 115.

³ *Ibid.* p. 104.

⁴ Coxe (*Bourbon Kings of Spain*, vol. i.

ch. 7) erroneously represents the Emperor as having "forced the Elector of Bavaria into a treaty of neutrality;" whereas the union was accomplished at the desire of Louis XIV.

the Netherlands. In Lower Saxony the two discontent Dukes of Brunswick Wolfenbüttel had raised an army of 12,000 men, and given the command to a Frenchman; but the Elector of Hanover entered their dominions with a stronger force (March, 1702), and compelled them to disarm; and the Emperor afterwards found means to separate the brothers by promising the sole sovereignty to the elder.

On September 8th the Elector of Bavaria at length throw off the mask, and obtained possession of the Imperial city of Ulm by sending into it, on the previous evening, soldiers disguised as peasants, who opened the gates to their comrades. Maximilian refused to give it up, in spite of a decree of the Diet of Ratisbon, as well as a remonstrance addressed to him by his father-in-law, the Emperor; and he proceeded to seize Memmingen and other places necessary to secure his communications with the French. The Emperor, having a majority in the Diet at Ratisbon, now issued a declaration of war against France in the name of the Empire (October 6th, 1702), which differed little in essential points from that which he had already published as Sovereign of Austria. The Diet also empowered the Emperor to adopt against Bavaria all the measures permitted by the constitution of the Empire; in consequence of which proclamations were issued commanding all subjects of the Empire, on pain of ban and over ban—that is, of death—to quit the service of the Elector, and to enter that of the Emperor and his allies. And a few weeks later the subjects of the Elector were released by Imperial letters patent from their allegiance to their Sovereign.¹ Before these occurrences, the war, which in the previous year had been confined to Lombardy, had already become general. It is not our intention, however, to enter into its details, but, as we have before done, to give a brief chronicle of the principal events of each campaign.

1702.—In Italy, Prince Eugene opened the campaign at the beginning of February by surprising Cremona, the French headquarters. His troops, however, were at length repulsed, but carried off prisoner Marshal Villeroi, the French Commander-in-chief, who was replaced by the Duke of Vendôme. Vendôme compelled Eugene to raise the siege of Mantua (May). Philip V., who had landed at Naples in the spring, joined Vendôme at Cremona in July, to take the command of the army in person. The combined forces—Philip V. had brought a few thousand Spaniards—attacked Eugene near Suzzara, and captured that

¹ *Theatr. Europ.* t. xvi. p. 590; Zschokke, *Baierische Gesch.* B. iii. S. 437, Ann. 216.

town (August). After this action, which was the last of any importance, Philip V. set off for Spain, on the news of a descent of the English and Dutch near Cadiz.

On the Lower Rhine, the English and Dutch, under Marlborough as Commander-in-chief, began the campaign, in April, by an attack on the Electorate of Cologne, in execution of an Imperial monitory against the Elector Joseph Clement. In this quarter the French were nominally under the command of the Duke of Burgundy, but were really led by Marshal Boufflers. The allies successively took Kaiserwerth, Venloo, Stephanswerth, and Ruremonde; and Marlborough, being thus master of the Lower Meuse, marched on and captured Liège, October 23rd,

On the Upper Rhine the Imperialists were commanded by Joseph, King of the Romans, and by Prince Louis of Baden, while the command of the French had been given to Catinat. It was with much reluctance and after long deliberation that Leopold had appointed his son Joseph to this post, out of anxiety for the life of his successor; and the King of the Romans proceeded to the army with so much pomp and so long a train that it was near the end of July before he joined the camp at Landau. That place, the bulwark of Alsace,¹ which had been already invested during several months by Prince Louis of Baden, capitulated September 9th, the day after the surprise of Ulm by the Elector of Bavaria. In the following month Prince Louis was defeated at Friedlingen by Villars, who had joined the French army in Alsace, and was endeavouring to form a junction with the Elector of Bavaria (October 14th); but though this victory obtained for Villars the bâton of Marshal, it led to no result.

In the autumn of this year an armament under the command of the Duke of Ormond, consisting of a combined English and Dutch fleet of fifty sail of the line, besides smaller vessels and transports, under Sir George Rooke, and having on board 14,000 soldiers under Sir H. Bellasis, attempted a descent at Cadiz, but were repulsed by the Marquis of Villadarias, "with a great deal of plunder and infamy," to use the expression of Colonel Stanhope, who took part in the expedition.² The allies were, however, in some degree, consoled for their ill success by destroying the Spanish West India fleet, which had put into the Bay of Vigo (October 22nd). Seven French men-of-war, which formed part

¹ Landau had been fortified by Vauban after the Peace of Nimeguen.

² Lord Mahon's *War of the Succession*

in Spain, p. 59; which work contains the best account of those occurrences which took place in Spain itself.

of its escort, and six galleons were captured, and many more were destroyed. The victors obtained a large treasure in bullion; and a still greater sum went to the bottom of the sea, a terrible loss for the Spanish finances.

1703.—Marlborough, who had now been made a duke, returned into the Netherlands with reinforcements in the spring of 1703, where he was opposed by Villeroy, who had been ransomed, as commander-in-chief of the French army, and, under him, by Marshal Boufflers. The allies took Bonn (May 15th), thus completing the conquest of the Electorate of Cologne; but Marlborough's enterprises were checked by the delegates of the States-General, and little else of importance was done. The campaign ended by the allies taking Limbourg and Geldern.

The campaign in Germany had been more active. The Imperial forces had not been hitherto strong enough to take the offensive against the Elector of Bavaria; the Elector of Saxony, who was also King of Poland, and the King of Prussia having been compelled to withhold their contingents in consequence of the invasion of Poland by the Swedes. But this spring Count Schlick, the Austrian commander, and Count Styrum, general of the army of the Circles, invaded the Bavarian dominions, Schlick on the side of the Inn, whilst Styrum attacked the Upper Palatinate. But the Elector, having defeated Schlick at Scharding (March 11th), and compelled Styrum to retire into Suabia, hastened to Ratisbon, and seized that important Imperial city, the seat of the German Diet. Marshal Villars, who had made himself master of Kehl, now resolved to form a junction with the Elector, which was effected at Ehingen (May). But instead of adopting the suggestion of Villars, and marching upon Vienna, the capture of which might probably have been easily effected, the Elector preferred to attack Tyrol, where Vendôme, marching by way of Trent, with half the army of Italy, was to form a junction with him. The Elector penetrated by Kufstein and Innsbruck to the foot of the Brenner, while Vendôme, who had been somewhat slow in his movements, was bombarding Trent. But the Tyrolese peasants having risen against the Bavarians, whilst the Austrians had invaded Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate, the Elector was compelled to retreat. Many misunderstandings ensued between him and Villars, which prevented them from acting cordially together; but at length, having formed a junction at Nordendorf, they inflicted a severe defeat on the Imperialists in the plain of Höchstädt (September 20th). New

differences, however, arose between the two commanders, and Villars, in disgust, obtained his recall. He was replaced by Marshal Marsin, one of whose first exploits was to take Augsburg, which had been occupied by the Imperialists. Another opportunity now presented itself of marching upon Vienna. The insurrection in Hungary, led by Francis Rágoeczy, had assumed colossal proportions; the Hungarian light cavalry even threatened Vienna; and the Emperor was obliged to withdraw the garrisons from Passau and Pressburg in order to defend his capital. At the pressing instance of Louis XIV., the Elector now, when it was too late in the season, undertook to invade Austria, took Passau, and pressed on to Enns, in the Austrian dominions; but the rigour of the season compelled him to return to Munich. Meanwhilo the French army on the Rhine, under the Duke of Burgundy, Vauban, and Tallard, had taken Breisach (September 7th), defeated the Imperialists at Spirebach (November 15th), and recaptured Landau two days afterwards.

In Italy, Prince Eugene had temporarily resigned the command of the much-reduced Imperial forces to Count Stahremberg, and had proceeded to Vienna to solicit reinforcements, in which capital he acted as president of the Council of War. Vendôme's fruitless expedition into Tyrol, partly also his indolence, had, however, prevented him from taking advantage of his vast numerical superiority. The chief event in this quarter was the defection of the Duke of Savoy from the cause of his son-in-law, Philip V. The fickle Victor Amadeus, disgusted at not having received the command of the French and Spanish troops, as well as by the non-payment of the subsidies, and hoping also to obtain a share of the Milanese, acceded to the Grand Alliance in October.¹ He stipulated that the Emperor should have an army of 120,000 men in Italy, which he was to join with 15,000, and to have the command-in-chief. The Duke's negotiations with the Emperor, which had been going on since January, were well known to Louis XIV.; the Piedmontese troops in the French service had been disarmed and arrested before the treaty was signed, and Vendôme had demanded the surrender of Turin, which, however, he was not in a condition to enforce. The Duke of Savoy was not the only ally that Louis XIV. lost this year, although, perhaps, the most important, as by this event the communication with Italy was interrupted. The Admiral of Castile, alienated from

¹ Lamberty, t. ii. p. 547.

the cause of Philip V. by having been dismissed from his office of Master of the Horse, had retired into Portugal; and he succeeded in persuading King Pedro II. to accede to the Grand Alliance, who was enticed by the promise of the American provinces between the Rio de la Plata and Brazil, as well as a part of Estremadura and Galicia (May 6th). Pedro also entered into a perpetual defensive league with Great Britain and the States-General.¹ In the following December Paul Methuen, the English minister at Lisbon, concluded the celebrated commercial treaty between England and Portugal named after himself. It is the most laconic treaty on record, containing only two Articles, to the effect that Portugal was to admit British cloths, and England to admit Portuguese wines, at one-third less duty than those of France.

Don Pedro's accession to the Grand Alliance entirely changed the plans of the allies. Instead of confining themselves to the procuring of a reasonable indemnity for the Emperor, they now resolved to drive Philip V. from the throne of Spain, and to place an Austrian Archduke upon it in his stead. The Emperor and his eldest son Joseph formally renounced their claims to the throne of Spain in favour of the Archduke Charles, Leopold's second son, who was proclaimed King of Spain, with the title of Charles III. The new King was to proceed into Portugal, and, with the assistance of Don Pedro, endeavour to obtain possession of Spain. Charles accordingly went through Holland to England, and, after paying a visit to Queen Anne at Windsor, sailed for Lisbon, February 17th, 1704.

1704.—This year was rendered memorable by Marlborough's brilliant campaign in Germany. The English general, finding that Villeroi and Boufflers were resolved to remain on the defensive in Flanders, determined to carry the war into Germany. After a rapid and unopposed march he formed a junction with Prince Louis of Baden, near Ulm, June 22nd; and, on July 2nd, the united armies stormed and took the heights of Schellenberg, near Donauwörth, where Max Emanuel and Marsin had established a strongly fortified position. This victory rendered the allies masters of the course of the Danube, with the exception of Ulm and Ingolstadt; and they now offered the Elector favourable conditions of peace, which, however, he refused. Marlborough was joined by Eugene with his forces at Donauwörth, August 11th. On the

¹ *Ibid.* p. 501; Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 127.

other hand, the French general, Tallard, having joined the Elector and Marsin, Max Emanuel, determined to attack the allies, in spite of the representations of the French generals, who were for remaining at Höchstädt, a position easily defended. The French and Bavarians had encamped at a spot between Blenheim and Lutzingen, when, on the morning of August 13th, the allies determined to anticipate their attack. In the BATTLE OF BLENHEIM, Marlborough commanded the left wing of the allied army, consisting of English and Dutch, and resting on the Danube. He was opposed to the French under Marshal Tallard; while Eugene, with the right wing of the allies, consisting of Austrians and Germans, was in face of the Elector and Marsin, who occupied the village of Lutzingen and some wooded heights in the neighbourhood. Tallard was first defeated and taken prisoner after a hot engagement, and Marlborough then detached some troops to the help of Eugene, who was maintaining an unequal struggle with the Bavarians and French. But the Elector and Marsin, observing the rout of Tallard, retired towards Ulm in good order, without attempting to aid him. The main struggle was at the village of Blenheim, where Tallard had imprudently massed a large body of infantry which was entirely useless. In the evening, these troops, to the number of between 10,000 and 12,000 men, were forced to surrender themselves prisoners of war, while a still greater number of killed and wounded strewed the field of battle. In consequence of this decisive victory the French were compelled to recross the Rhine and evacuate all Germany. The allied generals also crossed the Rhine at Phillipsburg, September 5th, Villeroy, with the French army of reserve in that quarter, not venturing to oppose them. The Germans and Austrians now invested Landau, where they were joined by the King of the Romans; while Marlborough, advancing to the Moselle, finished the campaign by occupying Trèves, taking Trarbach, and pushing his advanced posts to the Sarre.

Landau surrendered to the Imperialists, November 24th. While the siege was going on, the Elector of Bavaria's second wife, a daughter of John Sobieski, to whom he had abandoned the reins of government, appeared in the Imperial camp, and concluded a treaty with the King of the Romans, by which she agreed to dismiss her army, and to surrender to the Emperor all the fortresses of Bavaria, with the exception of Munich, which was to be reserved for her domain and residence, but dismantled.¹

¹ Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 163.

The Emperor appointed Count Löwenstein Governor of Bavaria, and Max Emanuel was forced to content himself with his ancient government of the Spanish Netherlands.

The French were more successful in Italy, which the allies had been obliged in a great measure to sacrifice to their important operations in Germany. Vendôme succeeded in taking Vercelli and Ivrea, and in the following spring Verrua; thus rendering himself master of all the north of Piedmont, and re-establishing the communication with the Milanese, though he did not venture to attack Turin.

In March, 1704, the Pretender, Charles III., with an English and Dutch army of 12,000 men, landed in Portugal, with the intention of entering Spain on that side; but so far was he from accomplishing this plan that the Spaniards, on the contrary, under the Duke of Berwick, penetrated into Portugal, and even threatened Lisbon, but were driven back by the Marquis das Minas. An English fleet under Admiral Rooke, with troops under the Prince of Darmstadt, made an ineffectual attempt on Barcelona; but were compensated for their failure by the capture of Gibraltar on their return. The importance of this fortress, the key of the Mediterranean, was not then sufficiently esteemed, and its garrison had been neglected by the Spanish Government. A party of English sailors, taking advantage of a Saint's day (St. Dominic), on which the eastern portion of the fortress had been left unguarded, scaled the almost inaccessible precipice, whilst at the same time another party stormed the South Mole Head. The capture of this important fortress was the work of a few hours (August 4th). Darmstadt would have claimed the place for King Charles III., but Rooke took possession of it in the name of Queen Anne.

The general results, therefore, of the campaign of 1704 were greatly in favour of the allies, and may be said to have decided the whole colour of the future war. The French had been driven out of Germany and had lost Bavaria as an ally; Gibraltar, the key of the Mediterranean, had fallen into the hands of England, while the English and Dutch, established upon the Moselle, threatened France herself. Against all this Louis could only set off his slight and indecisive success in Italy.

1705.—This year was marked by the death of the Emperor Leopold, May 5th; a feeble prince, governed alternately by his wives, his ministers, and his confessors. His son, Joseph I., who, as King of the Romans, immediately assumed the Imperial title,

was of a more enterprising and decisive character. One of his first acts was to endeavour to conciliate the revolted Hungarians. In the preceding year, the party of Prince Ragoczy had seized many of the towns of Hungary, and had even insulted Vienna itself; but had been beaten in July near Raab, and in December near Tyrnau. From these defeats, however, the Hungarians had recovered; and though Joseph endeavoured to conciliate them by dismissing from office the friends of the Jesuits, whom they detested, and even accepted the mediation of England and Holland between himself and his revolted subjects, Ragoczy's party would hear of nothing short of the restoration of their elective constitution and the renunciation of Transylvania by the Emperor. In a Diet, held in September, 1705, Ragoczy was elevated on a buckler, as the supreme head of the Magyar confederation. But, without more help than Louis XIV. was now in a condition to afford them, and while the Turks remained neutral, the Hungarian insurrection, though annoying, could not prove formidable to Austria, especially as Joseph, by way of diversion, had succeeded in exciting some of the Slavonic tribes against the Magyars.¹

The campaign of 1705 was destitute of any important events on the side of Germany and the Netherlands. Villars, who, after resigning his command, had been employed in the somewhat inglorious office of opposing an insurrection of the *Camisards*, or Protestants of the Cevennes, was this year sent to oppose Marlborough on the Moselle, while Berwick was withdrawn from Spain to supply his place. Villars, establishing a fortified camp at Sierck, prevented Marlborough, who was but ill supported by the Imperialists, from penetrating into Lorraine;² and the rest of the season was spent in unimportant operations in the Netherlands. In Bavaria, the peasants, irritated by the oppressions of the Austrian Government, rose in a body, in the autumn, and, could they have been supported by France, would have placed the Emperor in great danger; but without that aid the insurrection only proved fatal to themselves. The insurgents were beaten in detail, and the Emperor now resolved on the complete dissolution of Bavaria as a state. The four elder sons of Maximilian were carried to Klagenfurt in Carinthia, to be there educated, under the strictest inspection, as Counts of Wittelsbach, while the younger

¹ For this insurrection see *Leben und Thaten des Fürstendeten Jos. Ragoczy*.

² The Emperor Joseph, in order to allay Marlborough's discontent at the inactivity of the Imperial army, invested him with

the confiscated Bavarian principality of Mindelheim, with a seat and vote in the Diet. Leopold had given him the dignity of a Prince of the Empire after the battle of Blenheim. Menzel, B. v. Kap. i.

sons were consigned to the care of a Court lady of Munich, and the daughters sent to a convent. The Electress, who had been on a visit to Venice, was not permitted to return to her dominions, and the Elector Maximilian, as well as the Elector of Cologne, was, by a decree of the Electoral College, placed under the ban of the Empire.¹ The Upper Palatinate was restored to the Elector Palatine, as well as the title of Archchamberlain (*Erztruchsess*, Seneschal); while by resigning the title of Archtreasurer (*Erzschatzmeister*), the Palatine enabled the Emperor to transfer it to the new Elector of Hanover, whose dignity was now universally acknowledged. The remaining Bavarian territories were confiscated, and divided among various princes.

While the campaign was thus unimportant in the Netherlands and Germany, the interest of the war was concentrated in Italy and Spain. In the former country the French forces were disposed in two divisions; one in Piedmont, whose object it was to take Turin, and the other in Lombardy, charged with preventing Eugene from marching to the assistance of the Duke of Savoy. This last object was accomplished by Vendôme in person, who, having defeated Eugene at Cassano (August 16th), finally compelled him to re-enter Tyrol. But this success was achieved by abandoning for the present the attempt on Turin; though, in other respects, the war in that quarter was favourable to the French, who, in course of the year, made themselves masters of Mirandola, Chivasso, Nice, and Montmelian. The last two places were dismantled.

While the French were thus successful in Italy, the still more important events in Spain were in favour of the allies. The Spaniards, sensible of the importance of Gibraltar, speedily made an effort to recover that fortress, and as early as October, 1704, it was invested by the Marquis of Villadarias with an army of 8,000 men. The French Court afterwards sent Marshal Tessé to supersede Villadarias, and the siege continued till April, 1705; but the brave defence of the Prince of Darmstadt, and the defeat of the French blockading squadron under Pointis by Admiral Lark, finally compelled the raising of the siege.² On the side of Portugal, the operations of the allies were confined to the taking of the unimportant towns of Valenza, Salvaterra, and Alburquerque on the borders of Estrémadura, and an ineffectual attempt on Badajoz. This want of success, however, on the western boundary of Spain

¹ *Theatrum Europ.* t. xvii. ad ann. 1706. *milit. de Louis le Grand*, t. iv. p. 400 sqq.;

² On these affairs see Quincy, *Hist. Mahon, War of the Succession*, ch. iv.

was more than compensated on the opposite quarter. Charles Mordaunt, the celebrated Earl of Peterborough, who, with some 5,000 English and Dutch troops, had sailed from Portsmouth early in June with the fleet under Sir Cloudesley Shovel, was furnished with a sort of roving commission, well suited to his erratic and enterprising temper, either to aid the Duke of Savoy, or "to make a vigorous push in Spain," at Barcelona, Cadiz, or wherever an opportunity might offer. Peterborough, having taken on board at Lisbon the pretended Charles III., and at Gibraltar the Prince of Darmstadt, was by them persuaded to undertake the siege of Barcelona. On the way thither, the castle of Denia, in Valencia, was occupied without much opposition, where Charles III. was, for the first time, publicly proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies. The expedition arrived off Barcelona, August 16th, and that important and strongly fortified city was at length reduced to surrender (October 9th), through the bold and hazardous, but successful operation of Peterborough in first capturing Mont Juich, an almost impregnable fort which commands the city. The Prince of Darmstadt was killed in the assault on Mont Juich. Charles III. entered Barcelona, October 23rd, amidst the acclamation of the people, and was again proclaimed King of Spain. The whole province of Catalonia now declared in his favour, and the example was soon followed by the greater part of Valencia.

1706.—The military operations this year were still more disastrous for the French than those of 1704 had been. Philip V., in person, assisted by Marshal Tessé, made an attempt to recover Barcelona, assisted by a fleet under the Count of Toulouse; who, however, on the approach of the English and Dutch fleets, was compelled to retreat, and the siege was then raised (May 12th). Philip V. and his army, afraid to retreat through Aragon amidst a hostile population, directed their march to Rousillon, and passing along the northern side of the Pyrenees, re-entered Spain through Navarre. The effect of this step was that all Aragon openly revolted, and proclaimed Charles III. The war on the Portuguese frontier was equally disastrous to Philip. The Duke of Berwick, who had assumed the chief command of the Spaniards in that quarter, was unable to arrest the progress of the allies. Alcantara and several other towns in Estremadura and Leon were rapidly taken; and on the news of the raising of the siege of Barcelona, the allies marched from Salamanca on Madrid. Philip V., who had regained his capital only a few days before, abandoned it on their approach (June 19th), having been preceded in his flight

by the grandees, the Councils of State, and the public tribunals; so that the allies, on entering Madrid (June 25th), found it almost deserted. But the allied generals, Lord Galway and Das Minas, instead of pursuing and annihilating the Spanish forces, lost a whole month in the capital; while the Archduke Charles also delayed his march from Barcelona to Madrid, although he had been proclaimed King of Spain in that capital. Meanwhile the dormant loyalty, or rather, perhaps, the strong national feeling, of the Castilians and Andalusians was roused at seeing the capital of the kingdom in the possession of Portuguese and heretics. The Castilian cities rose against the garrisons which had been left in them by the invaders. At Toledo, where the Queen Dowager and Cardinal Portocarrero had taken up their residence, and forgetting their former quarrels in their common hatred of the new dynasty, had warmly welcomed the entry of the allies, the people rose in insurrection, tore down the Austrian standards which Portocarrero had blessed, and the Queen had hoisted at her palace, and made her a prisoner of state.¹ The Andalusians raised of their own accord 14,000 foot and 4,000 horse for the cause of Philip. Towards the end of July, the Duke of Berwick, having united his small army with the troops which had returned through Navarre from the siege of Barcelona, as well as with some new levies, advanced upon Madrid; when the allied generals, seeing no hope of holding that capital in the midst of a disaffected population, marched out to meet the Archduke Charles and Peterborough, whom they joined at Guadalaxara, August 5th. Their united forces, however, were still unequal to those of Berwick; the men were suffering from sickness and want; disensions arose among the generals, and Peterborough, disgusted with his position, set off for Italy to assist the Duke of Savoy, as he was authorized to do by his instructions. The allies now retreated, pursued by Berwick, into Valencia, where they took up their winter quarters. Thus terminated one of the most singular campaigns on record, in which Philip V., after being driven out of his kingdom, and seeing the allies in possession of his capital, regained it again in the space of a few months without a single general engagement; while the allied army, after beginning the campaign on the western frontier of Spain, closed it in the most eastern province of that kingdom.² Other events of this year in Spain were the capture of Alicant and

¹ The Queen Dowager was kept thirty years at Bayonne, and being subsequently allowed to return to Spain, died at

Guadalaxara.

² For this campaign, see *Mémoires de Berwick*, vol. i.

Cartagena by the English and Dutch fleets; which also induced the Isles of Iviça and Majorca to declare for Charles III. But Cartagena was retaken by Berwick in the autumn.

The fortune of war was still more adverse to the French arms this year in Italy and Flanders. In the former country the campaign opened, indeed, in favour of the French; Vendôme defeated the Austrian general, Reventlow, at Calcinato (April 19th), and prevented Eugene from penetrating beyond the district of Trent. But in the middle of June, Vendôme was recalled from Italy to take the command in Flanders, and resigned his Italian command to the Duke of Orleans and Marsin; not, however, before he had been compelled by the advance of Eugene to abandon the line of the Adige and retire beyond the Mincio. Eugene continued to advance, Orleans retreating before him, till he joined the army of La Feuillade, which had invested Turin since May. Eugene having formed a junction with the Duke of Savoy near Carmagnola (August 29th), their united forces attacked the French lines before Turin, September 7th, and gained a complete victory, all the siege artillery, more than 100 guns and 40 mortars, falling into their hands. In this battle Marsin was killed, and the Duke of Orleans twice wounded. By the mismanagement of the French generals, the consequences of this victory were that all Lombardy submitted to the Imperialists. Eugene and Victor Amadeus entered Milan, September 24th, where "Charles III." was proclaimed; and, in March of the following year, a convention was signed by which the French agreed to evacuate almost the whole of Northern Italy. The Imperialists took possession of the Milanese and the Duchy of Mantua, ceding to the Duke of Savoy the Alexandrine and Lomelline, according to agreement.

The chief event of the campaign in the Netherlands in 1706 was Marlborough's decisive victory over Marshal Villeroi at RAMILLIES, near Tirlemont, May 23rd. The result of this battle, in which more than 13,000 French were either killed, wounded, or made prisoners, and 100 guns and 120 colours were captured, was the conquest of all Brabant and the greater part of Flanders, by the allies in a fortnight. In consequence of this disaster, Villeroi was superseded by Vendôme, who was recalled from Italy, as already related; but though that general succeeded in covering Ypres, Lille, and Tournai, he could not prevent Marlborough from taking Menin, Dendermond, and Ath. The campaign closed with the fall of the last-named place, October 2nd. The jealousy of the Dutch

had prevented Marlborough from besieging Dunkirk. On the side of the Rhine, where Villars commanded the French forces, nothing of much importance was attempted this year, either by that commander or by the Imperialists.

These reverses induced Louis XIV. to renew the offer for a peace which he had already indirectly made at the close of the preceding campaign. He had then proposed to certain members of the States-General that Spain should cede Naples, Sicily, and Milan; he now reverted pretty nearly to the terms of the Second Treaty of Partition, and offered that Philip V. should cede Spain and the Indies to Charles III., and the Spanish Netherlands to the Dutch, thus retaining only the Italian States. These offers were regarded with suspicion by the Imperial and English Cabinets as too favourable to be sincere, though the Dutch were inclined to accept them; but the Pensionary Heinsius yielded to the influence of Marlborough, and it was agreed to demand from Louis, as sole preliminary, the cession of the whole Spanish inheritance. Nay, the Austrian Cabinet went still further, and hinted at the erection of the two Burgundies into a kingdom, to be given by way of compensation to Philip V., and the restoration of the three bishoprics (Metz, Toul, and Verdun) to the Duke of Lorraine. It could hardly be expected that these terms should be accepted by the French King. Louis afterwards attempted, but with like success, to open a separate negotiation with the Austrian Cabinet through Pope Clement XI., offering to cede the Italian provinces on condition that Philip V. should retain Spain and the Indies.¹

1707.—The events of the following year were more favourable to Louis and his grandson. The campaign in Spain was opened by the memorable BATTLE OF ALMANZA, April 25th, which proved fatal to the cause of Charles III. in that country. Peterborough, who had returned to Valencia in the spring, but was soon afterwards recalled to England, had counselled the allies to remain on the defensive; but Galway and Das Minas resolved to attack Berwick, in the hope that they could do so before he had been joined by his reinforcements; in which, however, they were disappointed. Charles, by an unaccountable whim, had set off for Barcelona before the battle, taking with him several thousand Spanish and Dutch soldiers, so that when the allies arrived on the vega, or plain of Almanza, they had scarcely 12,000 infantry, whilst the enemy had double that number, besides being superior.

¹ Lamberty, t. iv. 3; Martin, *Hist. de France*, t. xiv. p. 471.

in cavalry.¹ The battle ended in the entire defeat of the allies, nearly the whole of whose infantry were either killed, wounded, or made prisoners; together with the loss of all their baggage and artillery and 120 standards. The bulk of the cavalry succeeded in escaping to Tortosa. This victory was purchased, on the part of the French and Spaniards, with the loss of only about 2,000 men. It was remarked that on this occasion the French were commanded by the Duke of Berwick, an Englishman, and the English by a Frenchman, Ruvigni, a Hugonot refugee, who had been made Earl of Galway; and that neither of the Kings whose crown depended on the issue appeared on the field of battle. The consequence of this victory was the submission of nearly all Valencia and Aragon to Philip V. Philip punished the Aragonese for their revolt by abolishing what still remained to them of their *Fueros*, or provincial privileges. The campaign was terminated by the siege and capture of Lerida, the bulwark of Catalonia, by the French. The arms of Philip had also been successful on the Portuguese frontier, where Ciudad Rodrigo was retaken.

The successful progress of the allies in Italy was some compensation for their reverses in Spain. A small Imperial army, under Daun, marched through the Papal Territories and occupied Naples without resistance (July); and the Spanish viceroy, who defended himself awhile at Gaeta, having surrendered on September 30th, the whole kingdom submitted to the Imperialists. The reverses of Charles III. in Spain had contributed to this result, by leading the Neapolitans to hope that he would take up his residence in their capital. In Northern Italy, however, the operations of the allies had not been attended with the like success. The Duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene penetrating into France by the Maritime Alps and Nice, appeared before Toulon towards the end of July, while Sir Cloudesley Shovel blockaded it by sea. But the Imperialists were prevented by Marshal Tessé from completing the investment of the city, and the approach of some strong French divisions compelled them to make a hasty retreat beyond the Var. The Duke of Savoy and Eugene revenged themselves by driving the French from Susa, which they had still continued to occupy.

In the Netherlands, where Vendôme was instructed to remain on the defensive, and where the operations of Marlborough were

¹ Coxe (who does not mention the departure of the Archduke). *Memoirs of the Bourbon Kings of Spain*, vol. i. p. 406, as well as the French historians (Martin,

ibid. p. 473), make the Anglo-Portuguese infantry at least double the number here given: but see Lord Mahon. *War of the Succession*, p. 230.

obstructed by the States-General, nothing of importance took place. In Germany, Villars forced the lines of Stolhofen, which had been so long successfully defended by Prince Louis of Baden. That commander was now dead, and his place had been very incompetently supplied by the Margrave of Baireuth. Villars penetrated to the Danube, and laid all Suabia and Franconia under contribution; but the Elector of Hanover, afterwards George I. of England, having been appointed to the command of the Imperial army, ultimately forced the French to recross the Rhine.

1708.—The union between England and Scotland, effected at the beginning of the preceding year, had caused a good deal of discontent in Scotland, of which Louis resolved to avail himself to attempt a descent of the Pretender, James III., in the Firth of Forth. Early in March, the Pretender put to sea from Dunkirk with 5,000 men; but his fleet was dispersed by Admiral Byng, and the enterprise entirely frustrated.

The campaign this year was most active in the Netherlands, where Marlborough had been joined by Prince Eugene. Early in July, Ghent and Bruges, disgusted, it is said, by the extortions of the allies, opened their gates to the French. A few days later (July 11th) the Duke of Burgundy and Vendôme, attempting to prevent the allies from passing the Schelde near OUDENARDE, were defeated with great loss by Marlborough and Eugene. This victory enabled the allies to enter French Flanders, where they laid siege to Lille, its capital, and obtained possession of the town by capitulation, October 22nd. The citadel, valiantly defended by Marshal Boufflers, did not surrender till December 10th. Other noticeable events of this campaign were the compelling the Elector of Bavaria to raise the siege of Brussels, and the retaking of Bruges and Ghent. Thus all Spanish Flanders, and part of French Flanders, remained in the hands of the allies.

On the Rhine, both sides remained on the defensive. In Spain, where Galway and Das Minas had been succeeded by Count Stahremberg and General Stanhope, Tortosa and Alicant were recovered by Philip V., and Charles III. was compelled to shut himself up in Barcelona. Here he espoused a princess of Brunswick. The operations at sea were more favourable to the allies. The island of Sardinia voluntarily submitted to Admiral Lake and proclaimed Charles III. (August); and in the following month Minorca was captured by the same Admiral and General

Stanhope. Port Mahon was garrisoned by British troops, and, like Malta at a later period, continued many years to be England's stronghold in the Mediterranean.

The length and ill success of the war had now begun to tell with fatal effect upon France. The financial difficulties occasioned by the enormous disbursements were met by ruinous loans, injudicious and vexatious taxes, the forestalment of future revenue, and the issue of paper money. The public misery was still further heightened by a winter of unparalleled severity. Even the impetuous Rhone was arrested by the ice; the sea froze as in the polar regions; the vines and fruit trees were destroyed; the corn perished in the earth. The pursuits of pleasure and the affairs of business were equally suspended; the tribunals, the theatres, and the shops were closed; whole families of the poor were found frozen to death in their hovels or their garrets. The dearth and famine which ensued produced discontent and sedition; insulting placards appeared against the government, and were affixed even to the statues of the Great King. Louis, thus humiliated in the midst of all his glory, renewed his proposals for peace; and in the negotiations which were opened at the Hague went so far as to renounce, in the name of his grandson, the whole of the Spanish succession, and even to offer to restore Strasburg to the Empire. The allies, however, and especially Marlborough and Eugene, entertained strong doubts of his sincerity, and regarded his proposals as designed only to adjourn the war to a more convenient season. Philip himself, so far from displaying any intention to abandon Spain, was making every effort to rouse the zeal and loyalty of the people in his favour; and during the progress of the negotiations he caused his son, an infant under two years of age, to be acknowledged by the Cortes of Castile and Aragon as Prince of Asturias and heir of the Spanish monarchy (April 7th, 1709). It was suspected that Louis would secretly help Philip to maintain himself in the Peninsula, as he had before succoured Portugal against Spain after the Treaty of the Pyrenees, and he was therefore required to assist the allies in compelling the "Duke of Anjou" to quit Spain at the expiration of two months.¹ Louis availed himself of the apparent harshness of this condition to rouse the pride of the French nation in his favour. In a public

¹ For these negotiations see *Mémoires de Torcy*, t. ii. (ed. 1756). Targe, *Hist. de l'acènement de la Maison de Bourbon*, t. v. p. 358, admits that Louis only meant to amuse his enemies. The French King's

nephew, the Duke of Orleans, had endeavoured to supplant Philip V., and opened communications with the allies for that purpose through General Stanhope. See Mahon's *War of the Succession*, ch. vii.

manifesto he detailed the sacrifices which he had been willing to make, and the insulting offers with which they had been met; an appeal which could not fail to be responded to by a nation like the French, who resolved to defend the honour of their king to the last extremity.

1709.—Extraordinary preparations were now made on both sides for renewing the war. Villars was selected to oppose Marlborough and Eugene in Flanders, the chief scene of operations this year. He could not save Tournai from the hands of the allies (September 3rd), who then invested Mons. For this purpose they were obliged to attack Villars in a strongly-fortified position at MALPLAQUET, from which they succeeded in driving him, but not without suffering enormous loss (September 11th). From the numbers engaged, and the immense returns of killed and wounded—between 30,000 and 40,000 men in all, of which the far greater portion belonged to the allies—this has been reckoned the greatest and the bloodiest battle of the eighteenth century. Villars himself was severely wounded. In consequence of this victory, the allies obtained possession of Mons.

On the eastern frontier of France the Imperialists, under the Elector of Hanover, had formed the design of penetrating into Burgundy, where they were to be joined by the Duke of Savoy. But the Count de Mercy, with a chosen body of German troops, having penetrated into Haute Alsace, was defeated at Rumerheim (August 26th), and an end was thus put to the plan of the campaign. Nothing of much importance was done in Spain.

This year, Pope Clement XI., though friendly to the cause of Louis XIV. and Philip V., was compelled to recognize Charles III. as King of Spain. Clement had long complained in vain of the garrisons established by the Imperialists in the States of the Church, and of the exorbitant contributions which they levied, as well as of the acts of sovereignty exercised by Joseph in the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza; and in July, 1708, he had published a bull in which he threatened the Emperor with his temporal as well as spiritual weapons.¹ In pursuance of these threats, Clement took measures for levying an army of 25,000 men; but on the approach of General Daun, he adopted more moderate counsels. He agreed to reduce his army to 5,000 men, and to permit the Imperialists free passage through the States of the Church, January 15th, 1709. In some secret articles he promised to recognize Charles III. as King of Spain, and to invest him with the

¹ See Menzel, B. v. S. 46.

crown of both Sicilies. The questions respecting Parma, Piacenza, and Comacchio were to be settled in private conferences. A formal brief of recognition was eventually issued (June 26th). But this violence towards the Pope was prejudicial to Austrian interests in Spain, since it gave the French party a handle to represent Charles to the zealous Spaniards as a favourer of heretical principles, and to confirm th^o insinuation, already made through his alliance wjth Protestant Powers, that it was intended to place a heretic on the throne of the Catholic Kings.

A treaty was also concluded this year (October 29th) at the Hague between Great Britain and the States-General, by which the States engaged to guarantee the Protestant succession in England in favour of the House of Hanover; while Queen Anne, on her side, promised to procure for the Dutch an adequate barrier on the side of the Netherlands, consisting of the towns of Furnes, Nieuport, Ypres, Menin, Lille, Tournay, Condé, Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Charleroi, Namur, Halle, Damme, Dendermond, and the citadel of Ghent. Several of these places were not yet taken.¹

1710.—In the spring of the year Louis renewed at Gertruydenberg the conference for a peace, and in addition to his former proposals he now offered the allies a subsidy of a million livres a month against his grandson Philip V., in case the latter should refuse to content himself with Sicily and Sardinia. It was, however, a suspicious circumstance that at this very time Louis bestowed on the infant son of the Duke of Burgundy the title of “Duke of Anjou,” which belonged to Philip V. in case of his renouncing the throne of Spain.² The allies, who were determined on maintaining the war, required that Louis should himself expel his grandson from Spain without any assistance, except, perhaps, from their armies in Catalonia and Portugal. This outrageous proposition at once put an end to the conference.

There was no general engagement this year in Flanders, where the allies captured Douai, Béthune, St. Venant, and Aire, thus encroaching more and more on the French frontier. On the Rhine the armies contented themselves with observing each other; and a projected invasion of Dauphiné and Languedoc, from Savoy and the sea, proved a complete failure. The chief operations were in Spain, and were at first favourable to the

¹ Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 243.

² Mahon, *War of the Succession*, p. 290. It might perhaps, however, be answered

that Philip was to be King of Sicily and Sardinia.

allies. Stahremberg and Stanhope, by their victories at Almenara and Saragossa, were again enabled to penetrate to Madrid; while Philip V. and his Court, and a great part of the population of the capital, retired to Valladolid. Charles III. entered Madrid for the first time towards the end of September, but was received by the inhabitants with a sullen silence, which caused him immediately to leave it for a villa in the neighbourhood. The arrival of Vendôme in Spain, who reorganized Philip's forces, and the advance of the Duke of Noailles to Perpignan, induced the allies to evacuate Madrid in November. Charles III. hastened to rejoin his consort at Barcelona. General Stanhope, with the rear-guard of the allies, composed of between 5,000 and 6,000 British troops, was overtaken by Philip and Vendôme at the little town of Brihuega (December 8th); where, being overpowered by superior numbers, and having exhausted all their ammunition, they were, after a brave and prolonged defence, compelled to surrender. Next day, Stahremberg, who was marching to Stanhope's relief, but too slowly, was defeated by Philip and Vendôme at Villa Viciosa, and compelled to hasten his retreat to Barcelona, where he arrived with only 7,000 men. These events were decisive of the fate of Spain. The Duke of Noailles having invaded Catalonia, Charles found his Spanish possessions reduced to Barcelona and Tarragona.

1711.—The war was now to take an unexpected turn through some unforeseen occurrences. In the course of 1710 that famous change of administration had taken place in England by which the Whigs were supplanted by the Tories. The influence of Marlborough and Godolphin gave place to that of Harley and St. John; the new ministry were inclined to peace, and were supported by the nation; for the people were weary of the war of which they bore the chief burden, though its advantages and emoluments were destined for others. While the English nation were in this temper, the death of the Emperor Joseph I., who died April 17th, 1711, at the age of thirty-two, changed the whole character of the War of the Spanish Succession. As Joseph left no male heirs, the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria devolved to his brother, the Archduke Charles; and though that prince had not been elected King of the Romans, and had therefore to become a candidate for the Imperial crown, yet there could be little doubt that he would obtain that dignity. Hence, if Charles should also become Sovereign of Spain and the Indies, the vast empire of Charles V. would be again united in one

person; and that very evil of an almost universal monarchy would be established, the prevention of which had been the chief cause for taking up arms against Philip V.

The English ministry had already made advances to the French King before the death of the Emperor, and Louis had expressed his willingness to enter into a separate negotiation with them. The terms proposed by the English Cabinet were: security that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united on the same head (a tacit acknowledgment of Philip V.); barriers for Holland and the Empire; the restitution of the conquests made from the Duke of Savoy and others; and a vague stipulation for "the satisfaction of all the allies." As regarded the particular interests of Great Britain, it was required that Louis should recognize Queen Anne and the Protestant succession in the House of Hanover, and dismiss the Pretender from France; that the fortifications of Dunkirk should be razed; that Gibraltar, Minorca, and St. Christopher's should be ceded to England, and that the privilege of the *Asiento*, that is, the monopoly of the slave-trade, should also be transferred to her; that the English should be placed on the footing of the most favoured nations in their trade with Spain; and that France should cede Newfoundland and Hudson's Bay and Straits; each country otherwise retaining its possessions in North America. These articles were signed as the preliminaries of a peace between France and England by Ménéger, Louis's envoy to London, October 8th.

Meanwhile the war still continued. Marlborough, though he had lost his political influence at home, retained the command of the army in Flanders; but his only exploit in this campaign was the capture of the little town of Rouchain (September 12th). The war was almost equally null in other quarters. In Spain, Philip V. took Gerona and Balaguer; in France, Marshal Berwick again prevented the Duke of Savoy from penetrating into Dauphiné. In Germany, Eugene, who had been recalled from the Netherlands to command the united army of Austria and the Empire, contented himself with covering the Electoral Diet which had assembled to choose an Emperor; nor was the Marquis d'Harcourt, the French commander, disposed to molest an assembly whose purpose would be of essential service to the actual policy of France. After an interregnum of half a year, during which the affairs of the Empire had been conducted by the Elector Palatine and the Elector of Saxony, as Imperial Vicars

for South and North Germany, the Archduke Charles was unanimously chosen King of the Romans, and consequently "Emperor Elect," by the Electoral College (October 12th); except that the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne, being under the ban of the Empire, had not been summoned to that assembly, and entered a solemn protest against its proceedings. Charles, who had embarked for Italy and Germany towards the end of September, leaving his consort at Barcelona as Regent, and as a pledge for his return, received the German crown at Frankfort, December 22nd, with the title of Charles VI.

The news of preliminaries having been signed between France and England had been received with dismay and dissatisfaction at Vienna, and the Hague; and indeed the conduct of the new Tory ministry in thus separating from their allies can hardly be defended, although Great Britain had just reason to complain that neither the Emperor nor the States-General had borne their fair share in a war conducted chiefly for their benefit. It can scarcely be doubted that the measures of the Tory Cabinet were as much prompted by the desire of ruining Marlborough and his party as by any patriotic motives; and though the arrangement which they proposed to the French King was perhaps on the whole a politic one, and the concessions demanded for Great Britain no more than she was entitled to for her sacrifices, yet it would have been more becoming in a great nation to have made it openly, and if not with the concurrence, at least with the knowledge, of her allies. The envoys at London of the Emperor, the States-General, and the Elector of Hanover, the last of whom was embittered against Louis as the protector of his rival, the Pretender, strained every nerve to overthrow the new ministry and defeat the peace; but though Prince Eugene came in person to support their representations, their efforts served only to confirm the English Court in its new policy. The majority of the House of Lords, which was adverse to the ministry, was swamped by the creation of twelve new peers; and Marlborough, besides being dismissed from all his offices, was accused of speculation. He was succeeded as Commander-in-chief by the Duke of Ormond.

There was now no alternative but to agree to a conference for a general peace, which was opened at Utrecht, January 29th, 1712. Three French plenipotentiaries, the Marshal d'Huxelles, the Abbé de Polignac, and Ménager, who had settled the preliminaries at London, had the difficult task of replying to eighty ministers of the allies; but they were supported by the English

plenipotentiaries, the Bishop of Bristol, and Earl Strafford. It had been a principle of the Grand Alliance that the allies should treat *jointly* for a peace, which the ministers of the Allied Powers interpreted to mean, all together, in one act or treaty. The French, however, insisted that it merely meant at one and the same time, but by separate acts or treaties; and this interpretation being approved by the English envoys, all general conferences ceased, and the ministers of the various States assembled in private to deliberate on their proceedings. The French propositions were in the main conformable to the preliminaries already mentioned as signed at London: *viz.*, the recognition of Queen Anne and the Protestant succession in England; a barrier for Holland; the cession of Landau to the Empire, and of the two Sicilies, the Spanish Netherlands, and the Milanese to the House of Austria; the re-establishment of the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne, and the transfer of the Island of Sardinia to the former as compensation for the Upper Palatinate; finally, Louis engaged to agree to any measures which might be deemed requisite to prevent the union of the crowns of France and Spain. To these propositions the allies, with the exception of England, replied only by counter-propositions still more extravagant than those they had already made. The Emperor demanded to be recognized as universal heir of the dominions of Charles II.; the Empire insisted on the restoration of Alsace, the three bishoprics, and Franche-Comté; the States-General required as a barrier all the towns of the Netherlands which France had acquired by the treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle and Nimeguen, except St. Omer and Cambrai; even the Duke of Savoy demanded an accession of territory on the side of Dauphiné and the principality of Monaco. These extravagant demands only further stimulated Louis to make a separate peace with England; but some fatal events which had taken place in France tended to protract the negotiations even between these two countries.

The Dauphin had died in April, 1711, and was succeeded in that title, as heir of the French monarchy, by his son, the Duke of Burgundy, the elder brother of Philip V. of Spain. The Duke of Burgundy had been the pupil of Fénelon—the Telemachus for whom the precepts of Mentor had been elaborated—and his talents and virtues, though the latter were perhaps of too ascetic and monastic a kind, had caused him to be regarded, both by his grandfather and the French nation, with joy and hope as the future king of France. Unfortunately, however, in February,

1712, he sickened and died of a fever which had carried off, a few days before, his amiable consort, Mary Adelaide of Savoy. Nor was this the whole of the misfortunes of the royal House of France. The two children of the Dauphin were seized with the same disorder which had proved fatal to their parents; the elder, who bore the title of Duke of Brittany, expired in a few days; the younger, the Duke of Anjou, survived indeed the crisis of the malady, but was left in so debilitated a condition that it was feared he must soon follow his parents to the tomb. This languishing infant of two years was, therefore, now the only life between Philip V. and the crown of France; and the English Cabinet, naturally desirous of fresh guarantees against its union with that of Spain, demanded that Philip should cede his eventual rights to his younger brother, the Duke de Berri. Louis objected that such a renunciation was contrary to the fundamental laws of France, which could be abolished by God alone; nevertheless the English Cabinet stated that it should be satisfied with such a renunciation, on the ground that it would be regarded in England as valid, and that, at all events, the claims of the prince, in whose favour the renunciation was made, could be justly supported by the parties to the convention. The negotiations on this subject, which were confined to the English, French, and Spanish Cabinets, were protracted several months. Philip at length consented to abandon the country of his birth for that of his adoption. In November, 1712, in presence of the Cortes assembled at Madrid, and of Lord Lexington, the English ambassador, he publicly renounced the rights and pretensions of himself and his posterity to the crown of France, to which the Duke of Berri was named next in succession after the Duke of Anjou; and in default of male heirs, the Duke of Orleans, Philip's uncle, the Duke of Bourbon, his cousin; and the remaining French princes in their order. The Dukes of Berri and Orleans also renounced in turn their claims to the Spanish monarchy; the succession to which, in default of heirs of Philip V., was assured to the House of Savoy, as descended from Catharine, sister of Philip II. Philip's renunciation was registered by the Parliament of Paris, and Louis cancelled the letters patent by which he had reserved to Philip his eventual claim to the French throne.²

¹ *Mémoires de Torey*, t. iii. p. 292.

² *Dumont*, t. viii. pt. i. p. 310. Philip had rejected another proposition of the English Cabinet, though it was warmly supported by his grandfather; viz., to

relinquish Spain in favour of the Duke of Savoy, and to receive in return Naples, Sicily, and the Duchies of Savoy and Mantua, which, with the exception of Sicily, were to be united to the crown of

Louis XIV. had acceded to these terms several months before, upon the English ministry showing a resolution to adopt vigorous measures. Meanwhile the allied armies had taken the field as usual in May; but Ormond had declined all active co-operation with Eugene; and in June, on receipt of intelligence that Louis had agreed to the proposed terms, he announced to the Germans in the pay of England an armistice of four months with France. On July 17th Ormond and the English troops separated from the allies; and about the same time a body of 5,000 English took possession of Durkirk as the price of the truce and a gage for the fulfilment of the promises made by the French King. Eugene, left to contend alone against Marshal Villars, soon felt the disastrous consequences of the defection of his allies. On July 24th he was defeated by Villars at Denain, who pursued this success by the recapture of Douai, Le Quesnoi, and Bouchain. In other quarters the war this year was wholly unimportant.

The defeat of the allies at Denain greatly modified the views of the Dutch; while Louis felt the advantage of his position, and insisted on a considerable modification of the barrier which they demanded. The English Cabinet persuaded the States-General to accept most of these alterations; and on January 29th, 1713, a new Barrier Treaty was signed between the two Maritime Powers. The places destined to serve as a barrier were now reduced to Furnes, the fort of Knocque, Ypres, Menin, Tournai, Moëns, Charleroi, the citadel of Ghent, and some fortresses in the neighbourhood of that city and Bruges; and Great Britain engaged to procure for the Dutch the right of garrison in them from the future Sovereign of the Spanish Netherlands. There was now "nothing" to hinder a peace between England, France, and Holland; but it was delayed awhile in order that all the belligerents should, if possible, sign together. The Emperor, who complained that England had betrayed him, still refused to join in the negotiations at Utrecht. He was, desirous, however, of effecting a convention for the evacuation of Catalonia, where his army was compromised by the withdrawal of the English forces in the autumn, and subsequently of the Portuguese; whose king, now John V.,¹ had signed a truce at Utrecht; November 7th. France and England agreed to such a convention, the neutrality of Italy being also guaranteed, without which peace would have

France, in case Philip succeeded to that kingdom; to which he was to retain his claims.

¹ John succeeded his father, Pedro II., December 9th, 1706.

been impracticable; since, if Savoy should be attacked by the Emperor, the Maritime Powers were bound to come to the Duke's support. An amnesty was stipulated for the Catalans, and Queen Anne promised her good offices for the maintenance of their ancient privileges, or *Fueros*, a promise, however, which was shamefully neglected.¹ Charles VI. having by this convention recovered his troops and his consort, who was still holding her Court at Barcelona, was only the more obstinate in rejecting the peace. The Catalans refused to accept the amnesty without the confirmation of their *Fueros*, and it became necessary to reduce them by arms. Barcelona was not captured by Marshal Berwick till September 12th, 1714, after a defence of almost unparalleled heroism.

England had fixed April 11th, 1713, as the day by which the allies were to accept the offers of France; after which term neither of those countries was to be bound by them. Count Zinzendorf, the Imperial minister, having rejected a paper containing the French proposals handed to him by the British plenipotentiaries, the latter accordingly signed a treaty with France; and on the same day separate treaties were also signed with that Power by the ministers of the States-General, Prussia, Portugal, and Savoy.

The principal articles of the treaty between France and Great Britain were conformable to those already mentioned in the negotiations between the two countries; viz., the recognition by France of the Hanoverian succession in England, the abandonment of the Stuarts, the acknowledgment of the various renunciations of the French and Spanish Crowns, as before stated, the destruction of the fort and fortifications of Dunkirk, the cession to England of Acadia (Nova Scotia), Hudson's Bay and Straits, Newfoundland, and St. Kitts.² On the same day a treaty of commerce was concluded between France and England, by which the subjects of either Power were placed on the footing of the most favoured nations.

The treaty between France and Portugal related only to colonial possessions, and some cessions were made in favour of Portugal.³

By the treaty with Prussia,⁴ Louis recognized the Elector of Brandenburg as King of Prussia, consented to give him the title

¹ Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 327. The Convention was executed at Utrecht, March 14th, 1713.

² *Ibid.* p. 339.

³ *Ibid.* p. 312.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 356. Frederick I. of Prussia had died in February, 1713, and the King with whom the treaty was concluded was his son, Frederick William I.

of "Majesty," ceded to him by virtue of a power from the King of Spain, the Spanish portion of Gelderland, except Venloo, and Ruremonde, but on condition that the Catholic religion should be upheld; assigned to him, as representative of the House of Chalons, amalgamated with that of Orange, the sovereignty of Neufchâtel and Valengin, in Switzerland, vacant by the death of the Duchess of Nemours, without children, in 1707; when the States of Neufchâtel had decided in favour of the King of Prussia's claims. Frederick William, on his side, renounced his pretensions to the principality of Orange and the lands and lordships belonging to it. He was the only German prince who treated separately and independently in these conferences.

The treaty between Louis XIV. and Victor Amadeus II. of Savoy,¹ restored to the latter Savoy and Nice, and ceded to him Exilles, Fécestrelle, and Chateau Dauphin. The summit, or watershed, of the Alps, was henceforth to be the boundary between France and Piedmont, and the plateau of those mountains was to be divided. Sicily, with the title of King, was guaranteed to the Duke; and he and his posterity were recognized as the legitimate heirs of the Spanish monarchy in default of heirs of Philip V. The cessions made to the Duke by the Emperor Leopold in the treaty of Turin (October, 1703) were confirmed.

The treaty between France and the States-General² assigned to the Dutch all that part of the Spanish Netherlands still held by the French, which the States were to hand over to Austria so soon as a barrier should have been arranged; and a portion of the French Netherlands was also ceded in like manner through the States to Austria. The States, on their part, agreed to restore certain places to France, as Lille, Orchies, Aire, Béthune, &c. A commercial treaty was also concluded between the two countries.

Spain could not take part in the general pacification till Philip V. had been recognized, and the Spanish ministers therefore did not appear at Utrecht till the treaties had been signed by the other Powers. The peace between Spain and Great Britain was retarded by the difficulties raised by Philip V. respecting the renunciation of Sicily; but these having been at length removed, a treaty³ was signed between those Powers, July 13th, 1713. The principal articles were the recognition by Spain of the Hanoverian succession, the cession of Gibraltar and Minorca to England, but on condition that no Moors nor Jews should establish themselves

¹ Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 377. ² *Ibid.* pp. 366, 377. ³ *Ibid.* p. 393.

in either, and the assignment of the *Asiento* to an English company for a period of thirty years from May 1st, 1713. In a previous assignment of this privilege by Philip V. to a French company in 1701, a fourth part of the profits of this trade had been reserved for the Kings of France and Spain, and similar shares were now assigned to the sovereigns of Spain and England. The number of negroes to be imported yearly into Spanish America was fixed, as before, at 4,800. At the intercession of the Queen of England, the Catalans were to have an amnesty, and *all the privileges enjoyed by Castilians*: a virtual abolition of their *Pueros*, or ancient and peculiar liberties.

By the treaty with the Duke of Savoy, August 13th, 1713,¹ Spain ceded Sicily to that House as a kingdom, and Victor Amadeus II. was crowned at Palermo, November 14th, 1713; but both the Pope and the Emperor refused to recognize him. Subsequently, by the Treaty of Quadruple Alliance, 1718, the Duke was forced to exchange Sicily for Sardinia.

The peace between Spain and the States-General was delayed till June 26th, 1714, chiefly through the extravagant ambition of the Princess des Ursins, who wished to persuade Philip V. to erect some part of the Spanish Netherlands into an independent sovereignty in her favour, to which both the Dutch and the Emperor were opposed. The treaty between Spain and the United Netherlands relates chiefly to colonies and commerce.²

The last treaty signed at Utrecht was that between Spain and Portugal (February, 1715), which had been delayed by the mutual animosity of the two nations. Everything taken during the war was reciprocally restored, so that the limits of the two kingdoms remained the same as before. Spain ceded the colony of St. Sacramento, on the north bank of the river La Plata.³

All these treaties together form the PEACE OF UTRECHT. As it consisted of so many particular conventions, which might be violated without the parties to them being in a condition to claim the help of their former allies, the Grand Alliance was consequently dissolved, and the Emperor, who was the centre of it, was left without support. A delay, till June 1st, 1713, was accorded to him to accede to the peace; but he could not yet digest the terms offered to him by France, and especially the proposal to give Sardinia to the Elector of Bavaria, by way of compensation for the Upper Palatinate, which had been restored to the Elector

Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 401.
Ibid. p. 427.

³ *Ibid.* p. 444. The treaties are also in Lamberty, t. viii.

Palatine. He therefore resolved to continue the war, in the hope that the talents of Prince Eugene might procure him a victory, and enable him to treat on better terms. With this view he assembled all his forces on the Rhine; but the campaign turned out very much to his disadvantage. Eugene could not prevent Villars from taking Landau (August), and subsequently Freiburg, the capital of the Breisgau (November). Charles VI. now consented to treat. Eugene and Villars, so lately opposed in the field, met at Rastadt for that purpose; and their negotiations proceeded much more rapidly than those of professional diplomatists. The Peace of Rastadt, signed March 7th, 1714, was the last service rendered by Villars to Louis XIV., who told him that he had crowned all his laurels with that olive branch. The definitive treaty, however, was not signed till September 7th, at Baden, in Switzerland.¹ The treaty was formed on the basis of that of Ryswick, and no regard was paid to the protests of the German States against the fourth clause of that treaty, so prejudicial to the interests of Protestantism. The Pope had exhorted Louis not to abrogate the clause; but it has been only lately known that Clement was incited to this step by the Court of Vienna.² All places on the right bank of the Rhine were restored to the Empire; but Landau and its dependencies were ceded to France. The House of Austria was allowed to take possession of the Spanish Netherlands, according to the stipulations in the Treaties of Utrecht; that is, reserving a barrier for the Dutch, and also Upper Gelderland, which had been ceded to Prussia. Charles VI. was permitted to retain possession of all the places he occupied in Italy; as the Kingdom of Naples, the Duchy of Milan, Sardinia, and the fortresses on the Tuscan coast. The Electors of Bavaria and Cologne were reinstated in their dominions and dignities; but the Emperor preferred to restore the Upper Palatinate to the former, rather than give him the Island of Sardinia. This island was promised to the Elector Palatine by way of compensation for the Upper Palatinate; but the promise was never performed. Such was the treaty which the House of Austria, through its stubborn obstinacy, was at length compelled to accept, instead of the infinitely more advantageous terms offered by Louis XIV. at the Hague and Gertruydenberg!

The ministers of the Emperor and the States-General met at Antwerp to carry out the stipulations respecting the Dutch

¹ Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 436.

² See above, p. 439. and the correspon-

dence on this subject in Garden, t. ii. App.

barrier, under the mediation of George I., who had now ascended the throne of England; and the Third Barrier Treaty was signed November 15th, 1715.¹ It was agreed that after the surrender of the Spanish Netherlands to the Emperor, a body of troops should be maintained in them, of which three-fifths were to be provided by the Emperor, and two-fifths by the Dutch. Dutch garrisons were to be placed in Namur, Tournai, Menin, Furnes, Warneton, Ypres, and the fort of Knocque, and a mixed garrison of Spaniards and Dutch in Dendermonde; the Dutch commandants taking an oath to hold these places for the House of Austria. The Emperor ceded Venlo and some other places, and especially such as were necessary for inundating the country in time of war. England guaranteed the treaty, and engaged to support it by arms. The Dutch delivered, in February, 1716, to the Emperor the Spanish Netherlands, as possessed by Charles II.; but not till 1719 the places ceded by France.

Thus was at length terminated the war of the Spanish Succession, the greatest which had agitated Europe since the Crusades. Its effect was to modify considerably the situation of the different European States. Spain herself was apparently the greatest loser, having been deprived of her dominions in the Low Countries and Italy, and compelled to allow England a settlement in one of her islands, and even on her very soil. But, on the other hand, she retained her American possessions; and the loss of her outlying territories seems rather to have strengthened her. At all events, it is certain that from this period she began slowly to revive: and the decrease in her population, which had been gradually going on since the time of Charles V., was now arrested. Austria, though compelled to renounce the gigantic hope of reaping the whole Spanish Succession, acquired the greater part of those territories of which Spain was deprived; yet as these acquisitions lay not contiguous to her, it may be doubted whether they were not rather a cause of weakness than of strength, by increasing her danger in a greater ratio than they multiplied her resources. France lost a portion of the frontier which she had formerly acquired, as well as her influence in Germany; the fear with which she had inspired the different States, driving them to unite themselves more closely with Austria. But these losses were nothing in comparison with her internal ills—the disorder of her finances and the exhaustion of her population.² After the

¹ Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 458.

in France after the peace, declared that

² The Duke of Argyll, who travelled for forty miles together he had not seen a

Peace of Utrecht, France, though still one of the principal elements of the European system, could no longer be reckoned the dominant Power. The influence and reputation of England, on the contrary, were much increased by the results of the war, in which she had proved herself a counterbalance to the power of France and Spain. Holland, on the other hand, gained nothing besides her barriers, and from this time her commerce began to fall into the hands of the English.

Neither Louis XIV. nor Queen Anne long survived the Peace of Utrecht. Anne died of an apoplexy, August 1st, 1714—a Sovereign as remarkable for her nullity as her rival Louis was for engrossing the state in his own person. She was succeeded by the Elector of Hanover, with the title of George I., a prince whose chief political tenet was, like that of his predecessor, William III., hatred of Louis XIV. One of his first acts was to dismiss the Tory Ministry, whom he regarded with abhorrence, as the advisers of the Peace of Utrecht. The Whigs were reinstated in office, and Marlborough, who at this very time was intriguing with the Pretender, was again made Captain-General and Master of the Ordnance.

Louis XIV. survived the English Queen thirteen months; but it would have been better for his fame if he had preceded her to the tomb. He was now sunk in the extremity of anile superstition, bigotry, and intolerance. Since the death of his confessor, Father la Chaise, in 1709, Louis had intrusted the keeping of his conscience to Father le Tellier, a Jesuit, whose religion was tinctured with pride and malignancy, instead of the Christian virtues of humbleness and charity. One of the first acts of Le Tellier was to procure the destruction of the celebrated convent of Port Royal, the refuge of the Jansenists, the enemies of his Society (November, 1709). He also obtained from Pope Clement XI. the celebrated bull *Unigenitus* (September, 1713), by which were condemned 101 propositions extracted from the “*Réflexions Morales sur le Nouveau Testament*,” an esteemed work by Quesnel, now the head of the Jansenists—a book which had received the approbation of Father la Chaise, and even of Clement himself. It would have been fortunate, however, if Le Tellier had confined himself only to attacking speculative doctrines. He persuaded the King to revive the intolerant spirit which had

man capable of bearing arms. See Lord Pussell's *Europe from the Peace of Utrecht*. vol. i. p. 6. But this must surely have been an exaggeration.

prompted the repeal of the Edict of Nantes, and to invade the privilege of conscience and the sanctuary of domestic life. In 1712 a royal ordinance was published prohibiting physicians from succouring, after the third day, patients labouring under dangerous maladies, unless they could produce from an ecclesiastic a certificate of confession! This atrocious edict was followed, in 1715, by another, which denied those who died without receiving the sacraments the rites of sepulture.

Yet the political conduct of this royal zealot was marked in his last years by the grossest perfidy. Although he literally fulfilled his engagement to fill up the port of Dunkirk, he endeavoured to evade the spirit of it by causing to be made between that place and Mardyck a huge canal, a league in length, and capable of sheltering vessels of 80 guns. This was done on the pretence of providing an outlet for some canals previously emptied by the sluices at Dunkirk, and it was only after some threatening remonstrances from the English Government that the undertaking was suspended. Again, by the Peace of Utrecht Louis had solemnly recognized the succession of the House of Hanover in England, and had promised to withdraw his protection from the Stuarts; yet he secretly encouraged the pretended James III.'s ill-judged and abortive expedition to Scotland in 1715, by procuring for him a vessel, arms for 10,000 men, and a loan from Philip V. of 1,200,000 francs, which he was not able to advance out of his own funds. If these are bad specimens of Louis's political honesty, his legitimating his children by Madame de Montespan, the fruits of a double adultery, his endowing them with the rights of princes of the blood, and making them capable of succeeding to the crown, are no less cogent proofs that, in spite of his mechanical devotion, he was totally destitute of any genuine feeling of morality and religion.

It is not improbable that Louis's efforts in favour of the Pretender might have again precipitated France into a war with England had the King's life been prolonged. But in August, 1715, he was seized with a slow fever, which terminated in symptoms of mortification, and, after a confinement of three weeks, put an end to his life, September 1st. In the last days of his existence this mighty King was abandoned by all his family and courtiers—even by Madame de Maintenon, his wife—and died in the presence only of priests, physicians, and attendants. He had attained the age of seventy-seven years, during seventy-

two of which he had sat upon the throne, the longest reign on record. He died with constancy and resignation, and the last days of his life show him to more advantage as a man than the season of his greatest glory and prosperity. In the presence of eternity the dazzling mists of vanity and ambition, already partly dissipated by experience and misfortune, faded entirely before his mental vision, and revealed to him in their naked truth the objects which he had pursued.* It had been well for his people had the aged monarch been impressed at an earlier period of his reign with those words of counsel which he addressed on his deathbed to the youthful Dauphin. "My child," said he, "you will soon be the sovereign of a great kingdom. Do not forget your obligations to God; remember that it is to Him you owe all that you are. Endeavour to live at peace with your neighbours; do not imitate me in my fondness for war, nor in the exorbitant expenditure which I have incurred. Take counsel in all your actions. Endeavour to relieve the people at the earliest possible moment, and thus to accomplish what, unfortunately, I am unable to do myself."¹

These words, which were afterwards inscribed on the bed of Louis XV. by order of Marshal Villeroy, are, in fact, a condemnation by Louis himself of his whole reign. In that retrospect of conscience, he denounces his constant wars, his profligate expenditure, his uncontrollable self-will, and regrets that no time was left him to repair the misfortunes which they had produced. This condemnatory review was confirmed by the French people. The day of his funeral was a day of rejoicing and holiday; the procession was greeted with laughter and songs by the carousing populace, who added another article of reproach, over which the royal conscience had slumbered. Some proposed to use the funeral torches to set fire to the houses of the Jesuits;² but Louis had expired without giving the slightest indication that the course which he had pursued in religious matters gave him any compunction. In spite, however, of his defects, Louis XIV. must be allowed in many respects to have possessed the qualities of a great sovereign. He was generous and munificent; in grace, affability, and dignity of manner, in all that goes to constitute the outward semblance and bearing of a king, he was unrivalled; and all his projects, however unjust and impolitic, were marked by grandeur of conception, and ability and perseverance in their

¹ Saint Simon, t. xii. p. 483; Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV.* ch. xxviii.

² Voltaire, *l. c.*

execution. And now that the misery inflicted by his reign has been forgotten, and only its glory and conquests are remembered, it is probable that the image of Louis XIV. will continue to occupy a conspicuous niche in the national Pantheon of the French, a nation ever ready to pardon the faults of those who have extended their boundaries, upheld their military reputation, and promoted the fame of their literature and art.

CHAPTER XLI.

WHILE these things were going on in Southern and Western Europe, the close of the seventeenth century was marked in the north by the breaking out of an extensive war. The death of Charles XI. of Sweden, in April, 1697, and the accession of his son Charles XII., at the age of only fifteen years, inspired several of the northern sovereigns with the hope of aggrandizing themselves at the expense of so youthful a monarch, and of recovering some of the territories which had been wrested from them by his predecessors. Sweden still possessed the provinces which had been assigned to her by the treaties of Oliva, Copenhagen, and Kardis. Finland, Carelia, Ingria, Esthonia, and Livonia, as well as the greater part of Pomerania, the fortresses of Stettin and Stralsund, Wismar and its fortified harbour, and the Duchies of Bremen and Verden continued subject to her sceptre. Augustus, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, was the prime mover in this conspiracy of sovereigns, and must be regarded as the main cause of a war which desolated Northern Europe during twenty years, and ruined for a long period his own dominions as well as Sweden.

Augustus himself, however, was led into the war by the counsels of Patkul, the Livonian noble, whose flight from Sweden and from the tyranny of Charles XI. has been already recorded.¹ Patkul inspired Augustus with the hope of acquiring Livonia by painting in glowing colours the discontent which prevailed in that province. An article of the *Pacta Conventa*, subscribed by Augustus on his election to the Crown of Poland, by which, in vague terms, he had undertaken to recover the provinces which had been dismembered from that Kingdom, might serve as an excuse with his Polish subjects for entering into the war; while, as regarded Sweden, it might be alleged that Livonia had been ceded to that Power by the Treaty of Oliva, only on condition that its privileges should be respected, and that these had been grossly violated by

¹ Above, p. 404. Patkul's conduct, however, can hardly be imputed to self-interest, as his own estates had not been subjected to the "reduction."

Charles XI. But under these plans of foreign aggression Augustus concealed another for strengthening himself at home. Under pretence of war, he contemplated introducing Saxon troops into Poland, and by reducing the party opposed to him in that Kingdom, to make himself absolute, and render the crown hereditary in his family. To conciliate the leading Poles, Cardinal Radziejowski, Primate of Poland, who enjoyed extensive influence, was bribed with 100,000 rix-dollars, which Patkul offered him in the name of the nobles of Livonia; and a kind of capitulation was drawn up and signed by Augustus, August 24th, 1699, for the future government and constitution of that province.¹

As the King of Poland could not hope by himself successfully to oppose the power of Sweden, he determined to form alliances with such neighbouring princes as, like himself, were jealous of the Swedish might and ambition, or desirous of recovering some of the provinces which had been wrested from them by the Swedish arms. He first applied to the King of Denmark, the natural rival of Sweden, and now further embittered against that Power by the part which the Swedish King had taken against him in his quarrels with the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. Fresh disputes had arisen in 1694 between Christian V. and Frederick, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. The Danish Court having raised some difficulties about their common subjects doing homage to Frederick, the latter, with the aid of Swedish soldiers, constructed some new forts. In 1696 he formed an alliance with the Duke of Brunswick Lüneburg, in which Sweden was included; and subsequently he entered into treaties with Great Britain and the States-General; which Powers, in consideration of his furnishing a certain number of men for the war against France, guaranteed him from any attempt at coercion on the part of Denmark.² The Emperor now interposed, and, in August, 1696, a conference was opened at Pinneberg, in which the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg acted as mediators between the King of Denmark and the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. The debates were, however, protracted, and while the conference was still going on Charles XI. of Sweden died (April 5th, 1697). His successor, Charles XII., was the intimate friend of the Duke of Holstein, with whom he had been educated. In 1698 Charles gave the Duke his sister in marriage, and promised to support him in his quarrels with Denmark; while Christian V., on his side, concluded a secret defensive

¹ Schmauss, *Einleitung zu der Staats-wissenschaft* B. ii. S. 253.

² Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 366.

alliance with the Elector of Saxony, who, as already related, had been elected to the Polish Crown in June, 1697, with the title of Augustus II.¹ In the year 1699 Christian, having demolished the fortifications erected by the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, the latter sought the aid of his brother-in-law, Charles XII.; and, having been made generalissimo of the Swedish forces stationed in Germany, he entered his duchy with a body of Swedes and reconstructed his forts.

In the midst of these events Christian V. died, August 25th, 1699. Frederick IV., his successor on the Danish Throne, resolved to extend the alliance already entered into with Augustus II., and to make it an offensive one; and a treaty for that purpose was signed at Dresden, September 25th. It was arranged that Augustus should invade Livonia, while Frederick should divert the Swedish forces by an attack upon Holstein. In order, however, to insure the success of these measures, Augustus resolved to obtain the assistance of the Czar Peter, with whom a treaty was concluded, November 21st. This prince was now to play a remarkable part in the affairs of Europe, and it will, therefore, be proper to give a short account of his career.

The Czar Alexis died January 29th, 1676, leaving by his first marriage two sons, Feodor and Ivan, and six daughters; and by his second marriage one son, Peter, afterwards called the Great and two daughters. Feodor III., who succeeded Alexis, reigned till his death, in April, 1682; but these six years present nothing of much European importance. Feodor was succeeded by Ivan, who, however, from his weakness both of mind and body, reigned only nominally. He was also nearly blind and dumb; and in consequence of these disqualifications he had solemnly renounced the Crown in favour of his young step-brother Peter, in presence of the clergy, magistrates, soldiers, and citizens, assembled at the Kremlin, immediately after the death of Feodor. Peter now received the usual homage; but, as he was only in his tenth year, his mother, the Czarina Natalia Kirillovna, was declared Regent during his minority. Sophia, however, the third sister of Feodor, an ambitious and enterprising princess, having formed a party in her favour, and gained over the Strelitzes, a body of troops which resembled, by their privileges and influence, as well as by their unruly conduct, the Turkish Janissaries, succeeded in seizing the reins of government; when she caused Ivan to be proclaimed Czar jointly with Peter, and herself to be invested with the Regency.

¹ See above, p. 390.

She even pretended to the title of Autocrat, and, with her paramour Golizyn, ruled everything at her pleasure. Sophia was in person a monster of deformity; very short, enormously fat, with a head as big as a bushel measure, and a face covered with hair; but under this repulsive exterior was concealed a mind of extraordinary acuteness, although capable of committing the greatest crimes for the attainment of power.¹ She had formed the design of espousing Golizyn, by whom she had children, after he should have succeeded in shutting up his wife in a convent; they were then to set aside, at a favourable opportunity, the claims of Peter, and virtually to rule the State in the name of the incapable Ivan. But these plans were defeated by the courage and conduct of Peter. The marriage of the young Czar, in January, 1689, with Eudoxia Feodorowna, a young lady belonging to the rich and ancient family of the Lapuchin, served very much to increase his power and influence; and he soon took an opportunity to assert himself. In the following June, on the occasion of a public solemnity at Moscow, he insisted that his sister should appear, not as Regent and Autocrat, but only as Grand Princess; and, on her refusing to comply, he banished her the city. Sophia now formed a conspiracy to take Peter's life, in which she engaged some of the Strelitzes. But Peter, having received timely notice of the plot, escaped by flight the sword of the assassins, turned all Sophia's arts against her; accused her and her paramour of high treason; caused Golizyn and several other nobles to be banished, and Sophia to be shut up in a convent which she had herself erected at a little distance from Moscow. Two days after Peter entered the capital on horseback, mustered the now obedient Strelitzes to the number of 18,000, and conducted his wife and his mother in state to the Kremlin, amid the enthusiastic shouts of the people. Thus did Peter, at the age of seventeen, become sole ruler of the Russian Empire. He displayed, however, the greatest affection for his unfortunate brother, Ivan; and, till the death of that prince, in 1697, allowed his name to appear at the head of the Imperial Ukases.

Peter now applied himself to reform the State, and particularly the army, in which cares he was assisted by General Patrick Gordon and Le Fort, a Genevese. He also directed his attention to commercial affairs and to the navy. In order to extend the Russian trade he was desirous of getting a footing both on the Baltic and the Black Sea, and to possess a navy which might

¹ Hojer, *Leben Friderichs IV.* B. i. S. 21.

protect the commerce thus created. He invited shipbuilders from Holland, whom he employed in building small vessels on the Russian lakes; and, in company with these men, whom he treated as his familiar friends, he speedily acquired the Dutch language. Dissatisfied, however, with such small efforts, Peter journeyed, in the summer of 1693 and following year, to Archangel, the only part of his dominions where he could obtain any practical knowledge of the sea and maritime affairs. Here he assumed the dress and exterior of a Dutch skipper, made small voyages in his yacht, and sometimes appeared on the exchange and made contracts with the merchants. It was during Peter's abode at Archangel that the keel of the first Russian merchant vessel was laid down. It left that port in 1695, to carry, for the first time, the Russian flag into foreign harbours. In that and the following year Russia was engaged in the war in the Crimea, as already related. After the capture of Azof, in 1696, Peter relinquished the conduct of the war to his generals, in order that he might carry out a plan which he had formed for acquiring knowledge by travelling into foreign countries. Before he set out, his life was again exposed to extreme danger through a conspiracy which his sister Sophia had hatched against him on the occasion of the death of their brother Ivan, in January, 1697; for Peter's reforms had excited great discontent among certain classes. But, having discovered and frustrated this design, and punished the ringleaders, the young Czar set out on his travels.¹ His first journey was to Riga, whither he proceeded, under the name of Peter Michailoff, in the character of a military officer and one of the members of a splendid embassy consisting of 270 persons. The Czar's reception here by Count Dahlberg, the Swedish commandant, was afterwards made one of the pretences for his war with Sweden. From Riga Peter made his way through Königsberg and Berlin to Saardam in Holland. Here he hired from a poor widow an apartment consisting of two rooms in a back dwelling, and putting on the dress of a common labourer, obtained employment in one of the dockyards as a shipbuilder. It must be confessed that he was more in his element here than among the *beau monde*, even such as it then was at Riga and Berlin, whom he at once amused and

¹ In a letter written this year the person of the Czar is thus described: "C'est un prince d'une fort grande taille, puissant, robuste, beau de visage; et quoiqu'il ait l'oeil vif, noir, et perçant, quand il parle avec action, il a pourtant la phy-

sionomie très douce. Il est très affable et souhaite même qu'on l'entretienne de tout ce qui est curieux."—See Brand, *Relation du Voyage de Mr. Evert Isbrand, Envoyé de sa M. C. à l'Empereur de la Chine*, p. 233. (Amst. 1699.)

shocked by a strange mixture of barbarism, vivacity, and bashfulness. Thus, at a supper given by the Elector, alarmed by the fall of some earthenware on the marble floor, he sprang up from table, drew his sword, and put himself upon his guard; and when he was at last satisfied that it was an accident, he demanded that the waiter who had caused it should be severely punished. On another occasion he snatched a smart new-fashioned peruke from the head of a master of the ceremonies, and, after examining it minutely, flung it away with a loud laugh.¹ Peter seems to have been more at home when drinking a glass of Geneva with the mothers or wives of his adopted fellow-workmen, or throwing plums from his hat to the boys in the streets of Saardam. When the Russian embassy entered Amsterdam with great splendour Peter took his place in one of the last coaches, amid the noblemen who filled it; and, while his representatives were living in state and luxury in houses rented for 100,000 guilders, he himself occupied a small lodging on the quay, boiled his own pot, and lived in every respect like a common labourer, under the name of Master Peter, or Carpenter Peter, of Saardam. Our space will not allow us to dwell on all the adventures and pursuits of this extraordinary man while in Holland; his interviews with William III., his studies in natural history under Leeuwenhoek, of botany and anatomy under Boerhaave. His natural curiosity even prompted him to learn the art of tooth-drawing, his newly-acquired skill in which he exercised without need on the jaws of his unlucky retinue. Early in 1698 Peter went over to England, where he preferred to Somerset House, which had been assigned to him as a residence, the house of Evelyn, near Deptford Dock-yard. In England, as in Holland, his time was chiefly spent with workpeople and mechanics of all descriptions. On his departure, early in May, King William made him a present of a handsome frigate of twenty-four guns, which had been prepared for the King's own use. Peter was so pleased with his visit to this country that he used often to tell his nobles that "it was a happier thing to be an English admiral than Czar of Russia."² In June Peter returned to his dominions by way of Dresden and Vienna. In his progress through Holland he had hired between 600 and 700 workmen, chiefly shipwrights, who were sent to

¹ For these and other anecdotes of his travels see Bergmann, *Peter der Grosse*, B. i. S. 251 ff. Descriptions of the Czar's manners will also be found in the letters of Sophia Charlotte in Erman's *Mém.*

pour servir à l'histoire de Sophie Charlotte, p. 116 sqq.

² *Der jetzige Staat von Russland*, von Johann Perry, Capitain. Leipzig, 1717, 8vo. S. 258.

Archangel; and at Vienna he took into his service nine Venetian sea-captains.

The Czar was diverted from his intended journey into Italy by a fresh insurrection of the Strelitzes, which caused him to return to Moscow. At Rawa, a small place not far from Lemberg, in Poland, he met by appointment Augustus II.; and it was here, during entertainments, which lasted three days, that the two sovereigns formed the plan of attack upon Sweden, for which, in the following year, they entered into a definite treaty. Patkul and General Von Carlowitz accompanied the Czar to Moscow to arrange the details. When Peter arrived in his capital he found that the Strelitzes had been already reduced to obedience through the courage and firmness of General Patrick Gordon, and that little remained for him to do but to punish the mutineers. During a period of three weeks many hundreds of the Strelitzes were hanged or beheaded under the inspection of the Czar himself, who is said to have executed many with his own hand, while he sometimes compelled those *Bojars*, or nobles, whom he suspected of disaffection to perform the office of hangman. Peter's own wife, Eudoxia, who was implicated in the investigation, and who had incurred his dislike by her zeal for those old Russian customs which he wished to abolish, was sent to a nunnery and compelled to take the veil, under the name of Sister Helena. In August, 1700, he dissolved the whole corps of Strelitzes, then consisting of about 20,000 men.

Instead of the New Year's Day hitherto observed in Russia (September 1st), Peter introduced at the opening of the last year of the seventeenth century (January 1st, 1700), the reckoning of the Julian calendar then in use in the Protestant countries of Western Europe. At the same time he made a change in the dress and manners of his subjects. The Dutch and German fashion of dress was ordered to be observed, models of which were hung up at all the entrances of the Imperial residence; and the police had orders to cut away to the knees the long frocks or pelisses of those who adhered to the ancient fashion. Even the women, who had been accustomed to wear large loose-flowing coats, were compelled to conform to the new mode. By introducing plays, concerts, balls, and the like, he endeavoured to improve and soften the rude and barbarous manners of his subjects. In short, through all these improvements, and those which he introduced into the civil, military, and naval service of the country, Peter must be regarded as one of the most remarkable

Reformers that the world has ever seen; and as better deserving the name of the "Great" than most of the princes to whom that epithet has been applied.

Peter's chief motive for joining the alliance against Sweden was the desire of possessing a port upon the Baltic, and opening that sea to the navigation and commerce of his subjects, just as he had done in the Black Sea by the conquest of Azof. His ambition was at first confined to a single port. While his war with the Turks was still going on, he had sent an envoy to Stockholm to explain his plans, namely, to direct the trade of Persia into the Baltic; and he had asked either for Narva or Nyenskans, for which he offered an equivalent. It was not till after these offers had been refused that Peter listened to the proposals of the Kings of Poland and Denmark; and indeed it was scarcely for his interest to assist the Republic of Poland in the conquest of Livonia, a province to which he himself had pretensions.¹ In consequence of his negotiations with General Carlowitz and Patkul at Moscow, Peter signed on November 21st, 1699, a treaty with Augustus II., by which it was agreed that the King of Poland should attack the Swedes in Livonia and Esthonia, and that the Czar, to whom a footing on the Baltic was secured, should invade Ingria and Carelia, as soon as he should have concluded a peace with the Porte. This was not effected, as we have already mentioned,² till July, 1702, the negotiations having lasted more than two years; but Peter, nevertheless, found himself enabled to take part in the war in 1700. The allies endeavoured to draw Frederick, the Elector of Brandenburg, into the league; but that prince, although he was on a good footing with all of them, and especially with the Czar, whom, as we have seen, he had entertained in his dominions, and though he had, besides, as much cause as they for making reprisals upon Sweden, yet preferred to maintain inviolate his treaties with that Power.³

Augustus II., at the very time that he was preparing to make

¹ Nestesuranoy, *Mém. du règne de Pierre le Grand*, t. ii. p. 431. Peter's *Journal*, drawn up under his own eyes and corrected in many places with his own hand, offers authentic materials for his reign down to the year 1721. There is a German translation of it by Bacmeister in the first two volumes of his *Beiträge zur Gesch. Peters des Grossen* (Riga, 1774, 3 B. 8vo.). The French translation by Formey ends at the year 1714. On Peter's reign may also be consulted—Bergmann, *Peter der*

Grosse als Mensch und Regent dargestellt; Alex. Gordon, *Hist. of Peter the Great* (Aberdeen, 1755, 2 vols. 8vo.); Herzmann, *Gesch. des russ. Staats*, B. iv.; Voltaire, *Hist. de Pierre le Grand*.

² See above, p. 391. Hermann, *Gesch. Russlands*, B. iv. S. 96, erroneously places the definitive treaty with the Porte in July, 1700. See Zinkeisen, *Gesch. des osman. Reiches*, B. v. S. 234, Ann.

³ Bacmeister, *Peters Tagebuch*, B. i. § 2 ff.

war upon his cousin,¹ was deceiving him by a show of friendship, and had sent an ambassador to Stockholm to negotiate a treaty. The Saxon troops began to move towards Riga towards the end of 1699; but, through the dilatoriness of their commander, General Flemming, who had just married the daughter of a Livonian noble, the attack on Riga was delayed till near the end of February, 1700, and the opportunity of surprising that place was consequently lost.² Nor did the Livonians rise in favour of Augustus as Patkul had led him to expect. Flemming was, therefore, compelled to turn the siege of Riga into a blockade, and to attack some smaller places, as Dünamunde, Budberg, &c.: Dünamunde, important as commanding the mouth of the Dwina, was soon obliged to capitulate. Meanwhile, Frederick IV., relying on this diversion, which he thought would prevent Charles XII. from assisting his brother-in-law, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, had commenced an attack upon that prince. But he had completely mistaken the character of the Swedish King.

Charles, who had not completed his fifteenth year at the time of his father's death, was a few months after that event declared major by the Swedish States: the regency appointed by his father's will was set aside, and the youthful king took into his own hands the reins of government.³ Count Piper, who had been the chief instrument in this affair, now became Charles's confidant and counsellor. During the first two or three years of Charles's reign, nothing happened to call forth his latent and yet hardly developed qualities; but he gave a foretaste of his reckless courage in desperate bear hunts, in which the danger of the sport formed its chief relish. His character was first displayed to Europe through the confederacy organized against him by his cousins. The news of the invasion of Livonia by the Saxons filled his counsellors with anxiety and alarm. But Charles's noble address to the Senate soon calmed their apprehensions. "I have resolved," he said, "never to wage an unjust war; but, at the same time, never to close a just one except by the destruction of my enemies."⁴ The hopes inspired by this remark were increased by the change observed in Charles's mode of life. His hunting parties, as well as

¹ The Kings of Sweden, Denmark, and Poland were all of kin to one another. Charles XII. was the son of Frederick IV.'s aunt, and Augustus II. was the son of Charles XII.'s aunt.

² Bergmann's *Historische Schriften*, B. i. S. 119 sqq.

³ For the history of Charles's reign see

Nordberg, *Hist. de Charles XII. traduite du Suédois*; Lundblad, *Gesch. Karls des XII.* (übersetzt von Jenessen, Hamburg, 1835, 2 B.); Voltaire, *Hist. de Charles XII.* (valuable for its style rather than as an authority); Adlerfeld, *Hist. militaire de Charles XII.*

the expensive ballets, plays, and other divertisements in which he had indulged for the amusement of his sisters, were exchanged for military exercises and reviews, and instructive conversations with the few veteran officers who had survived the wars of his grandfather. The faithless conduct of his cousin, the King of Poland, filled him with surprise and indignation; and when that monarch, after his ill-success at Riga, made some advances for an accommodation with Charles through the French ambassador, the Swedish King refused to treat till he should have inflicted some chastisement on his perfidious kinsman.

First of all, however, he resolved to fly to the aid of his brother-in-law, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, who, as already related, had invoked his help against the King of Denmark. The Danes had entered Sleswick in March, 1700, and, after taking Husum, Eiderstedt, and other places, laid siege to Tönning, the Duke's principal town; from which, however, they were forced to retire on the approach of an army of Swedes, Hanoverians, and Dutch, under the Duke of Brunswick Lüneburg (June). Frederick IV., misled by the idea that the attack on Livonia by the Saxons and Poles would prevent the Swedes from going to war with him, had joined his army before Tönning, in the confident hope of an easy victory; instead of which he was to see his own capital threatened with destruction.

Charles XII. had concluded at Stockholm a defensive alliance with the Dutch, February 22nd, 1698, which, in the following May, was acceded to by William III. of England.¹ The object of this alliance was declared to be, not only mutual defence, but also the maintenance of peace in Europe; and the views of the Maritime Powers in forming it were, to keep Sweden in that line of anti-French policy which she had adopted since the Peace of Nimègue. Charles XII., indeed, at the persuasion of Piper, also concluded a defensive treaty with France in July of the same year;² but this was only a temporary deviation from the policy adopted by his father. In January, 1700, he renewed and extended his alliance with the Maritime Powers by a fresh treaty,³ by which, in case of attack, the reciprocal succour was fixed at 6,000 men. But by a secret article, the King of Sweden bound himself to furnish 10,000 men, in case Great Britain or the States-General should be compelled to go to war to maintain the Peace of Ryswick; and, by another secret article, those two Powers guaranteed to the Duke of Holstein the rights secured to him by his treaty with Christian V.

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 439.

² *Ibid.* p. 447.

³ *Ibid.* p. 475.

at Altona in 1689, which they had helped to mediate.¹ Agreeably to these treaties, Charles XII. now called upon the Maritime Powers for aid. A combined English and Dutch fleet, under Rooke and Allemonde, passed the sound in June, 1700, and in the following month formed a junction with the Swedish. The Danish fleet, too weak to contend with an armament which numbered upwards of sixty ships of the line, was compelled to take refuge under the guns of Copenhagen.

Notwithstanding the danger which threatened his capital, Frederick IV. obstinately refused to treat till a descent of the Swedes in Zealand, led by the King in person, rendered his position altogether desperate. Covered by the fleet, Charles effected a landing near the village of Humlebek, August 5th. With fiery impatience, he himself was among the first to leap into the water, which reached up to his armpits.² The few troops which opposed the landing were soon dispersed; the Swedish camp was safely established; and so strict was the discipline maintained among the soldiers, that the Danish peasants brought in an abundant supply of provisions, for which they were punctually paid. Prayers were regularly offered up twice a day in the camp, and were attended by the King himself; who in this, as in many other particulars, offered a striking contrast to most contemporary sovereigns. It being now obvious that Copenhagen could be saved only by a speedy peace, negotiations were opened at the castle of TRAVENDAHL, and on August 18th a treaty³ was concluded on better conditions than Frederick IV. might have expected. Charles, desirous of prosecuting the war with Poland, consented to easy terms, and, forgetting his own interests, stipulated only in favour of his brother-in-law. All the ancient treaties between Denmark and Holstein were renewed and confirmed, and the King engaged to pay the Duke 260,000 rix-dollars as an indemnity for losses suffered. Thus did Charles finish his first war in the course of a few weeks without fighting a single battle. On September 3rd, he returned to Helsingborg; and on the 8th, Admirals Rooke and Allemonde withdrew their fleets from the northern waters, in which they had been the heralds of peace rather than the ministers of war.

The Peace of Travendahl took the allies by surprise. The Czar,

¹ Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 231.

² The anecdote told by Voltaire, and often retailed, that Charles, on being told that the whistling which he heard was occasioned by the flight of bullets, ex-

claimed, "This shall henceforth be my music," appears to have no foundation. Lundblad, Th. i. S. 77, Anm.

³ Dumont, *Ibid.* p. 480.

who was ignorant of it, declared war against Sweden, September 1st, and for the first time, with all the usual forms of European diplomacy. But this apparent advance in civilization was counterbalanced by the observance of the good old Russian custom of throwing the Swedish resident at Moscow into prison; and this while the Russian envoy was giving Charles the warmest assurance of his master's friendship. The reasons which Peter alleged for hostilities could not but be very weak, and were chiefly grounded on the reception he had met with from the commandant at Riga. An army of 80,000 men—an immense force for that age—gathered together from all the Russian provinces, and even from Asia, was directed against Ingria under the command-in-chief of Duke Charles Eugene of Croy. A division under Prince Trubetskoi, Governor of Novgorod, appeared before Narva September 19th, and was joined by the Czar and the Duke of Croy, October 1st, when the siege was commenced. Peter on this occasion assumed the rank and fulfilled the duties of a simple lieutenant; crossing the bridge which had been thrown over the river, pike in hand, with his company, in order to give the soldiers an example of subordination.¹ Charles XII., after his return from Zealand, had determined to lead his forces against the Saxons in Livonia; but, as he was embarking them at Karlshamn, his plans were altered by news that the Russians had not only declared war against him and imprisoned his ambassador, but had even invaded Ingria. The Swedish armament sailed October 10th, and landed the troops partly at Pernau, partly at Revel. Charles immediately resolved to direct his march on Narva. The two divisions of his army, when they formed a junction at Wesenberg, numbered only 13,000 men, and after making the necessary detachments for the defence of the country, he advanced against the enemy with but 5,000 foot, 3,300 horse, and 37 guns.² On November 27th Charles forced the reputed impregnable defile of Pyajokki, defended by 6,000 chosen Russians under Scheremetoff, who fled in the greatest alarm to the Russian encampment before Narva, spreading the report that the Swedes were advancing 20,000 strong. On the morning of November 29th Charles had penetrated to Lagena, only six miles from Narva. The news of the defeat of Scheremetoff and approach of the Swedes filled the Czar with consternation. At three o'clock on the morning of the 28th, Peter entered the tent of the Duke

¹ *Theatrum Europæum*, t. xv. p. 793.

² *Landsblad, Gesch. Karls des XII.* Th. i. p. 92 ff.

of Croy, almost mad with fright, and, after drinking several glasses of brandy, desired the Duke to take the entire command of the army, while he himself, accompanied by Princes Golovin and Menschikoff, hastily left the camp, under pretence of fetching reinforcements from Pleskow.¹

The flight of their sovereign and principal commanders had a most demoralizing effect on the Russian army. When the Swedes debouched from the wood of Lagena and formed in order of battle, they appeared to be so few that Croy took them only for the advanced guard of the 20,000 men reported by Scheremetoff. He declined, therefore, to leave his entrenchments, which were assaulted by the Swedes under cover of a snow-storm which drove into the faces of the Russians. In less than a quarter of an hour the Swedes had penetrated into the encampment; when the Russians, regardless of their officers, fled in disorder. In the pursuit hundreds were drowned in the Narova, the bridge over which had been broken down; others, who tried to shelter themselves behind some huts and baggage-waggons, were cut down like sheep. The young King of Sweden distinguished himself by the personal part which he took in this dreadful day. A spent ball lodged in his cravat; and in leading an assault he lost his sword and one of his boots in a morass. He was dragged out by his followers, and continued to fight with only one boot. It is said that 12,000 Russians fell in this battle, and on the following morning the remainder of their infantry surrendered; the cavalry had saved themselves by flight. As it was impossible to keep so many prisoners, they were dismissed, after defiling barheaded before Charles to the number of 18,000 men, and giving up their arms and colours. The general and higher officers alone were retained in captivity. The loss of the Swedes is computed at only 2,000 men.

The battle of Narva is an epoch in the history of Russia. It opened the eyes of the Czar to the defects of his army; and as he was not of a temper to be discouraged by his defeat, he regarded it as a useful lesson and redoubled his efforts to bring his forces into a better condition. But as it afforded a handle to the discontented Bojars, and even threatened to produce a revolution, Peter hastened back to his capital, where his political courage

¹ Hermann, *Gesch. Russlands*, B. iv. S. 115. The Saxon General Hallart, in a letter to Augustus II., describes these great bearded Russians as crying like children; characterizes the Czar himself

as "no soldier," and his generals as having "no more heart than a frog has hair on his belly." Cf. Lundblad, *ibid.* p. 95; *Theatr. Europ.* t. xv. p. 797; Gordon, *Hist. of Peter the Great*, vol. i.

and activity served to compensate for the lack of those qualities which he had displayed in the field.

Charles, who had taken up his winter-quarters in Livonia to refresh and recruit his little army, was long detained there in order to obtain reinforcements from Sweden. As it was uncertain whether, when he again took the field, he would direct his forces against the Russian provinces or the army of Augustus, that King and the Czar had an interview at Birsa in February, 1701, to take measures for their future safety; where, amid banquets and drinking bouts, which both loved well enough, their friendship was cemented by personal acquaintance, mutual interest, and a common danger. On March 3rd they concluded a new treaty, by which the Czar engaged to pay Augustus 200,000 rix-dollars, and to send him from 15,000 to 20,000 Russian troops. His motive for this last step seems to have been that his men might become habituated to European discipline.

Charles, having received large reinforcements from Sweden, broke up from Dorpat June 27th, 1701, the anniversary of his birthday. On July 20th, he crossed the Dwina a little below Riga, and defeated the Saxons under Marshal Steinau. Agreeably to the Czar's promise, Prince Repnin was leading 20,000 Russians to the aid of Steinau, of which, however, only 4,000 had been able to form a junction with that general before he was attacked by the Swedes. Kokenhusen, Dunamünde, and other places held by the Saxons were recovered before the end of the year, and all Courland was occupied by Charles's troops. The Swedish King might now have concluded an honourable and advantageous peace. The Czar, alarmed at the rapid progress of the Swedish arms, endeavoured to propitiate Charles through the mediation of the States-General. Augustus II. had still more cause for alarm, as Charles, in letters addressed to the Cardinal Primate, Radziejowski, and to the Polish Senate, had plainly intimated his wish that Augustus should be deposed. The Polish King solicited the interference of the chief European Powers; and William III., who was desirous of maintaining peace in Northern Europe, strongly persuaded Charles to reconcile himself with his adversaries, pointing out that he was in a position to dictate his own terms. But Charles refused to listen to any such proposals till he had gratified his revenge. That the perfidious conduct of Augustus was a reasonable ground of offence, and that the war in its origin was a just one, cannot be questioned; but the vindictive feelings of Charles, and it must be

added also his passion for war, made him overlook the true interests of Sweden, and finally precipitated both his country and himself into irretrievable ruin.

The Polish Republic, however, had given Charles no cause for complaint; for though the war was ostensibly waged by Augustus in the interest of Poland, yet it was carried on with Saxon troops, and against the wish of the Poles, who frequently assured Charles of their friendly disposition. He had cantoned his army along the borders of Samogitia, the frontier province of Poland Proper; but it was long before he could make up his mind to cross them. His first expedition was into Lithuania in the winter of 1701, whither he was attracted by the feuds of the two powerful families of Sapieha and Oginski. The faction of Sapieha was unfriendly to Augustus, whom they denounced as the enemy of the national liberties. But this rash expedition, which Charles undertook with only 1,500 horse and a few hundred infantry, without apparently any settled plan, led to no result. At Friski Charles was surprised by the troops of Oginski, and with difficulty found his way back to his army. It was after his return from this expedition that Augustus despatched to him his mistress, the beautiful Aurora von Königsmark, a Swedish countess, to sue for peace; but Charles saw through his cousin's design, and with a prudence and self-command remarkable in so youthful a Prince, refused to receive the fair ambassadress. A deputation from the Diet assembled at Warsaw met with scarcely a better reception. Charles, who was now on his march towards that capital, successively appointed to meet the envoys at Kovno and Grodno, but evaded both these appointments, and only at length gave them an audience at Dlugowice (May 4th, 1702). The purport of their message was, that the Polish Republic wished for peace, but that they could never consent to the dethronement of their Sovereign; and they desired that the Swedish troops should evacuate Samogitia and Courland, which were fiefs of the Republic.¹ Such demands, unsupported by an army, were little regarded by Charles. He refused to treat with Augustus, or to recognize him as King of Poland; and he directed his answer to Radziejowski, the Cardinal Primate, as if the throne had been vacant.

Against the advice of his best generals and counsellors, especially Stenbock, Piper, and Oxenstiern, Charles now pushed on for Warsaw, and on May 24th reached the suburb of Praga on the right bank of the Vistula. His approach occasioned a panic

¹ *Theatr. Europ.* t. xvi.

in the capital. Most of the nobles, including the Primate, retired to their estates; King Augustus set off for Cracow, where he had appointed his Saxon troops to rendezvous. Charles entered the town and castle without opposition. His army numbered only 9,000 men: with such a force had he undertaken to hold a city of 60,000 inhabitants, and to direct the policy of fourteen million Poles! He had expected to meet warm partisans at Warsaw, and was surprised and hurt at the sullen silence with which he was received. It was only after repeated invitations that the Primate, who had retired to his Archbishopric of Gnesen, could be induced to return to Warsaw. Charles received him with all military honours in his tent outside the town, but in a manner which the Primate afterwards complained of as inconsistent with the respect due to his age and to his rank as second person in the kingdom. Charles advanced a few steps to meet him, but no chair was offered, and both King and Cardinal remained standing. Charles was on this occasion dressed in his ordinary costume, a coat of coarse blue cloth with metal buttons, stiff boots which reached above his knees, leathern small-clothes, large gloves whose elk-skin cuffs reached to his elbows, a ponderous sword, designed for use rather than show. Charles endeavoured to draw the Primate to his views; but Radziejowski declined to sanction the deposition of Augustus, or even to call a Diet, on the ground that he was not constitutionally empowered to do so.

Charles XII. did not pursue his march towards Cracow till about the end of June. This interval had enabled Augustus, whose cause was favoured by the nobles of the Palatinates of Cracow and Sandomierz, to raise a much larger force than that of his adversary; and he was so elated by this circumstance that he resolved to give battle, though his most prudent generals advised him to wear out the Swedes by marches and countermarches. The two kings met, July 20th, near Clissow, a place between Warsaw and Cracow; when Charles gained a complete victory over 20,000 Saxons and 12,000 Poles, under Jerome Lubomirski, and captured the camp of Augustus, with forty-eight guns, many standards, the military chest, and the King's silver dinner-service. Charles's joy at this victory was, however, damped by the death of his brother-in-law, Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, who was killed by a cannon-ball. In consequence of this victory, Cracow fell into the hands of Charles, and Augustus retired to Sandomierz. Here the nobles of Little Poland, exasperated by the exactions of the Swedes, rallied round Augustus, and formed a confederation to

support him, which was afterwards joined by many of the nobles of Great Poland and Lithuania. They sent an embassy to Charles to offer very favourable conditions of peace,¹ which, however, he refused. A fall from his horse, by which he broke his thigh-bone, detained Charles longer at Cracow than he had intended. It was not till October 12th that he began his march towards Sandomierz in a litter; while Augustus, on his approach, set off for Thorn in Polish Prussia.

The winter was spent in debates and negotiations. The Cardinal Primate, whose wavering policy, dictated by self-interest, seemed sometimes to incline for Charles and sometimes for Augustus, summoned the Senate to meet at Warsaw; while the Polish King called a Diet at Marienburg, which gave its sanction to the Confederation of Sandomierz. Meanwhile Charles had taken up his winter-quarters at Lublin, and towards the middle of April, 1703, he concentrated all his forces at Warsaw. Hence an attack was directed against a Saxon division under Steinau, posted at Pultusk on the Narew, which was completely defeated (May 1st), with the loss of only twelve men on the part of the Swedes. Charles now directed his march upon Thorn, where Augustus had left 7,000 men. He appeared before that town May 23rd, but did not succeed in taking it till October 15th, when it surrendered at discretion. The fortifications were now demolished, and the garrison sent to Sweden. Charles remained at Thorn till November 21st, and then put his army into winter-quarters in the neighbourhood of Dantzic and Elbing.

In the course of this summer Augustus had summoned another Diet at Lublin, which formed, as it were, the complement of that of Marienburg. This assembly showed itself favourable to the King. It again sanctioned the Confederation of Sandomierz, and authorized Augustus to take means for prosecuting the war; for which purpose the army of the Crown was to be raised to 36,000 men, and that of Lithuania to 12,000; but Saxons were not to be admitted into it, nor was any alliance to be formed with Russia. It was resolved that the question of the King's deposition should never be debated in the Diet. The Primate had the boldness to appear in this assembly and declare that he had taken no part against the King. He was received with a tumult of indignation; the bitterest reproaches were levelled against him; shouts arose of "The Swedes' friend! the betrayer of his country!" nay, swords were even drawn; yet the prelate, by his imperturbable

¹ See Lundblad, Th. i. S. 215, Ann.

coolness, succeeded in allaying all this animosity, and even seemed to have convinced the assembly of his innocence!¹ The Diet resolved to despatch a deputation to Charles with terms of peace; he was to be allowed a space of six weeks to decide whether he would accept them; and if, at the expiration of that period, he should declare for war, Augustus was to be at liberty to seek foreign aid. The offers made by the Diet, which were supported by the Court of Vienna and the States-General, were, the confirmation of the Peace of Oliva and the complete neutrality of Poland. But Charles refused to receive any proposals which had not for their basis the deposition of Augustus, and in September he published a circular denouncing the proceedings of the Diet of Lublin. Augustus, in consequence, made a new treaty with the Czar, by which the latter engaged to send him 12,000 men, and promised 200,000 roubles yearly.²

Only a few months after these proceedings, the treacherous Primate summoned another Diet at Warsaw (January, 1704); giving out that Charles, with whom he was in communication, and who sent two ambassadors to the assembly, would treat with the Polish Republic, but not with the Polish King. The Diet, which was composed of only ten senators and the Nuncios of Great Poland, formed itself into a Confederation to effect the deposition of Augustus. The propositions made to Charles, through the Countess of Königsmark, which she had delivered into the hands of the Swedish ministers, were made a ground of accusation against Augustus. They proved that, in order to buy a peace, he had offered to cede some of the Polish provinces to Sweden. This charge excited universal indignation. Not a voice was raised in the King's favour; the throne was voted to be vacant, and on February 16th, 1704, an interregnum was publicly proclaimed.

The Primate had been led by his friendship for James Sobieski to take this open and irretreivable step against Augustus. The memory of his father, King John, had rendered James Sobieski very generally popular among the Polish nobles; and it had been agreed, with the concurrence of Charles, to raise him to the throne. But Augustus frustrated this design by seizing the person of his intended successor. James Sobieski and his brother Constantine dwelt in the castle of Ohlau, near Breslau; and as they were one day riding towards that city they were suddenly

¹ *Theatr. Europ. Th. xvi. pt. ii. p. 393.*

² *Halem, Leben Peters des Grossen, B. i. S. 225.*

surrounded by a party of Saxon dragoons and carried to Leipsic, where they were kept in a sort of honourable confinement in the Pleissenburg. Alexander, the youngest brother of John Sobieski, having declined the proffered crown, much difficulty arose as to the choice of a king. Four candidates appeared in the field: Jerolne Lubomitski, Grand General of the Crown; Charles Stanislaus Radzivil, Chancellor of Lithuania; Piemiazek, Voyvode of Siradia; and Court Stanislaus Lesczinski, Voyvode of Posen. The claim of Lubomirski was supported by the Primate; but Charles preferred Stanislaus Lesczinski. The Swedish army was moved towards Warsaw; a detachment appeared on the plain of Vola, the place of election; and on July 19th, 1704, against the wish of the higher nobles, and without the concurrence of Radziejowski, Stanislaus was saluted King of Poland.¹

He was not, however, to enjoy his new dignity in quiet. Augustus, who had still a considerable party in his favour, had retired to Cracow, and afterwards for greater security to Sandomierz, where his adherents, under the name of "Reconfederates," published a manifesto against the proceedings at Warsaw and the election of Stanislaus (July 28th). The new Monarch was recognized by no Power except Sweden; and the Primate Radziejowski, who had ultimately acknowledged him, was deprived of all his dignities by a Papal bull. Soon after the election Charles and his army proceeded to Heilsberg to levy contributions, leaving Stanislaus with only a few troops at Warsaw; and he afterwards marched into Red Russia, or Gallicia. Augustus quickly took advantage of this political as well as strategical error. By a rapid and dexterous march he pushed on his cavalry, among whom was a large body of Cossacks, to Praga: he himself, with the remainder of his forces, appeared before Warsaw, August 31st, and the Swedish General Horn was compelled to surrender the town and castle. Stanislaus now fled to Charles for protection; his estates, as well as those of the other confederates, were plundered; and he found himself deserted by many of the nobles who had joined him.

While these things were going on at Warsaw, Charles, whose chief object seems to have been plunder, was forming an expedition against Lemberg, the capital of Gallicia. Having failed to surprise that place with a body of horse, he captured it by assault at the head of his dismounted troopers, he himself being among the first to mount the ramparts. Here it was that he was joined

¹ *Theatr. Europ.* Th. xvii. p. 254.

by Stanislaus, and he now hastened to repair the faults he had committed. The march of the Swedish army was again directed upon Warsaw, before which it appeared October 24th, after capturing Zamosc by the way. Augustus, after making some show of disputing the passage of the Vistula, deemed it more prudent again to evacuate his capital, and fled with his cavalry to Cracow. The Swedish infantry now took possession of Warsaw, while Charles, with his horse, pursued the Saxon foot under Schulenburg, whom he overtook at Punitz, in the Palatinate of Posen. But Schulenburg, by the admirable disposition of his troops, resisted for some hours all the attacks of Charles, till night came to his assistance, during which he effected his retreat in good order. The Swedish troops were now put into winter quarters along the frontiers of Silesia; while Augustus repaired to Dresden, his capital, and, as if with a presentiment of his fate, employed himself in putting the fortifications in order.

The following year (1705), though almost destitute of military events, was fertile of political ones. The Cardinal Primate, who had taken refuge at Dantzic, was at length persuaded to sanction the coronation of Stanislaus, but on condition that the King of Sweden should engage to support him during five years in his new dignity; that he should cease to levy the exorbitant war-taxes which were ruining the country, and that he should protect the Primate against the effects of the Pope's anger against him for having consented to the coronation.¹ The Primate, however, declined to put the Crown on the head of Stanislaus with his own hand, and that office was performed by the Bishop of Lemberg, October 3rd. Charles himself, accompanied by Count Piper and the Prince of Würtemberg, was present *incognito* at the ceremony; while the Swedish soldiers who guarded the church-doors betrayed the source to which Stanislaus owed his Crown.

The Cardinal Primate survived this event only a few days. Stanislaus appointed the Bishop of Lemberg as his successor, while Augustus named the Bishop of Cujavia. As the confederates of Sandomierz had mostly declared in favour of the conqueror, nothing now stood in the way of a treaty of peace and alliance between Sweden and the Polish Republic, which was accordingly signed at Warsaw, November 18th. The principal articles were, the confirmation of the Peace of Oliva; a general amnesty, except for King Augustus and his adherents, whether Saxons or others; no peace was to be made with Augustus till he should have

¹ Lundblad, Th. i. S. 322.

renounced the Polish Crown, and given satisfaction to the Republic, as well as to the King of Sweden, for all their losses by the war; the contracting parties were to pursue the war against the Czar of Muscovy with united forces till they had compelled him to give satisfaction; dissenters were to enjoy the free exercise of their religion; Sapieha, and other nobles of Lithuania, were to be restored to their estates and dignities.¹

After these occurrences, the only hope of Augustus seemed to rest on the friendship of the Czar Peter, with whom he had an interview at Grodno towards the end of the year. Augustus on his way thither was met at Tykocayn by a large body of the most distinguished dignitaries and nobles of Poland, including Lubomirski, the General of the Crown, who came to assure him of their friendship. At Grodno the meetings of the Polish senators were attended both by Peter and Augustus; and a new treaty was concluded between the Czar and the Polish King.² The Czar was called away by some disturbances in Astrachan; but he left 15,000 men, under Ogilvy, at the disposal of Augustus. In spite, however, of Peter's friendly behaviour, Augustus put but little trust in him; and it was precisely at this time that he caused Patkul to be apprehended, who had left his service for that of Peter, and was now Russian envoy to the Saxon Court. Patkul, who was suspected of endeavouring to promote a peace between the Czar and the King of Sweden, was confined in the fortress of Königstein.³

Charles XII. set out in mid-winter with 20,000 men to attack Augustus at Grodno, before which place he arrived towards the end of January. In this ill-considered expedition the Swedish army suffered incredible hardships from cold and hunger, of which, however, if it be any excuse, it must be allowed that Charles himself bore his share. Nor did they meet with the slightest reward for all these hardships. Augustus escaped from Grodno with his cavalry; the Russian infantry shut themselves up in the town, and Charles, who could neither besiege nor assault it, retired to Kamionka, a place at some little distance, where he and his army lay two or three months inactive, enduring the greatest privation and misery.⁴ Augustus had ordered Schulenburg to march with

¹ Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 173.

² Peter's *Tagebuch*, B. i. S. 152; Gordon, *Peter the Great*, vol. i. p. 178.

³ The circumstances of Patkul's arrest are fully related and explained by Hermann, *Gesch. Russlands*, B. iv. S. 197-223.

⁴ Charles's disregard of physical obstacles frequently amounted to a want of

common sense. On marching from Grodno and arriving at the Niemen, it was found that the ice was unsafe. Charles, however, impatient of the slow process of throwing a bridge over the stream, attempted to cross it on foot; when the ice breaking, he was precipitated into the water, and was with difficulty brought out alive! Lundblad, Th. i. S. 345.

the troops cantoned in Silesia to the relief of Grodno; but he was defeated at Frauenstadt (February 13th, 1706) by the Swedish general Rehnskiöld, when the Saxon infantry was almost annihilated. After all, the Russian infantry, under Ogilvy, escaped Charles's vigilance, and made good their retreat in the spring from Grodno into Volhynia, whither he immediately followed them. His reasons for this difficult and dangerous march through almost impassable forests and morasses are said to have been to refresh his troops in Volhynia, and to annihilate the party of Augustus in that province. The Russians had placed themselves out of his reach by crossing the Dnieper; and though the Volhynians acknowledged Stanislaus with their lips, it was evident that their new-born devotion would vanish as soon as Charles's back was turned. The only satisfaction he derived from this laborious expedition was the maintaining his army and replenishing his military chest at the expense of the nobles who adhered to Augustus.

At length, however, after so many campaigns without a plan, Charles hit upon a scheme which might have put an end to his struggle with the Polish King some years earlier. He resolved to march into Saxony and dictate a peace to Augustus in his own capital. Although Charles kept his design concealed even from his own generals till the last moment, yet his movements appear to have raised a suspicion of it in the mind of Augustus, who, with a view to divert him from his enterprise, had formed a junction in Lithuania with 20,000 Russians under Prince Menschikoff. But Charles, without heeding this demonstration, marched straight to his object, and, on September 1st, entered Silesia with about 20,000 men. That province belonged to the Emperor; but as Joseph was then engaged in the War of the Succession with France, it was not to be feared that he would avenge this breach of his neutrality, especially as Augustus had also allowed himself the same licence. On September 16th, the Swedes crossed the Elbe, having established themselves in Saxony without meeting with any serious resistance.

Augustus was filled with dismay at the news of these events. He addressed a humble letter to Charles, beseeching him to spare an unfortunate prince and kinsman; and he sent envoys to the Swedish camp at Altranstädt, near Leipsic, to negotiate a peace, "on moderate and Christian conditions," including the resignation of the Polish Crown. Charles, in reply, dictated the following terms through his minister, Count Piper: that Augustus should renounce the throne of Poland for himself and his descendants,

retaining, however, the title of King, but not of Poland; that he should give up his alliance with Russia, liberate the Prince Sobieski, and deliver up all renegades, especially Patkul. Augustus had no alternative but to comply with these conditions, which form the principal articles of the TREATY OF ALTRANSTADT, signed September 24th, 1706.¹ The Swedes were to be allowed to take up their winter quarters in Saxony, at the expense of the inhabitants. The treaty was to be kept secret till such time as Augustus could disengage himself from the Russians, and was, therefore, represented as a mere armistice. The most disgraceful feature of it was the surrender of Patkul, who had been seized in violation of the law of nations, and in spite of the protest of Prince Galitzin, the Russian minister at the Court of Saxony. The unfortunate Patkul, after being kept a prisoner nearly a year with the Swedish army, was broken on the wheel at Casimir in October, 1707.²

The necessity for keeping this treaty secret from the Russians placed Augustus in an awkward dilemma, and had nearly occasioned the upsetting of the whole peace. Augustus, as we have said, was with the army of Prince Menschikoff; who no sooner heard that Charles had entered Saxony, leaving in Poland only a small force under General Marderfeld, than he resolved to attack this commander; and Augustus, after exhausting every pretext for delay, found himself compelled to join in the attack. As the only way to avert it, he gave Marderfeld secret notice of the peace which had been concluded, and exhorted him to retire with his troops. But the Swedish general, regarding this advertisement as a snare, was only the more eager to give battle. The armies met at Kalisz, October 30th, when Marderfeld, being deserted by the Poles, and having lost a great part of his Swedes, was compelled to surrender himself prisoner with the remainder. Augustus wrote to Charles to excuse this unfortunate occurrence, and, after sending the Russians into winter quarters in Volhynia, he himself hastened into Saxony to pacify the anger of the Swedish King. On December 27th, he had an interview at Leipsic with Charles XII. and his own supplanter, Stanislaus I.; when he affected indifference for a crown that had caused him so much bitterness.

The Peace of Altranstädt marks a pause in the struggle between Charles and Augustus, of which we shall avail ourselves to take a brief retrospect of the progress of the Russians.

¹ Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 204.

² Halem, B. i. S. 232, 238.

After his return from Birsá, the Czar had employed himself in exercising his troops at Novgorod and Pleskow. Towards the end of the year (1701) he again ventured to take the offensive. A Russian corps, under Scheremetoff, invaded Livonia, and defeated the Swedish general Schlippenbach at Erraster, in the district of Dorpat (December 30th), an exploit for which Scheremetoff was made field-marshal. During the winter, Peter employed himself in constructing a fleet on Lake Peipus, with which, in the following summer, he gained some advantages over the Swedes. The Russians were also successful on land; and, in July, Schlippenbach was again defeated at Hummelshof. The Russians abused their success by the barbarous destruction of several Livonian towns and villages. Marienburg was captured in September, an event which was destined to have an important influence on the Czar's future life. Among the prisoners made on this occasion was Catharine, a young peasant girl of Esthonia, and then a servant in the family of Glück, the Provost of Marienburg, who, a few years after, became the wife of the Czar, and ultimately sovereign of Russia with the title of Catharine I. In October Peter himself was present, as a captain of bombardiers, at the taking of Nöteborg, a fortress which lay on an island in the Neva. Peter's desire to possess a fort on the Baltic was gratified the following year by the capture of Nyenschanz. Here, accompanied by his favourite, Menschikoff, he put to sea with thirty small vessels and captured two Swedish barks, which had come to the relief of the place. Peter celebrated this event as the first naval victory gained by the Russians, and decreed to himself and Menschikoff the order of St. Andrew, which he had recently revived. As Nyenschanz, however, did not appear to be well seated for the purposes of trade, he laid the foundations of a new city in an island at the mouth of the Neva. The site of this place still belonged, according to treaties, to the Swedes; yet he already destined it to be the future capital and chief marine station of his empire, and named it, after himself or his patron saint, St. Petersburg. It would be impossible for anything to display in a stronger light Peter's keen view and just appreciation of the situation and prospects of his adversary. Nyenschanz was ordered to be razed, and the population transferred to the new city; for whose defence he caused fortifications to be erected on an island that lies before the mouth of the Neva. This fortress, then known by the name of Kronschlot, has since become the formidable Kronstadt. In the two

¹ See above, p. 503.

following years, some Swedish vessels in vain endeavoured to bombard and capture it. In giving his new capital a German name, it was Peter's intention to remind his subjects that they must adhere to that adoption of foreign, and especially German, manners which he had prescribed for them. In November he celebrated his victories by entering Moscow in triumph; when the inhabitants beheld with astonishment their mighty Czar following on foot, at the head of his company of bombardiers, the magnificent sledges of his generals Scheremeteff, Repnin, and Bruce.

The Russian campaign of 1704 was signalized by the capture of the important towns of Dorpat and Narva. After the taking of the latter place, the Russian soldiers indulged in the most detestable cruelties. The Czar himself cut down some of these offenders; and, throwing his sword, still reeking with blood, on the table of the Burgomaster, exclaimed, "Fear not! this is Russian blood, not German." In the following year, Peter entered Lithuania with 60,000 men. Hence he despatched Scheremeteff into Courland, who was beaten by the Swedish general Löwenhaupt, at Gemauerthof, near Mitau; nevertheless, the Swedes, being so inferior in numbers, were ultimately compelled to evacuate the province. The Czar himself, with 10,000 men, took Mitau. Peter's interview with Augustus at Grodno, towards the end of 1705, has been already mentioned, as well as Charles's pursuit of the Russians in the following spring, and the battle of Kalisz in October. The other operations of the Russians, in 1706, were not of much importance. A Swedish corps of 4,000 men, under General Moydel, penetrated, in July that year, to within a few miles of St. Petersburg; but the Russian conquests in that quarter were now too well established to be easily recovered. It was at Narva, in December, 1706, that the Czar learnt the Peace of Altranstädt, and he immediately set off for Poland, to retain the heads of the Republic, without whose consent or knowledge the peace had been concluded, in the Russian alliance. The Bishop of Cujavia, the primate nominated by Augustus, showed himself a zealous adherent of Russia. He summoned, in January, 1707, an assembly of the Senate at Lemberg, which declared its readiness to adopt the views of the Confederation of Sandomierz; but it was difficult to bring them to any resolution, their only aim seeming to be to sell themselves at the highest price.¹ At length a Diet of the Russian-Polish party, assembled at Lublin at the

¹ Parthenay, *Hist. de Pologne sous Auguste II.* t. iii. p. 181 sqq.

instance of Peter, declared the throne vacant, and issued summonses for an Elective Diet (July 8th).

To parry this blow, Charles set himself in motion in September, the Czar and his forces evacuating Warsaw at his approach, and retiring towards Vilna. As the Swedish army, well refreshed by its quarters in Saxony, and recruited to the number of 44,000 men, was too formidable to be attacked, Peter resolved to harass and wear it out by long marches,¹ a policy which was crowned with entire success. In October the Swedes went into winter quarters in Polish-Prussia, but broke up early in 1708. Charles now marched upon Grodno, and, after seizing that town, proceeded to Minsk, the Russians retiring before him and destroying all the bridges and magazines. Charles passed the Beresina July 10th, a river destined to be fatal, a century later, to a still greater conqueror than himself. A few days after he defeated Scheremeteff, who, with 30,000 Russians, occupied an entrenched camp at Golowstschin, and pushed on to Mohilev, on the Dnieper. It seems to have been the opinion of Charles's own army, as well as of the Russians,² that it was his intention to march on Moscow; and, in fact, after some stay at Mohilev, he crossed the Dnieper, and advanced on the road to Smolensko. But all the difficulties of his undertaking began now to stare him in the face. The villages and houses were abandoned, the crops burnt, the roads fortified, the foraging parties in constant danger from the enemy's cavalry. When Charles at length asked the advice of his quartermaster-general, Gyllenkrook, as to his proceedings, that officer replied by inquiring what plan he had formed for the campaign? To his astonishment and alarm, the King answered, "I have no plan." Gyllenkrook could scarcely believe but that Charles was jesting. Rehnskiöld, however, whom he consulted on the occasion, confirmed this state of things, and assured him that, when he consulted Count Piper as to future operations, he had often been told by that minister, "The Devil, who has hitherto been chief adviser, may, for me, continue to be so."³ In fact Charles's only idea of warfare was to march straight at the enemy; and hitherto this very rashness, supported by the excellent troops which he commanded, had proved successful. But he had now seen the term of his prosperity. The Russian Empire presented a more vast and difficult field of enterprise than Poland; and in Peter he had to

¹ *Tagebuch*, B. i. S. 194.

² Peter, in his *Journal*, describes the march of Charles upon Smolensko only as a feint, to draw away the Russians

from the roads leading to the Ukraine.

Ibid. B. i. S. 213.

³ *Lundblad*, Th. ii. p. 49 sqq.

contend with a much more wary and skilful adversary than Augustus.

Charles now turned to the south, and determined to march to the Ukraine, whither he had been invited by Ivan Mazepa, Hetman of the Cossacks. In the minority of Peter, during the regency of his sister Sophia, Mazepa had been made Hetman by Prince Galitzin (1687), and he had subsequently gained the confidence of the Czar by his exploits against the Turks. But Mazepa, though near eighty years of age, was devoured by an insatiable ambition. He had formed a plan of making himself independent; the victorious progress of the Swedish king seemed to offer him a means to achieve his wish; and he opened communications with Charles through King Stanislaus, with whom he had become acquainted when stationed in Southern Poland. Charles's situation after leaving Mohilev presented only a choice of difficulties; and he was decided by the pressing importunities of Mazepa to make for the Ukraine, as well as by the consideration that a position in that country, while it insured a communication with Poland, would also enable him to annoy the Russian Empire. On September 20th his leading columns took the road for the Ukraine; nor could the representations of his generals induce him to await the arrival of Löwenhaupt, who was bringing a reinforcement of more than 12,000 men, together with large quantities of stores and ammunition. Peter immediately perceived the mistake of the Swedish king. Marching with one of his divisions to Liesna, he totally defeated Löwenhaupt at that place (October 9th), destroyed half his men, and captured his convoy; so that when that general at length succeeded in joining Charles, he brought only about 6,000 or 7,000 men. Peter was not a little elated with his victory. "The battle of Liesna," he says in his Journal, "is the true foundation of all the following successes of Russia, and our first essay in the art of war; it was the mother of the victory of Pultava, gained nine months later."¹ His joy was increased by the news which he soon after received of the miscarriage of an attempt of the Swedish general Lübecker to penetrate, with 12,000 men, from Finland to the Neva, and to destroy St. Petersburg and Kronstadt.²

After a difficult march through the almost impassable forests of Severia, Charles arrived, in November, in the Ukraine. At Gorki, to his exceeding surprise and discouragement, he was met by Mazepa, not as an ally with the 30,000 men whom he had pro-

¹ *Tagebuch*, B. i. S. 219.

² *Ibid.* p. 223.

mised, but as a fugitive and suppliant with some forty or fifty attendants! The Hetman had succeeded in inducing only about 5,000 Cossacks to join his standard, and by these he had been deserted on the third day! Baturin, Mazeppa's capital, was taken by assault by Menschikoff, November 14th. Charles took up his winter quarters at the Cossack town of Gaditche, where he lost several thousands of his men through the intensity of the cold and continual skirmishes. In the spring of 1709 he somewhat recruited his numbers by an alliance with the Saporogue Cossacks,² whom Mazeppa persuaded to join the Swedes. But the army was in a miserable state. The men's clothes were worn out, and sufficed not to protect them from the weather, and many hundreds were without shoes. Mazeppa, as well as Piper, counselled a retreat into Poland; but Charles listened in preference to his general Rhenskiöld and to the Saporogues, who were for besieging Pultava. The Swedes sat down before that place, April 4th. The siege had lasted more than two months with little effect, when an army of 60,000 Russians, under Scheremeteff, Menschikoff, and Bauer, the Czar himself serving as colonel of the guards, was announced to be approaching to its relief. Although Charles's army numbered only about 20,000 men, nearly half of whom were Cossacks and Wallachians, he resolved to give battle. A wound in the foot, received a few days before while reconnoitring, obliged the Swedish King to relinquish the command-in-chief on this important day to Rhenskiöld, although he himself was present on the field in a litter. It is said that the movements of the Swedes were not conducted with the usual firmness; it is certain that they were short of ammunition, and without cannon; and though they made several desperate charges with the bayonet and displayed all their usual valour, they were at length compelled to yield to superior numbers. Of the Swedish army, 9,000 men were left on the field, and about 3,000 were made prisoners, among whom were Rhenskiöld himself, the Prince of Württemberg, Count Piper, and several other distinguished personages.

¹ Hermann, *Gesch. Russlands*, B. iv. S. 242. Some writers, however, represent Mazeppa as really bringing 4,000 or 5,000 men.

² These hordes were so called from their inhabiting the islands beneath the waterfalls (*sa pasogi*, Russ.) of the Dnieper, some 300 miles beyond Kiev. This singular people, a sort of male amazons, who lived chiefly by plunder, professed to regulate the commerce of women, and were

recruited by renegades from all nations. Nevertheless, their numbers seem also to have been kept up in the natural way, though their wives were domiciled in distant places, and were not allowed to be seen in the *Setachj*, or capital of the men; a sort of town or village of mud huts surrounded with an earthen rampart. See Engel, *Gesch. der Kosaken*, S. 43 (*Allg. Weltgeschichte*, Halle, 1796); Lundblad *Th.* ii. S. 95 f.

Charles, whose litter was found on the field shattered to pieces by balls, escaped with difficulty in a carriage. Peter distinguished himself by his activity and courage on this eventful day. Mounted on a little Turkish horse presented to him by the Sultan, he flew through the ranks encouraging his men to do their duty. A bullet pierced his cap; another lodged in his saddle. After the battle, he entertained the captured generals at his table, presented Rhenskiöld with his own sword, and caused that of the Prince of Würtemberg to be restored to him.

The VICTORY OF PULTAVA, achieved July 8th, 1709, may be said to form an epoch in European history as well as in the Swedish and Russian annals. It put an end to the preponderance of Sweden in Northern Europe, occasioned the Grand Alliance to be renewed against her, and ultimately caused her to lose the conquests of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles X. Russia, on the other hand, now began to step forward as a great European Power. The penetrating mind of Peter saw at a glance the importance of his victory, which he commanded to be annually celebrated. In a letter addressed to Admiral Apraxin, at St. Petersburg, only a few hours after the battle, he observes: "Our enemy has encountered the fate of Phaeton, and the foundation stone of our city on the Neva is at length firmly laid." Peter now assumed, at the request of his ministers, generals, officers, and soldiers, the title of Lieutenant-General in the army, and Rear-Admiral at sea.¹ The annihilation of the remnant of the Swedish army was speedily achieved. Of the 54,000 Swedes who had quitted Saxony, and the reinforcement of 16,000 led by Löwenhaupt, only 9,000 remained; the rest had perished in the steppes of Russia. With this small force Charles was disposed again to try his fortune against the enemy; but he was at length persuaded by his generals to cross the Dnieper with an escort of a few hundred men, and accompanied by Mazeppe to seek a refuge at Bender, in Bessarabia, where he was honourably received by the Turkish commandant.² Before he took his departure, he intrusted the command of the army to Löwenhaupt, and he had some hopes that that general would be able to effect his escape into Tartary; but on the approach of a Russian division under Menschikoff, Löwenhaupt surrendered on capitulation (July 11th). Thus was annihilated an army which

¹ *Tagebuch*, B. i. S. 271; Halem, *Leben Peters d. Gr.* B. i. S. 270 (Leipzig, 1803).

² The Porte had made proposals for an alliance to Charles after he had dethroned

Augustus, and he appears to have reckoned on the support of the Khan of Tartary on arriving in the Ukraine. Von Hammer, *Osm. Reich*, B. vii. S. 136 f.

a few months before had been deemed invincible, and Sweden was unable to furnish another.

The misfortunes of Charles XII. occasioned the renewal of the Grand Alliance against Sweden. Frederick IV. of Denmark concluded a treaty with Augustus, at Dresden, June 28th, 1709, by which he engaged to invade Sweden so soon as the Czar should have acceded to the alliance. Thus the false step which Charles had made in marching to the Ukraine was already plain to standers-by before the battle of Pultava. After that event, Lubomirski, with several other Polish nobles, proceeded to Dresden to invite Augustus to resume the Crown of Poland; and that Prince, declaring that the Peace of Altranstädt had been imposed upon him by force, marched to Thorn with an army of 13,000 men; the Confederation of Sandomierz was renewed; Stanislaus, deserted by most of his adherents, retired into Pomerania, and Augustus II. was again generally recognized. The Czar Peter, who had proceeded to Warsaw in September, was congratulated by the Diet on his victory at Pultava, which, they said, had preserved their liberties and restored to them their legitimate King!¹ Early in October Peter had an interview with Augustus at Thorn, when a reconciliation took place between them, and their former alliance was renewed. Augustus renounced the pretensions of the Polish Republic to Livonia, and Peter promised him a corps of 1,000 men. The King of Denmark was received into the alliance, and a league offensive and defensive was concluded at Copenhagen between him and the Czar, October 22nd.² Frederick I. of Prussia entered into defensive treaties with the allies, and promised to aid them so far as might be compatible with the neutrality which he had assumed. In consequence of this renewal of the Grand Alliance, Frederick IV. declared war against Sweden, November 9th, 1708, and in the course of that month a Danish army of 180,000 men landed in Schonen, took Helsingborg, and laid siege to Landskrona and Malmö. But they were defeated by Stenbock, March 10th, 1710, and compelled to re-embark.

In the course of the year (1710), the Emperor Joseph, Great Britain, and the States-General concluded two treaties (March and August³) guaranteeing the neutrality of all the States of the Empire, including the Swedish and Danish; to the latter of which treaties the King of Prussia and several other German princes acceded. But Charles XII. having protested from his

¹ *Tagebuch* (Bacmeister, B. i. S. 278).

² *Ibid.* S. 281.

³ Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 249 and 254.

retirement at Bender against these treaties, and declared that he should regard the parties to them as his enemies, the northern allies considered themselves absolved from their obligation of neutrality towards his German possessions; and in August, 1711, a combined army of Saxons, Poles, and Russians crossed the Oder, occupied Anclam and Greifswald, and blockaded Stralsund. In the following year siege was laid to Stettin, while the Danes, having crossed the Elbe, took Stade and occupied the duchies of Bremen and Verden. On the other side, the Swedish General Stenbock entered Mecklenburg, occupied Rostock, November 14th, and on the 20th defeated the King of Denmark in person at Gadëbusch. Hence he penetrated into Holstein and burnt Altona (January 9th, 1713); a disgraceful act, which he attempted to justify on the plea of retaliation. But after several reverses, he was compelled by the allies to surrender with his whole army (May 16th).¹

The Swedish possessions in Germany being deprived of all defence by this event, the Swedish ministers, in the hope of saving some portion of them, proposed a sequestration into the hands of the King of Prussia. The throne of that kingdom was now occupied by Frederick William I., Frederick I. having died February 25th, 1713. Frederick William was not averse to a proposal which might ultimately place many important towns in his hands without the risk or expense of fighting for them; and the northern allies on their side were willing to conciliate a sovereign whose enmity might be dangerous. By the Convention of Schwedt,² October 6th, 1713, Prince Menschikoff agreed, on the part of the northern allies, that Stettin, Demmin, Anclam, Wolgast, and other places of Swedish Pomerania should be placed in the hands of the King of Prussia, and should be occupied, till a peace, by garrisons composed partly of his soldiers and partly of those belonging to the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp.

We must now return to the affairs of the Czar, and of his adversary Charles XII. After the capitulation of Löwenhaupt and the remains of the Swedish army, the Russian general Scheremeteff was despatched with 40,000 men into Livonia to secure that important province and the coast of the Baltic. Peter himself, after his interview with Augustus II. at Thorn, already related, proceeded, in November, to Riga, and opened the siege of that place by firing three bombs with his own hand. Hence he

¹ By the Capitulation of Oldenswörth, Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 388.

² *Ibid.* p. 407.

hastened to the Neva to inspect the progress of his new city, for the adornment of which his nobles were ordered to construct palaces of stone. Among other improvements a canal was planned between Lake Ladoga and the Volga, by which a water communication was established with the Caspian Sea. Towards the close of the year Peter entered Moscow with a triumphal procession, in which figured the captured Swedes. In 1710 the conquest of Livonia and Carelia was completed.

Meanwhile Charles XII. had been straining every nerve to incite the Porte to hostilities against Russia; in which he was assisted by his friend Count Poniatowski, by the Khan of Tartary, and by the French ambassador at Constantinople. Their efforts at length succeeded. On November 21st, 1710, the Sultan Achmet III. declared war against the Czar, and, according to Turkish custom, imprisoned Tolstoy, the Russian ambassador, in the Seven Towers. Peter, relying on the negotiations which he had entered into with the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, despatched a Russian division, under Scheremeteff, to the Pruth; and he himself set off in the same direction in the spring of 1711. Demetrius Cantemir, the Hospodar of Moldavia, a prince of Greek origin, who had engaged to assist the Czar, in his war with the Turks, on condition that Peter should aid him in rendering his sovereignty hereditary, induced the Russians to cross the Pruth by representing that they would be able to seize some considerable Turkish magazines. But Peter, when he had crossed the river, found that he had been completely deceived. The Moldavians were not inclined to rise, and the want of forage and other necessaries soon compelled the Czar to retreat. But, he had not proceeded far when he was overtaken and hemmed in by the Turkish army, which was infinitely more numerous than his own, in a spot between the Pruth and a morass. In this situation, to retreat or to advance was equally impossible; yet the want of provisions allowed him not to remain stationary. Despair now seized the heart of Peter. A single hour might upset all those plans and labours for the benefit of his country which had occupied his whole life; and in his distress and agitation, which he cared not to betray, he shut himself up in his tent, and gave strict orders that nobody should be admitted to his presence.

In these circumstances a council of the principal Russian officers determined that the only chance of escape was to come to terms with the Grand Vizier, Mohammed Baltadschi, who commanded the Turkish army. None, however, was bold enough to

communicate his decision to the Czar, except Catharine his wife. Catharine, who, before her capture at Marienburg, had been betrothed to a Swedish corporal, had subsequently been the mistress of Scheremeteff and Menschikoff. In this last capacity she attracted the notice and love of Peter, who secretly married her in 1707, and before setting out on this expedition against the Turks, in which she accompanied him, he had publicly proclaimed her his lawful consort. Catharine, besides a handsome person, had been endowed by nature with an excellent understanding and the most engaging manners. Although so ignorant that she could not even read or write, she had great skill in penetrating the characters of those with whom she was connected, and of adapting herself to their views and dispositions. She had gained complete empire over Peter by entering warmly into all his plans, and while seeming to humour him in all his caprices, she entirely governed him. She alone undertook an office which might have cost another his life; she entered Peter's tent, soothed him by her caresses, and persuaded him to send a messenger to the Vizier with offers of peace. She obtained from the principal officers what money they had to make up the customary present on such occasions,¹ to which she added her own jewels. Fortunately for the Russians, Mohammed Báltadschi was anything but a hero. An intimation on the part of the Czar, supported by a slight demonstration in the Russian camp, that, if his proposals were not accepted, he meant to force his way through at the point of the bayonet, induced the Vizier to come to terms. In this moment of awful suspense, Peter displayed the great qualities which he really possessed, though they were sometimes obscured by the peculiarities of his temperament. He addressed a letter to his Senate, in which he directed them that, in the event of his being made a prisoner, they should no longer regard him as their sovereign nor obey any instructions they might receive in his name, even though signed with his own hand; while, if he should be killed, they were immediately to elect another Czar.² The Vizier, however, consented to receive the Russian plenipotentiaries, and on July 21st was signed the Capitulation of the Pruth.³ By this

¹ Some authors represent the sum collected as large enough to bribe the Grand Vizier to betray his duty and grant a peace. It seems, however, more probable that it represented only the usual gift on such occasions, according to Eastern custom. See Zinkeisen, *Gesch. des osm. Reichs*, B. v. S. 424. See for these events De la Motraye, *Voyages*, t. i. ch. 19, t. ii.

ch. 1 and 2; Fabrice, *Anecdotes du Séjour du Roi de Suède à Bender*; Pogatowski, *Remarques*, &c.

² De la Motraye, t. ii. p. 19; Ståhlin, *Anecdotes orig. de Pierre le Grand*, p. 45; (Strasbourg, 1787).

³ The terms of this treaty, which is also called the Capitulation of Hoesta-Guesty, will be found in De la Motraye, t. ii. p. 20.

Convention the Czar agreed to restore Azov to the Porte, to destroy the fortifications of Taganrog, Kamenska, and Samara, to recall his army from Poland, and to forbear from all interference in the affairs of the Cossacks subject to the Khan of Tartary. No stipulation was made respecting the King of Sweden, except that he should be permitted to return unmolested to his own dominions.

When the Russian army was first surrounded in a situation from which it seemed impossible to escape, Poniatowski, who had accompanied the Grand Vizier, despatched a messenger in all haste to Charles XII. at Bender, begging him to come without delay and behold the consummation of his adversary's ruin. Charles instantly obeyed the summons, but, to his unspeakable mortification and rage, arrived only in time to see in the distance the last retreating ranks of the Russian rear-guard. Loud and bitter were the reproaches which Charles addressed to Baltadschi for his conduct. He besought the Vizier to lend him 20,000 or 30,000 men, wherewith he promised to bring back the Czar and his whole army prisoners; but Baltadschi, with a mortifying apathy, pleaded the faith of treaties, and Charles, rushing from the Vizier's tent with a loud and contemptuous laugh, mounted his horse, and rode back at full gallop to Bender. Here he and Poniatowski, in conjunction with the Khan of Tartary, employed themselves in effecting the ruin of the Grand Vizier. He was accused of having taken bribes to grant the peace; and though the news of the Capitulation had at first been received at Constantinople with every demonstration of joy, these accusations, supported by the enemies of Baltadschi in the Seraglio, procured his banishment to Lemnos, where he died the following year.

The Sultan now endeavoured to hasten the departure of the King of Sweden from his dominions, who was both a troublesome and an expensive guest. But Charles was not disposed to quit except on the most exorbitant terms. He demanded a payment of 600,000 dollars and an escort of 30,000 men, while the Porte was inclined to grant only 6,000 men and no money. After a forbearance of many months, the Sultan at length prepared to use force. Charles's daily allowance was withdrawn, and the Janissaries were commanded to seize his person, dead or alive. Charles betrayed on this occasion his characteristic obstinacy and recklessness. Although surrounded by a force which left no hope of successful resistance, he resolved, with a few hundred followers,

to defend to the last extremity his little camp at Varnitza,¹ which he had fortified with a barricade composed of chairs, tables, casks, bedding, and whatever came to hand; and it was not till after a desperate hand-to-hand conflict, in which he was more than once wounded, that he was at length secured (February, 1713), Charles was now carried to Adrianople, and thence to Demotica, where a residence was assigned to him, but with a very reduced allowance. Shortly after his departure from Bender, King Stanislaus arrived at that place with the view, it is said, of mediating a peace between Charles and Augustus by resigning the crown of Poland. But Charles would not hear of such an arrangement. He still entertained the hope that the Porte might be induced to take up his cause as well as that of Stanislaus. But these expectations were frustrated by a treaty concluded in April, 1714, between the Porte and Augustus II., by which the Peace of Carlowitz was confirmed.² Augustus undertook that Russian troops should no longer be suffered in Poland, while, on the other hand the Pasha of Bender received orders to dismiss from that place all Polish "malcontents." Stanislaus, who seemed to be tacitly included in this designation, set off in the autumn for the King of Sweden's duchy of Deux-Ponts, with the hope of finding in a private station that quiet and contentment which had been denied to him during his insecure and stormy reign.

About the same time, Charles XII., at length abandoning all hope of inducing the Porte to take up his cause against the Czar, was persuaded by General Lieven to return to his kingdom, or rather to his army in the north of Germany. The Emperor promised him a safe passage through his dominions; the Sultan provided him with an escort to the frontier; but Charles, impatient of the slow progress of the Turks, set off with only two companions from the Wallachian town of Pitescht, and crossing the Hungarian frontier at the Rothenthurm Pass, proceeded through Hermannstadt, Buda, Vienna, Ratisbon, Hanau, Cassel, Güstrow, and Tribsees, to Stralsund. This extraordinary journey, which was lengthened by a considerable *détour*, and must have been at least 1,100 miles in length, was performed for the most part on horseback, and was accomplished in seventæch days.³

¹ A village within a mile or two of Bender. This extraordinary fight, which lasted seven hours, is known by the name of the *Kalabalike*. That Charles should have escaped with his life can only be accounted for by the circumstance that the Janissaries endeavoured to capture

him alive. Lundblad, Th. ii. Kap. xviii.

² Zinkeisen, B. v. S. 454 f.

³ Charles left Pitescht on November 5th, and arrived at Stralsund on the 21st. See a detailed account of the journey in Lundblad, Th. ii. S. 422, Anm. His companion, Captain Dürang, was almost

One of the first steps of Charles, after his arrival in the North, was to demand from the King of Prussia the restitution of the places which he held in Pomerania; and as Frederick William demurred to comply with this demand, Charles proceeded to occupy the Isle of Usedom with 3,000 Swedes (April, 1715). This was the signal for war. The King of Prussia immediately caused the troops of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, which, along with the Prussians, formed the garrisons of Stettin and Wollin, to be disarmed; and he despatched 20,000 of his troops to join the Danes and Saxons in the siege of Stralsund. Both he and the King of Denmark appeared in person before that place in the summer; and although Stralsund was defended and victualled on the sea side by the Swedish fleet, and on the land side was protected by an entrenched camp of 12,000 men, animated by the presence of their warlike King, yet the operations of the allies were gradually successful. Charles, foreseeing the fall of Stralsund to be inevitable, endeavoured to avert it by offers of peace; and on their rejection, he embarked for Sweden. In the same year the Czar appeared with a large fleet on the coasts of Gothland, while Prince Golitzyn marched to the Gulf of Bothnia and threatened the northern boundaries of Sweden. The allies were assisted in the siege of Wismar by George I., King of England and Elector of Hanover, who had entered into an alliance with the King of Denmark, and obtained from him, for a large sum of money, the Duchies of Bremen and Verden. Wismar, the last place held by the Swedes in Germany, surrendered April 19th, 1716.

After this event the war languished, and a mutual jealousy began to sow dissension among the allies. The Czar perceived that it would not be advantageous for him that Denmark should conquer Sweden, nor that Augustus should establish absolute monarchy in Poland; but rather that the two Scandinavian kingdoms should remain in a state of mutual weakness, and that the Poles, under the name of liberty, should be plunged in perpetual anarchy. These political motives were strengthened by his disgust at the conduct of the allies after the taking of Wismar. He had hoped to obtain that city for his nephew-in-law, the Duke of Mecklenburg; but after its capture, the allied army had forcibly prevented a Russian corps from entering it and

killed with fatigue, and the King himself had got a bad sore in the leg, not having taken off his boots for eight days. The royal suite, left behind at Pitescht, did

not arrive at Stralsund till the summer of 1715. Cf. De la Motraye, t. ii. ch. 9; Fabrice, p. 337 sq.

forming part of the garrison: Of the other allies, the King of Prussia was satisfied with having obtained possession of Stettin and the mouth of the Oder, and all the country between that river and the Peene, which had been relinquished to him by the allies after the capture of Stralsund; while Augustus II. was precluded from taking any further part in the war by the events which had taken place in Poland. Although all the differences between the Polish Republic and the Ottoman Porte had been arranged in April, 1714, by the treaty already mentioned, the Saxon troops had been still retained in Poland, to the great jealousy of the Polish nobles. In the autumn of 1715 two Confederations were formed, one by the army of the Crown at Gorzyce, the other by the troops of Little Poland at Tarnogrod, to expel the Saxons; and hostilities broke out, which were at length pacified by the mediation of the Czar. By a perpetual peace proclaimed at Warsaw, November 3rd, 1716, Augustus engaged to dismiss all his troops from Poland, except 1,200 guards; never to declare war without consulting the Diet, nor to absent himself from Poland more than three months in the year.¹ These conditions established him on the throne, but precluded him from taking any part in the Northern war.

Charles XII., however, still counted among his adversaries the Czar, the King of Denmark, George I. of England, as Elector of Hanover, and the Dutch. But the Czar, as we have before remarked, was not inclined to prosecute the war with any vigour. He had already wrested from Sweden nearly all that he could expect or desire. In 1713 almost all Finland had been reduced under his dominion, he himself commanding the van of the fleet under Apraxin. His cares were henceforth directed chiefly to the preservation of his conquests and to the creation of a powerful navy, by purchasing ships in England and Holland, and building some at St. Petersburg—an operation which he often personally superintended. On the occasion of a launch in that city in May, 1714, he addressed a remarkable speech to the spectators, in which he adverted with a justifiable pride to the success of his labours. “Who among you, my brethren,” he said, “would have dreamt, thirty years ago, that you would have been ship-building here with me on the Baltic? or that, in the garb of Germans, we should have fixed our dwellings in lands subdued by our valour and perseverance, should have provided ourselves with so many brave and victorious soldiers and sailors, so many

¹ Koch et Schöll, *Hist. abr. des Traites*, t. xiii. p. 260.

skilful mechanics, born or educated in foreign countries, and have acquired the esteem of all princes and peoples? The arts and sciences, taking their rise in Greece and Italy, have spread themselves over Germany and Poland. Our turn will come next, and you will then support me in my endeavours at improvement, not from blind obedience, but of your own free will. I may compare the progress of the sciences to the circulation of the blood. I suspect that they will at some period leave their abode in England, France, and Germany, to dwell some centuries among us, thence to return to Greece, their proper dwelling. Meanwhile, I exhort you to remember the precept, 'Pray and work;' for be assured that even perhaps during our own lives we may put to shame other civilized nations, and raise the fame of our country to its highest point."¹

While such were Peter's feelings with regard to the war, the attempt on the part of one of the King of Sweden's ministers to detach him from his allies proved no difficult task. Baron Görtz, a man of large views and enterprising character, not content with the circumscribed sphere of action which the service of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp afforded to his abilities, resolved to enter that of Charles XII., and to retrieve, if he could, the desperate fortunes of that sovereign and his kingdom. In the spring of 1716 Görtz proceeded to Holland, on the ostensible mission of procuring money for Charles. His principal object, however, was to conciliate the Czar through Prince Kurakin, the Russian minister at the Hague; and though no formal alliance was yet concluded, or even negotiated, between Charles and Peter, and though the Czar continued to act ostensibly with his former allies, yet his conduct showed that the efforts of Görtz had not been without success. Charles XII. having invaded Norway in the spring of 1716 and occupied Christianja, the capital, the Czar and the King of Denmark agreed to make a diversion by a descent in Schonen, in which they were to be supported by an English and a Dutch squadron. The Czar assumed the command of the combined fleet, which numbered more than eighty vessels of war; but when everything seemed ready for the enterprise, Peter, to the surprise and disappointment of the Danish King, suddenly declared that the season was too far advanced to attempt such an operation (September). It is most probable that he had never seriously thought of undertaking it, and that his only objects had been to throw

¹ Weber, *Das veränderte Russland*, S. 11.

dust into the eyes of his allies, and to involve the King of Denmark in a useless expenditure. His behaviour was so equivocal that he was even suspected of a design to surprise Copenhagen. Instead of 20,000 Russian troops he had introduced double that number into Zealand; and they behaved with such insolence that Frederick was compelled to demand their withdrawal. Peter put them into winter quarters in Mecklenburg, which they continued to occupy in spite of the remonstrances of the Emperor and the Elector of Hanover. Peter is said to have conceived a design of settling himself at this extremity of the Baltic, and becoming an unwelcome member of the German body.

The views of the Czar were manifested by his subsequent policy. Gortz, after the negotiations of the Hague already mentioned, proceeded to France, where he intrigued with the Pretender, promised to help him to the British throne, and endeavoured to obtain the assistance of the Regent Orleans in his schemes. Peter, who himself visited Holland and France in 1717, likewise used his influence with the Regent to further these views, but without avail, as that Prince was unwilling to endanger his alliance with England. Among other things it was proposed that Charles XII., who had conceived a mortal hatred against George, should invade England with 12,000 men. One fruit, however, of the Czar's journey to Paris was the Treaty of Amsterdam, which may be said to have introduced Russia into the general European system. It was the design of Peter to occupy the place of Sweden, which he had humbled, as the leading Power of the North, and to succeed her in the French alliance. Prussia also was induced to become a party to this treaty. Frederick William I. had indeed already formed an alliance with France by a secret treaty, September 4th, 1716, by which the possession of Stettin and Pomerania as far as the Peene had been assured to him, whilst he, on his side, guaranteed the Treaties of Utrecht and Baden, and promised to use his endeavours to prevent the Empire from declaring war against France.¹ The chief articles of the Treaty of Amsterdam, concluded between France, Russia, and Prussia, August 4th, 1717, were that the Czar and the King of Prussia should accept the mediation of France to restore peace between them and Sweden, and France promised not to renew the treaty of subsidies with Sweden which expired in 1718.² This abandonment of the

¹ Sknael, *Gesch. der Preuss. Staats*, B. III S. 283.

² Dumont, t. VIII. pt. 1. p. 490. In consequence of this treaty, France for the

Swedish alliance by France was the Czar's principal object. On the other hand, the Regent persuaded him to withdraw his troops from Mecklenburg, and to suspend his designs upon the Empire.

The intrigues of Görtz having come to the ears of the English Government, he had been apprehended at Arnheim in February, 1717, and a like fate had befallen Gyllenborg, the Swedish ambassador in London. After a few months' detention, however, they were set at liberty, and Peter, on returning into Holland after his visit to France, had an interview with Görtz at Loo. The Swedish minister having engaged to bring about in three months, at the expense of Denmark and Great Britain, a peace that should be agreeable to the Czar, Peter agreed to abstain from all hostilities against Sweden. The schemes of Görtz had been aided by the Spanish minister Alberoni. Spain was now at open variance with Great Britain and the other members of the Quadruple Alliance.¹ She had seized Sardinia, and was contemplating a descent on Sicily; and, in support of this movement, Alberoni wished to pacify and unite Russia and Sweden, to direct their joint arms with those of Spain against Great Britain, and effect the dethronement of George I. and the restoration of the Pretender.² On his return to Sweden, Görtz procured the consent of Charles XII. to the negotiation of a peace with Russia; for which purpose a Congress was held in May, 1718, at Lofoe, one of the Aland Islands, under the mediation of a Spanish agent. The preliminaries of a treaty were here arranged, of which the following is a general outline. Ingria, part of Carelia, Esthonia, and Livonia, were to be ceded to the Czar, he undertaking to help Charles to compensate himself for these losses in other ways. He engaged to depose Augustus II. and reinstate Stanislaus on the Polish throne; to procure for the King of Prussia, in conjunction with Sweden, an equivalent for the restoration of Stettin and its territory, but at the expense of the Polish dominions in West Prussia; to assist Charles in conquering Norway, as well as in an attack upon Germany; and especially he promised to march with all his troops against the King of England as Elector of Hanover, and to compel him to restore to Sweden the Duchies of Bremen and Verden; or, as an alternative, Peter would persuade the Duke of Mecklenburg to abandon his dominions to Charles, that

first time established regular diplomatic relations with Russia, to which she sent an ambassador and consul.

¹ See below, chap. xlv.

² St. Philippe, ap. Coxe, *History of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon*, vol. ii. p. 328.

Sovereign being compensated by some part of the Polish territories.¹

Although these preliminaries had not been ratified in a formal treaty, Charles XII. reckoned so securely on a peace, that, with the view of compensating himself for his sacrifices and losses by the conquest of Norway, he directed all his available forces towards that kingdom, leaving his capital almost denuded of troops. A division, under Armfeldt, was directed to invade the northern part of Norway; whilst Charles himself, with the main body, entered the south, and in November laid siege to Frederikshald. Before this place, in the cold winter nights of that northern climate, Charles often slept in the open air on a plank or a bundle of straw, covered only with his cloak. In inspecting the progress of the trenches he frequently exposed his person to the enemy's fire, and in an assault of one of the forts he led the storming column in person, and planted the ladder with his own hand. But he at length paid the penalty of his rashness. On the night of December 11th he was shot, while in the trenches, with a musket-ball through the head. Charles, at the time of his death, was thirty-six years of age.

After this event, the Swedish commanders immediately resolved to evacuate Norway. The retreat of Armfeldt, in January, 1719, over the mountains of the frontier, was most disastrous; his whole force except about 1,500 men perished of cold, and he himself returned home mutilated by the frost. Charles Frederick, the young Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, then eighteen years of age, was serving in the division before Frederikshald; and, being the rightful heir of the Swedish Crown, as the son of Charles's eldest sister, the generals in command had, after the death of that monarch, testified a disposition to acknowledge him as their sovereign. But the youthful prince wanted resolution to seize the occasion, and the Swedish Crown was soon snatched from his grasp. The revolution which took place at Stockholm had been long prepared, but was so quickly developed after Charles's death as to lead to a suspicion² that it was connected with a foreknowledge of that event. The Senate kept the fatal occurrence secret till it had taken measures to secure the government; when, passing over the rightful heir, they named Ulrica Eleonora, Charles's second sister, as their queen. Ulrica was married to Frederick,

¹ Koch et Schöll, t. xiii. p. 277 sqq.; Lundblad, Th. ii. S. 521; Bacmeister, B. iii. Beylage xvi.; Schmauss, *Einführung*, &c. B. ii. S. 384 ff.

² On the grounds for suspecting that Charles met his death from the hand of an assassin, see Lundblad, *Gesch. Karl des XII.* Th. ii. S. 563 ff.

hereditary Prince of Hesse Cassel, who had likewise been serving under the late King in Norway, and after his death had assumed the command of the army. One of the first steps of the Government was to arrest Baron Görtz. That minister was arraigned, before an illegally constituted tribunal, for having intended to procure the crown for the Duke of Holstein, and to introduce the Russians into the kingdom; for having depreciated the currency, and other things. Even if these charges were true, Görtz had acted with the consent, or by the order of the late King; but he was sentenced to death against all forms of law and justice, and executed March 13th, 1719. An assembly of the States was summoned in February, and completely altered the constitution. Sweden was declared an elective kingdom, and the government was vested in a council of twenty-four members, divided into eight colleges, who were invested with a power so absolute that their elected queen was reduced to a mere shadow. In short, the ancient oligarchy was restored, and Sweden became the prey of a few noble families.

The foreign policy of the new Government was precisely the reverse of that of Görtz. The conferences with the Russian ministers were indeed continued till September, 1719, but they were then broken off, and Sweden approached the other Powers from which Russia had separated herself. In November a treaty was signed at Stockholm between Sweden and Great Britain, by which the Duchies of Bremen and Verden were ceded to George I. in consideration of a payment of one million rix-dollars.¹ By another treaty in January, 1720, George engaged to support Sweden against Denmark and Russia, and to pay a yearly subsidy of 300,000 dollars during the war.² About the same time an armistice was concluded with Poland till a definitive treaty should be arranged on the basis of the Peace of Oliva. Augustus was to be recognized as King of Poland; but Stanislaus was to retain the royal title during his life, and to receive from Augustus a million rix-dollars. Both parties were to unite to check the preponderance of the Czar, whose troops excited great discontent and suspicion by their continued presence in Poland. On February 1st a peace was concluded with Prussia under the mediation of France and Great Britain. The principal articles of this treaty were that Sweden ceded to Prussia, Stettin, the Islands of Wollin and Usedom, and all the tract between the Oder and Peene, together with the towns of Damm and Golnow beyond the Oder. The King of

¹ Dumont, t. viii. pt. ii. p. 15.

² *Ibid.* p. 18.

Prussia, on his side, engaged not to assist the Czar, and to pay two million rix-dollars to the Queen of Sweden.¹

The terms of a peace between Sweden and Denmark were more difficult of arrangement. Frederick IV. had conquered Stralsund, the Isle of Rügen, part of Pomerania, &c., and the example of Hanover and Prussia seemed to justify his pretensions to retain what he had gained. The allies, however, did not deem it advisable that the Swedes should be entirely expelled from Germany; and Denmark, as the weakest among them, was compelled to abandon her claims. By the Treaty of Stockholm, June 12th, 1720, the King of Denmark restored to Sweden, Wismar, Stralsund, Rügen, and all that he held in Pomerania; Sweden paying 600,000 rix-dollars and renouncing the freedom of the Sound. Thus the only territorial acquisition which Denmark made by the war was the greater part of the Duchy of Schleswick, the possession of which was guaranteed to her by England and France.²

Sweden and Russia were now the only Powers which remained at war. During the years 1719, 1720, and 1721, the Russians gained many advantages both by sea and land, and committed the most frightful devastations on the Swedish coasts.³ These calamities, as well as the fear of being deprived by the Czar of his new kingdom, induced Frederick I., to whom, with the consent of the States, the Swedish Crown had been transferred by his consort, Ulrica Eleonora, in the spring of 1720, to use every endeavour to procure a peace with Russia. As a means of intimidation, the Czar had pretended to adopt the cause of the young Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, with whom he had an interview at Riga in March, 1721. That prince was seeking to assure himself of the Czar's protection by a marriage with his daughter, Anna Petrowna. At length, through the mediation of France, conferences were opened in May, 1721, and the PEACE OF NYSTAD signed, September 10th. Peter would not relax any of the conditions agreed upon with Görtz. The only portion of his conquests that he relinquished was Finland, with the exception of a part of Carelia; but as, by his treaty with Augustus II., at the beginning of the war, he had promised to restore Livonia to Poland if he conquered it, he paid the Crown of Sweden two million dollars in order to evade this engagement by alleging that he had pur-

¹ Dumont, t. viii. pt. ii. p. 21.

² Dumont, *ibid.* p. 29; Allen, *Gesch. des Königreichs Dänemark*, S. 308 (Kiel, 1846). Frederick IV. obtained the whole

of Schleswick except the territories belonging to the House of Glücksburg.

³ For these events see Meuser, B. ii. S. 172 ff.

chased that province. The Czar engaged not to interfere in the domestic affairs of Sweden.¹

was at length terminated the Great Northern War, which had lasted upwards of twenty years. In a letter to Dolgoruki, his ambassador at Paris, written a few days after the conclusion of the Treaty of Nystäd, Peter observes: "Apprenticeships commonly end in seven years; ours has lasted thrice as long; but, thank God, it is at last brought to the desired termination, as you will perceive from the copy of the treaty."² The apprenticeship was, indeed, long and arduous, but the results were in proportion. Having to contend with a State formidable both by sea and land, Peter found it necessary to remodel his army, and to create a navy; and it was from the Swedes themselves, then the most warlike nation of Europe, that he at length learnt how to beat them—a fact which he was always ready to acknowledge. His triple apprenticeship could not have been spent in a better school; but it required qualities like his to reap the full advantage of it: a mind acute and large enough to perceive his own deficiencies and those of his people; modest enough to learn how to remedy them; energetic enough to submit to any privations and dangers for that purpose. After this peace, the Senate and Synod conferred upon him the title of "Emperor of All the Russias;" and, on his return to St. Petersburg in October, he was saluted by his nobles and people as "the Father of his country, PETER THE GREAT." Never, perhaps, have these titles been more fairly earned. Peter had risen, not by right of birth, but by his own abilities and perseverance, from the voluntary condition of a mechanic and the rank of a subaltern to be one of the first potentates of Europe.

¹ Dumont, t. viii. pt. ii. p. 36.

² Bergmann, *Peter der Grosse*, Th. v. S. 89.

END OF VOL. III.

